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Abstract
This thesis investigates whether the European Union (EU) achieves a fair balance between the 
protection o f seals and the rights o f indigenous peoples to engage in their traditional economic 
activities. It does this in the context o f the EU legislation on trade in seal products, which imposes a 
sale and import ban on products from commercial seal hunts, but exempts indigenous peoples from 
its scope. Despite this exemption, Inuit of Canada have been unable to access the EU market under 
the legislation. In this thesis, it is argued that the balance is fair, if  the EU legislation recognises and 
respects the rights under the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples; does 
not impose a disproportionate restriction on the right o f indigenous peoples to engage in the 
commercial exploitation o f seal products; is consistent with the EU’s obligations under international 
trade agreements in that it does not discriminate against products o f Inuit origin from Canada as 
opposed to those from Greenland; and results in improved animal welfare outside the EU. In order to 
assess what the concept o f ‘fair balance’ may mean in the context o f the EU seal products legislation, 
this thesis examines three specific legal tests balancing human rights and societal interests. The thesis 
concludes that despite the EU’s arguments to contrary, the balance is unfair due to the de facto 
discrimination against products originating Inuit regions o f Canada.
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Chapter-1^ Introduction
1.1 Introduction
This thesis focuses on a conflict between the rights o f Inuit o f Canada and Greenland, and 
the European Union’s (EU) policy on seal products, which imposes restrictions on the sale and 
import o f all products originating from all species o f pinnipeds* into the EU, The family of 
pinnipeds consists of true seals {Phocidae), walrus (Odobenidae) and sea lions and fur seals 
iPtariidae). Although the EU legislation applies to all products containing any species of 
pinnipeds, it uses the term ‘seal’ to denote all these species.^ In effect, the legislation puts all 34 
species o f seals, fur seals, sea lions and walrus together in a single group regardless o f their 
conservation status. For clarity, in this thesis, the term ‘seal’ is understood to encompass all true 
seals {Phocidae)?
The EU legislation consists o f two regulations: Regulation 1007/2009 on trade in seal 
products (the Basic Regulation),'* and Regulation 737/2010 implementing it (the Implementing 
Regulation)^ (collectively referred to as the ‘EU legislation’). The Preamble to the Basic Regulation 
reveals that it was adopted to eliminate obstacles to the functioning o f the internal market by 
harmonising national bans on seal products enacted by several Member States.^ The Preamble also 
reveals why such obstacles arose:
* There are 34 species o f  pinnipeds. See Thomas A Jefferson, Stephen Leatherwood and M arc A W ebber, 
FAO Species Identification Guide: Marine Mammals o f the World (UNEP and FAO 1993) para 4.1.
 ^Regulation (EC) N o 1007/2009 o f  the European Parliam ent and o f  the Council o f  16 September 2009 on 
trade in seal products [2009] OJ L286/36, art 2(1): “ seal’ means specimens o f  all species o f  pinnipeds 
{Phocidae, Otariidae and Odobenidaey.
 ^ A ll the six species o f  seals (grey seal, harp seal, ringed seal, harbour seal, hooded seal and bearded seal) 
found in Canadian and Greenland’s waters are true seals.
'*n2.
 ^ Commission Regulation (EU) N o 737/2010 o f  10 August 2010 laying down detailed rules for the 
implementation o f  regulation No 1007/2009 [2010] O JL 216/1.
 ^ 1007/2009, preamble, recital 21.
In response to concerns o f citizens and consumers about the animal welfare aspects 
o f the killing and skinning o f seals and the possible presence on the market of 
products obtained from animals killed and skinned in a way that causes pain, 
distress, fear and other forms o f suffering, several Member States have adopted or 
intend to adopt legislation regulating trade in seal products by prohibiting the 
import and production o f such products^
It further states that the EU institutions wanted to ensure that the EU legislation would not 
adversely affect ‘[t]he fundamental economic and social interests o f Inuit communities’ who have 
traditionally hunted seals.^ The Regulation does this by acknowledging that seal ‘hunt is an integral 
part o f the culture and identity o f the members o f the Inuit society, and as such is recognised by the 
United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples’  ^ (UNDRIP).*® Consequently, 
Article 3(1) o f the Basic Regulation exempts products ‘from hunts traditionally conducted by Inuit 
and other indigenous communities and contribute to their subsistence’.
The next section introduces the terminology which is relevant for the purposes o f this
thesis.
1.2 The terminology used in this thesis
In order to discuss the research question o f this thesis, certain terminology used throughout 
this thesis may need clarification. Therefore, this introductory chapter discusses the terms ‘Inuit’, 
‘indigenous peoples’ and ‘subsistence’. The EU seal products legislation sparked the Government 
o f Greenland to issue a statement that it was ‘very concerned about the increasing numbers o f bans 
and especially on the interest from foreign countries to define “Inuit”, “subsistence” and 
“traditional hunting’” .** According to the government, the EU should abide ‘by definitions already
 ^Regulation 1007/2009, preamble, recital 5.
® ibid recital 14.
Mbid
*® A/RES/61/295.
'* Government o f  Greenland, ‘Management and Utilization o f  Seals in G reenland’ (April 2012) (W hite Paper) 
36.
adopted by the UN’.*^  Consequently, in its opinion, any terms that have not yet been defined, should 
be defined in the relevant fora with the participation o f relevant indigenous peoples and 
governments. Whilst the Basic Regulation contains a definition of the term Tnuit’, the 
Implementing Regulation defines the term ‘indigenous communities’. It appears that the EU uses 
the definitions adopted by the International Labour Organisation (ILO), a specialised agency of the 
United Nations (UN), and the Inuit Circumpolar Council (ICC), which has official status as a non­
governmental organisation (NGO) within the UN system and is a permanent member o f the Arctic 
Council.*^ However, since the term ‘subsistence’ is not defined by either o f these bodies, guidance 
on how this term should be defined has been found elsewhere.*'*
1.2.1 Who are the ‘indigenous peoples’ under international law?
Article 2(1) of the Implementing Regulation defines ‘indigenous communities’ as:
communities in independent countries who are regarded as indigenous on account 
of their descent from the populations which inhabited the country, or a 
geographical region to which the country belongs, at the time o f conquest or 
colonisation or the establishment o f present state boundaries and who, irrespective 
of their legal status, retain some or all of their own social, economic, cultural and 
political institutions.
This definition is derived from Article 1(1 )(b) of the 1989 ILO Convention 169.*  ^ The only 
difference between the EU legislation and the ILO Convention is that the EU uses the term 
‘indigenous communities’, whereas the latter uses the term ‘indigenous peoples’, which is 
commonly used under international law, particularly within the UN system.
*^  Management and Utilization o f  Seals in Greenland ( n i l )  36.
*^  Inuit cooperate with each other through their membership o f  the Inuit Circum polar Council 
<www.inuit.org> accessed 15 February 2010.
*'* s i . 2.2.1.
*^  ILO Convention concerning Indigenous and Tribal Populations in Independent Countries 1989 (No 169) 
28 ILM 1382.
It can be argued that the EU’s conscious use o f term ‘indigenous communities’ reflects its 
awareness over the contentiousness o f the term ‘indigenous peoples’ under international law. 
Indeed, the merits o f an exact definition of the latter term remain a subject o f debate between States 
due to implications arising from the term ‘peoples’, which according to some interpretations infer 
that indigenous peoples should have a right to independent statehood.*® This is because several 
international law instruments, including the Charter o f the United Nations, the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR),*^ the International Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights** and the Vienna Declaration and Programme o f Action*^ recognise the right 
to self-determination. This right is articulated in Common Article 1 of both International 
Covenants: ‘All peoples have the right o f self-determination. By virtue o f that right they freely 
determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development’.
In fact, the origins of this disagreement go back to the early-1960s when the European 
colonial powers argued that self-determination was not a right, but a mere principle.^® Perhaps for 
this reason some States, such as Denmark, have challenged the merits o f a formal definition o f the 
term ‘indigenous peoples’ under international law. According to the Danish Ministry o f Foreign 
Affairs, ‘the diversity of the world’s indigenous peoples is such that no single definition is likely 
to capture the breadth o f their experiences and existence’.^ * Indeed, according to the UN, there are 
approximately 300 million indigenous peoples spread over more than 70 countries worldwide.^^
*^  See eg James Anaya, Indigenous Peoples in International Law (2nd edn, OUP 2004) oh 3; Tara W ard, 
‘The right to free, prior, and informed consent: Indigenous peoples’ participation rights within international 
law (2011)10 Northwestern Journal o f  International Human Rights 54.
*^  Adopted 16 December 1966, entered into force 23 M arch 1976, 999 UNTS 171.
** Adopted 16 December 1966, entered into force 3 January 1976,993 UNTS 3.
*^  A /CO N F.l 57/24 (Part I), ch III.
M anfred Nowak, Commentary on the UN Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: CCPR Commentary (2"^ 
edn, Engel 2005) 10.
*^ Ministry o f  Foreign Affairs, Strategy for Danish Support to Indigenous Peoples (M inistry o f  Foreign 
Affairs 2004) para 2.2.
^  See Office o f  the High Commissioner for Human Rights, ‘Fact Sheet N o 9 (Rev 1), The R ights o f  
Indigenous Peoples’ (1995) 1 <www.ohchr.org/Docum ents/Publications/FactSheet9rev.Ien.pdf>  accessed 
20 September 2011.
Since States define a large part of the international law norms and rules, it is ultimately up to them 
to decide which groups are indigenous and which are not.
Moreover, the definition also varies depending on who uses it. For instance, indigenous 
peoples themselves may understand the term differently from the States.^* Also different 
indigenous peoples may have different understanding of this term. For instance, although both Inuit 
o f Canada and Greenland can be regarded as indigenous, the ways in which these Inuit populations 
characterise themselves differ considerably. Whereas the Inuit of Greenland (also known as 
Kalaallit)^'* do not explicitly describe themselves as indigenous, the Inuit o f Canada do.^ ® Indeed, 
section 35(2) of the Canadian Constitution Act, 1982^ ® explicitly states that Inuit are an ‘aboriginal 
people’ o f Canada. Although Canadian legislators and the judiciary use the term ‘aboriginal’ instead 
o f ‘indigenous’, essentially these two terms have the same meaning since they both refer to distinct 
groups o f indigenous people with distinct characteristics and legal character who lived on the land 
before new settlers arrived.^^ For clarity and consistency, this thesis adopts the term ‘indigenous 
peoples’, whilst the terms ‘aboriginal peoples’ and ‘aboriginal rights’ is used exclusively in Chapter 
4.
Although there are no similar provisions in Danish or Greenlandic law,^* on ratification of 
the ILO Convention 169, the Danish government stated that the people o f Greenland as a whole
^  For more detailed discussion on the topic, see Anaya, Indigenous Peoples in International Law (n 16).
The population o f  Greenland refer to themselves as both ‘Inuit’ and ‘K alaallit’. The word ‘K alaallit’ means 
Greenlanders. See L R  Bjorst, En anden verden: Fordomme og Stereotyper om Gronland ogArktis (Forlaget 
Bios 2008).
^  It has been suggested that this is because Kalaallit do not wish to be treated differently from their Danish 
co-citizens. See eg N atalia Loukacheva, Arctic Promise: Legal and Political Autonomy o f Greenland and 
Nunavut (University o f  Toronto 2007).
®^ Constitution Act, 1982, s 35(2), being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982 c 11, which 
recognises that there are three distinct cultural groups o f  indigenous people inhabiting Canada: ‘[i]n this Act, 
“aboriginal peoples o f  Canada” includes the Indian, Inuit, and M etis peoples o f  Canada.’
See eg Brian Slattery, ‘The constitutional guarantee o f  aboriginal and treaty rights’ (1983) 8 Q ueen’s L J 
232.
C f eg Perustuslaki 731/1999 (Constitution ofFinland) (Unofficial translation), s 17, which stipulates which 
groups are indigenous and which ones are minorities.
constituted an indigenous people within the meaning of the ILO Convention 169?^ In its National 
report submitted to the Human Rights Council, Denmark further acknowledged that the ‘indigenous 
population in Greenland (Inuit) is the only indigenous people in the Kingdom of Denmark in the 
sense of the last-mentioned ILO Convention’.*® Despite these differences in legal provisions both 
Inuit populations are recognised as indigenous by the Governments o f Canada and Denmark. 
Consequently, they are entitled to the rights conferred on indigenous peoples under international 
law.
In the past few years, the international community has consented to the idea that a universal 
definition o f the term ‘indigenous peoples’ may not be useful because o f its contentiousness. This 
could be argued to be reflected in the UN Declaration, which does not offer any comprehensive 
definition o f the term. Instead, the Declaration recognises that indigenous peoples are ‘distinct 
peoples’ with their own unique cultural values and ethnic identities,** and that they have ‘distinctive 
customs, spirituality, traditions, procedures, practices and.. .juridical systems or customs’.** 
Although the following criteria are not exhaustive, the UN Special Rapporteurs have suggested 
over the years that in order to determine who is indigenous, a group should have the following key 
features: tribal characteristics; cultural distinctiveness; an attachment to land; and they should have 
experienced colonisation or dispossession.** It could be argued that these features rule out the 
possibility o f non-indigenous peoples being regarded as ‘indigenous’.
See Gronlandsk-Dansk Selvstyrekommission, ‘Betænkning om selvstyre i G ronland’ April 2008 
(Greenland-Danish Self-Government Commission, ‘Report on Home Rule in G reenland’), app 7 citing a 
N ote from the M inistry o f  Foreign Affairs Legal Service (8 N ovem ber 2004 JTF, 8.S 27) 
<http://dk.nanoq.gl/Emner/Landsstyre/Selvstyre/Groenlandsk-
dansk selvstyrekommission/~/media/41A7B060F64E4666ABEE7798F0EC0B55.ashx> accessed 12 July 
2012 .
*® UN Human Rights Council, National report submitted in accordance with paragraph 15 (a) o f  the A nnex 
to Human Rights Council Resolution 5/1 (Denmark)
<www.fnforbundet.dk/media/34472/uprreportdenmarkpdf.pdf>  accessed 15 June 2012 para 8.
** UNDRIP, art 8(2)(a).
** ibid art 34.
** For studies attempting to provide an overarching definition o f  indigenous peoples see Committee on 
Human Rights, ‘Study o f  the Problem o f  D iscrimination Against Indigenous Populations’ Final report 
submitted by the Special Rapporteur, M r José M artinez Coho, ch X XI-XXII, paras 196-7, 
E/CN.4Sub.2/1983/21/Add.8 (1983); Committee on H um an Rights, ‘D iscrimination A gainst Indigenous
1.2.1.1 Inuit
Although the term ‘indigenous peoples’ comprises all indigenous peoples o f the world, the 
discussion in this thesis focuses on Inuit o f Canada and Greenland. It is noteworthy that Inuit inhabit 
several countries with territories in the Arctic region.*'* Article 2(4) o f the Basic Regulation 
reproduces the ICC definition o f the term ‘Inuit’. Accordingly, the term ‘Inuit’ ‘means indigenous 
members o f the Inuit homeland recognized by Inuit as being members of their people and shall 
include the Inupiat, Yupik (Alaska), Inuit, Inuvialuit (Canada), Kalaallit (Greenland) and Yupik 
(Russia)’.** Following accepted practice and as a general rule, Inuit are referred to in this thesis 
using their own specific, indigenous names, such as the ‘Inuvialuit’*® or ‘Inuit o f Canada’ and the 
‘Kalaallit’ or ‘Inuit o f Greenland’. Although the term ‘Eskimo’ has been widely in use in the past, 
‘is not an Inuit term, and is not one that Inuit have themselves adopted’.** Especially in Canada the 
term has been strongly associated with the time o f European exploration o f the Arctic.**
Although there are many other indigenous populations in the Arctic region and sub-Arctic 
regions,*^ who have traditionally hunted marine mammals, such as an Aleut community o f the
Peoples: Protection o f  the heritage o f  indigenous people’ Final report o f  the Special Rapporteur, M rs Erica- 
Irene Daes, UN Doc E/CN.4/Sub/2/l986/7/A dd 4, 379 (1986). See also Patrick Thomberry, Indigenous 
Peoples and Human Rights (M anchester UP 2002) 33-60.
*'* Approximately 155,000 across the circumpolar region. Inuit C ircumpolar Council (Canada) 
<www.inuitcircumpolar.com/index.php?ID=415&Lang=En> accessed 16 August 2011.The Inuit population 
o f  Canada in 2011 was 59,440 and in Greenland 56,600. See Statistics Canada, Aboriginal Peoples in 
Canada: Aboriginal Peoples in Canada: First Nations People, Métis and Inuit: National Household Survey 
2011 (M inister o f  Industry 2013) 14 {National Household Survey 2011) <w w w l2.statcan.gc.ca/nhs- 
enm/201 l/as-sa/99-01 l-x/99-01 l-x2011001-eng.pdf> accessed 13 M ay 2013; M anagement and Utilization 
o f  Seals in Greenland (n 11) 10.
** Inuit Circumpolar Council Charter, art 1(6) <www.inuit.org/index.php?id=210> accessed 15 June 2011.
*® Under s 1 o f  the 1984 Inuvialuit Final Agreement, the term ‘Inuit’ includes Inuvialuit.
** Inuit Circumpolar Council Resolution 2010-01 on the use o f  the term Inuit in scientific and other circles.
** See E Benveniste, ‘The ‘Eskim o’ N am e’ (1953) 19(3) Inter nationalJournal o f  American Linguistics 242. 
*^  A lbeit being extremely sparsely populated, these regions are homelands to more than 30 different 
indigenous peoples. Danish Ministry o f  Foreign Affairs, Denmark, Greenland and the Faroe Islands: 
Kingdom o f Denmark Strategy for the Arctic 2011-2020 (Danish M inistry o f  Foreign Affairs 2011) 9. See 
also M ark Nuttal, Protecting the Arctic: Indigenous Peoples and Cultural Survival (Routledge 1998) 2.
Pribilof Islands, Alaska;'*® the Nisga’a First Nation o f Vancouver Island, Canada; the Labrador 
Métis o f Canada;'** the Chukchi and the Yup’iit peoples o f north-eastern Russia;'** and the Sami 
population of the Nordic countries (Norway, Sweden and Finland),'** the rights o f these peoples are 
not discussed in this thesis in full detail. The reason is that although these peoples prima facie  
qualify for the Inuit exemption under Article 3(1) o f the Basic Regulation on the grounds that they 
have traditionally hunted seals,'*'* these communities hunt seals almost entirely for personal use and 
consumption.'** The 2010 Commission-funded study by a consultancy firm. Consultancy Within 
Engineering, Environmental Science and Economics (COWI)"*® noted that seal hunt by Aleut takes 
place ‘purely for subsistence, with most products consumed locally, or shipped to Aleut 
communities outside Alaska’.'**
It also noted that the same was true for Russia where ‘the majority o f seals that are hunted 
by Inuit or indigenous communities are not industrialised, but consist o f small-scale hunts serving 
as input to the daily life o f these communities’.'** Additionally, the Sami communities in Finland 
and Norway no longer hunt seals.'*  ^Because this thesis investigates whether the EU achieves a fair 
balance between the protection o f seals and the rights o f indigenous peoples to engage in their 
traditional economic activities, namely seal hunting and the sale o f by-products, only Inuit o f
'*® For more detailed discussion about indigenous peoples in A laska see R  B M orrison and C R  Wilson (eds). 
Native Peoples: The Canadian Experience (2nd edn, M cCelland and Steward 1995).
'** Both the First N ations and the Labrador M étis have traditionally hunted seals in Canada. See eg Debbie 
Holly M artin, ‘Food Stories: A  Labrador Inuit-M etis community speaks about global change’ (PhD thesis. 
University Halifax, 2009).
'** See Crete K Hovelsrud, M eghan M ckenna and Henry P Huntington, ‘M arine mammal harvests and other 
interactions with hum ans’ (2008) 18(2) Ecological Applications, supps S135, S139.
'** According to historical evidence, the Sami have traditionally hunted seals along the shores o f  the G u lf o f  
Bothnia during the late Iron Age and the M iddle Ages. See eg Juha Ylimaunu, Itameren 
hylkeenpyyntikulttuurit ja  ihminen-hylje-suhde (Suomalaisen kirjallisuuden seura 2000) 97.
'*'* See Commission, ‘Study on implementing measures for trade in seal products’ (Final Report M arch 2010) 
(COWI Report 2010) 30.
'** ibid 26-27 ,32
'** ibid 85: ‘products traded under article 3.1, which does not have to be non-profit and non-com mercially 
based (although the subsistence argument precludes a true commercial trade)’.
'** ibid 
'** ibid
COWI Report 2010 (n 44) 28.
Canada and Kalaallit can be characterised to hunt seals for purposes other than ‘personal use and 
consumption’. Consequently, rights, which do not include economic component, are not analysed 
in this thesis in full detail.
1.2.2 What is meant by the term ‘subsistence’ in the context o f the EU legislation?
As noted in section 1.1, the EU legislation exempts products ‘from hunts traditionally 
conducted by Inuit and other indigenous communities and contribute to their subsistence’.*® 
However, since the rights o f Inuit of Canada and Kalaallit to hunt seals and sell the by-products of 
their hunting activities are not limited to ‘subsistence’ only, there may be a conflict between the 
EU legislation and these rights. Since the ability to engage in economic activities can be argued to 
be central to modern-day indigenous societies of the Arctic Canada and Greenland,** this 
introductory chapter examines the meaning o f the term ‘subsistence’ and whether its use in the EU 
legislation impedes the exercise of indigenous peoples’ rights unnecessarily. The term ‘subsistence’ 
is critical for this thesis since it was used to define the scope o f the exemption under which Inuit 
are able to sell their products in the EU. The point this thesis makes is that the EU’s interpretation 
of indigenous economic rights may be too narrow because it views these rights as mere subsistence 
rights, whereas international law and the States where Inuit live have moved beyond the limiting 
concept of ‘subsistence rights’.** Consequently, the EU’s understanding o f indigenous peoples’ 
economic rights may have resulted in a breach of these rights not only under the UNDRIP, but also 
customary international law.**
In order to outline the conditions for indigenous peoples’ market access under the 
Implementing Regulation, it was necessary for the Commission to identify who were the ‘Inuit and
*® Regulation 1007/2009, art 3(1); Regulation 737/2010, art 3(1 )(a); ch 2 s 2.3.1.
** According to Canada, the purpose o f  hunts conducted by indigenous peoples is to cam  income and make 
profits by selling by-products o f  the hunted seals, s 1.2.2.1.
** s i .2.2.1.
** eh 3 s 3.5.
other indigenous communities’ which were ‘traditionally dependent on subsistence hunting of 
seals’.*'* The Commission based its implementing measures on the findings o f the COWI Report 
2010, which explained that the identification o f relevant indigenous communities required the 
development o f a measurable definition of ‘seal hunting contributing to subsistence’.** Further, the 
fact that the hunt should contribute to the subsistence o f an indigenous community indicated that 
‘it is an important element of the welfare o f the community’.*® Consequently, the COWI established 
the following criteria for the hunts qualifying within the Inuit exemption.
First, the hunt should not be ‘conducted for the sole purpose o f placing [seal products] on 
the market’ .** In other words, the motivation underlying the hunt should not be purely commercial, 
but rather ‘maintaining cultural tradition o f hunting’ or ‘ self-consumption’ .** Second, part o f the 
consumption should be on the local market. Put differently, seals should not be ‘killed in order to 
export the products for a commercial profit’.*^  Furthermore, the hunt should contribute to the 
maintaining o f the community subsystems economically or socially.®® Last, the hunt should not 
be organised at a large scale.®* Essentially, the COWI treats trading activities by Inuit as i f  they 
were non-commercial of nature because hunting should not be motivated by the possibility to 
export the products for a commercial profit.
It is worth noting that the Inuit exemption does not contain the term ‘non-commercial’, 
but this term is derived fi*om the ‘marine resources exemption’ in Article 3(2) o f the Basic 
Regulation to which the COWI compared the Inuit exemption.®* The marine resources exemption 
enables the placing on the EU market o f seal products from the non-commercial hunts conducted 
for sustainable management o f seal populations. Essentially, this means seal products originating
*'* COW I Report 2010 (n 44) 3.
** ibid 10.
ibid 9.
** ibid 10.
** ibid 10, Table 2-2.
*^  ibid 10.
^  ibid
®* ibid Table 2-2.
“  Both exemptions are discussed in more detail in ch 2 s 2.3.1.
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from the EU Member States. According to the COWI, the term ‘non-commercial’ in Article 3(2) 
does not preclude all placing on the market in exchange for payment, it means that only the 
hunters’ costs should be covered and the hunt should be non-systematic and o f such a scale®* that 
‘it is sufficiently likely that it does not concern a commercial, profit-making activity’.®'*
Thus, although the COWI Report 2010 makes a distinction between products qualifying 
for the Inuit exemption and those qualifying for the marine resources exemption, it further notes 
that although the trade under the Inuit exemption ‘does not have to be non-profit and non- 
commercially based’,®* the term ‘subsistence’ means that the ‘exemption is not a completely fi-ee 
pass to trade firom these communities’.®® Consequently, the Inuit exemption ‘precludes a true 
commercial trade’.®* Thus, indeed, although products of Inuit origin can be placed on the market 
in exchange for payment, the use o f the term ‘subsistence’ means that indigenous peoples should 
not hunt seals primarily in order to export the products for a commercial profit. Consequently, 
although, in theory, Inuit have the right to trade products in the EU market, it is subject to a number 
o f limitations imposed by the EU.
The Commission elaborated its stance on what the term ‘subsistence’ meant in its second 
written submission to the World Trade Organisation (WTO).®* According to it, the condition that 
‘hunts make a contribution to the subsistence o f the community’ was included in Article 3(1) of 
the Implementing Regulation because the EU recognises that traditional indigenous hunts ‘may 
have a commercial dimension in the sense that part o f the products resulting from the hunt are not 
consumed by the hunters and their families but are also sold in the market’.®® Therefore, the Inuit
®* eg size o f  batches sold.
^  COWI Report 2010 (n 44) 63.
®* ibid 
ibid 9.
*^ ibid 85.
®* See E C S eal Products (DS400, DS401) Second W ritten Submission by the European Union (27 M arch 
2013) (EU ’s second submission to the W TO) para 209.
®® ibid; W TO: European Communities: Measures Prohibiting the Importation and Marketing o f  Seal 
Products—Report o f the Panel (25 N ovem ber 2013) W T/DS400/R and W T/DS401/R (EC-Seal Products), 
para 7.286.
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exemption would be useless, if  the profits did not enable indigenous communities to purchase 
necessary goods to which they do not have access in their immediate area as well as to finance the 
costs o f conducting such hunts.*® Consequently, the commercial dimension was ‘critical to the 
subsistence o f those communities’.**
However, according to the EU, hunts qualifying for the Inuit exemption differed from the 
purely commercial hunts ‘in that they must contribute to the subsistence of the Inuit or other 
indigenous communities.** Therefore, in its view, indigenous hunting should not be conducted 
primarily or exclusively for commercial purposes’.** Consequently, the Inuit exemption was 
necessarily narrow in scope in order to eliminate possible abuse o f the exemption by commercial 
hunters and to ensure that only products from hunts conducted genuinely for subsistence purposes 
qualify.*'* Accordingly, the Inuit exemption was ‘calibrated’ not to go beyond what it is ‘necessary’ 
to achieve its purpose, and that the conditions did not function as incentivising indigenous people 
to engage ‘in intensive and systematic hunting, in order to kill more seals for the market’.** 
However, by arguing that the Inuit exemption should be narrow in order to discourage indigenous 
peoples from hunting more seals is rather patronising and may be argued to infringe indigenous 
peoples’ rights under international law.
Inuit themselves disagree with the EU on the purpose o f their hunts. Indeed, Inuit argued 
before the Court of Justice o f the European Union (CJEU)*® that their rights were not subsistence 
rights, but that they had the ‘right...to engage in the commercial exploitation of seal products’.** 
Although this litigation is discussed in more detail in Chapter 6, the applicants argued specifically
*° EC-Seal Products (n 69) para 7.286.
** E U ’s second submission to the WTO (n 68) para 228; EC-Seal Products (n 69) para 7.286.
** E U ’s second submission to the WTO (n 68) para 228.
*^  ibid
*'* ibid para 209.
** ibid paras 209 and 228.
*^  This Court consists o f  the European Court o f  Justice (ECJ) and European General Court (EGC). The terms 
‘EU courts’ and ‘C JEU ’ is used to indicate both the ECJ and the EGC.
** See Case T-18/10 R  ITK v Parliament and Council [2010] ECR 11-75 (Proceedings for interim m easures 
1), para 59 (emphasis added).
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that the EU seal products legislation demoted ‘their economic activities to traditional hunting 
methods and subsistence''?^ indicating that the use of this term was inappropriate. In the dispute 
between the EU and Canada before the WTO, EC-Seal Products?^ the dispute settlement Panel 
noted that although indigenous communities hunted seals for their own use and consumption as 
part of their culture and tradition,*® seal hunting served another purpose, namely the exchange of 
by-products either through barter for other goods, or sale on the market to generate inconie.** 
Although EC-Seal Products^^ is discussed in more detail in Chapter 7, it is highly relevant to 
several key issues throughout the thesis. Significantly, the Panel noted that depending on the 
indigenous community concerned, seal products may be traded in international markets.** Indeed, 
because Inuit o f Canada and Greenland sell their products on commercial markets,*"* the EU’s 
narrow understanding o f the scope o f their rights ultimately hampers the exercise o f these rights. 
According to the Government o f Greenland’s White Paper ‘Management and Utilization o f Seals 
in Greenland’, Inuit hunters depend on the income derived fi*om the sale of seal products to support 
their traditional hunting activities.** Therefore, the exercise o f the right to hunt seals in Greenland 
is not confined to mere household consumption or the exchange o f by-products through barter for 
other goods, but Kalaallit sell their products on the market to generate income.
Similarly, the Government o f Canada maintained before the WTO that the ability to sell 
by-products o f hunting activities was immensely important for Inuit due to ‘the emergence o f a 
monetized society and new technologies [which] has caused the Canadian Inuit to commercialize
** Case T-18/10 R  ITK v Parliament and Council (n 77) paras 54-55 (emphasis added).
EC-Seal Products (n 69).
*® ibid para 7.263 referring to COWI Report 2010 (n 44) 2 4 ,2 6 ,2 9  and 32.
*' ibid para 7.263 referring to Government o f  Nunavut, ‘Report on the Impacts o f  the European Union Seal 
Ban, (EC) NO 1007/2009, in Nunavut 2012’ (27 January 2012) (Nunavut Report), 2 
<http://env.gov.nu.ca/sites/default/files/impactssealban_web.pdf> accessed 13 October 2012; M anagement 
and Utilization o f  Seals in Greenland ( n i l )  25-28; Commission, ‘A ssessment o f  the potential im pact o f  a 
ban o f  products derived from seal species’ M arch 2008 (COW I Report 2008) 26.
** EC-Seal Products (n 69).
** ibid para 7.263 referring to M anagement and Utilization o f  Seals in Greenland ( n i l )  25-28; Nunavut 
Report (n 81) 2; COW I Report 2010 (n 44) 29; COWI Report 2008 (n 81) 26 and 45-46.
* S  1.2.1.
** M anagement and Utilization o f  Seals ( n i l ) .
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some output to generate income’.*® For this reason, the hunts conducted by Inuit did not necessarily 
differ from hunts, which were conducted ‘primarily or exclusively’ for commercial reasons.** The 
Panel agreed with Canada, observing that ‘the commercial aspect of...[indigenous community] 
hunts resembles the purpose o f commercial hunts, which is to earn income (and make profits) by 
selling by-products o f the hunted seals’.** It also noted that the difference between purely 
commercial hunts and those conducted in Greenland was not that dissimilar due to the volume of 
sealskins traded by Kalaallit.*® According to the Panel, Greenland traded amounts, which were 
‘comparable to that o f commercial (rather than...indigenous community) hunts in Canada, and 
much larger than other Inuit or indigenous communities that may potentially qualify under 
the... [Inuit] exception’.®® Further, in the Panel’s view, the commercial aspect o f indigenous hunts 
was more related to the need o f Inuit to adjust to modem society, rather than the need to continue 
the ‘cultural heritage o f bartering’, which appears to be the EU’s view of the scope o f indigenous 
rights.®* This finding is significant for the purposes o f this thesis because it is consistent with 
indigenous peoples’ rights o f under the UNDRIP. As is seen in Chapter 3, the UNDRIP supports 
the right o f indigenous peoples to ‘engage freely in all their traditional and other economic 
activities’.®* This implies that the way in which the EU attempts to restrict indigenous economic 
rights is highly inappropriate.
In summary, the Panel recognised that the commercial aspect o f indigenous hunts was 
related to the need of these peoples to adjust to modem society,®* rather than maintaining cultural 
tradition o f bartering, and that Inuit traded some seal products for economic gain.®'* The EU’s
*® EC-Seal Products (n 69) para 7.281 referring to Canada's response to Panel question N o 67.
** ibid
** ibid para 7.287.
*® ibid
®° ibid paras 7.287 and 7.310. Approximately 163,000 seals were caught in Greenland annually between 1993 
and 2009, o f  which h a lf  were traded. By contrast, in 2006, only about 6,000 Nunavut sealskins were exported. 
®* ibid para 7.288.
®*ch 3 s 3.4.1.
®* EC-Seal Products (n 69) para 7.287.
®^ ibid para 7.288.
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approach towards Inuit is problematic because although it seemingly takes an accommodating view 
towards indigenous trading activities, it insists that the scope of these rights be interpreted narrowly 
due to the possibility that the Inuit exemption may be abused by commercial hunters. However, by 
arguing that the Inuit exemption is aimed at discouraging indigenous peoples from hunting more 
seals, the EU effectively stipulates how indigenous peoples’ rights should be exercised. However, 
its views differ from international law protection o f indigenous peoples’, which recognises the right 
to ‘engage freely in all their traditional and other economic activities’.®*
1.2.2.1 How is the term ‘subsistence’ defined outside the context o f EU legislation?
The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary defines the term ‘subsistence’ as ‘the action or 
condition o f subsisting or of supporting life, the provision o f food etc’. Further, the term relates to 
(i) ‘means o f supporting life; livelihood’; (ii) ‘a bare or minimal level o f  existence; an income 
providing this’; and (iii) ‘food supply, provisions’.®® This is significant since the scope o f the rights 
o f Inuit o f Canada and Greenland is not limited to a ‘bare or minimal level o f existence’. Indeed, 
an investigation of Canadian and Greenlandic legislation in Chapters 4-5 reveals that although 
indigenous harvesting activities can be curtailed on the grounds o f animal welfare, firearms safety 
and conservation, neither legislation defines indigenous rights as mere ‘subsistence’ rights. The 
inappropriateness o f the term ‘subsistence’ becomes obvious from the case law o f the Supreme 
Court o f Canada. In the Court’s 1999 decision in v Marshall Lamer CJ indicated that the term 
‘subsistence’ was no longer accurate when describing contemporary indigenous peoples’ rights. He 
held that ‘[b]are subsistence has thankfully receded over the last couple o f centuries as an 
appropriate standard of life for aboriginals and non-aboriginals alike’ .®* In fact, as is seen in Chapter
®* ch 3 s 3.4.1.
®® Allan Stevenson (ed). Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, vol 2 (6th edn, OUP 2007) 3087 (emphasis 
added).
®* 7? V Marshall [1999] 3 SCR 456 [Marshall].
®* ibid % 59, Lam er CJ. Instead, in the context o f  this particular case, the Court, identified the concept o f  
‘moderate livelihood’ as more appropriate. However, the concept o f  moderate livelihood has been coined by
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4, under Canadian law, the right of Inuit to hunt seals comprises a right to sell all non-edible parts
o f seals, such as sealskins, in a commercial market place.®®
It appears that none o f the legal documents investigated for the purposes o f this thesis
contains a detailed definition o f the term ‘subsistence’. An investigation into the relevant UN
instruments reveals that although this term is frequently used, it is not defined. For instance.
Common Article 1(2) o f the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights stipulates that:
All peoples may, for their own ends, freely dispose o f their natural wealth and 
resources without prejudice to any obligations arising out o f international economic 
co-operation, based upon the principle of mutual benefit, and international law. In 
no case may a people be deprived o f its own means o f subsistence.
Although the term ‘subsistence’ is not defined by Article 1(2), it is mentioned in the 
context of the right to use natural resources, which implies that a State, or indeed, a group o f self­
determining people, should be entitled to ‘a full stream of benefit from the exploitation o f the 
resources’ within their jurisdiction.*®® In fact, the UN Human Rights Committee has interpreted 
indigenous peoples to be covered by Article 1(2) ICCPR and thus, as entitled to dispose o f their 
natural wealth and resources under this provision by virtue o f rights protected under Article 27 
ICCPR,*®* which support the right to engage in economic activities, which are related to 
indigenous cultures.*®* Similarly, the UN Declaration recognises that: ‘[ijndigenous peoples have 
the right...to be secure in the enjoyment o f their own means o f subsistence and development, and
the courts in the case law involving assertion o f  First N ation rights as a  defence for a prosecution for a 
regulatory offence. Therefore, this concept may not be appropriate in the context o f  Inuit right to hunt seals. 
®® ch 4 s 4.3-4.3.4.
*°° Control over natural resources is linked to the right to self-determination. See eg M argaret M oore, ‘Natural 
resources, territorial right, and global distributive justice’ (2012) 40(1) Political Theory 84, 86-89 DOl: 
10.1177/0090591711426999. See also Timo Koivurova, ‘Jurisprudence o f  the European Court o f  Human 
Rights Regarding Indigenous Peoples: Retrospect and Prospects’ (2011)18 International Journal on M inority 
and Group Rights 1 <http://ssm .com /abstract-2397016> accessed 7 M arch 2014.
*®* Apirana Mahuika and others v New Zealand (Communication N o 547/1993) views adopted 27 O ctober 
2000, para 9.2: ‘The Committee observes tha t...the  provisions o f  article 1 may be relevant in the 
interpretation o f  other rights protected by the Covenant, in particular article 2 7 .’
*®* eg reindeer herding and related economic activities. See ch 3 s 3.4.1.1. See also ch 2 s 2.5.2.
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to engage freely in all their traditional and other economic activities.’*®* Therefore, the UN 
Declaration could be argued to support the view that Inuit have the right to engage in ‘commercial 
exploitation’ o f seal products because under the UNDRIP they have the right to ‘engage freely’ in 
all economic activities.*®'* In conclusion, essentially, the EU’s view of indigenous right to sell their 
products in the EU under the seal products legislation differs from the economic rights of 
indigenous peoples under international law.*®*
1.3 Research question
The primary research question o f this thesis is: does the EU achieve a fair balance between 
the protection of seals and the rights o f indigenous peoples to engage in their traditional economic 
activities? In its impact assessment accompanying the proposal for the EU seal products legislation, 
the Commission proposed measures which would ‘maintain the balance between the animal 
welfare, economic and social dimensions’. *®® This implies that the EU recognised the need to ensure 
that any potential restrictions on economic activities arising from this legislation should be justified. 
Since the Preamble to the Basic Regulation explicitly recognises the ‘fundamental economic and 
social interests o f Inuit communities engaged in the hunting o f seals’, the Commission’s statement 
concerning the maintaining balance ‘between the animal welfare, economic and social dimensions’ 
could be interpreted as a need to balance animal welfare with the ‘economic and social interests’ 
o f Inuit. In fact, in its second submission to the WTO the EU argued that the seal products 
legislation ‘balances the welfare of seals with the interests o f Inuit’ *®* because it contains a specific 
exemption for their benefit.
*0* UNDRIP, art 20(1).
*®'*ch 3 s 3.4.1.
*°* ibid
*°^  Commission, ‘Proposal for a Regulation o f  the European Parliam ent and o f  the Council concerning trade 
in seal products’ COM (2008) 469 final, 11.
*®* E U ’s second submission to the WTO (n 68) para 208.
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To assess how ‘the welfare o f seals’ and ‘the interests o f Inuit’ may be balanced fairly, this 
thesis examines what is meant by the principle o f ‘fair balance’ in the context of legal tests 
balancing human rights and societal interests known as ‘balancing tests’ or ‘tests of justification’. 
Many balancing tests have been developed by judiciary all across the world, including in the United 
States (US), Israel, Canada and Germany.*®* The underlying principle of these tests is that in 
democratic societies, which are subject to the rule o f law, national authorities need to balance the 
general interest of a wider community against the fundamental human rights o f individuals.*®® If 
individuals believe that their rights have been unjustifiably infi*inged by government decisions, the 
courts must be able to reach a determination o f this.**® A central element in any balancing test is 
the ‘limitation clause’, which determines that human rights may be limited only if  they satisfy 
certain conditions, including the principle o f proportionality.***
At the regional level, balancing tests are used most notably by the CJEU and the European 
Court o f Human Rights (ECtHR). The latter court has used the fair balance principle extensively 
when applying the provisions o f the Convention for the Protection o f Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms*** (ECHR) across a wide variety o f situations.*** According to its case-law, 
‘inherent in the whole of the... [ECHR] is a search for a fair balance between the demands o f the 
general interest o f the community and the requirements o f the protection of the individual’s 
fundamental rights’.**'* Outside the human rights context, other international bodies, such as the
*®* Suzie Navot, ‘Israel: Creating a constitution: the use o f  foreign precedents by the Supreme Court (1194- 
2010)’ in Tania Groppi and M arie-Claire Ponthoreau (eds), The Use o f Foreign Precedents by Constitutional 
Judges (Hart 2013) 132-134.
*°® See eg A lastair Mowbray, ‘A study o f  the principle o f  fair balance in the jurisprudence o f  the European 
Court o f  Human R ights’ (2010) 10(2) Human Rights Law Review 289 doi:10.1093/hrlr/ngq006.
**° ibid
*** Navot (n 108) 132.
*** ETS 5; 213 UNTS 221.
*** eg ECHR, art 8 (right to respect for private and family life).
**'* Soering v United Kingdom A  161 (1989) 11 EHRR 439, para 89. See also N  v United Kingdom 47 EHRR 
39, para 44.
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dispute settlement bodies o f the WTO, use one form of weighing and balancing test (known as the 
‘necessity test’) in the context o f multilateral trade agreements.***
Although the WTO’s necessity test does not concern the balancing of human rights per se, 
it involves balancing economic and non-economic principles, from both within and outside the 
WTO legal order, against each other.**® Therefore, the principle o f proportionality plays a crucial 
role in guiding this process within the WTO.*** In fact, certain rules within the WTO legal system 
can be considered to strike a balance between the ‘right’ o f a WTO Member to take measures 
necessary for certain policy objectives and ‘the duty o f that same Member to respect the treaty 
rights o f the other Members’.*** Thus, the balancing test implies that in the context o f the WTO, 
the right o f a Member to enact measures for the protection of non-trade interests must be balanced 
with the rights o f other Members under the WTO agreements. Whether these ‘rights’ were 
sufficiently balanced in EC-Seal Products, i s  the subject o f Chapter 7.
1.3.1 Justificatory tests
In order to assess what the concept o f ‘fair balance’ may mean in the context of the EU 
legislation on seal products, three justificatory tests were considered relevant for the purposes of 
this thesis. These are the tests employed by (i) the CJEU (the ‘proportionality test’),**® (ii) the 
Supreme Court o f Canada (the ^Sparrow test’)*** and (iii) the WTO dispute settlement bodies (the 
‘necessity test’).*** These tests are helpful in evaluating what may be an acceptable restriction on 
Inuit economic rights under the EU seal products legislation. The proportionality test is considered
*'* ch 7 ss 7.2.1.3 and 7.3.2.
**^  M ads Andenas and Stefan Zleptnig, ‘Proportionality: W TO law in comparative perspective’ (2007) 42(3) 
Texas International Law  Journal 371,375.
*** ibid
*** ch 7 s 7.3.3.
**® EC-Seal Products (n 69).
**° ch 6 s 6.4.
*** ch 4 s 4.4.1.
*** ch 7 ss 7.2.1.3 and 7.3.2.
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appropriate for the purposes o f this thesis because it balances the objectives o f legislative and 
administrative measures against the interests, rights and freedoms o f private parties recognised 
under EU law. As noted in section 1.2.2, the Inuit o f Canada and Greenland have challenged the 
EU seal products legislation before the CJEU. It appears that in ITK v Commissionf^^ the European 
General Court (EGC) may have used the proportionality test in order to assess whether the EU 
institutions struck fair balance between the rights of Inuit and the objectives of the EU legislation.**'* 
The second test, the Sparrow test, is appropriate for the purposes o f this thesis because the 
Supreme Court o f Canada developed this test in 1990 to govern the restriction o f Canadian 
indigenous peoples’ rights.*** The Sparrow test clarifies how the rights of Inuit may be restricted 
due to public safety, conservation or animal welfare concerns under the Canadian legal system. It 
is considered appropriate for this thesis because very little relevant case law concerning indigenous 
peoples’ rights exists before the ECtHR**® or the national courts o f the EU Member States. 
Additionally, the ECtHR’s jurisdiction is limited to those Arctic indigenous peoples who inhabit 
the jurisdictions o f the 47 State parties of the ECtHR, including Kalaallit, the Sami o f Nordic 
countries and various indigenous peoples living in Russia and the Russian Federation.*** Although 
the Human Rights Committee’s decisions under Article 27 ICCPR, discussed briefly in Chapter 3, 
are helpful for assessing the scope of indigenous peoples’ rights under international law, the 
Committee’s decisions do not specifically concern the rights o f Inuit, but the case law consists of 
complainants made by indigenous peoples world-wide.***
The third test, the ‘necessity test’ of the WTO dispute settlement bodies was chosen for the 
purposes of this thesis because the EU seal products legislation is subject to the dispute settlement
*** Case T-526/10 ITK v Commission (EGC, 25 April 2013).
**'*ch6s6.1.
*** c h 4  s 4.4.1.
**^  Although several complainants have been heard by the ECtHR, only a minority o f  such cases have 
survived to the merits stage. For a general overview o f  the suitability o f  this court for resolving disputes 
relating Arctic indigenous peoples’ rights, see Koivurova (n 100).
*** ibid
*** See eg Bibliography at the end o f  this thesis. Decisions o f  the UN Human Rights Committee.
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proceedings before the WTO. The dispute settlement Panel utilised this test in its decision in EC- 
Seal Products^^^ to assess whether the EU’s objective o f the protection o f public moral concerns 
on animal welfare was ‘necessary’ and thus, consistent with the EU’s obligations under the WTO 
agreements.**®
In this thesis, it is argued that the balance is fair if  the EU legislation and exemptions result 
in the following things;
• the EU recognises and respects the rights o f indigenous peoples under the UN Declaration 
and other relevant provisions o f international law;***
• the restriction on the right o f Inuit to engage in the commercial exploitation o f seal products 
is not disproportionate;***
• the legislation results in improved animal welfare outside the EU;***
• the Inuit exemption is consistent with the EU’s obligations under the WTO Agreements in 
that it does not discriminate against products of Inuit origin from Canada as opposed to 
those from Greenland.**"*
Whether the EU legislation respects indigenous peoples’ rights under the UN Declaration 
and other relevant provisions of international law is investigated specifically in Chapters 3 and 7.*** 
Chapter 6 investigates whether the institutions respect the right o f Inuit to engage in the commercial 
exploitation o f seal products under the ECHR, or the Charter o f Fundamental Rights o f the
**® EC-Seal Products (n 69).
**®ch7ss 7.2.1.3 and 7.3.3.
*** See ch 3 ss 3.4.1-3.4.3; ch 8 s 8.2. In addition to the right to engage in economic activities under Article 
20 UNDRIP, Inuit have argued that the EU m ust respect their right to participate and be consulted in m atters 
relating to their rights under arts 18 and 19 UNDRIP as well as to guarantee that they as indigenous peoples 
are not deprived from judicial protection before the CJEU. See also Case C -398/13 P ITK v Commission 
[2013] OJ C 274/11 (appeal pending before the ECJ).
*** ch 6 s 6.2.-6.4.1; ch 8 s 8.3.
* * * c h 7 s7 .2 .1 .2 .;c h 8 s8 .4 .
**"* ch 7 s 1 .223 ;  ch 8 s 8.5.
*** ch 3 ss 3.4.1-3.5. See also ch 8 s 8.2.
21
European Union*^^ under which the CJBU decided to address their c l a i m s .W h e t h e r  the EU 
legislation results in improved animal welfare outside the EU is explored in Chapters 2 and 7.^ ^^  
Chapters 4-5 and 7 assess whether the legislation results in an adverse impact on Inuit o f Canada 
as opposed to Inuit of Greenland.*^^ Additionally, Chapters 4 and 7 help in assessing whether the 
restrictions on Inuit market access under the seal products regulation are proportionate in the light 
o f restrictions, which have been deemed acceptable by the Supreme Court of Canada.
1.4 Why do Arctic indigenous peoples’ rights matter?
Although the rights o f Inuit o f Canada and Kalaallit are further explored throughout this 
thesis, the reason why they matter in the context o f EU seal products legislation is briefly explored 
here. The rights o f Kalaallit were chosen for the purposes o f this thesis due to the association 
between Greenland and the EU.*'*^  Because o f Greenland’s status as one of the overseas countries 
and territories (OCT) linked to the EU Member States, the EU has certain obligations towards the 
Kalaallit under the Treaty on the Functioning o f the European Union (TFEU).*"*  ^However, the EU 
has no similar obligations in relation to the Inuit o f Canada even if Canada and one EU Member 
State, namely the UK, have a special relationship because they share a sovereign. Her Majesty 
Queen Elizabeth II.
[2010] OJ C 83/02 (Charter o f  Fundamental Rights), 
ch 6 ss 6.2 and 6.2.2. See also ch 8 s 8.3. 
ch 2 s 2.3; ch 7 s 7.2.1.2. See also ch 8 s 8.4. 
ch 5 s 5.2.1; ch 7 s 1 2 .2 3 .  See also ch 8 s 8.5.
"^ 0 ch 4 s 4.2.1.
ch 5 s 5.2.1.
^^ 2 [2012] OJ C 326/47, part IV.
British Monarchy, ‘The Queen's role in C anada’
<www.royal.gov.uk/M onarchAndCommonwealth/Canada/TheQueensroleinCanada.aspx> accessed 15 
December 2012; Government o f  Canada, ‘Canada-United Kingdom Political R elations’ 
<www.canadaintemational.gc.ca/united_kingdom-royaume_uni/bilateral_relations_bilaterales/political- 
politiques.aspx?lang=eng> accessed 15 December 2012.
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Because the rights o f Kalaallit are not explicitly codified as ‘indigenous peoples’ rights’ in 
Greenlandic legislation, it is easier to understand their rights in relation to the rights o f another 
indigenous people, namely the Inuit of Canada. The rights of Canadian Inuit were chosen for the 
purposes of comparative analysis due to the close connection between the Kalaallit and the Nunavut 
Inuit. This is evidenced, inter alia, through historic ties and shared language, traditions and 
culture. Furthermore, the self-governing regions o f Greenland and Nunavut (Canada) collaborate 
with one another in many fields, including, inter alia, conservation o f marine life, fisheries research 
and operational defence.
Even though the Arctic region has traditionally been regarded as a region with unlimited 
natural wealth, which can be exploited without regard to the region’s indigenous inhabitants,^'*^ in 
recent decades the participation*'*^ o f indigenous representatives in governance systems and 
processes concerning the Arctic region has become essential due to indigenous self-governance 
arrangements.*'** Indeed, the principles guaranteeing indigenous participatory rights and the right 
to give ‘free, prior and informed consent’ are highly applicable to Inuit o f Canada and Greenland.*'*^ 
Consequently, all new policy initiatives concerning the Arctic should promote local bottom-up
*'*^  Inuit Circum polar Council (Canada) ‘IC C ’s Beginning’
<http://inuitcircum polar.com/section.php?ID=I5& Lang=En& Nav=Section> accessed 28 N ovem ber 2013. 
*'*^  eg M emorandum o f  Understanding between the Government o f  Canada, the Government o f  Nunavut, and 
the Government o f  Greenland for the Conservation and M anagem ent o f  Polar B ear Populations (2009); 
Memorandum o f  Understanding between Canada and Denmark on enhanced operational defence co ­
operation in the Arctic (2010); Memorandum o f  Understanding betw een Canada, G reenland and Denmark 
enhancing education and science cooperation in the Arctic (2012).
*'*^  Nuttall (n 39) 4.
Indeed, the principles guaranteeing indigenous participatory rights and the right to give ‘free, prior and 
informed consent’ are embraced by all international law instruments supporting indigenous peoples’ rights. 
See ch 3 s 3.4.2. The right to participate is derived from the right to self-determination, which is considered 
to be one o f  the founding principles o f  indigenous peoples’ rights. See eg W ard (n 16) 55.
*'** ch 4 s 4.2; ch 5 s 5.2. Although Denmark has been keen to highlight that the Government o f  Greenland is 
not an indigenous government per se, all members o f  the Parliam ent o f  Greenland and Government o f  
Greenland are o f  Inuit descent. D enm ark’s National report submitted in accordance with paragraph 15 (a) o f  
the Annex to Human Rights Council Resolution 5/1, para 97 
<www.fnforbundet.dk/media/34472/uprreportdenmarkpdf.pdf> accessed 15 June 2012.
*'*^  See eg Annika Bergman Rosamond, Perspectives on security in the Arctic area (Danish Institute for 
International Studies 2011) 63 <www.diis.dk/graphics/Publications/Reports2011/RP2011-09-Arctic- 
security_web.pdf>  accessed 12 M arch 2013.
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activities in order to give voice to people who are directly a f f e c t e d .T h e  existing self-governance 
systems are undoubtedly one of the reasons why Inuit want to ensure that their rights are adequately 
taken into account by the EU and other international actors in decisions affecting them. Indeed, 
Inuit consider themselves as ‘active and equal partners in policy-making and decision-making 
affecting Inuit [homeland]’.*^ *
It is noteworthy that the EU is in the process o f developing its Arctic policy, which 
explicitly refers to Arctic indigenous peoples. However, the EU is not an Arctic State as such. 
Nor is the EU a member o f or an observer in the Arctic Council, which would give it any 
bargaining power in this Council.*^* However, because two EU Member States, Finland and 
Sweden, have a Sami population, the EU is claimed to have direct cultural ties to Arctic indigenous 
peoples.* '^* Because o f this, the EU institutions have acknowledged that the involvement o f 
indigenous peoples in policy making concerning the Arctic region, particularly in issues affecting 
their rights, must be promoted. In the context o f the EU’s application to become an observer of
the Arctic Council*^^ in 2012, EU’s High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, 
Catherine Ashton made a statement that ‘[t]he EU wants to make a positive contribution to the
Bergman Rosamond (n 149) 63.
Circumpolar Inuit Declaration on Resource Development Principles in Inuit Nunaat, art 4.1. 
<http://inuit.org/en/about-icc/icc-declarations.html> accessed 12 N ovem ber 2013.
Commission, ‘The European Union and the arctic region’ (Communication) COM (2008) 763 final, para 
1; Commission, ‘Developing a European Union Policy tow ards the Arctic Region: progress since 2008 and 
next steps’ (Communication) JOIN (2012) 19 final.
Michael Laiho, ‘Building common interests in the Arctic: the E U ’s Energy Security Strategy in 2012 and 
beyond’ in Andreas M aurer and Bettina R udloff (eds). The European Union and the High North: Interests, 
Instruments and Policies (Nomos Publishers 2013).
*5^* ibid
See eg Council, ‘Conclusions on Arctic issues’ 2985th Foreign Affairs Council M eeting (8 Decem ber 
2009) <www.consilium .europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/EN/foraff/111814.pdf> accessed 15 
February 2010; Parliament, Resolution on a sustainable EU policy for the High N orth (20 January 2011) 
<www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+TA+P7-TA-2011 - 
00244-0+DOC-t-XML-t-V0//EN> accessed 29 June 2011.
Although the EU has applied for an observer status, its application has thus far been unsuccessful. See 
Joint Statement by EU H i ^  Representative Catherine Ashton and EU Commissioner M aria Damanaki 
regarding Arctic Council decision on EU's observer status (15 M ay 2013) 
<www.consilium .europa.eu/uedocs/cm s_Data/docs/pressdata/EN/fbraffil37127 .pdf> accessed 19 June 
2013.
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cooperation between the Arctic states and take into account the needs o f indigenous and local 
communities inhabiting Arctic areas’.
However, although the EU could be claimed to have direct cultural ties to the Sami o f 
Finland and Sweden, the President o f the Finnish Sami Parliament noted in 2011 that the 
opportunities o f the Sami to influence the EU decision making were virtually non-existent in the 
absence o f consistent and systematic dialogue between the Sami Parliament and the EU 
institutions.*^* Despite the lack o f regular dialogue the Commission acknowledges that EU policies 
in areas, such as environment, climate change, energy, research, transport and fisheries are likely 
to have a direct bearing on the Arctic.*^^ It also appears that the impact o f the EU’s activities and 
interests in the Arctic is likely to extend well beyond the borders o f the two northernmost EU 
Member States inhabited by the Sami, considering that some programme funding benefiting the 
Sami of Nordic countries is already directed ‘to some extent [to the Sami population] in Russia’.*^® 
Similarly, other EU programmes, such as the ‘Northern Periphery Programme’, extend beyond the 
EU borders to Greenland, Iceland and Norway.*^*
The fact that EU policies are likely to have an impact on Arctic indigenous peoples is 
critical for the purposes o f this thesis since most o f these peoples live outside the EU’s jurisdiction 
and thus, have no connection to the EU. However, changes caused by climate change, such as the 
melting o f sea ice and subsequent developments in the Arctic region due to this, are anticipated to
High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Catherine Ashton in Commission, 
‘Knowledge, responsibility, engagement: the EU outlines its policy for the A rctic’ (3 July 2012) Press release 
<http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-12-739_en.htm?locale=en> accessed 7 February 2014.
*^ * Suoma Sâmedikki Sagadoalli (Blog o f President o f  Sami Parliam ent in Finland, K lemetti Nâlâkkâlâjarvi) 
<http://klemetti.blogspot.eom/2011/01/vuoden-alun-tunnelmia.html> accessed 19 September 2011. The 
Finnish Sami Parliam ent is the representative body for Sami in Finland. Its responsibilities include, inter alia, 
m atters relating to Sami languages and culture, their status as an indigenous people and distribution o f  the 
funds. It sponsors bills and releases statements on matters that fall under its jurisdiction. Arctic Centre, ‘The 
Sami Parliam ent-Sam ediggi’ <www.arcticcentre.org/lnEnglish/RESEARCH/Arctic-research-in- 
Finland/lnstitutions/Associations-and-offices/Sam i-parliament> accessed 14 M arch 2014.
*5^  COM (2008) 763 final, para 1.
*^ ° ibid
*^ * See Commission, ‘The inventory o f  activities in the framework o f  developing a European Union Arctic 
Policy’ (S taff W orking Document) SWD (2012) 182 final, para 1.2.
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have a negative impact on indigenous peoples and animal species inhabiting marine regions in 
Greenland, Canada, Alaska and Russia. For this reason the EU has acknowledged that it needs 
to engage with Arctic indigenous populations, both inside and outside the EU.*^* In 2012 the 
Commission reviewed the progress concerning the EU Arctic Policy and noted that:
[t]he EU engagement towards indigenous peoples takes place in the context of 
the .. .[UNDRIP], the adoption o f which was supported by the EU. The EU seeks to 
integrate human rights, including indigenous issues, into all aspects o f its external 
policies, including its political dialogues with third countries and regional 
organisations, and multilateral fora such as the United Nations, and by providing 
financial support.*^
It appears that the EU is prima facie committed to respect international law on indigenous 
peoples under the UNDRIP by engaging in a dialogue with Arctic indigenous peoples, the States 
where these peoples live and various organisations such as the UN.*^  ^How these rights are applied 
in practice is subject to Chapter 3.
1.4.1 The EU as a global actor in issues concerning the environment
Before evaluating whether it is appropriate for the EU to take decisions concerning the 
Arctic indigenous peoples inhabiting the regions outside the EU on the grounds o f animal welfare, 
it is important to investigate the EU’s role o f a global leader and ethical consumer in a range of 
societal and environmental issues. This is relevant for the purposes o f this thesis because the EU’s 
unilateral adoption o f the seal products legislation raises questions whether the Panel’s decision in 
EC-Seal Products^^ authorised the globalisation o f the EU’s regulatory standards when it held that
SWD (2012) 182 final, para 1.2. For instance, the opening up o f  new shipping routes from the Atlantic 
and Pacific Oceans through the Arctic Ocean may have some negative impacts on the Arctic even the positive 
impacts are numerous. The new shipping routes could, for instance, considerably shorten current sea 
journeys, save energy, reduce emissions, promote trade and diminish pressure on the main trans-continental 
navigation channels, ibid para 2.3 
ibid para 1.2. 
ibid 
*^ 5 ch 3 s 3.6.1.
EC-Seal Products (n 69).
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the EU legislation was ‘necessary’ to protect public morals; whether this was appropriate, and did 
it ensure that the decision in EC-Seal Products^^’ will not encourage other countries to adopt 
measures, which can be argued to contribute to a ‘disguised protectionism or regulatory 
imperialism’,*^ * but are ‘shielded’ by the public morals defence.*^^
The seal products legislation demonstrates that the EU can be seen to influence 
jurisdictions outside its borders by imposing sustainability criteria or certification requirements on 
various products imported into its markets.’^ ** By doing so, the EU attempts to influence behaviour 
in its trading partners by adopting measures that aim to affect various types o f environmental, social 
and economic consequences o f activities, which the EU considers harmful despite the fact that they 
are confined to certain area outside the EU’s jurisdictions.*’* Indeed, the EU has adopted a number 
o f similar measures, which rely on the dynamics o f international trade to influence developments 
at the global level and to push for compliance with the EU’s standards. In addition to seal products, 
the EU has addressed a wide range o f issues during the past decade, including chemical safety;*’  ^
biofuels;*’* safety and security o f shipping and the prevention o f marine pollution;*’'* trade in
*^ ’ EC-Seal Products (n 69).
See eg Emanuela Orlando, ‘The evolution o f  EU policy and law  in the environmental field: achievements 
and current challenges’ Transworld w orking paper 21, 10 (April 2013)
<www.iai.it/pdfiTransworld/TW _W P_21.pdf> accessed 12 N ovem ber 2013.
*^  ^ See eg Robert Howse, Joanna Langille and Katie Sykes, ‘Animal Welfare, public morals and trade: the 
W TO Panel Report in EC-Seal Products’ American Society o f  International Law 18(2) (29 January 2014) 
<www.asil.org/insights/volume/18/issue/2/animal-welfare-public-morals-and-trade-wto-panel-report-ec- 
%E2%80% 93-seal-products> accessed 4 M arch 2014.
*’° s 2 .3 .
*’* See eg Laurens Ankersmit, Jessice C Lawrence and Gareth T Davies, ‘Diverging EU and WTO 
perspectives on extraterritorial process regulation’ (2012) M innesota J Inti L, 11-12 
<http://ssm.com/abstract=2007098> accessed 28 July 2013.
*”  Regulation N o 1907/2006 o f  18 December 2006 concerning the Registration, Evaluation, Authorisation 
and Restriction o f  Chemicals (R EA C H )... [2006] OJ L 396/1.
Directive 2009/28/EC o f  the European Parliament and o f  the Council o f  23 April 2009 on the promotion 
o f  the use o f  energy from renewable sources [2009] OJ L 140/16.
*’'* eg in the context o f  International Maritime Organisation. See Judith van Leeuwen and Kristine Kern, ‘The 
external dimension o f  European Union marine governance: institutional interplay between the EU and the 
International M aritime O rganization’ (2013) 13(1) Global Environmental Politics 69.
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illegally logged timber;*’* toxic wastes; and waste electronic equipment.*’* Additionally, the 
extension of the EU’s Emission Trading Scheme to the aviation sector is one of the EU’s most 
visible attempts to unilaterally influence the policies and norms on climate change at the global 
level.*”
It has been suggested that due to its own strict environmental policies the EU has a strong 
incentive to export its environmental standards to other jurisdictions.*’* Indeed, through the 
adoption o f various trade measures the EU has moved from addressing these issues at the 
multilateral level to bilateral or even unilateral level. This can be argued to result from slow 
progress in many policy areas at the multilateral fora.*’  ^ However, the EU’s unilateral action 
nevertheless raises questions whether and to what extent this is an effective way o f dealing with 
global problems.**® It further raises questions as to what extent a unilaterally driven globalisation 
o f the EU’s standards is an appropriate objective underlying genuine societal and environmental 
interests; and ultimately, how it can be ensured that the EU’s actions do not encourage other 
jurisdictions to measures which contribute to a disguised protectionism or regulatory 
imperialism.***
Although it has been suggested that the EU’s role as a global leader in international 
environmental issues stems from strong environmental policies adopted by the EU institutions, it
*’* See Council Regulation (EC) N o 2173/2005 o f  20 December 2005 on the establishment o f  a FLEGT 
licensing scheme for imports o f  tim ber into the European Community [2005] OJ L347/1; Commission 
Regulation (EC) N o 1024/2008 o f  17 O ctober 2008 laying down detailed measures for the implementation 
o f  Council Regulation (EC) N o 2173/2005 on the establishment o f  a FLEGT licensing scheme for imports 
o f  tim ber into the European Community [2008] OJ L277/23.
*’* See eg Ludwig Kramer, ‘Seal killing, the Inuit and European Union Law ’ (2012) 21 (3) RECIEL 291, 
295.
*”  See eg Orlando (n 168) 10.
*’  ^ See W ade Jacoby and Sophie M eunier, ‘Europe and the management o f  globalization’ (2010) 17(3) 
Journal o f  European Public Policy 299, 309 <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13501761003662107> accessed 23 
M arch 2013.
*’  ^The meagre results o f  Rio+20 in 2012 could be argued to demonstrate that States have little political will 
to address issues where trade rules stand in conflict with environmental rules at the international level. See 
Kramer, ‘Seal killing, the Inuit and European Union L aw ’ (n 176) 294.
*^® See eg Orlando (n 168) 10. 
ibid
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appears that the matter is more complex since different actors within the EU have contributed to 
the shaping and development o f the EU’s environmental policies. The CJEU has certainly held an 
influential role in the development and consolidation o f the early EU environmental policy and 
legitimising EU internal and external action in the environmental field in the absence of an express 
competence in the Treaty.**’ The EU courts’ 1980s case law remarkably established that the 
protection of the environment ‘was one o f the essential objectives o f the EU’, which may limit the 
free moment o f goods.***
It has been argued that by promoting green policies the institutions have increased the 
popularity and legitimacy o f the EU in the eyes of citizens as this has demonstrated that in addition 
to promoting business interests, it also serves public interests.**"* From this point o f view it is easy 
to see why the institutions supported the ban on commercial seal products. However, critics also 
argue that despite its ‘green’ image and environmentally friendly policies, the EU has been slow in 
implementing its domestic environmental policies and complying with the global climate change 
targets under the Kyoto Protocol.*** Accordingly, these points could be argued to raise some doubts 
about the credibility of the EU as a ‘green actor’.***
Additionally, according to some critics, the image o f ‘Green Europe’ stems from the 
‘greenness’ o f certain individual Member States,**’ rather than the institutions. It is certainly true 
that due to the EU’s internal dynamics and due to the sheer number o f different interests involved, 
EU Member States do not always act uniformly.*** As the EU keeps expanding, there may be an
**^  See eg Orlando (n 168) 5.
*^ * See eg Case 240/83 Procureur de la République v Association de défense des brûleurs d ’huiles usages 
[1985] ECR 531, para 13; Case 302/86 Commission v Denmark [1988] ECR-4607, paras 8-9 (Danish bottles 
case).
*^"* See eg R  Daniel Kelemen, ‘Globalizing European Union environmental policy’ (2010) 17(3) Journal o f  
European Public Policy 335, 339-340 DOI: 10.1080/13501761003662065. -
*** Kyoto Protocol to the United N ations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 10 Dec 1997, UN Doc 
FCCC/CP/1997/7/Add. 1, 3 7 ILM 22 (1998)
*^ * A ndrea Lenschow and Carina Sprungk, ‘The myth o f  a  green E urope’ (2010) 48(1) JCMS 133,135. See 
also Ludwig Kramer, EU Environmental Law (7th edn, Sweet and Maxwell 2011).
*”  Lenschow and Sprungk (n 186) 139.
See eg Ankersmit and others (n 171) 46.
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increasing discrepancy between the environmental policy commitments o f diverse Member States, 
Therefore, although externally the EU may be committed to multilateralism at the international 
level, several disputes before the WTO have demonstrated that, on occasion. Member State policies 
have led to a conflict with international free trade rules in disputes involving, inter alia, asbestos,**® 
beef hormones,*®® genetically modified organisms*®* and most recently, seal products.*®’ Some of 
these disputes are further discussed in Chapter 7. The reason for these disputes frequently is that 
some EU Member States argue that they have good reasons to ban trade in products that they 
consider objectionable.*®*
In conclusion, it can be argued that the EU has frequently taken on a leadership role in 
promoting multilateral environmental agreements and by engaging in efforts to ‘green’ 
international institutions, such as the WTO.*®"* However, frustrated by the slow progress at the 
multilateral fora, the EU has attempted to remedy the failures of international negotiations by taking 
unilateral regulatory action. The EU’s unilateral adoption o f the seal products legislation raises 
questions whether the WTO authorised the globalisation o f the EU’s regulatory standards; did the 
Panel ensure that its decision does not trump the interests o f Canada and further it does not 
encourage other countries to adopt future measures, which contribute to a ‘disguised proteetionism 
or regulatory imperialism’,*®* but are effectively protected by the public morals defence.
189 W TO: European Communities: Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing Products-Report 
o f the Appellate Body (5 April 2001) W T/DS135/AB/R (EC-Asbestos AB).
190 W TO: European Communities: European Communities-Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products- 
Report o f the Appellate Body (16 January 1998) W T/SD26/AB/R.
191 W TO: European Communities: Measures affecting the approval and marketing o f  biotech products- 
Report o f the Panel (20 M ay 2003) W T/DS291-W T/DS293 (EC-Biotech).
*®’ EC-Seal Products (n 69).
*^ * See eg Ankersmit and others (n 171) 46.
*®"* The EU  is signatory to more than 40 multilateral environmental agreements, and has had a prom inent role 
in the international climate change policy negotiations. Lenschow and Sprungk (n 186) 139. See eg Kelemen 
(n 184).
*^ * See eg Orlando (n 168) 10.
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1.4.2 Should the EU take decisions concerning Inuit?
In the context o f the arguments that the WTO approved the unilateral imposition o f the 
EU’s standards on its trading partners as it upheld the EU’s public morals defence, a question arises 
why should the EU make decisions affecting Arctic indigenous peoples who live outside the EU’s 
jurisdiction? From an Arctic inhabitant’s point o f view, the EU is too remote to take decisions 
affecting the local level. For instance, the EU’s decision concerning conservation o f wolves within 
the territory o f EU Member States demonstrates that the EU’s approach of ‘one-size-fits-alF may 
not be appropriate in all cases. Local populations’ dissatisfaction with the EU’s decision to conserve 
wolves under the Habitats Directive*®* has caused heated debate in Sweden and Finland.*®’ The 
top-down imposition o f EU policy, which allows little flexibility at the State, regional or local level 
in this area, has led to illegal hunting o f wolves, especially in Finland.*®* Consequently, the 
incompatibility o f Finnish and Swedish wolf-hunting policies with EU law has resulted in 
infringement proceedings against both Member States.*®® Although under the Habitats Directive 
wolves are considered as a protected species, residents in rural areas disagree on their classification 
as such because wolves cause considerable financial damage to farmers and reindeer herders by 
preying on their livestock and other domestic animals.’®® Therefore, local populations question the
*^ * Council Directive 92/43/EEC o f  21 M ay 1992 on the conservation o f  natural habitats and o f  wild fauna 
and flora [1992] OJ L 206/7 (Habitats Directive).
*”  See eg Jukka Bisi and Sami Kurki, The Wolf Debate in Finland: expectations and objectives for the 
management o f  the wolf population at regional and national level (University o f  Helsinki 2008); Jan Darpo, 
‘Brussels advocates Swedish grey wolves: on the encounter between species protection according to Union 
Law and the Swedish w olf policy’ (2011) 8 European Policy Analysis 1
<www.jandarpo.se/upload/2011_8epa_2.pdf> accessed 28 January 2013; Suvi Borgstrom, ‘Legitimacy 
issues in Finnish w olf conservation’ J Environmental Law (2012) doi: 10.1093/jel/eqs015.
*^ * Borgstrom (n 197).
*®® Case C-342/05 Commission v Finland [2007] ECR 1-04713, para 47. The ECJ found that Finland failed 
to fulfil its obligations under arts 12(1) and 16(l)(b) o f  the H abitats Directive by authorising w olf hunting on 
a preventive basis, w ithout establishing that the hunting was aimed at preventing ‘serious dam age’ w ithin the 
meaning o f  art 16(l)(b). On the situation o f  Sweden see Jan Darpo (n 197).
’®® See Borgstrom (n 197); B isi and Kurki (n 197); Anneli Pohjola and Jam o Valkonen (eds), Poronhoitajien 
hyvinvoinnin uhat ja  avun tarpeet (Lapland UP 2012) 24-25
<www.doria.fi/bitstream/handle/10024/87897/Porohoitajien_hyvinvoinnin_uhatJa_avun_tarpeet.pdf7sequ 
ence= l> accessed 18 Decem ber 2013.
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legitimacy of the EU to decide on the conservation of wolves in their territory without taking into 
account their opinions or the local, cultural, ecological and social conditions in each Member State.
As the EU’s competence has gradually increased, the decisions made by the EU institutions 
affect a growing number o f people and their everyday lives both within and outside the EU. 
Consequently, criticism of EU decision making has increased. It has been argued that a series o f 
political events, including the French and Dutch rejection of the Constitutional Treaty’®* in 2005 
and the Irish dismissal of the Treaty o f Lisbon’®’ in 2008, suggest that the EU faces a severe 
legitimacy crisis, which results from ‘the gap between the level o f public support for European 
integration and the scope o f EU policy-making by the ‘Brussels elite’.’’®* Many o f the EU’s 
legislative decisions can be argued to be reactive, rather than proactive, ‘with a striking lack o f time 
and energy devoted to in-depth analysis o f the underlying issues and the consequences o f existing 
and proposed new legislation’.’®"*
The same way as the EU considers itself capable of setting the conservation agenda for 
wolves in the Nordic countries, it considers itself capable o f adopting legislation, which not only 
impacts trade in seal products in the EU, but adversely affects indigenous peoples’ rights and their 
everyday life. The problem with this is that although the EU considers that it balances the protection 
of seals fairly with the interests o f Inuit, these peoples are not part o f the EU nor do the seal 
populations in question fall within the EU’s jurisdiction. Therefore, the EU’s actions can be seen 
highly inappropriate. Although primafacie  the aim o f the EU legislation is to safeguard the interests 
o f Inuit by exempting their products from the general sale and import ban, it has been proven
’®* Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe [2004] OJ C310/1.
’®’ Treaty o f  Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing the European 
Community [2007] OJ C306/01.
’®* Lenschow and Sprungk (n 186) 133-134.
’°"* Beate Sjafjell, ‘Regulating companies as i f  the world matters: Reflections from the ongoing sustainable 
companies project’ (2012) N ordic and European Company Law W orking Paper N o 10-27, 133 
<http://ssm.com/abstract=1964213> accessed 12 September 2013.
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impossible for most indigenous peoples to benefit from this exemption.’®* Therefore, the questions 
arise whether the Inuit exemption fulfils the EU’s international obligations under the UN 
Declaration or the WTO Agreements. These questions are further addressed in Chapters 3, 7 and 
8 .
1.5 Methodology
The research methodology used in this thesis was informed primarily by doctrinal legal 
research and comparative legal research.’®* Doctrinal research provided the starting point for this 
project, which began with clarification and critical analysis o f the existing literature and 
commentary undertaken in the area. This included, inter alia, text books, journal articles, 
conference papers, newspaper reports and online information. While these secondary resources are 
not authoritative in doctrinal research, they may be persuasive.’®’ Primary sources (legislation and 
case law) were subsequently identified and analysed to determine what the existing law was and 
how it applied. Moreover, the analysis included establishing how relevant EU laws’®* were being 
developed in terms o f judicial reasoning and legislative enactment. In this context, the thesis also 
investigated the legislative proposals o f the Commission.’®® Additionally, the national legislation 
and legislative proposals on seal products, which provided impetus for the development o f the EU- 
wide seal products legislation, were analysed in detail.’*® In order to determine the overall objective
’®* Inuit applicants in the litigation before the CJEU argued that the requirem ents o f  the Implementing 
Regulation were ‘im practicable’. See Case T-18/10 R I I ITK v Parliament and Council [2010] ECR 11-235 
(Proceedings for interim measures 2).
’®* For an overview o f  doctrinal legal research method, see eg Terry Hutchinson, Researching and writing in 
law (2nd edn. Lawbook Co 2006); M ichael M cConville and W ing Hong Chui, Research methods fo r law 
(Edinburgh UP 2007,2010) 18-32; Dawn W atkins and M andy Burton, Research Methods in Law (Routledge 
2013). For comparative research methodology see eg Geoffrey Samuel, ‘Comparative law and its 
m ethodology’ in W atkins and Burton (n 206) 115.
’®’ McConville and Chui (n 206) 28.
’®^ eg the rules concerning access to justice under the previous amendments o f  the Treaty and legislation on 
seal products.
’0^  ch 2 s 2.2.
’ *0 ch 2 s 2.3.
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in undertaking the research, a tentative hypothesis was formulated. In delineating the scope of the 
topic, important terms were defined and jurisdictional focus was identified.
The doctrinal analyses enabled the use o f non-doctrinal research methods, namely problem, 
policy and law reform-based research.’** The problem-based research enabled assessment o f the 
problems affecting the law and policy underpinning, inter alia, the EU seal products legislation and 
private applicants’ access to justice before the CJEU.’*’ This included, inter alia, underlining the 
weaknesses in current policies and the rules determining the admissibility o f action before the 
CJEU by private applicants. This in turn enabled reaching a conclusion that current law may need 
to be amended or new rules may need to be enacted in order to ensure that indigenous peoples’ 
rights are taken seriously and that adequate procedures exist for addressing their concerns in cases 
where EU legislation has an adverse impact on them.’** The identification o f problems with the 
current policy and law also included a consideration o f impacts o f the existing EU laws on Inuit, 
particularly those inhabiting Canada.’*"*
Due to growing internationalisation o f law and the impacts of the EU seal products 
legislation in Canada and Greenland, the comparative legal analysis was identified as appropriate 
research method for this thesis. This approach can provide a broad range of solutions to barriers 
and differences in legal approaches by examining principles and rules originating in a legal order 
o f another jurisdiction.’** Although comparative studies have frequently been justified in terms o f 
the benefit for national legal systems,’** there is a tradition o f using comparative methods in aspects 
o f both EU and international law.’*’ Although generally many courts may be cautious to cite foreign
’** McConville and Chui (n 206) 19.
’*’ ch 6 ss 6.2-6.2.2.
’ ** ch 6 s 6.2.2.
’*"* See eg ch 2 s 2.6.1; ch 6 s 6.2.2; ch 7 ss 1 2 .2 3  and 7.4.
’** Koen Lenaerts, ‘Interlocking legal orders in the European Union and comparative law ’ (2003) 52(4) ICLQ 
873.
’** M ost comparative studies have focused on comparing aspects o f  different national legal systems. 
McConville and Chui (n 206) 87; Robert Cryer and others, Research Methodologies in EU and International 
Law (Hart 2011)28.
’*’ See eg Cryer and others (n 216) 12; M cConville and Chui (n 206) 88.
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precedents explicitly, there is an increasing trend among judiciary to refer to decisions by other 
jurisdictions.’** For instance, the judgments o f the CJEU and the Opinions of the Advocates- 
General frequently use comparative analysis in interpreting EU law despite containing very little 
explicit references to comparative law.’*® This is because the CJEU is often required to investigate 
the legal orders o f one or more Member States, third countries or the international legal order to 
establish the rule o f law in the EU legal order.” ® Considering that the EU legal system itself is a 
mixed jurisdiction,” * bringing together 28 Member States’ legal systems under a single 
legislature,’”  it is almost impossible for the CJEU not to adopt a comparative approach in its case 
law.” *
However, the purpose o f comparison in this thesis is not to import foreign solutions, but to 
find guidance, inspiration and enlightenment in developing the interpretation o f EU law.” "* 
Comparative law methodology acknowledges that law operates within the distinctive legal culture 
o f each jurisdiction.” * According to Cotterrell, culture plays a fundamental role in understanding 
the meaning o f aspects of law in other jurisdictions.” * Consequently, ‘any aspect o f any legal 
system -  concept, category, rule, institution -  must be understood within its particular legal culture 
itself situated within the wider culture o f the relevant society’.’”  Therefore, comparative studies
Groppi and Ponthoreau (n 108) 422.
Lenaerts, ‘Interlocking legal orders’ (n 215) 874. The Court frequently refer to term s such as ‘legal 
traditions’ or ‘constitutional traditions’ common to all (or at least several) M em ber States.
” ® ibid 873.
” * It is noteworthy that although the EU is a non-State legal entity and EU law can be perceived as ‘a species 
o f  international law ’, the case law o f  the ECJ indicates that it perceives the EU legal order as i f  it were that 
o f  a State. See Cryer and others (n 216) 20 referring to Case T -315/01 Kadi v Council and Commission [2005] 
ECR 11-3649.
Helle Tegner Anker, A nita Ronne and Birgitte Egelund Olsen, Legal systems and wind energy: a 
comparative perspective (K luwer Law  International 2009) 47-48; W illiam Tetley, ‘M ixed jurisdictions: 
common law vs civil law (codified and uncodified) (Part I)’ (1999) 3 Uniform Law Review /  Revue de droit 
uniforme 591 <w ww.unidroit.org/english/publications/review/articles/1999-3-tetleyl-e.pdf> accessed 27 
Novem ber 2013.
” * Lenaerts, ‘Interlocking legal orders’ (n 215) 874.
” "* Groppi and Ponthoreau (n 108) 422.
” * W atkins and Burton (n 206) 2.
” * Roger Cotterrell, ‘Comparative law  and legal culture’ in M athias Reinm ann and Reinhard Zimmermann 
(eds) The O ff or d  Handbook o f  Comparative Law (OUP 2006) 710.
Samuel (n 206) 103.
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should avoid giving an impression o f superiority o f one legal system over other.” * Rather, 
comparison could be based on, inter alia, the suggestion that the longer history o f one court in 
certain type of litigation may be informative for another court.” ®
It appears that several courts in non-European jurisdictions, particularly Australia, Canada, 
South Africa and Mexico, increasingly rely on the decisions o f the ECtHR in the context o f their 
decisions concerning human rights.’*® Although the reasons explaining this are varied, some of the 
likely explanations include the long-standing democratic and human rights-oriented traditions of 
European countries, the accessibility o f decisions due to common language and the specific area of 
law (human rights), which is perceived more fertile soil for external reference.’** Indeed, rather 
strikingly the explicit citations of foreign precedents by courts are generally limited to a handful o f 
countries in the English speaking world.’*’ One reason for this could be similar cultural and legal 
features and the lack o f linguistic and cultural barriers.’**
Additionally, comparative analysis can be used to reduce problems resulting from conflicts 
o f law arising from the overlap in the social and economic environment impacted by different legal 
orders (eg the EU and UN Conventions).’*"* It can be used to analyse the facilitation o f international 
trade involving non-State legal entities, such as the WTO (eg recognition between the EU and 
WTO) or harmonisation o f more than one legal system (eg the relationship between the EU and its 
Member States).’** In these three situations the integration between the EU and Member States 
legal systems is the strongest, with the highest degree o f interconnectedness between them. Thus, 
comparing EU law and the rules o f the WTO or the Canadian legal system is likely to be more
” * Hutchinson (n 206); W atkins and Burton (n 206) 2; Cryer and others (n 216) 29.
Cryer and others (n 216) 29 discussing Rachel Murray, ‘A comparison between the African and European 
Courts o f  Human R ights’ (2002) 2 African Human Rights Journal 195.
’*° Groppi and Ponthoreau (n 108) 420.
’** N avot (n 108) 132-133; Groppi and Ponthoreau (n 108) 422.
’*’ Groppi and Ponthoreau (n 108) 422.
’** ibid 420.
’*"* According to Cryer and others, there is no direct interaction between legal systems in this case, merely 
overlap. Cryer and others (n 216) 22.
’** Cryer and others (n 216) 22. See also McConville and Chui (n 206) 88.
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difficult than comparing the EU legal system with its Member States’ legal systems. Indeed, in 
general like-to-like comparison o f different jurisdictions is difficult because jurisdictions rarely 
share the same understanding o f terms which are common in more than one discipline.” * Therefore, 
rather than comparing different legal systems at a general level, the comparison should be between, 
inter alia, different methods o f statutory interpretation, styles o f codification, techniques of 
legislation, diverse ways o f resolving conflicts, styles in judicial opinion, or the authority o f 
precedents within each system.’*’ According to the comparative approach, a common platform can 
be constructed for comparison similarities and differences o f a given legal concept in two or more 
legal systems.’**
Some disagreement exists among scholars whether comparison should focus on the 
similarities or differences. According to Zweigert and Kotz, a presumption o f similarity is ‘the 
basic methodological principle o f all comparative law’ because only those things, which fulfil the 
same function, are comparable.’*® Therefore, the presumption o f similarity functions as a means o f 
examining the results.’"*® If  the results demonstrate great differences, the terms in which the original 
question was posed can be revisited in order to evaluate whether they were purely functional, and 
whether the net o f researches was wide enough.’"** However, this view has been contested on the 
grounds that comparison is about identifying diversity in law and therefore, it involves the 
presumption of difference.’"*’ For this reason, this thesis investigates both the similarities and 
differences between, inter alia, the principle o f ‘fair balance’ in the context o f three justificatory 
tests identified in section 1.3.1. Yet, this thesis acknowledges that despite similarity, the principle 
o f ‘fair balance’ is used differently in each legal system. Hence, the direct applicability o f decisions
’** W atkins and Burton (n 206) 2; Cryer and others (n 216) 28.
’*’ Konrad Zweigert and Hein Kotz, An Introduction to Comparative Law (Tony W eir tr, 3"^ * edn, OUP 1998) 
4; Samuel (n 206) 103.
’** Samuel (n 206) 110.
’*^  Zweigert and K otz (n 237) 40.
ibid 4-5.
’"** ibid
’"*’ Pierre Legrand and Roderick M unday (eds). Comparative Legal Studies: Traditions and Transitions (CUP 
2003) 272.
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involving the Sparrow test in Canadian case law is impossible before the CJEU. However, the 
longer history o f Canadian courts in the aboriginal and treaty rights litigation could be informative 
for the CJEU in its decisions concerning Inuit.
Under the comparative approach, different methods exist for understanding the similarities 
and differences. However, because the relevant question in the context o f comparative methods is: 
‘what new knowledge is likely to emerge from the comparison’,” * simple causal explanation of the 
similarities and differences may not necessarily give rise to new knowledge.’"*"* Therefore, 
understanding and knowledge may require recourse to other approaches, such as the structural, 
functional and dialectical methods.’"** The structural approach envisages the concept under 
investigation as consisting o f a range o f elements, which operate as a system whose interaction 
provides of itself relevant knowledge.’"** The functional model provides understanding by reference 
to a social role o f the concept being compared.’"*’ In this context, it may be useful to investigate 
what is the function of the chosen concept in each system and to what extent this function provides 
a basis for understanding it as an item of knowledge.’"** The dialectical method can be adopted to 
examine the controversies and debates surrounding the use of a given concept in different legal 
systems.’"*®
To facilitate research activities, a small number o f materials was used in several European 
languages.’*® In this context, I have undertaken the translation o f any foreign language materials 
used for this thesis myself. Consequently, the thesis crosses the boundaries between the common 
law system of Canada’** and the European civil law systems in use in Denmark, Finland, Belgium,
’"** Cryer and others (n 216) 28.
’"*4 Samuel (n 206) 111.
” * ibid 
’"** ibid 
” 7 ibid 
’"*» ibid 
249 ibid
’*® including Dutch, Danish, Finnish, French, Norwegian, Spanish and Swedish.
’** With the exception o f  Quebec, Canada’s criminal and civil law has its basis in English comm on and 
statutory law.
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the Netherlands and Norway. Due to the international focus o f this research, the materials I have 
relied upon include EU primary law (eg the Treaties and the Charter o f Fundamental Rights) and 
secondary legislation; national legislation o f EU Member States, non-EU Member States (Norway) 
and self-governing regions outside the EU (Greenland); Canadian legislation (including the 
Treaties conducted between the federal government and indigenous peoples o f Canada); 
international environmental agreements; international law instruments and national legislation 
protecting indigenous peoples’ rights; international and regional human rights law; case law o f the 
international and regional human rights courts and bodies; case law o f the CJEU, the Supreme 
Court of Canada, the Federal Court o f Canada, the Supreme Court o f British Columbia and the 
WTO dispute settlement bodies. Additionally, I have consulted several secondary sources, which 
are included in the bibliography at the end o f thesis.
1.6 Structure o f the thesis
This thesis is organised in the following way: the EU legislation on seal products, the Inuit 
exemption, its practical implementation and anticipated impacts on Inuit are discussed in Chapter 
2; indigenous peoples’ rights under international and national law are examined in Chapters 3-5; 
the two legal challenges initiated by Inuit before the CJEU are explored in Chapter 6; and the legal 
challenge against the EU initiated by Canada before the WTO is analysed in Chapter 7.’*’ In order 
to demonstrate how these chapters contribute to the argument, each chapter is discussed in more 
detail in the following sections.
2*2 In addition to Canada, Norway challenged the EU legislation. Since the focus o f  this thesis are the rights 
o f  Inuit o f  Canada and Greenland, N orw ay’s arguments are not discussed in full details in this thesis. See 
W T/DS401/5 European Communities-Measures Prohibiting the Importation and Marketing o f  Seal Products 
(Request for consultations by Norway).
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1.6.1 The EU legislation on seal products (Chapter 2)
Chapter 2 helps answering the primary research question by investigating the provisions of 
the EU seal products legislation. The legislative history o f this legislation reveals that a specific 
Inuit exemption was included in the legislation at the national level based on the EU’s 1980s 
approach towards products originating from seal pups.” * Since the institutions have maintained 
that the EU legislation balances welfare o f seals and the interests o f Inuit because it exempts 
indigenous peoples from the general sale and import b an ” "* Chapter 2 analyses the implementation 
o f the Inuit exemption’** and its anticipated impacts on Inuit and welfare of seals outside the EU.’** 
Additionally, Chapter 2 investigates the EU’s arguments why it felt compelled to enact a general 
sale and import ban on seal products. This is done by examining the EU’s written submissions to 
the WTO where the EU stated that the legislation was based on moral concerns of EU citizens.’*’ 
Therefore, Chapter 2 identifies the ethical approaches underpinning the EU legislation. It is worth 
noting that some ethical approaches towards animals consider that any exemptions for indigenous 
peoples in wildlife laws are incompatible with the aim of protecting animals from various types of 
harm inflicted by humans.’** Although the EU legislation does not advocate, for instance, the rights- 
based view, there are certain elements in the legislation, which suggest that indigenous economic 
rights are incompatible with the protection of animals.’*® Lastly, Chapter 2 investigates whether 
reliable trade statistics exist, which could demonstrate that the adverse impact on Inuit emerged as 
a result of the EU Member legislation.’*®
1.6.2 The rights guaranteed to indigenous peoples in international law (Chapter 3)
’** ch 2 ss 2.2 and 2.4.
2^ 4 See E U ’s second submission to the WTO (n 68) para 208: the legislation ‘balances the welfare o f  seals 
w ith the interests o f  Inuit’.
2** ch 2 s 2.3.
2*6 ch 2 s 2.6.
2*7 ch 2 s 2.5.
2** ch 2 s 2.5.2.
2*9 ibid 
260 ch 2 s 2.7.
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The role o f Chapter 3 in answering the main research question is that it assesses whether 
the EU respects indigenous peoples’ rights under international law. Therefore, Chapter 3 
investigates the extent to which the instruments codifying indigenous peoples’ rights are binding 
on the institutions and enforceable before the CJEU. As a minimum these measures are considered 
to include the UN Declaration to which the EU has referred to in the seal products legislation.’** 
However, the Declaration has been understood to codify customary international law and other 
legally binding international law instruments, such as the ILO Convention 169 and the ICCPR. 
Since all EU Member States are parties to the ICCPR, the decisions o f the Human Rights 
Committee under the provisions of this Covenant can be argued to carry great deal o f weight within 
the EU Member States.’*’ Therefore, these instruments together with the UNDRIP guarantee 
several customary international law rights, which are aimed at preserving, inter alia, indigenous 
livelihoods and self-sufficiency.
To assess whether the balance between the protection o f seals and the rights o f Inuit to sell 
their products in commercial market place is fair. Chapter 3 focuses specifically on those 
international law instruments, which support the indigenous participatory rights and the right to 
engage in economic activities.’** Since the EU has recognised that the interests o f Arctic indigenous 
peoples should be taken into account in its future policy for the Arctic region,’*"* it has expressed 
its commitment to strengthen and implement relevant international law instruments, including the 
UNDRIP.’** The implications o f this are that if  the seal products legislation was drafted without
’** Regulation 1007/2009, preamble, recitals 14-15.
’*’ For similar arguments in the context o f  the ECtHR, see Koivurova (n 100).
2** ch 3 s 3.4.1.
2*4 Although no uniform definition o f  the term ‘A rctic’ exists, in this thesis, the notion ‘Arctic region’ covers 
the area around the N orth Pole north o f  the Arctic Circle, including the Arctic Ocean and territories o f  the 
eight Arctic states: Canada, Denmark (Greenland), Finland, Iceland, Norway, Russia, Sweden and the US. 
COM (2008) 763 final, para 1.
265 ch 1 s 1.4.2.
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adequate participation o f relevant indigenous peoples, the balance between the rights of Inuit and 
the protection o f seals cannot be argued to be fair.
1.6.3 Indigenous peoples’ rights in Canada and Greenland (Chapters 4-5)
Chapters 4-5 identify the relevant legislation in force both in Greenland and the Inuit 
regions o f Canada under which the rights of Inuit are protected. In order to answer the primary 
research question, these chapters investigate how far Canadian and Greenlandic law regulate the 
seal hunting activities o f Inuit in the interest o f animal welfare.’** The way in which these rights 
are balanced with the protection o f seals at the national or regional level is important because the 
EU has criticised Canada for being unable to restrict the use o f cruel hunting practices because this 
may interfere with indigenous rights.’*’ Despite explicitly acknowledging that the EU legislation 
did not regulate the hunting o f seals outside the EU nor was it aimed at reducing cruelty of 
indigenous hunting practices because these practices do not raise moral concerns the same way as 
the practices used during commercial hunting do,’** the EU argued before the WTO, inter alia, that 
animal welfare legislation was not properly enforced and monitored in Canada and that Inuit were 
exempted from the animal welfare requirements outlined in Canadian legislation.’*® Therefore, the 
purpose o f Chapters 4-5 is to show that the national legislators are the appropriate authorities to 
decide how indigenous peoples’ rights and animal welfare should be balanced at national level. 
Since, the existing legislation in force in Canada and Greenland determines the acceptable level of 
cruelty towards animals, national authorities are in the best position to decide which hunting 
methods are considered unacceptably cruel and thus, prevent the use o f such methods.
’** ch 4 s 4.5; ch 5 s 5.4.
’*’ ch 4 s 4.2.
2 * » c h 6 s 6 .3 .1 ;c h 7 s 7 .5 .
2*^  ch 4 s 4.2.
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Chapters 4-5 demonstrate that both in Canada and Greenland, indigenous rights to hunt 
seals are subject to general laws concerning, inter alia, firearms and humane killing o f wildlife.” ® 
Therefore, any hunting methods employed by Inuit may be restricted by the Canadian authorities 
should they be considered unacceptable.” * Similarly, any hunting methods, which are considered 
cruel, such netting, used primarily in exceptional circumstances in Greenland.” ’ Therefore, the 
EU’s arguments that Inuit are exempted from Canadian animal welfare requirements are incorrect. 
Because o f this, it is inappropriate for the EU to intervene with the protection o f indigenous 
peoples’ rights by enacting unnecessary obstacles on the exercise o f these rights, especially since 
Inuit o f Canada and Greenland live outside the EU’s jurisdiction. How the EU legislation may be 
viewed to constitute an infringement of indigenous rights is further explored in the context o f 
jurisprudence o f the Supreme Court o f Canada, which has established that any interference, which 
is ‘not significant’, constitutes a prima facie  infringement o f the rights o f indigenous peoples of 
Canada.” *
1.6.4 How is the conflict between the protection o f seals and indigenous rights solved by the CJEU? 
(Chapter 6)
Since the sale o f sealskins and other wildlife products is one o f the primary economic 
activities o f Inuit, Chapter 6 investigates the conflict between this activity and the protection of 
seals outside the EU’s jurisdiction due to animal welfare concerns o f the EU citizens. This is done 
in the context of two legal disputes initiated by Inuit applicants fi-om Canada and Greenland before 
the CJEU.’”  Whilst the challenge against the Basic Regulation has been decided and the Courts’ 
conclusion is that the applicants lack standing to bring proceedings against this Regulation, an
” ® ch 4 s 4.5; ch 5 s 5.3.3.
” * ch 4 8 4.5.
ch 5 s 5.4.1.
” * ch 4 s 4.4.1.
” 4 Case T-18/10 ITK v Parliament and Council (EGG, 6 September 2011); Case T -526/10, ITK v Commission 
(EGC, 25 April 2013).
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appeal against the Implementing Regulation is still pending before the ECJ. One o f the main 
arguments in the appeal case against the Implementing Regulation is that the institutions did not 
strike a fair balance between the interests o f Inuit and the various objectives o f the EU legislation 
(ie the protection of seals from cruelty).” *
Whilst the EU does not wish to be seen to be infringing indigenous peoples’ rights,” * in 
practice, Inuit market access is subject to numerous conditions, which have rendered the Inuit 
exemption virtually unusable for the Inuit o f Canada.” ’ Therefore, the balance between the rights 
o f indigenous peoples to engage in their traditional economic activities and the protection o f seals 
cannot be argued to be fair. However, thus far, the decisions o f the CJEU have been very unhelpful 
since the Inuit applicants have been unable to access the CJEU due to the strict admissibility criteria 
governing the access o f private applicants to the court. Additionally, the Court has rejected all their 
claims concerning a breach o f fundamental rights under the ECHR due to insufficient evidence.” *
1.6.5 EC-Seal Products', trade dispute before the WTO (Chapter 7)
Whereas Chapter 6 focuses on the disputes before the CJEU, Chapter 7 concerns the 
international trade dispute before the WTO, EC-Seal Products Although the latter case did not 
involve Inuit as parties, its outcome is critical for this thesis because it demonstrates that the EU 
prioritises animal welfare concerns o f the EU citizens over the indigenous peoples’ right to engage 
in economic activities. In essence, the finding that the Panel considered the protection o f the EU
” * ch 6 s 6.3.1.
” * See eg the statements made by the EU ’s High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, 
Catherine Ashton, in ch 3 s 3.2.3; ch 7 s 7.4.
” ’ ch 7 s 7 .2 .23 . 
ch 6 s 6.1.
EC-Seal Products (n 69). In addition to Canada, N orway challenged the EU legislation. Since the focus 
o f  this thesis are the rights o f  Inuit o f  Canada and Greenland, N orw ay’s arguments are not discussed in full 
details in this thesis. See Request for consultations by N orway (n 252).
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public ‘moral concerns on seal welfare’’*® as consistent with the WTO Agreements means that the 
EU is, in principle, justified to adopt its legislation on seal products.’**
This can be argued to mean that if  the EU amends its legislation in such a way that no 
discrimination between imports and products originating from the EU and Greenland arise, it is 
consistent with the WTO Agreements.’*’ The implications o f this are potentially far-reaching since 
if  the ban and the strict conditions determining Inuit market access remain in place, they are likely 
to continue to impact Canadian Inuit adversely.’** Although the EU has indicated that it ‘will 
respect the outcome of on-going procedures regarding [the EU legislation] in the WTO’,’*"* both 
the EU and Canada have appealed the Panel decision. This means that the EU may not amend the 
seal products legislation in the foreseeable future. Thus, although the Panel decision necessitates 
the EU to amend its legislation to make it WTO compliant, the likelihood that it does not change 
its policy is nevertheless very real since the possibility not to amend the offending legislation is 
entirely permissible under the WTO system.
1.6.6 Conclusion (Chapter 8)
Chapter 8 summarises the findings o f Chapters 2-7 and concludes whether the EU balances 
fairly the protection o f seals and the rights o f Inuit to engage in economic activities. The 
proportionality o f the sale and import restrictions and the nature o f adjustments that Inuit have to 
make as a result o f the EU legislation are important because the EU’s decisions concerning the 
Arctic region affects approximately 155,000 Inuit across the circumpolar North.’** Although this
EC-Seal Products (n 69) para 7.382 and 7.443.
” * The Panel did not fully endorse the EU legislation because it found that the exemptions to the E U ’s sale 
and import ban violated the non-discrimination principles found in the W TO agreements.
ch 7 ss 7.2.1.3; 1 2 2 3  and 7.3.3. To comply with the Panel decision, the EU  must widen the scope o f  the 
exemptions under the seal products legislation (ch 2 s 2.3) in order to lift the restrictions on imported products. 
2*5 ibid
2*4 JOIN (2012) 19 final, para 2.2.
2*5 s i . 2 .2 .1.
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amounts to very small percentage o f people in a global scale, the EU has recognised itself that 
interests o f indigenous peoples are recognised broadly in international law.’** Therefore, it is 
questionable whether the EU has the balance right, if this means that in order to sell their products 
in the EU Inuit must adopt a complicated traceability system, which imposes a burden on them. If 
they do not have such a system in place, they face exclusion from the EU market. This is 
nevertheless problematic because the EU legislation can be argued to impose the EU’s animal 
welfare standards on its trading partners and thereby trump their understanding o f the acceptable 
level o f cruelty, considering that most existing animal welfare legislation allows the continued use 
of animals, provided that it is conducted humanely. Additionally, it means that the EU can be 
argued to violate indigenous peoples’ rights to engage freely in all economic activities under 
international law. This may eventually mean that Inuit are no longer able to support themselves, 
their families and their communities.
The consequences o f the CJEU and the WTO Panel coming to different conclusions about 
the objectives o f the seal products legislation are potentially vast for Inuit. The WTO dispute 
settlement Panel found ample evidence o f the inability o f the Canadian Inuit to access the EU 
market due to the EU legislation.’*’ It based its findings specifically on the practical application of 
the Inuit exemption by the Danish authorities, which enabled trade in seal products originating in 
Greenland on the EU market from the day when the Inuit exemption entered into force.’** In 
contrast, products from Inuit regions o f Canada have not benefited from similar treatment. In fact, 
the Panel’s findings concerning the Inuit exemption were the most significant part o f its analysis 
since they enable this thesis to conclude that the EU had no intention to make this exemption 
available for all potential beneficiaries.’*® Consequently, the practical implementation o f the Inuit
’** ch 7 s 12.1.2. 
’*’ ch 7 s 1.2.2.3. 
2** ch 6 s 6.1.
2*9 ch 7 s 1.2.2.3.
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exemption resulted in an inability o f Inuit of Canada to access the EU market.^^*  ^The Panel decision 
is highly unflattering to the EU because the institutions have repeatedly argued that the EU as a 
whole is committed to indigenous peoples’ rights under international law and that the EU wanted 
to ensure that the seal products legislation would not infnnge these rights.^^^
In contrast with the EC-Seal P r o d u c t s the CJEU found no evidence that the design and 
implementation o f the Inuit exemption infringed indigenous peoples’ rights. Although the EU can 
be argued to violate indigenous economic rights under international law because it has excluded 
Inuit o f Canada from the EU market,^^^ the CJEU did not consider that the institutions were wrong 
to adopt the seal products legislation. Therefore, the practical implementation o f indigenous 
peoples’ rights in EU policies fails Canadian Inuit despite numerous pledges by the institutions to 
recognise indigenous peoples’ rights under relevant international law instruments.
^  ch 7 s 7.5.
291 ch 7 s 7.4.
292 EC-Seal Products (n 69).
293 ch 7 s 1 2 2 3 .
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Chapter 2: EU Seal products legislation
2.1 Introduction
As noted in Chapter 1, this thesis investigates whether the EU achieves a fair balance 
between the protection of seals and the rights o f indigenous peoples to engage in economic 
activities. In its impact assessment accompanying the draft regulation for seal products, the 
Commission suggested that legislation should ‘maintain the balance between the animal welfare, 
economic and social d i m e n s i o n s I n  order to investigate how the EU achieves this balance 
Chapter 2 focuses on the legislative background o f the Basic Regulation.^^^ The contribution o f 
Chapter 2 to the research question is significant because the legislative history o f the Basic 
Regulation reveals the ethical approaches underlying the legislation as well as the origins o f the 
Inuit exemption.29^ It reveals that the EU’s policy on seals was assessed to have adverse impacts 
on Inuit, whereas its positive contribution to animal welfare outside the EU’s jurisdiction was 
considered less certain due to the diversion of seal products to other markets.^^’ These findings 
raise questions whether the EU took into account the conclusions o f its impact assessments in order 
to establish fair balance between the anticipated adverse impacts on Inuit and the potential 
contribution on seal welfare.
Chapter 2 begins with a brief overview of the existing legislation protecting seals within 
the EU.^^* It then analyses the Inuit exemption, the other two explicit exemptions as well as an 
implicit exemption to the general sale and import ban found in the context o f the seal products 
legislation.299 The analysis focuses on the implementation o f the Inuit exemption, which is the most
29'* Commission, ‘Proposal for a Regulation o f  the European Parliam ent and o f  the Council concerning trade 
in seal products’ COM  (2008) 469 final, 11.
295 s 2.4.
295 s 2.5.
297ss2.6-2.6.1.
298 s 2.2.1-2.2.3.
299 S 2.3.
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important exemption for the purposes of this thesis. Chapter 2 investigates the legislative history 
o f the Basic Regulation at the national and European l e v e l A l t h o u g h  EC-Seal Products^^^ is 
discussed in more detail in Chapter 7, Chapter 2 explores the EU’s arguments as to why the ban on 
seal products was ‘necessary’ for the protection o f public morals in the context o f this dispute.^®  ^
Additionally, Chapter 2 explores briefly whether the protection o f wildlife on ethical grounds 
conflicts with the indigenous economic activities o f hunting, trapping and reindeer herding.^°^ 
Lastly, this chapter considers the impact o f the EU legislation on Inuit in two reports commissioned 
by the EU institutions^®'  ^and the trade in sealskins originating from Greenland and Nunavut.^®^
2.2 Existing legislation on seals and seal products
2.2.1 The Habitats Directive and the Regulation implementing CITES
The seal products legislation builds upon the existing EU legislation on wild animals, 
namely (i) the Habitats Directive and (ii) Regulation 338/1997.^®® The former protects all seal 
species inhabiting the territory o f the EU Member States, whereas the latter regulates international 
trade by implementing the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Wild Flora and Fauna 
and Flora (CITES).^®  ^It is notable that both measures protect seals on the grounds o f conservation, 
rather than welfare. In respect o f seals, the primary objective o f the Habitats Directive is to maintain 
or improve the conservation status o f all seal species found in the EU, whereas the objective of 
Regulation implementing CITES is to prevent commercial exploitation of endangered species.
300 s 2.4.
30' EC-Seal Products (n 69).
302 s 2.5.
303 ss 2.5.1-2.5.2.
304 s 2 .6 .
305 s 2 .7 .
305 Council Regulation (EC) No 338/1997 of 9 December 1996 on the protection of species of wild fauna and 
flora by regulating trade implements on the territory of the Community [1996] OJ L61/1.
307 983 UNTS 243.
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The actual implementation and application o f these two measures depend on the 
conservation status o f each seal species falling within their scope. Crucially, neither o f these 
measures prohibits commercial activities originating from any seal species hunted in Canada nor 
Greenland. Nor do they regulate the methods o f hunting within the EU Member States, apart from 
the Habitats Directive, which stipulates that, inter alia, the use o f explosives, poisons and non- 
selective nets and traps is prohibited as appropriate killing methods for mammals.^®* Essentially, 
this aspect o f the Habitats Directive can be argued to be aimed at preventing animal cruelty by 
outlawing certain hunting methods, which can be considered inhumane. However, it does not 
prohibit, for instance, hunting of seals in open water.^ ®® It is also noteworthy that the Habitats 
Directive does not apply in Greenland because it is not subject to the European acquis, nor is 
Greenland party to the Bern Convention^^® implemented by this Directive. Greenland’s position as 
an autonomous part of Denmark and as an overseas territory of an EU Member State is further 
explored in Chapter 5.^"
2.2.2 Seal Pup Directive
The third existing EU conservation measure relating to seals is the Seal Pup Directive,^*^ 
adopted in 1983, which concerns the commercial trading of skins obtained from hooded seal 
(Cystophora cristata) and harp seal {Pagophilus ^oenlandicus) pups, which were hunted 
commercially in Atlantic Canada before 1987. The Seal Pup Directive can be argued to have been 
adopted primarily to address the vulnerable conservation status o f hooded seals, rather than to
3°8 H abitats Directive, annex VI(a).
3®9 See also ch 4 s 4.2.
3'° Convention on the Conservation o f  European W ildlife and Natural Habitats (1979 CETS N o 104).
3" ch 5 s 5.2. Greenland became a member o f  the EC when Denmark joined the Community on 1 January 
1973. A fter a  consultative referendum in 1982 Greenland chose to leave the EC with effect from 1 February 
1985. Folketinget, ‘EU-Oplysningen’ (Danish Parliam ent, ‘EU Information Centre’) <http://www.eu- 
oplysningen.dk/euo_en/spsv/all/17/>  accessed 4 June 2014.
3’2 Council Directive 83/129/EEC o f  28 M arch 1983 concerning the importation into M em ber States o f  skins 
o f  certain seal pups and products derived therefrom [1983] OJ L091/30 (Seal Pup Directive).
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prevent cruelty. This is evident from the Preamble to the Directive, which states that: ‘various 
studies have raised doubts concerning the population status of the harp and hooded seals and 
especially as to the effect o f non-traditional hunting on the conservation and population status of 
hooded seals’.
Article 1(1) o f the Seal Pup Directive requires that EU Member States ensure that products
derived from these seal pups ‘are not commercially imported into their territories’. The products
affected by the Directive are ‘[ra]w furskins and furskins, tanned or dressed, including furskins
assembled in plates, crosses and similar forms’ and any objects made o f such s k i n s Article 3 of
the Directive stipulates that the ban on commercial imports ‘only appl[ies] to products not resulting
from traditional hunting by the Inuit people’. Therefore, products of Inuit origin are exempted from
the general import ban. This is because ‘hunting, as traditionally practised by the Inuit people,
leaves seal pups unharmed and it is therefore appropriate to see that the interests of the Inuit people
are not affected.’ *^"* The Preamble further acknowledges that seal hunting is an important part of
indigenous way of life and economy:
the exploitation of seals and of other species, depending upon their capacity to 
withstand such exploitation and with due respect for the balance o f nature, is a 
natural and legitimate occupation and in certain areas of the world forms an 
important part of the traditional way of life and economy.
Since the Seal Pup Directive seemingly allows commercial imports o f products resulting 
from hunting activities of the Inuit, the question arises why does the EU think it is acceptable for 
Inuit to exploit skins from pups commercially, but not any other seal products? Despite the 
seemingly accommodating view towards indigenous economic activities under the Seal Pup 
Directive, Inuit have argued that the exemption in their favour was ineffective because in practice 
no seal products could be traded in most EU Member States, resulting in a devastating impact on
3'3 Seal Pup Directive, annex. 
3'4 ibid preamble.
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their economies.^ Despite this the EU has refused to take blame for the devastation o f the market 
due to the adoption o f the Directive. However, it appears that the EU was the main buyer of 
sealskins in the early 1980s. In fact, the EU accounted for about 80% of world demand in sealskins 
(425,000 annually) before the adoption o f the Directi ve^ ^® and five years later it still accounted for 
about 65% of global demand (110,000 a n n u a l l y ) A  1987 report by the Commission stated that 
the anti-sealing campaign was most probably to blame for the devastation of the market, although 
changes in consumer tastes and attitudes towards fur products together with other economic factors 
contributed to the problem. According to this report.
[it has been] universally agreed by both opponents and proponents of sealing that 
the decline in the market has been due to the anti-sealing campaign, although there 
is some evidence that even without the campaign, demand would have declined 
due among other things to changing fashions and economic factors. The 
widespread reaction against the use o f furbearing animals in general also plays an 
important role.^^*
It is noteworthy that the exemption under the Directive was ineffective because it contained no 
provisions how the products o f Inuit origin would be distinguished from other products.^*® 
Although the Basic Regulation contains specific implementation measures outlining detailed 
conditions to which the exempted products must adhere,^^® Inuit have argued that the impacts of 
the 1983 Directive and the Basic Regulation are nevertheless the same.^^i
3’5 See COWI Report 2010 (n 44); Alfred Malouf, Seals and sealing in Canada: Report o f  the Royal 
Commission, vol 2 (M inister o f  Supply and Services 1986) <www.thesealfishery.com/files/malouf_v2.pdf> 
accessed 17 January 2013. According to M alouf, the decline in the European demand for sealskins had a 
devastating effect on the Inuit economy, crippling it for several years, ibid.
3'5 M arket and Industry Analysts, ‘The development o f  the market for sealskins’ final report prepared for the 
Commission o f  the European Communities, D irectorate General Environm ent 22 October 1987, 7. Annexed 
to Commission, Communication in compliance with Council Directive 85/444/EEC o f  27 September 1985 
amending Council Directive 83/129/EEC concerning the importation into M em ber States o f  skins o f  certain 
seal pups and products derived therefrom (Communication) COM  (88) 147 final.
3'7 ibid 9.
3'8 ibid
3'9 See COWI Report 2010 (n 44).
320 Regulation 737/2010. See s 2.3.
32' Specifically, Regulation 737/2010. See Nunavut Report (n 81 )3 ; Case T-18/10 R II  ITKv Parliament and 
Council [2010] E C R 11-235 (Proceedings for interim m easures 2), para 35: ‘the applicants sta te ...that the ban 
on the importation o f  the skins o f  seal pups laid down by Directive 83/129 in 1983 resulted in the collapse o f
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For the purposes o f understanding the dynamics between the protection o f seals and the 
protection o f indigenous peoples’ rights within the EU, it is striking that the initial Commission 
proposal for the 1983 Directive contained no exemption for products o f Inuit origin.^^^ This was 
because the Commission considered that the trade in sealskins between Greenland and EU Member 
States would not be affected by the Seal Pup Directive because Greenland was part o f the European 
Community (EC) at the time. Thus, the Directive was designed to concern exclusively import 
products from outside the EU.^^  ^ Once in operation, the ban would have affected products, inter 
alia, from Canada and Russia. However, without the Inuit exemption, the ban would have also 
affected the products o f Inuit origin from Canada.
Whether this impact was accidental, it nevertheless demonstrates that the EU considered 
the Inuit exemption as relevant only after Greenland decided to withdraw from the EU in 1985 
because without such an exemption products from Greenland would have become subject to the 
ban.324 It can be argued that despite the unsuccessful implementation o f the Inuit exemption in the 
context o f the Seal Pup Directive, certain EU Member States^^s ^nd the institutions nevertheless 
adopted a similar approach towards seal products three decades later in 2009. However, this time 
Inuit are not willing to stand by, but they have taken legal action against the EU institutions before 
the CJEU.325
2.2.2.1. What is the difference between the 1983 Seal Pup Directive and the Basic Regulation?
The difference between the Seal Pup Directive and the Basic Regulation is that whereas 
the 1983 Directive applied to products made of specific seal pups, the Basic regulation has a much
the seal products market even for Inuit com m unities...The same result is to be expected w ith the 
implementing regulation.’
322 See M alouf (n 315).
323 ibid
324 ibid; see also M arket and Industry Analysts (n 316).
325 Specifically, the Netherlands and Belgium.
325 ch 1 s 1.6.4; ch 6 s6 .1 .
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wider scope because under it all imports into the EU and commercial transactions within the EU 
involving any products from any species o f pinnipeds are prohibited.^^^ According to Article 2(2) 
o f the Basic Regulation, seal products specifically include: ‘[a]ll products, either processed or 
unprocessed, deriving or obtained from seals, including meat, oil, blubber, organs, raw fur skins 
and fur skins, tanned or dressed, including fur skins assembled in plates, crosses and similar forms, 
and articles made from fiir skins’.
As noted in section 2.2.2, another notable difference between the 1983 Seal Pup Directive 
and the Basic Regulation is that the former contained no implementing measures. Article 3 of the 
Seal Pup Directive merely stipulated that it applies exclusively to products o f non-Inuit origin. 
However, the implementation of the Inuit exemption under the Basic Regulation is rather complex 
since qualifying products must fulfil all the conditions outlined in Articles 3(1), 6 and 7 o f the 
Implementing Regulation.^^* The exemptions under the Basic Regulation are considered next.
2.3 Exemptions under the Basic Regulation
The Basic Regulation contains three explicit exemptions and one implicit exemption to 
the general sale and import ban. Since this thesis investigates whether the EU balances fairly the 
protection o f seals against the rights of indigenous peoples, the Inuit exemption found in Article 
3(1) of the Basic Regulation is the most relevant for the purposes o f this section. It stipulates that 
‘[t]he placing on the market o f seal products shall be allowed only where the seal products result 
from hunts traditionally conducted by Inuit and other indigenous communities and contribute to 
their subsistence’. For the completeness o f the argument, this section briefly introduces the three 
other instances in which seal products are exempted from the general sale and import ban. Under 
Article 3(2), by-products o f hunts ‘conducted for the sole purpose o f the sustainable management 
o f marine resources’ can be placed on the EU market, provided that the transactions involving
327 Regulation 1007/2009, arts 2(1), 3 and 8.
328 s 2.3.1.
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these products are non-commercial and non-profit in character.^^^ Similarly, occasional imports 
‘o f goods for the personal use of travellers or their families’ are exempt from the import ban, if 
there are not involved in commercial transactions within the EU.^ ^®
Additionally, albeit the EU legislation does not explicitly mention this, seal products, 
which are merely transiting through the EU on their way to other markets, are excluded from the 
scope o f the import ban. Consequently, the warehousing and processing o f seal products is 
permitted in duty-free zones within the EU on their way to the Russian and Asian markets, 
provided that they do not enter local commerce.^^* The ban was not extended to these products 
because it was anticipated to have a significant adverse impact on processing operations, logistics 
firms, and traders in several EU Member States, including Germany, Finland, Denmark, and 
I t a l y I n d e e d ,  this reveals that the implicit exemption was a compromise between those Member 
States who wanted to ban seal products due to ‘concerns o f citizens and consumers’^^  ^and those 
Member States who had a significant interest in facilitating trade in seal products to markets 
outside the EU.^ '^‘ '
The implicit exemption is critical for the purposes o f this thesis because this exemption 
should have a much more significant role in determining the success of the EU’s objective of 
improving animal welfare outside the EU. This thesis argues that the transit trade diminishes the 
achievement o f the EU’s objective, which is to protect seals from cruelty outside the EU’s borders. 
This argument is supported by the findings o f the COWI, which noted in 2010 that the EU
329 Regulation 1007/2009, art 3(2)(b). Also known as the ‘marine resources’ exemption.
339 ibid art 3(2)(a).
33' ch 6 s 6.6.
332 See eg Peter Fitzgerald, ‘“M orality” may not be enough to justify  the EU seal products ban: animal welfare 
meets international trade law ’ (2011) 14 J o f  Inti W ildlife Law  and Policy 85
DOI: 10.1080/13880292.2011.583578.
333 Regulation 1007/2009, preamble, recital 5. See also ch 1 s 1.1.
334 In 2006, several M em ber States traded in considerable numbers o f  raw  furskins. In total 4,536,511 
sealskins were imported to and within the EU-27. M em ber States involved in intra-EU trade were: Finland, 
the UK and Sweden who processed approximately 40%  o f  all sealskins and imported them to Italy and 
Greece. Sealskins from Russia were imported directly to Italy, w hereas sealskins from Canada and Greenland 
were imported primarily to Denmark. COWI Report 2008 (n 81) 25 and 105.
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legislation was unlikely to result in improved animal welfare outside the EU, if  trade flows were 
diverted to markets outside the EU:
Policy measures - such as prohibitions o f market access for seal products - might 
reduce the size o f the hunting and thus the number of seals suffering. However, 
animal welfare gains will be reduced by the extent such policy measures imply that 
seal products are diverted to others markets - which might have lower requirements 
to animal welfare aspects
It appears that there was a significant export o f seal products, particularly ‘o f tanned or dressed 
furskins o f seal, whole, with or without heads, tails or paws, not assembled (excl. white- coat pups 
o f harp seal or blueback pups of hooded seal)’^^  ^ffom the EU-27 to Russia before the adoption of 
the EU ban. Therefore, it is understandable that certain EU Member States wanted to continue 
trading in these products despite the restrictions imposed on the trading on the EU’s internal market. 
It can nevertheless be argued that the implicit exemption for transit trade undermines the EU’s 
objective under the EU legislation.^^^ Additionally, the explicit exemptions have not resulted in the 
desired outcomes, since the exempted products have not been able to enter the market.^^*
In conclusion, the exemptions to the EU seal products legislation appear to reflect a 
compromise between different interests EU Member States had in seal products. Whereas several 
Member States had a vested interest in this trade, others sought to prohibit the entry o f all seal 
products into the EU market.^39 As a compromise the institutions inserted three explicit exemptions 
in the general sale and import ban for allowing products originating from Greenland and EU 
Member States to enter the internal market. Additionally, products from commercial seal hunts 
were allowed to transit through the Member States, provided that such products are not available 
for the EU public. As is seen in Chapter 7 these exemptions have nevertheless had only moderate
335 COWI Report 2008 (n 81) table 5.1.1. See also ch 2 s 2.5. 
335 COWI Report 2008 (n 81) 104-105.
337 ch 7 s 7.2.1.2.
338 ch 7 ss 1.1.13  and 7.3.1-7.3.3.
339 s 2.4.
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success in guaranteeing the achievement o f  the EU’s multiple objectives under the seal products
legislation. '^*®
2.3.1 How is the Inuit exemption implemented?
Essentially, the Inuit exemption allows for the sale and import o f all seal products which 
can be proven to originate from ‘indigenous community hunts’.^ '** To qualify, the products must 
fulfil all the following conditions outlined in Article 3(1) of the Implementing Regulation:
(i) seal products must originate from hunts that have been ‘conducted by Inuit or other
indigenous communities which have a tradition o f seal hunting in the community and 
in the geographical region’;
(ii) seal products are ‘at least partly used, consumed or processed within the communities 
according to their traditions’; and
(iii) the hunts ‘contribute to the subsistence o f the community’.3^*2
Although it initially appeared that Article 3(1) of the Basic Regulation would not prohibit 
the selling of products of Inuit origin for profit in the EU, this interpretation has been brought into 
question by the wording o f Article 3(1) o f the Implementing Regulation. Indeed, products o f Inuit 
origin were seen to differ from two other groups o f exempted products '^*^ because they were 
thought to be the only products which, in principle, could be sold for profit in the EU under the 
exemptions.3'*'* However, this is not the case because the requirement that seal products must 
contribute to the subsistence o f the indigenous communities ‘precludes a true commercial
340 ch 7 s 7.2.1.2.
34' This term is used by the W TO settlement Panel to denote seal hunts conducted by indigenous communities.
342 Regulation 737/2010, art 3(l)(a).
343 Regulation 1009/2009, art 3(2).
344 See Fitzgerald (n 332).
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trade’.3^*3 This indicates that the EU considers that all indigenous peoples hunt seals for purposes, 
which are not ‘primarily or exclusively’ commercial.3^*® However, as noted in Chapter 1, the EU’s 
interpretation o f indigenous economic activities as largely non-commercial in nature is 
inappropriate because it does not apply to all indigenous peoples.3^*^ Although it is true that 
Russian and Alaskan Inuit populations hunt seals for merely personal consumption, Inuit of 
Canada3'*3 and Greenland sell their products on a commercial marketplace.3'*®
Further, Article 7(3) o f the Implementing Regulation requires that products o f Inuit origin 
are accompanied by attesting documents.33° This means that the exempted products must be 
accompanied by documents, which verify that they conform to Article 3(1) o f the Implementing 
Regulation. Only after presenting an attesting document can these products be released ‘for free 
circulation’ in the EU pursuant to Article 79 of Regulation 2913/92.33' Furthermore, attesting 
documents can only be issued by a ‘recognised body’, which must be based in the country of 
origin, and which must have been approved by the Commission.332 In order for a regional or 
national entity to become a recognised body, it must submit to the Commission a request 
accompanied by documentary evidence that it fulfils the requirements outlined in Article 6 o f the 
Implementing Regulation.
This provision requires, inter alia, that these bodies have legal personality and are subject 
to an independent third party audit.333 Additionally, they must have the capacity to: (i) issue and
345c h i  s i . 2.2.
345 ibid
347 See also ch 7 s 7.5.
348 The Government o f  Nunavut purchases sealskins from Inuit seal hunters after which they are transported 
to and sold at the Fur Harvesters A uction bi-annual auction where they are usually sold to national and 
international buyers. See Nunavut Report (n 81) 3.
349 COW I Report 2010 (n 44) 26-28, 32.
359 Regulation 737/2010, art 7(3): ‘when a seal product is placed on the market, the original attesting 
document shall be delivered with the seal product’.
35' ibid art 7(6). This means that after completing import formalities and paying o f  any duties, which may be 
legally due, seal products ffom indigenous hunts can be placed on market anywhere within the EU the same 
way as those goods which have been produced within the EU M em ber States. See Council Regulation (EEC) 
N o 2913/92 o f 12 October 1992 estaUishing the Community Customs Code [1992] OJ L302/1.
352 Regulation 737/2010, art 7(1).
353 ibid art 6 (2)-(l).
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manage attesting documents; (ii) ascertain that the attested products comply with the Inuit 
exemption; and (iii) withdraw or suspend the validity o f attesting documents in case o f non- 
compliance.334 Furthermore, the recognised bodies must ‘carry out [their] functions in a manner 
that avoids conflict o f interest’ and ‘monitor compliance with the requirements [for sale and import 
o f seal products]’.333 Lastly, the attesting documents must conform to the models set out by the 
EU.335
Since almost all EU Member States have proposed the national CITES management 
authorities to be a ‘recognised body’ with the meaning of Article 6,337 Government of Nunavut
could, in theory, be responsible for issuing the attesting documents.338 During the interim review 
stage at the proceedings in EC-Seal Products^^^ the EU submitted new evidence to the Panel that 
it was negotiating with the Governments o f Canada and Nunavut in order for the latter to be 
approved as a recognised body.35° The Panel did not consider this information since no new 
evidence could be submitted during interim review.3®' The fact that no government o f a non-EU 
Member State or indigenous self-government region had been approved as a recognised body was 
more relevant.3®2
334 Regulation 737/2010, art 6 (2)-(l). 
333 ibid
356 ibid art 7(1) and annex.
337 ‘List o f  nominated competent authorities in accordance with A rt 9(1) o f  the Commission Regulation (EU) 
737/2010’
<http://ec.europa.eu/environment/biodiversity/animal_welfare/seals/pdfrcomp_authorities.pdf>  accessed 19 
September 2012.
338 Government o f  Nunavut is one o f  the CITES management authorities in Canada. See Government o f  
Nunavut, ‘Nunavut wildlife resource and habitat values’ (February 2012), table 6.1-2. 
<www.nunavut.ca/files/wildlife_report/Nunavut_W ildlife_Resource_and_Habitat_Values_2012_3.pdf> 
accessed 29 November 2012.
339 EC-Seal Products (n 69).
359 ibid para 6.53.
35' EC-Seal Products (n 69) para 6.53.
352 To date the Commission has approved only Swedish and Greenlandic entities. See Commission Decision 
o f  18 December 2012 recognising the County Administrative B oards o f  Norrbotten, Vasterbotten, 
Vastemorrland, Gavleborg, Uppsala, Stockholm, Sodermanland, Ôstergôtland, Kalmar, V astra Gbtaland and 
Halland in Sweden for the purposes o f  Article 6 o f  Commission Regulation (EU) N o 737/2010 o f  10 August 
2010 laying down detailed rules for the implementation o f  Regulation (EC) N o 1007/2009 o f  the European 
Parliament and o f  the Council on trade in seal products [2012] C(2012) 9453 final; Commission Decision o f  
25 A pril 2013 recognising the Greenland Department o f  Fisheries, Hunting and Agriculture (APNN) for the 
purposes o f  Article 6 o f  Commission Regulation (EU) N o 737/2010 o f  10 August 2010 laying down detailed
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2.4 The legislative history o f  the EU seal products legislation: Member State bans
Most material concerning the Member State bans on which this section relies is in Dutch, 
Flemish or French. Therefore, all legislative proposals and actual legislation used for this section 
has been translated by the author.
2.4.1 Belgian Bill on seal products
Although Canadian commercial seal hunt is not explicitly mentioned in the EU seal 
products legislation, it is clear from the legislative history o f this legislation that it was adopted to 
address concerns raised about the cruelty of the commercial hunt conducted in Canada.^®  ^ The 
origins o f the EU-wide sale and import ban is the Belgian Government’s decision to require import 
licences for fur products containing cats, dogs and seals in 2004,^^ which was subsequently notified 
to the Commission333 in compliance with Article 8(1) o f Directive 98/34/EC.335 The Belgian 
Government sought to justify the ban under Article 36 TFEU (ex-Article 30 EC), which provides 
‘prohibitions or restrictions on imports, exports or goods in transit justified [inter alia] on grounds 
o f public morality". Since all other EU Member States must be notified of any proposed national 
legislation which may have an impact on intra-EU trade, Italy, Denmark and the UK raised
rules for the implementation o f  Regulation (EC) N o 1007/2009 o f  the European Parliament and o f  the Council 
on trade in seal products C (2013) 2277 final.
353 Canadian seal hunt is the largest marine mammal hunt in the world, and the controversy surrounding the 
hunt dates back to the 1960s. See Andrew Linzey, ‘An ethical critique o f  the Canadian seal hunt and an 
examination o f  the case for im port controls on seal products’ (2006) 2 J Animal L 87.
354 Ministerieelbesluittot wijziging vanhet ministerieel besluit van 15 September 1995 waarbij de invoer van 
sommige goederen aan vergunning onderworpen wordt, N  2004-1983 [C-2004/11258] 28 May 2004, art 1 
(Belgium) (Import licensing requirement).
355 W etsvoorstel tot invoering van een verbod op de commerciële productie en commercialisering van 
honden- en kattenbont en hiervan afgeleide producten en tot invoering van een verbod op de fabricage en de 
commercialisering van producten die afgeleid zijn van zeehonden Belgische Senaat, Zitting 2005-2006 
W etgivingstuk N o 3-1630/1 (Belgian Bill on seal products 2005-2006) para 2.1.
355 Directive 98/34/EC o f  the European Parliament and the Council o f  the European Union o f  22 June 1998 
laying down a procedure for the provision o f  information in the field o f  technical standards and regulations, 
and rules and regulations concerning the Information Society services [1998] L204/37.
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questions about the compatibility o f the proposed import restrictions with the Treaty, the WTO 
agreements and the Overseas Association Decision^^^ under which the EU grants unilateral trade 
preferences to all products originating in the OCTs linked to EU Member States, including 
Greenland,353
Due to the lack o f progress with the implementation o f their initial proposal due to the 
questions raised by other Member States, the Belgian legislators proposed enactment o f a ban on 
seal products in the parliamentary session 2005-2006. The new proposal prohibited the processing, 
manufacture and marketing o f all seal products, with the exception o f products originating from 
seals ‘traditionally hunted by Inuit’.^ ^^  The legislators argued that they could no longer wait for the 
EU’s or the WTO’s approval, considering that seals were suffering and the ban was compatible 
with both the EC T reaty^ ”^® and the WTO A greem ents.^^ ' The proposal was supported by a legal 
opinion commissioned by the International Fund for Animal Welfare (IFAW).^^^ Although this 
opinion has not been made public, it was utilised in a similarly worded draft legislation banning 
trade in seal products under Dutch law.^^^
357 Council Decision 2001/822/EC o f  27 November 2001 on the association o f  the overseas countries and 
territories with the European Community [2001] L314/1 replaced by Council Decision 2013/755/EU o f  25 
November 2013 on the association o f  the overseas countries and territories with the European Union [2013] 
O JL344/1.
358 Belgian Bill on seal products (2005-2006), para 2.1.
359 W et betreffende het verbod op de fabricage en de commercialisering van producten die afgeleid zijn van 
zeehonden N  2007-1590 [C—2007/11138] 16 maart 2007, art 3(1) (Belgium) (Ban on manufacture and 
conduct o f  commerce in seal products 2007). The ban is due to be repealed by W etsontwerp betreffende de 
handel in zeehondenproducten Belgische Kam er van Volksvertegenwoordigers Belgische Senaat, Zitting 
2013-2014, N o 3336/001 (Bill on trade in seal products 2013-2014).
379 Treaty on European Union and o f  the Treaty establishing the European Community [2006] OJ C321 E/1. 
37' Belgian Bill on seal products (2005-2006), para 2.1.
372 Ludwig Kramer, ‘The compatibility o f  the draft law o f 2004 concerning the prohibition on the manufacture 
and commercialization o f  products derived from seal with European Community law and the provisions o f  
the W TO ’ April 2005 (unpublished).
373 Ban on manufacture, sale and import o f  products derived from seals (Belgium).
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2.4.2 Dutch Bill on seal products
The legislative proposal o f the Dutch Parliament noted that similar proposals were being 
prepared in other Member States .3^ *^ It asserted that the 2006 Belgian BilP’  ^ not raise objections 
by other Member States after its notification to the Commission.3^® Additionally, the Dutch 
legislature considered that it had the right to adopt measures for the protection o f the environment 
beyond its own territory because this was one o f the most important objectives of the Community. 
The Bill stated that its legislative action was further supported by Article 191(1) TFEU (ex-Article 
174(1) EC), which recognised that the ‘Community policy on the environment shall contribute 
to ...p rom otin g  measures a t international level to dea l with regional or w orldw ide environmental 
problems"  Therefore, no further proof was needed that the environment extended beyond the 
EU.3^3 The Dutch legislature further asserted that the import ban on the grounds o f animal welfare 
(cruelty o f hunting) and the protection o f bio-diversity (the scale o f hunting) was compatible with 
Article 30 EC and the exemptions to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 19943^ ® 
(GATT).339 As is noted in Chapter 7, under Article XX GATT, restrictions on international trade 
may be justified under several general exceptions, provided that the restriction does not result in a 
barrier on international trade or an arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between trading 
partners.33'
374 eg Germany, Luxembourg, the UK and Italy. Voorstel van w et van de leden Kruijsen en Snijder-H azelhoff 
tot wijziging van de Flora- en faunawet in verband met het verbod op de handel in producten van zadelrobben 
en klapmutsen, Tweede Kam er der Staten-Generaal (2005-2006) 30409 (Bill prohibiting the trade in seal 
products 2005-2006) (the Netherlands). The ban entered into force in 2007. See n 397.
375 Belgian Bill on seal products (2005-2006), para 2.1.
375 Dutch Bill on seal products (2005-2006).
377 ibid
378 ibid. However, in this context it could also be argued that Article 174(1) EC suggested that the EU should 
promote multilateral, rather than unilateral action at international level.
379 (15 April 1994) LT/UR/A-1 A /l/G A TT/1 ; 1867 UNTS 190 <http://docsonline.wto.org>
389 Dutch Bill on seal products (2005-2006).
38' ch 7 s 7.4.
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Strikingly, both the Belgian and Dutch Bills reveal that animal welfare NGOs^^^ played a 
central role in the introduction o f the bans at the national level. Similarly, these organisations have 
had considerable input in the adoption o f the EU-wide seal products legislation since they have 
attended several o f the consultation meetings organised by the Commission^^^ and meetings o f a 
group consisting o f Members o f the European Parliament, which addresses issues relating to the 
welfare and conservation of animals.^*'* Additionally, in its 2013 decision in Animal Defenders 
International v the ECtHR noted that animal welfare NGOs have immense influence on EU 
decision making through indirect influencing and lobbying. In this case, the ECtHR upheld the 
decision by the UK courts that animal welfare NGOs could not advertise on TV and radio on the 
grounds that it constituted ‘paid political advertising’ Clearly, these organisations are able to 
circumvent the ban by using the internet and social media as new forms o f influencing and raising 
public awareness. With their powerful messages and pictures o f endearing seal pups,^^^ these 
organisations appeal to the public, whereas indigenous peoples have no resources for similar 
campaigning.
382 eg GAIA and IF AW .
383 Commission, ‘Report o f  Stakeholder Meeting: Possible implementing measures for the Regulation on 
Trade in Seal Products’ (18 N ovem ber 2009) (Stakeholder M eeting Report) 
<http://ec.europa.eu/environment/biodiversity/animal_welfare/seals/pdfrreport_stakeholder_meeting.pdf> 
accessed 22 September 2012.
384 Intergroup on the W elfare and Conservation o f  Animals, ‘Report o f  the 274th Session’ (7 July 2011) 
<www.animalwelfareintergroup.eu/wp-content/uploads/2011/09/minutes274.pdf> accessed 13 M arch 2013.
385 Animal Defenders International v UK App no 48876/08 (ECtHR, 22 April 2013).
385 ibid para 66:
Paid political advertising is statutorily forbidden in the vast majority o f  W estern European 
countries...The most traditional justification for this prohibition is that rich or well- 
established parties would be able to afford significantly more advertising tim e than new  or 
minority parties -  thus amounting to a discriminatory practice.
387 It is Striking that animal welfare organisations use pictures o f  endearing harp seal pups with white fluffy 
coats in their campaign against commercial seal hunts although it has not been possible to hunt these seals 
under Canadian law since 1987. See eg Marine Mammal Regulations 1993 SOR/93-56, s 27: ‘No person 
other than a beneficiary shall sell, trade or barter a whitecoat or blueback.’
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2.4.3 Developments at the European level
Concurrently with the developments at the Member State level, the European Parliament 
adopted a declaration^^* requesting the Commission to draft a regulation to ban the import, export 
and sale o f all harp and hooded seal products, whilst ensuring that the ban would not adversely 
impact traditional hunting practices o f the Inuit, even though such activity ‘only accounts for 3% 
of the current hunt’.**® This is relevant for the primary research question o f whether the EU 
balances fairly the rights o f Inuit and the protection o f seals. According to the Parliament, the scale 
o f indigenous hunting activities was small, and therefore, worthy o f protection even if  commercial 
hunting was likely to be adversely impacted by the ban. It is noteworthy that initially the 
Parliament asked the Commission to ban commercial transactions of products originating from 
only those seal species, which are hunted commercially in Canada. However, after the introduction 
of the Commission’s legislative proposal,*®® the Parliament changed the draft to apply to all 
pinnipeds. Therefore, two questions arise in this context: why did the Parliament consider it 
important to protect all pinnipeds, considering that not all species are commercially exploited? If 
the EU had banned products ffom commercially exploited seal species only, would the products 
of Inuit origin have needed attesting documents, since Inuit hunt predominantly ringed seals 
{Phoca h isp idafl
Following the Parliament’s 2006 declaration, the Commission asked the European Food 
Safety Authority (EFSA) to assess the most appropriate killing methods, which reduce 
unnecessary pain, distress and suffering and to issue a Scientific Opinion outlining the animal
*** European Parliament, W ritten declaration adopted during its session o f  September 25th to 28th 2006 
(Parliam ent’s W ritten Declaration 2006)
<www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?reference=P6_TA(2006)0369&language=EN> accessed 15 
January 2010.
*8® ibidH (2).
*9® COM (2008) 469 final.
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welfare aspects of the killing and skinning o f seals.*®* At the same time, also the Council of Europe 
adopted a recommendation on seal hunting,*®  ^which stated as its main concerns animal welfare 
and conservation. The recommendation invited its Member and Observer States hunting seals ‘to 
ban all cruel hunting methods which do not guarantee the instantaneous death, without suffering, 
o f the animals, prohibiting the stunning o f animals with instruments such as hakapiks, bludgeons 
and guns’.*®* The recommendation also requested all Members:
to ensure that the populations o f seals and other marine mammals are afforded effective 
protection and their numbers maintained and pursue such a conservation policy as part of 
an overall approach geared to the sustainable management o f natural heritage and the 
protection o f wildlife.*®'*
It is noteworthy that when the Commission introduced its proposal for EU seal products 
legislation in 2008 it noted specifically that Belgium*®* and the Netherlands*®^ had adopted bans 
on seal products and that Germany intended to so.*®^  By the time the Basic Regulation was adopted 
in 2009, two more Member States had adopted bans on seal products.*®* Additionally, two States 
had notified the Commission o f their proposal; and three other States had made known their 
intention to adopt bans in the absence of EU measures.*®® Although it is unclear which Member 
States had taken steps to adopt the ban, the Parliament indicated in 2006 that Luxembourg, Italy
3®' Bo Algers and others, ‘Scientific Opinion o f  the Panel on Animal H ealth and W elfare on a request from 
the Commission on the Animal W elfare aspects o f  the killing and skinning o f  seals’ (2007) 610 The EFSA 
Journal 1. This Opinion is briefly discussed in section 2.5.1.
392 Council o f  Europe, Recommendation 1776 (17 N ovem ber 2006) Seal hunting 
<http;//assem bly.coe.int/m ain.asp?Link=/docum ents/adoptedtext/ta06/erecl 776.htm# 1> accessed 10 
February 2010.
393 ibid para 13.1.1.
394 ibid para 13.1.2.
395 Ban on manufacture and conduct o f  commerce in seal products 2007 (Belgium)
395 Besluit van 4 ju li 2007, houdende wijziging van het Besluit aanwijzing dier- en plantensoorten Flora- en 
faunawet en het Besluit vrijstelling beschermde dier- en plantensoorten in verband met het verbod op de 
handel in producten van zadelrobben en klapmutsen (Staatsblad 2007 nr 253) (the Netherlands) (Ban on trade 
in products o f  hooded and harp seals 2007). The ban was repealed 30 M ay 2011 by Besluit van 28 novem ber 
2000 houdende regels voor het bezit en vervoer van en de handel in beschermde dier- en plantensoorten 
(Decision exempting endangered animal and plant species) (the Netherlands), § 5.
397 COM (2008) 469 final, 5.
398 Case T -526 /10 /7X  v Commission (EGC, 25 April 2013), para 50.
399 ibid
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and the UK were ‘considering action’.'*®® It is nevertheless impossible to verify whether this is 
correct since that same year Finland, the UK (Scotland) and Sweden processed approximately 
40% of all sealskins traded in the EU and subsequently exported them to Italy and Greece. 
Additionally, sealskins ffom Russia were exported directly to Italy.'*®* Therefore, it seems 
questionable whether Italy and possibly the UK would have been in the process of adopting a ban 
on seal products.
This indicates that due to the number o f Member States involved, the institutions 
considered it more feasible to take measures to harmonise the market, rather than to begin lengthy 
legal proceedings against several ‘misbehaving’ Member States.'*®^  It therefore appears that the 
institutions did not really have any other option than to ban the trade in seal products, considering 
that many Member States were opposing the trade. However, in ITK  v Commission, t h e  EGC 
denied that a specific number o f Member States contemplating banning seal products was relevant 
in the adoption of an EU-wide measure,'*®'* but the adoption o f seal products legislation was 
justified under Article 114 TFEU because the ‘divergent measures were such as to constitute 
obstacles to the free movement o f seal products’.'*®*
400 Parliam ent’s W ritten Declaration 2006 (n 388) F: ‘a  number o f  EU countries (Belgium, Luxembourg and 
Italy) have already taken steps to ban the trade in seal products, and others (the UK and the Netherlands) are 
considering action’.
'"** COWI Report 2008 (n 81) 25 and 105.
492 Due to the internal dynamics o f  the EU, the institutions can either adopt a harmonising measure or to start 
infringement proceedings against the M em ber States in question. See eg Ankersm it and others (n 171) 46.
493 Case T-526/10 /T K  v Commission (n 398) para 50.
494 ibid para 51.
495 ibid
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2.5 What are the EU’s arguments as regards to the justification o f  the EU seal products legislation?
This section investigates the EU's justification for the sale and import ban in the context of 
EC-Seal Products. T h e  EU’s arguments are significant for the purposes of this thesis because 
they clarify why the EU considered it important to protect seals outside its jurisdiction. Ultimately, 
the disagreement between the EU and Canada over seal hunting boils down to the uncertainty as to 
how much suffering is involved in seal hunting, what degree o f suffering is acceptable, and whether 
it is possible to apply, monitor and enforce humane hunting methods in seal hunts. According to 
the EU, the sale and import ban is based on the premise that the application and enforcement of 
humane hunting methods are not always feasible due, inter alia, to the unique environmental 
conditions in which seal hunting takes place.'*®^  In its second submission to the WTO, the EU 
implied that hunting methods used in commercial seal hunts were consistently cruel. Accordingly, 
the institutions considered the ‘unavoidable’ risks to animal welfare inherent in commercial seal 
hunting as ‘excessive and unacceptable’.'*®* It further argued that due to the ‘inherent inhumane 
nature of commercial hunts’, the European public was ethically and morally repelled by the 
presence on the market o f such products.'*®® Consequently, the sale and import ban was the only 
effective way to protect the public moral concerns o f EU citizens.'**®
According to the EU’s second submission to the WTO, the EU legislation addressed two 
types o f moral concerns: (i) ‘the inhumane killing o f seals as such’ and (ii) ‘moral concerns about 
the EU public’s contribution, as consumers, to the inhumane killing of seals’.'*** These moral 
concerns stemmed from the view that ‘humans ought not to inflict suffering upon animals without 
a sufficient justification’.'**^  By prohibiting the marketing o f seal products the EU addressed ‘selling
495 EC-Seal Products (n 69).
497 ibid para 7.4.
498 See EU ’s second submission to the W TO (n 68) paras 304-306.
499 EC-Seal Products (n 69) para 7.4.
4*9 ibid. In contrast, in ITK v Commission, the EGC identified the harmonisation o f  the internal market as the 
sole objective o f  the legislation. Case T-526/10 ITK v Commission (EGC, 25 April 2013); ch 6 s 6.5.1.
4** EC-Seal Products (n 69) para 7.274. E U ’s second subm ission to the WTO (n 68) para 274.
4*2 E U ’s second submission to the WTO (n 68) para 274.
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seal products from commercial hunts, because it involves an act o f commercial exploitation o f an 
immoral act (the killing o f seals in an inhumane way); and purchasing those seal products, because 
it promotes such immoral killings’.'***
Although the EU argues that it may not be possible to kill and skin seals in a consistent 
way in order to avoid unnecessary pain, distress, fear, or other forms of suffering,'**'* some of its 
arguments can be refuted based on the findings o f the EFSA. Indeed, the EFSA noted in 2007 that 
none o f the existing killing methods was able eliminate all suffering with 100% certainty, regardless 
whether this method was used in an abattoir or in the wild because all animals were different:
The efficacy of the methods used to kill domesticated and wild animals, in terms o f the 
intensity and duration o f poor welfare they potentially inflict, will vary according to the 
species o f animals, methods used and the sMlls o f the person using them. In both cases 
some animals will not be killed without causing some pain, distress and other forms o f 
suffering, as there is no perfect killing method that will work at all times, and under all 
circumstances."***
Consequently, the EU’s argument that no seals should be subject to any pain or suffering 
is unrealistic, considering that some degree o f pain and suffering is likely to occur, regardless o f 
whether animals are killed in abattoirs or in the wild. Therefore, it could be argued that killing 
animals for the purposes o f feeding millions of Europeans does not differ considerably from killing 
animals in the wild. The EFSA further noted that most observations for existing studies assessing 
the cruelty o f commercial seal hunts were conducted from a distance or through video recordings 
by NGOs or industry-linked groups.'**® Therefore, it was challenging for it to establish with 
certainty whether an individual seal’s movements were a flight response o f a threatened animal or 
those o f a successfully stunned animal.'**^
'**3 E U ’s second submission to the WTO (n 68) para 279.
'**'* Regulation 1007/2009, preamble, recital 11.
'**5 Algers and others (n 391) 88 
'**5 ibid para 5.4.2.
'**7 ibid
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In its general recommendations, the EFSA noted that some of the existing studies ‘may 
contain potentially unproven serious biases’ because they ‘highlight serious deficiencies and 
concerns in the hunts’.'*** Clearly, several possible interpretations can be made from the conclusions 
o f the EFSA and the reports'**® reviewed by it since the EU and Canada disagree about the findings. 
Considering that in the EFSA’s opinion, many studies were potentially biased it is surprising that 
the Panel supported the EU’s arguments in EC-Seal Products In its decision the Panel referred 
specifically to one recent study on the Canadian commercial hunt, which in its opinion 
demonstrated that depending on the scale o f the hunt potentially ‘a large number o f seals’ 
experienced suffering during the Canadian commercial seal hunt.'*^* Whether one such report 
constitutes sufficient evidence o f the inherent cruel nature o f seal hunt is questionable.
In general, the experts specialised in veterinary science and other sources disagree as to 
what constitute adequate welfare standards and criteria in relation to seal hunting.'*^^ Whereas many 
experts have provided recommendations to improve hunting methods within the limits of practical 
demands o f seal hunting,'*^* others have rejected such recommendations as a risk to animal 
welfare.'* '^* Since the disagreement over the humanity o f commercial seal hunts continues,'*^* the
'*** Algers and others (n 391) General Recommendations 2.
'**® eg Pierre-Yves Daoust and others, ‘Animal welfare and the harp seal hunt in A tlantic C anada’ (2002) 43 
Canadian Veterinary J 687; Bruce Smith and others, ‘Improving humane practice in the Canadian harp seal 
hunt: A  report o f  the independent veterinarians’ (August 2005)
<http://ivwgonline.org/IVW GReportAug2005.pdf> accessed 17 M arch 2010; A ndrew  Butterworth and 
others, ‘W elfare aspects o f  the Canadian seal hunt’ (31 August 2007).
429 EC-Seal Products (n 69).
42* ibid para 7.207 referring to Pierre-Yves Daoust and Charles Caraguel, ‘The Canadian harp seal hunt: 
observations on the effectiveness o f  procedures to avoid poor animal welfare outcom es’ (2012)21(4) Animal 
W elfare 445 DOI 10.7120/09627286.21.4.445.
422 EC-Seal Products (n 69) para 7.494.
423 See eg Algers and others (n 391) 10; Smith and others (n 419); NAM M CO Expert Group, ‘Report on the 
meeting on best practices in the hunting and killing o f  seals’ (February 2009) 5-6.
424 See eg Butterworth and others (n 419); M ary Richardson, ‘A ha lf century o f  evidence proves C anada’s 
commercial seal hunt cannot be made acceptably hum ane’ (August 2007) 
<www.harpseals.org/about the hunt/sealing inherently inhumane richardson 2007.pdf>  accessed 11 
D ecember 2013.
425 Andrew Butterworth and Mary Richardson, ‘A review o f  animal welfare implications o f  the Canadian 
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scientific knowledge in this area appears to be incomplete. In other words, science has not been 
able to establish conclusively that seal hunting is inherently cruel. It is noteworthy that it is 
impossible for natural science to define what is ‘unnecessary’ suffering, pain and distress.'**® 
‘Unnecessary suffering’ is the term, which has thus far been the accepted standard as it is found in 
most existing animal welfare legislation.'*** However, the EU legislation appears to challenge this 
view.'***
Since what constitutes ‘unnecessary suffering’ in relation to seal hunting is not easily 
quantifiable or fixed, it can be argued that this depends on who uses the term. Thus, seal hunting 
can be perceived as cruel by those who oppose hunting and humane by those who support it. Indeed, 
although veterinary experts generally recognise the ‘principle o f minimising pain and suffering’, 
various expert conclusions on seal hunting appear to understand and interpret this principle 
differently.'**® Despite this, according to one view, ‘suffering’ can be determined as an acute or 
prolonged occurrence o f unpleasant subjective feelings resulting from an inability ‘to carry out the 
actions that would normally reduce risks to life or reproduction’.'**®
Biologists focusing on animal welfare have noted that due to the subjectivity of an animal’s 
experiences, establishing any kind o f criteria to measure animal welfare is challenging.'*** Indeed,
Richardson, ‘A  review o f  animal welfare implications o f  the Canadian commercial seal hunt: a  response to 
critique o f  paper MP13 172’ (2014) 43 M arine Policy 379.
'*25 Laura Hanninen and Anna Valros, ‘Turkiselainten hyvinvointi: M ita tarkoittaa elainten hyvinvointi?’ (29 
May 2013) (Opinion on fur animal welfare submitted to the Finnish Agriculture and Forestry Committee) 
<http://web.eduskunta.fi/dman/Docum ent.phx?documentId=sc 16213140140361 &cmd=do wnl oad> 
accessed 13 July 2013.
'*27 See eg John A lder and David Wilkinson, Environmental Law and Ethics (M acmillan 1999).
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EC-Seal Products (n 69) para 7.494.
439 See Corrado Carenzi and M arina Verga, ‘Animal welfare: review o f  the scientific concept and definition’ 
(2009) 8(1) Italian Journal o f  Animal Science 21, 23 citing M  Dawkins, ‘From an anim aPs point o f  view: 
motivation, fitness and animal w elfare’ (1990) 13 Behav Brain Sci 1.
43* See eg Carenzi and Verga (n 430) 23; Suzanne Held and M arek Spinka, ‘Animal play and animal w elfare’ 
(2011) 81(5) Animal Behaviour 891 http://dx.doi.Org/10.1016/j.anbehav.2011.01.007; Jaakko Mononen, 
‘What is animal welfare and how can we measure it?’ (W ellmann International Scientific Conference, 
Budapest, April 2013)
<http://videotorium.hu/en/recordings/details/6409,Prof._Dr._Jaakko_M ononen_- 
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according to the Norwegian Research Council, the term ‘animal welfare’ can be understood as ‘an 
individual animal’s subjective experience of its mental and physical state as regards its attempt to 
cope with its environment’.'*** Therefore, welfare has to be inferred from factors, such as an 
individual animal’s behaviour, physiology and health.'*** Additionally, separate criteria has to be 
established for each animal species.'**'* Consequently, what applies to cows or farmed foxes is 
unlikely to apply to seals or other pinnipeds.
2.5.1 Which ethical approaches underpin the EU legislation?
The fact that most existing animal protection legislation is aimed at minimising inflicting 
pain and suffering on animals is significant because despite changes in public perception of nature 
and the emergence o f the environmental movement,'*** most countries adopt the utilitarian approach 
to animal welfare. Indeed, the approach taken by most animal welfare or animal cruelty 
legislation'**® investigated for the purposes of this thesis is essentially utilitarian, including most EU 
legislation on animals. This approach implies that the use of animals by humans is acceptable, 
provided that the use is carried out humanely. Therefore, most animal welfare legislation is 
designed to allow the continued use o f animals, rather than to prohibit various legitimate activities 
(eg slaughter).'*** Similarly, most anti-cruelty statutes, such as those governing the Canadian seal 
hunt, prohibit certain deliberate actions which are likely to cause harm to animals."***
432 M ononen (n 431) citing Norges Forskninsgrad 2005 (unofficial translation).
433 M ononen (n 431).
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(2014) 23(1)REC IEL DOI: 10.1111/reel.l2054.
71
Linking in to the discussion in section 2.5 concerning the difficulties to define what 
constitutes ‘unnecessary suffering’, the utilitarian approach has been criticised on the grounds that 
the term ‘unnecessary’ gives legislators large amount o f discretion in deciding which forms of 
suffering are justified and what degree of suffering is acceptable.'*^^ For this reason, legislators have 
been argued to be easily influenced by economic, rather than ethical interests.'^® It has also been 
acknowledged in relation to the utilitarian approach that different ethical values cannot always 
logically be reconciled with each other because o f the impossibility to rank them on a common 
scale.'*'** Consequently, it is generally possible to achieve one goal at the expense of another.'*'*  ^This 
is illustrated by the argument that, for instance, environmental protection and economic values are 
often considered incommensurable.'*'*^ It also appears that the broader the ethical concerns are, the 
more challenging it is to reconcile them.'*'*'* Critics further argue that questions remain as to whether 
the utilitarian approach truly gives equal consideration to animal interests and if  so which animal 
interests should be taken into account in the analysis which weighs the benefit to humans against 
the potential harm to the animal.'*'*^
Indeed, the utilitarian approach can be contrasted with several other ethical approaches to 
animals, including the rights-based view, which is founded on the suggestion the interests of 
animals should be given significant moral weight in public policy due to their ‘sentience’.'*'*^ 
Although the term ‘sentience’ itself is difficult to define, it has been suggested that sentient beings 
have physical and emotional feelings which matter to them.'*'*  ^Consequently, the proponents o f the 
rights-based view argue that it is unacceptable to use animals for non-essential cultural reasons.
'*^  ^See eg Ellen-M arie Forsberg, ‘Inspiring respect for animals through the law? Current development in the 
N orwegian animal welfare legislation’ (2011) 24 J Agric Environ Ethics 351.
^0 ibid
“*^* See eg A lder and W ilkinson (n 427).
'*^ 2 ibid 
'*^  ^ ibid 
'*^ ibid
'*'*^ See eg Simon Brooman and Debbie Legge, Law relating to Animals (Cavendish 1997) 91ff.
'*'*® See eg John Hadley, ‘Liberty and valuing sentient life’ (2013) 18(1) Ethics and the Environment 87.
'*'*’ See eg Jacky Turner and Joyce D ’Silva (eds), Animals, Ethics and Trade: The Challenge o f  Animal 
Sentience (Earthsean 2006) xxiii.
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such as for food, clothing, cosmetics or sport.'*'** The rationale underlying this approach is that even 
if  activities, such as fur farming and fox hunting, are legal in many States, a shift in public attitude 
towards these activities will generate significant change.'*'*  ^However, scientists have criticised the 
rights-based approach because it is not based on sound knowledge about animals and animal use 
practices.'*^® Additionally, the right-based arguments in theology, green criminology and the study 
o f animal law are merely debates since no State recognises legal rights o f animals. Because the EU 
does not advocate the rights-based approach it is not discussed in full detail in this thesis.
Based on the Preamble and the provisions o f the Basic Regulation, which were investigated 
in the light o f Cheyne and Alder’s ethical analysis o f the Hunting Act 2004 (UK),'*^* it is possible 
to argue that the Basic Regulation rejects the utilitarian approach to animal welfare because it 
imposes a blanket ban on the products o f purely commercial hunts. Therefore, it is more consistent 
with the virtue ethics approach, which is similar to the utilitarian ethics because it prohibits 
unnecessary suffering and takes into account the interests o f humans. However, the virtue ethics 
approach goes one step further by taking the view that conserving animas for economic reasons as 
unacceptable.'*^^ Thus, an assertion that hunting serves a valid conservation purpose is not useful 
from the virtue ethics point of view.'*^* Additionally, this view condemns wastefulness and taking 
pleasure in suffering.
'*'**According to this view , humans are not privileged in making ethical judgm ents because no morally 
legitimate distinction between humans and other sentient beings exists. See eg Tom Regan, The Case for  
Animal Rights (University o f  California Press 1985); M alouf (n 315) 197 citing Peter Singer, ‘Ethical 
considerations relevant to the harvesting o f  seals. B rief to the Royal Commission on Seals and the Sealing 
Industry in Canada on behalf o f  the International fund for Animal W elfare’ (London 1985); Tom Regan and 
Peter Singer (eds). Animal Rights and Human Obligations (2nd edn, Prentice Hall 1989); Gary L Francione 
and Robert Gamer, The animal rights debate: abolition o f  regulation? (Colum bia UP 2010).
It could be argued that public attitude towards many legal animal uses has already started to change, 
particularly in countries like the UK, Belgium and the Netherlands. ElfVing (n 438).
'*^ ° See Carenzi and Verga (n 430) 27.
'*^* Hunting Act 2004 c 37 (UK). For discussion o f  utilitarian approach in the context o f  fox hunting see Ilona 
Cheyne and John Alder, ‘Environmental ethics and proportionality; hunting for a balance’ (2007) 9 Env L 
Rev 171.
'*^  ^Cheyne and Alder (n 451).
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It has been argued that the virtue ethics approach is embodied in several international 
instruments, such as the CITES and the European Convention on Animal Experimentation,'*^'* 
which, inter alia, states that ‘man has a moral obligation to respect all a n i m a l s A s  such, this 
statement is similar to the EU’s argument that the European public is repelled by cruelty inflicted 
upon seals and does not want to contribute to cruel seal hunting activities by buying seal products.'*^^ 
What is remarkable about virtue ethics is that its supporters view animals as worthy o f protection 
because o f their aesthetic value. Accordingly, humans have a moral obligation to preserve nature’s 
beautiful creatures,'*^^ not because they are endangered.
Had the Basic Regulation adopted the utilitarian approach, it would have allowed the trade 
o f seal products from commercial hunts, provided that these hunts were conducted humanely. 
Therefore, it can be argued that the EU legislation would have allowed Canada to demonstrate that 
its hunts are conducted humanely according to criteria established by both parties, in the absence 
o f internationally agreed standards. Although the Basic Regulation itself adopts the virtue ethics 
approach, the exemptions for souvenirs; products derived from indigenous community hunts; and 
products from hunts, which aim at keeping seal populations manageable and which are placed on 
the market for non-profit,'*^* imply that the exemptions are more utilitarian in character. However, 
they are not entirely utilitarian either because they condemn purely commercial exploitation of 
seals. As noted in Chapter 1, ‘the subsistence argument [in Article 3(1) o f the Basic Regulation] 
precludes a true commercial trade’ even if  the trade in products of Inuit origin did not have to be 
‘non-profit and non-commercially based’.'*^  ^Therefore, both the Inuit exemption and the marine
'*^ '* Cheyne and A lder (n 451).
'*^  ^European Convention for the Protection o f  Vertebrate Animals used for Experimental and other Scientific 
Purposes 1986 ETS 123.
"*^  ^E U ’s second submission to the WTO (n 68) para 274.
'*^ ’ A lder and W ilkinson (n 427).
'*5* Regulation 1007/2009, art 3 (l)-(2).
'*:**ch 1 s i . 2.2.
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resource exemption contain elements from both the virtue ethics approach and utilitarian approach 
because commercial interests are excluded from the scope o f these exemptions.
Another characteristic of the virtue ethics approach is that it concentrates on human 
attitudes and motivations for acting, rather than the impact o f those actions.'*^® The Preamble to the 
Basic Regulation supports the virtue ethics approach since acknowledges that:
[t]he hunting o f seals has led to expressions of serious concerns by members o f the 
public and governments sensitive to animal welfare considerations due to the pain, 
distress, fear and other forms o f suffering which the killing and skinning o f seals, 
as they are most frequently performed, cause to those animals.'*^*
For these reasons, it appears that the seal products legislation as a whole is consistent with 
the virtue ethics approach. Not even the exemptions under Article 3 o f the Basic Regulation are 
fully utilitarian since they exclude ‘true commercial trade’. However, the suitability o f virtue ethics 
to the law-making context is questionable because as is seen in Chapter 7, the practical 
implementation o f these exemptions has resulted in an inability o f the exemptions to achieve their 
intended outcomes.'*^^ Indeed, the Panel found that the actual implementation and operation o f the 
Inuit exemption suggested that the EU had no intention to make this exemption available for all 
potential beneficiaries identified in Chapter 1 It is striking, however, that the Panel accepted the 
EU’s virtue ethics approach towards seals, considering that the Panel explicitly noted that although 
available evidence demonstrated that the EU public had moral concerns on seal welfare in general, 
the EU’s arguments that the EU public attributed a higher moral value to the protection of Inuit 
interests as compared to seal welfare were not supported by this evidence.'*^ Therefore, it is 
surprising that the Panel accepted the EU’s arguments that the Inuit exemption was aimed at the
See eg Cheyne and A lder (n 451). 
Regulation 1007/2009, preamble, recital 9.
"^ 2 ch 7 s 1 2 2 3  
ibid; ch 1 s 1.2.2.
464 EC-Seal Products (n 69) para 7.299.
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protection o f indigenous peoples rights because it confirmed itself that the EU considered the 
protection o f public morals o f its citizens more important than the interests o f Inuit.
It is also striking that the Panel did not question the EU’s virtue ethics approach, which 
differs considerably from most animal welfare laws, which are based on the utilitarian approach.'*®  ^
Although the Panel noted that no link existed between ‘seal or animal welfare’ and ‘the morals o f 
the EU public’, it was nevertheless persuaded that animal welfare was ‘an ethical or moral issue’ 
in the EU.'*^  ^ Further it noted that ‘international doctrines’ and similar measures in other WTO 
Members illustrated that animal welfare was a matter o f ethical responsibility for human beings in 
general.'*^^ However, the Panel clearly did not address the issue to what extent the EU’s approach 
was consistent with the approach adopted by other WTO Members or the ‘international doctrines’, 
which are most likely to be primarily utilitarian. However, the Panel did not identify any such 
doctrine. Therefore, the Panel’s superficial conclusions concerning the EU’s understanding of 
animal welfare being a globally recognised issue together with the narrowness of the Inuit 
exemption raises some fundamental questions as to whether the EU legislation, in fact, supports 
the arguments raised by animal welfare NGOs who view the indigenous way o f life as conflicting 
with the aim of protecting seals from cruelty.
2.5.2 Do animal welfare concerns conflict with indigenous peoples’ rights?
This section is essential for this thesis because the EU’s arguments concerning the need to 
make the Inuit exemption narrow in scope mirror some of the arguments by animal welfare NGOs. 
It can be argued that animal welfare NGOs supporting the EU seal products legislation view 
indigenous peoples’ rights as limited to subsistence, without possibility to engage in commercial 
activities. For instance. Nurse condemns the possibility o f indigenous peoples to exercise their
s 2.5.
^  EC-Seal Products (n 69) para 7.404.
ibid
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activities for commercial purposes,'*^* which is reflected in the EU’s arguments concerning the 
narrowness of the Inuit exemption/®^ According to Nurse, indigenous rights to hunt, fish or trap 
should be exercised exclusively in order to achieve food security, rather than for any other 
reasons.'*’® He cites as an example the Sami o f Finland who sell reindeer meat as part o f their 
reindeer herding activities.'*’* However, as a citizen of an Arctic EU Member State, it is easy to see 
that Nurse and the animal welfare NGOs fail to understand the realities in which Arctic indigenous 
peoples’ harvesting activities and reindeer husbandry takes place. Even if  the Sami reindeer herding 
activities could be characterised as containing commercial elements, critics are seemingly unaware 
o f the fact that the activities of the majority o f reindeer herders are on a small scale.'*’  ^For this 
reason, many herders are of the opinion that income fi-om herding activities is insufficient on its 
own.'*’* This is confirmed in the UN Human Rights Committee’s 1996 decision in Lansman and 
Others v Finlandf^^ where the Committee noted that because the economic benefit from reindeer 
herding was low, many reindeer herders had to look for additional sources o f income.'*’* Although 
the Sami would prefer to work solely in reindeer herding, the reality is that they have had to develop 
other economic activities besides reindeer herding in order to survive.'*’®
Although achieving food security may be an acceptable reason for the critics to consent to 
indigenous peoples’ traditional activities, they nevertheless describe the indigenous rights to, inter 
alia, hunt whales and seals and herd reindeer as ‘legitimised animal harm’ on a par with other forms
'*®* See eg Nurse (n 437).
'*®^ ch 1 s 1.2.2.
'*’° See eg Nurse (n 437).
'*’* ibid
'*’* Pohjola and Valkonen (n 200) 24-25.
M eat production provides the primary income for the families engaged in reindeer herding. Additional 
income is often received from related activities, such as m eat processing, tourism and forestry. Particularly, 
women usually work in industries which are unrelated to reindeer herding, ibid 25.
'*’'* See eg Jouni Lansman and Others v Finland (Communication N o 671/1995) views adopted 30 October 
1996.
'*’* ibid para 7.3.
'*’* ibid. They work, inter alia, as butchers for other herdsmen's committees, private local landowners or 
conduct small-scale logging within their own private forests.
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of legal animal harm, such as factory farming, wildlife trafficking and animal experimentation.'*”  
Critics question ‘the extent to which animal harm of this type remains a cultural necessity’.'*’* For 
instance. Nurse criticises the fact that courts in many countries allow indigenous hunting activities 
to continue unchallenged.'*’® He criticises the fact that indigenous peoples are legally able to:
kill, hunt and harvest otherwise protected animals where considered necessary to 
their cultural expression and to preserve a minority way of life; making the animal 
harm involved o f a type justified by the neutralization'**® of necessity and in some 
cases o f providing a means o f survival integral to a specific way o f life that is 
otherwise under threat.'***
He further characterises indigenous harvesting practices, which are essential to indigenous 
cultural identity, as ‘animal killing as cultural self-expression’ because they are not treated the same 
way as activities by non-indigenous peoples.'**^ Therefore, he attacks the protection o f indigenous 
way o f life on the grounds that indigenous activities are treated differently from other activities. 
Although indigenous rights may be judged as unfair on the grounds that they ‘privilege’ certain 
social groups and exclude all others,'*** critics clearly fail to see that without the possibility to 
engage in economic activities, such as the sale o f sealskins, polar bear hides or reindeer meat, 
indigenous peoples would struggle to support themselves. Therefore, it can be concluded that 
neither Nurse nor the animal welfare organisations have intimate knowledge o f the societies which 
they criticise.
'*”  Nurse (n 437) 140.
'*’* ibid 
'*79 ibid
480 ‘Neutralisation’ means justification used by individuals inflicting cruelty on animals or committing 
wildlife crime. See ibid ch 3.
'*** ibid 140. Therefore, it appears that not only does N urse criticise the indigenous hunting practices, but the 
use o f  animals altogether for purposes which he does not agree with, such as factory farming, trade in wildlife, 
and animal experimentation, which implies that he is not proponent o f  utilitarian approach. Despite this, he 
acknowledges that it is unlikely that these activities will cease taking place in foreseeable future.
'**^  ibid 140.
'*** Kenneth Ruddle and Anthony Davis, ‘Human rights and neo-liberalism in small-scale fisheries: Conjoined 
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The views expressed by Nurse concerning indigenous peoples’ rights echo the 1970s 
arguments o f the animal welfare NGOs, according to which Tnuit no longer hunted to feed their 
families but rather for sport and commercial profit’.'**'* According to these NGOs, the use of modem 
equipment, such as rifles, motor boats and snowmobiles, ‘proved that Inuit activities were no longer 
geared toward traditional subsistence’.'*** Consequently, the NGOs demanded that hunting by Inuit 
be subject to licencing, annual quotas and reporting requirements.'**® It has been argued that these 
NGOs not only sought to reduce profit from the sale o f animal products, but also to limit access to 
traditional foods .^ *’ In this sense the arguments o f the NGOs could be seen to conflict with 
indigenous peoples’ rights. Whereas it is seen in Chapter 4, Canada has not succumbed to demands 
o f the NGOs,'*** Kalaallit are subject to licencing, armual quotas and reporting requirements.'**®
Whilst commentators, such as Nurse, question the legal protection given to indigenous 
harvesting practices altogether,'*®® others have adopted a more constmctive point o f view, which is 
consistent, for instance, with the current approach o f the Government of Canada under the Inuit 
Treaties, discussed in Chapter 4.'*®* Varmer argues that contemporary indigenous peoples should 
no longer be morally justified in using inefficient and relatively inhumane hunting techniques used 
by their pre-contact ancestors.'*®  ^He cites as an example the hunts in which hundreds o f bison were 
driven off a cliff by Native Americans, which could be argued to be inhumane and disproportionate
'**'* Ann M cElroy, ‘Sedna’s children: Inuit elders’ perceptions o f  climate change and food security’ in Helen 
Kopnina and Eleanor Shoreman-Ouimet (eds), Environmental Anthropology: Future Directions (Routledge 
2013)157 .
'*** ibid. Arguments that snowmobiles and motorboats are used ignore the fact that this equipment makes 
easier journeys to harvesting sites which are located further away as a result o f  relocation o f  dispersed 
indigenous families to communities by the governments. See eg George Wenzel, ‘Canadian Inuit subsistence 
and ecological instability: i f  the climate changes, must the Inuit?’ (2009) 28 Polar Research 89, 92 
<doi:10.111 l/j.l751-8369.2009.00098.x> accessed 6 Decem ber 2012.
'**® M cElroy (n 484) 157.
'**’ ibid 
'*** ch 4 s 4.3.
'**® ch 5 s 5.3.
'*®® McElroy (n 484) 157.
'*®* ch 4 s 4.5.
'*®^ See eg Gary Varmer, ‘A  H arean perspective on humane sustainability’ (2010) 15(2) Ethics and the 
Environment 3 1 ,3 9  DOI: 10.1353/een.2010.0053.
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to the needs o f indigenous peoples because they may have not had the means to use and preserve 
all the meat. Unlike Nurse, Varmer does not criticise the legal protection o f indigenous harvesting 
activities per se, only the techniques, which cause large numbers o f animals to perish unnecessarily.
It is noteworthy that although Nurse criticises the legal protection o f indigenous hunting 
practices on the grounds they form part of indigenous culture, he himself notes that the content and 
depth o f animal welfare legislation is frequently determined by the extent to which cultural 
perspectives on animal use are incorporated into legislation.'*®* Therefore, it is a common place to 
justify certain hunting practices or, for instance, ritual slaughter'*®'* on the grounds o f culture and 
religion in relation to non-indigenous peoples. Such an approach has been adopted both within and 
outside the EU. For instance, the EU recognises that in some Member States religious rites, cultural 
traditions and regional heritage may influence the content o f national animal welfare legislation.'*®* 
Similarly, in Canada, each province has some form of animal cruelty statute, which vary according 
to the jurisdiction, inter alia, in terms o f what actions constitute as cruelty, the level o f punishment, 
and how the term ‘animal’ is defined.'*®®
The fact that animal welfare legislation reflects, inter alia, each country’s individual 
circumstances is supported by international organisations, such as the UN Food and Agriculture 
Organisation. The organisation has taken the view that any international animal welfare legislation 
should be developed with the view that such legislation’s essential elements may need to be 
modified, implemented incrementally, or supplemented with economic incentives and voluntary 
schemes, depending on the individual circumstances o f each country.'*®’ It is noteworthy that there
'*®* See Nurse (n 437).
'*®'* eg the methods o f  animal slaughter used by Jews and Muslims.
'*®* See eg David Benson and Andrew Jordan, ‘A grand bargain or an “incomplete contract”? European Union 
environmental policy after the Lisbon Treaty’ (2008) EEELR 280.
'*®® See eg National Farm Animal Care Council, ‘A  Summary report on farm animal welfare law in Canada 
for the Farm Animal Council N etw ork’ (2013)
<www.nfacc.ca/resources/Farm _Animal_W elfare_Laws_Canada.pdf> accessed 20 M arch 2013.
'*®’ See Jessica Vapnek and M egan Chapman, Legislative and regulatory options for animal welfare (FAO 
2011), 17
<www.fao.org/docrep/013/i 1907e/il907e00.htm> accessed 12 M ay 2012.
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is no universal animal protection legislation on the grounds o f vyelfare,'*®* but international laws 
relate exclusively on conservation and management o f wildlife as well as trade in wildlife 
products.'*®® Indeed, although there are currently almost 300 global or regional Treaties covering a 
wide range o f international environmental problems,*®® none of them concern animal welfare as 
such. Consequently, in the absence o f a coherent international approach towards animal welfare or 
internationally recognised standards concerning the welfare o f seals, each individual State is at 
liberty o f deciding which actions constitute cruelty towards seals. Although this can be interpreted 
to work both ways, it should not mean that one country could impose its strict animal welfare 
standards on another, but decisions to legislate animal welfare at international level should be taken 
multilaterally, considering that the animal welfare views adopted by the EU, and advocated by 
animal welfare NGOs, are not based on any universally recognised standards or animal welfare 
criteria. Therefore, the fact that the EU’s public moral defence was upheld by the Panel, could be 
seen as an imposition of the EU’s standards on Canada.
Indeed, as noted above, the EU recognises that EU Member States may derogate from 
animal welfare legislation due to the need to respect certain religious and cultural reasons as well 
as regional heritage. Therefore, it can be argued that no uniform understanding o f animal welfare 
exists within the EU Member States. In fact, the possibility to derogate from common rules has 
been criticised because it may weaken the protection o f animals within some Member States.*®* 
Although there is scope for Member State derogation, it could be argued that under the animal 
welfare provision o f the Treaty (Article 13 TFEU), the institutions have a duty to actively work to 
achieve the objective o f protection o f animals into the sectors specifically mentioned in this
'*®* There have been several unsuccessful attempts to introduce universal animal welfare legislation at the 
UN. See N urse (n 437) 8-9.
'*®® See eg CITES and the Bern Convention. For an overall account on different international instruments 
using terminology used by animal welfare theories see eg M ichael Bowman, Peter D avies and Catherine 
Regwell, Lyster's International Wildlife Law (2nd edn, CUP 2010) 62.
*®® See Division o f  Policy Development and Law, Register o f  International Treaties and O ther Agreements 
in the Field o f  the Environment UNEP/Env.Law/2005/3 (United N ations Environm ent Programme 2005). 
Benson and Jordan (n 495).
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provision.*®^ Additionally, this duty is in principle enforceable before the CJEU. Therefore, the 
Commission may start infringement proceedings against Member States that fail to respect the 
protection o f animals. Similarly, Member States can initiate proceedings against the institutions 
should they fail to respect their duties under Article 13 TFEU, which stipulates that:
In formulating and implementing the Union’s agriculture, fisheries, transport, 
internal market, research and technological development and space policies, the 
Union and the Member States shall, since animals are sentient beings, pay full 
regard to the welfare requirements o f animals, while respecting the legislative or 
administrative provisions and customs of the Member States relating in particular 
to religious rites, cultural traditions and regional heritage.
Thus, Article 13 TFEU requires the institutions to undertake their activities in a certain 
way and with a particular goal,*®* namely to formulate and implement their policies in such a way 
that they ‘pay full regard to the welfare requirements of animals’. However, it can be argued that 
the institutions do not only have a legal duty to promote animal welfare in their policies, they also 
have a duty to seek a balance between the various general objectives of the EU, including the 
protection of indigenous peoples’ rights, which is an aspect o f the EU’s human rights policy.*®'*
Whilst the EU seal products legislation seemingly supports some of the arguments raised 
by Nurse and the animal welfare NGOs, particularly since the EU insists that seal hunting should 
not be practiced ‘primarily or exclusively for commercial purposes’,*®* at the same time the EU 
recognises the special legal status of indigenous peoples under international law.*®® In fact, as is 
seen in Chapter 3, the international protection o f indigenous peoples’ rights is considered sui 
generis law, which means that it was drafted specifically to address the unique situation of
*®* For similar arguments in the context o f  the EU environmental policies under A rticle 11 TFEU, see Beate 
Sjafjell, ‘Sustainable Development, EU Law and Companies: The EU Law Fram ework for the Sustainable 
Companies Project’ (2011) 8(1) Inti and Comparative Corporate L J 1 <http://ssm.com /abstract=1712789> 
accessed 22 May 2013.
*®* ibid 
*®'* ch 3 s 3.5.
*®* ch 1 s 1.2.2.
*0® ch 3 s 3.2.1.
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indigenous peoples who required specific type o f protection vis-à-vis non-indigenous peoples.*®’ 
Whether these rights are adequately protected in EU law is discussed in Chapter 3.
2.6 Impact assessment on the EU seal products legislation
This section is crucial for this thesis since it reveals that the EU may have not balanced 
indigenous economic rights with the need to protect seals from cruelty. Throughout this thesis 
references are made to two COWI reports assessing the impact o f the EU seal products legislation, 
inter alia, on Inuit. The difference between the two COWI reports is that the COWI Report 2008,*®* 
based on which the Commission adopted its own staff working document,*®® evaluated the potential 
impact o f the Basic Regulation, whereas the COWI Report 2010 evaluated the likely impact o f the 
traceability regime. The findings o f the COWI Report 2010 were used to design the traceability 
regime discussed in section 2.3.1. Additionally, this report was also used as evidence by the 
applicants during the second proceedings for interim measures before the EGC in TTK v Parliament 
and Council.
The findings of COWI reveal that the Commission was aware of the potential adverse 
impaets o f the EU legislation on Inuit. The COWI Report 2008 acknowledged that the impact on 
indigenous populations was likely to follow the ‘impact on the local economy in the areas where 
seals are hunted’.*** Furthermore, if  the commercial seal hunt conducted by non-indigenous 
Canadians was likely to suffer from the EU ban, the adverse effects would be replicated on Inuit.* *^  
Although the 2008 report noted that the impact might be less negative if  the EU policy measures
*®’ ch 3 s 3.4.2.
*®* COWI Report 2008 (n 81)
*®® Commission, ‘Impact assessment on the potential impact o f  a ban o f  products derived from seal species’ 
(S taff W orking Document) SEC (2008) 2290, para 6.2.5.
**° Case T-18/10 R I I ITK v Parliament and Council [2010] E C R 11-235 (Proceedings for interim measures 
2).
*** COW I Report 2008 (n 81) table 5 .1 .1.
**^  ibid
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‘accepted the use o f traditional hunting methods or allowed sales o f seal products o f Inuit origin’,
it concluded that despite this any ‘policy measures that have adverse impact on the image o f seal
skins and other seal products will have a negative impact on the Inuit population’.*** The
Commission staff working document reiterated these findings as it recognised that:
the experience from the EU ban on certain seal products fi-om 1983...is that policy 
measures that have adverse impacts on the image o f seal skins and other seal 
products will have a negative impact on the Inuit population anyway.**'*
This implies that although the Commission viewed the Inuit exemption in the 1983 Seal Pup 
Directive as unsuccessful in preventing the negative impaet on Inuit, this historical injustice did not 
prevent the EU from adopting the Basic Regulation.
The 2010 Report notes that the Implementing Regulation was ‘likely to have a further 
negative impact on the image o f seal products and this may imply a continued decline o f the market 
(even after recovery from the [financial] crisis)’.*** The report stated that ‘Canadian Inuit may be 
[indirectly] affected through prices and the overall image or signalling effect o f the Regulation, 
possibly structurally decreasing global demand and prices o f seal products’.**® In fact, the findings 
o f the 2010 report reveal that the EU institutions were more concerned about the ability o f the 
legislation to prevent the entiy o f commercial seal products to the market than enabling Inuit to 
benefit from the Inuit exemption.
Rather strikingly, the COWI Report 2010 reveals that Inuit o f Canada were intentionally 
excluded from the market since the COWI did not believe that they would be able to invest into the 
required traceability regime outlined by the Implementing Regulation.**’ The COWI expressly 
aeknowledged that ‘[i]t is likely that only Greenland will be able to make the investments needed 
to make use o f exemptions, as the scale of the Canadian Inuit hunt is too small and not as centrally
*** COWI Report 2008 (n 81) table 5.1.1.
**'* SEC (2008) 2290, para 6.2.5. See also s 2.2.
*** COWI Report 2010 (n 44) para 6.1.
**® ibid
**’ ibid paras 3.1 and 5.3.
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organised as that in Greenland’.*** In other words products o f Inuit origin from Canada were
thought to be unable to reach EU markets because they depend on the commercial seal export and
marketing infrastructure.**® Additionally, the 2010 report indicated that since there were
‘negligible’ numbers o f seal products of Inuit origin from Canada on the EU market in 2010, the
impact on the Canadian Inuit would be insignificant.*’®
Despite this, the institutions argued during the seeond interim proceedings that the EU ban
had nothing to do with the disappearanee o f EU markets, but this was chiefly due to the financial
downturn. Their argument were supported by the EGC, which held that:
uncertainty due to the threat o f a ban on seal products following the adoption of 
Regulation No 1007/2009 does not have a significant effect on the ‘Inuit economy’ 
o f Canada...[Therefore] the huge decrease in the figures relating to the ‘seal 
economy’ in Canada must, in all probability, be attributed mainly to the worldwide 
financial turmoil, in so far as it also affected the large export markets o f Russia,
China and the Far East.*’*
Strikingly, the EGC based its conclusion on the COWI Report 2010, which mentioned ‘not 
the European Union, but Russia, China and the Far East as being the ‘large markets’ for seal 
products’.*”  However, as is noted in Chapter 7, the WTO dispute settlement Panel made entirely 
different conclusions from the same evidence. It concluded that the EU legislation had a restrictive 
impact on international trade since it reduced the demand for seal products within the EU and, to a 
certain extent, also globally.*”  The Panel referred to the COWI Report 2010, which stated that ‘the 
current legislation has been in the pipeline and has created uncertainty about the EU market’.*’'*
*'* COWI Report 2010 (n 44) 44. Furthermore, while the hunting o f  activities o f  Canadian Inuit may not be 
‘centrally organised’, the trading o f  seal products originating from N unavut is ‘centrally organised’ as it takes 
place through a  programme o f  the Nunavut Government due to logistic reasons and the high cost o f  
transporting sealskins to market. See Nunavut Report (n 81) 3.
**®ch 6 s 6.3.1.
*’®s 2.6.1.
*’* See Case T-18/10 R  II ITK v Parliament and Council [2010] ECR 11-235 (Proceedings for interim 
measures 2), para 80.
*”  ibid referring to COW I Report 2010 (n 44) annex 30.
*”  EC-Seal Products (n 69) paras 7.449-7.450, 7.459. For the Panel’s findings on the impact on Inuit see ch 
7 ss 1.2-13.
*’'* COWI Report 2010 (n 44) Annex 5, 16 and 19.
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Additionally, it noted that the COWI Report 2008 stated that ‘[sjince seal hunting mostly takes 
place outside the Community territory, any restrictions to market access in the Community will 
have trade impacts’.*’* Therefore, the EU legislation was found to have a negative impact on the 
global trade although the EU denies this.
The COWI report also assessed the likelihood whether products o f Inuit origin from 
Canada could replace commercial products in the EU market. According to the COWI report, this 
depended on the perceived attractiveness o f these products in the EU, the cost o f implementation 
of the traceability system, and the extent to which Greenland could cover the EU demand.*’® 
However, to investigate whether products o f Inuit origin from Canada could cover the demand for 
seal products in the EU is absurd, considering that the COWI report itself noted that Canadian Inuit 
hunt seals on a small scale. Additionally, the international market for sealskins is ‘driven primarily 
by fashion trends rather than specific demand for Inuit products’.*”  In fact, in 2006, over 4.5 
million sealskins were imported to and within the EU-27.*’* This indicates that the size o f the EU 
market in 2006 was 10 times larger than in the early 1980s, when the EU accounted for about 80% 
of global demand in sealskins.*’®
Significantly for the purposes of this thesis the COWI report further acknowledged that 
‘where net benefits are too low or even negative, Inuit products are unlikely to be placed on EU 
markets at all’.**® For instance, the investments needed to comply with more advanced traceability 
system as opposed to the minimum traceability requirements*** were estimated to be too costly and, 
thus, unlikely to outweigh the benefits.**’ This is because sourcing products from Inuit regions was
COWI Report 2008 (n 81) 102.
*2® COWI Report 2010 (n 44) para 6.1.
*”  Case T-18/10 R I I  ITK v Parliament and Council [2010] ECR 11-235 (Proceedings for interim measures 
2), para 34.
*’* In total 4,536,511 sealskins were imported to and within the EU-27 in 2006. COW I Report 2008 (n 81) 
25 and 105.
*’®s 2.2.2.
**® COWI Report 2010 (n 44) para 6.1.
*** s 2.6.1.
**’ COWI Report 2010 (n 44) para 6.1.
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more expensive than those originating from non-indigenous hunting due to distances, logistics and 
the small number o f products involved.*** Furthermore, the COWI report stated that ‘it may not 
make sense to develop Inuit sources in Canada’, if  it appears that sealskins from Greenland are 
capable o f covering the demand in the EU market.**'*
This implies that the COWI report expected no products o f Inuit origin from Canada to be 
placed on the EU market due to the inability o f Inuit to adopt the EU’s traceability system. 
According to Canada, there has not been much incentive for the Canadian Inuit to pursue the 
marketing o f seal products under the Inuit exemption because there has been no demand for their 
products from the EU since the ban entered into force in 2010.*** Additionally, since the existing 
networks would no longer be viable because o f the EU legislation, considerable investment would 
have been needed to develop a new processing and distribution centre and chains.**® This would 
nevertheless be economically unfeasible.**’
In conclusion, it can be argued that the EU deliberately excluded Canadian Inuit from its 
market at the design stage because they could not invest into the EU’s strict traceability regime. 
This nevertheless implies that the EU may have failed to respect indigenous peoples’ rights, despite 
acknowledging the importance o f indigenous cultural traditions and seal hunting under the UN 
Declaration.***
2.6.1 What were the alternatives for the current traceability regime?
One of the options for the implementation o f Inuit exemption was product labelling.**® The 
COWI report noted that a voluntary labelling system, which is considered an essential element of
*** COWI Report 2010 (n 44) para 6.1.
**'* ibid
*** EC-Seal Products, First Written Submission o f  Canada (9 N ovem ber 2012) (Canada’s first submission to 
the W TO) paras 37-48.
**® ibid 
**’ ibid
*** ch 1 s 1.1.
**® For full details o f  the different traceability options see COWI Report 2010 (n 44) para 3.1.
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the minimum traceability requirements,*'*® would improve transparency for the consumer; reduce
the costs o f compliance to buyers and producers; and additionally it could serve as a useful
marketing tool for products o f Inuit origin.*'** Rather remarkably the Commission’s initial proposal
for the seal products legislation specifically identified voluntary labelling as beneficial in terms of
price mark-ups and more favourable image o f seal hunting.*'*’ The COWI further recognised that
the minimum traceability requirements were flexible because they would leave:
the implementation o f the actual system behind this up to the economic operator.
As such, it provides the economic operators in the various countries -  which differ 
strongly with regards the nature and scale o f the hunt and trade in seal products -  
with the flexibility to opt for the most efficient system in light o f their 
circumstances and existing systems.*'**
Although it was assessed relatively easy for Canadian Inuit to develop a voluntary labelling 
and identification system and thus, meet the minimum traceability requirements contemplated by 
the EU, the Commission abandoned this system as a feasible option due to the concerns o f the 
animal welfare organisations that it would be abused by commercial hunters.*'*'* During a 
consultation meeting in 2009, these organisations argued that traceability measures had to be strict 
in order to achieve two purposes: first, to ensure that the Inuit exemption would not be used to 
import products from commercial hunts and second, to satisfy European consumers.*'**
However, evidence exists that the Council’s legal service considered labelling as '‘sim ilarly  
effective" as a trade ban.*'*® In fact, according the Opinion o f the Council’s legal service, labelling 
'‘might he slightly less efficient" because it would not contain ''any d irect enforcement measure other 
than the provision  and enforcement o f  labels" Overall, the Opinion concluded that product
*'*® ie requirements for identification, record keeping and traceability reports.
*'** COWI Report 2010 (n 44) para 6.1.
COM (2008) 469 final, 11.
*'** COWI Report 2010 (n 44) 81.
*'*'* ibid para 6.1.
*'** See Stakeholder Meeting Report (n 383).
*'*® Canada’s first submission to the WTO (n 535) paras 689-90 citing Legal Service o f  the Council, ‘Opinion 
on the Proposal for a Regulation o f  the European Parliam ent and o f  the Council Concerning Trade in Seal 
Products: Compatibility with the W TO ’ (17 M arch 2009) 7691/09, 7 (emphasis in original).
*”  ibid
labelling 'would assuage citizens ’ and consumers ’ ethical animal welfare concerns" The COWI
report further asserted that since Inuit products constitute ‘a very small share o f Canadian seal trade, 
and the amount o f Inuit products currently ending on the EU market is negligible’.*'*® On these 
grounds, it concluded even the most strict traceability option was unlikely to have a significant 
impact on Inuit.**®
In conclusion, the two COWI reports indicate that the EU legislation was likely to have a 
negative impact on Inuit. Additionally, the fact that the Commission was aware that Canadian Inuit 
could not afford to invest in the traceability regime, and thus, fulfil the conditions under the 
Implementing Regulation, reinforces the view that the EU infringed the rights of Inuit under the 
UNDRIP because accessing the EU market under the current legislation became virtually 
impossible for Canadian Inuit. Effectively, the EU excluded Canadian Inuit from the market before 
the Inuit exemption had entered into force because o f the view of the COWI that hardly any 
products of Inuit origin from Canada were found on the market at the time. However, this can be 
argued to be so due to market uncertainty created by the EU legislation.*** By concluding that the 
legislation was likely to have a negligible impact on Canadian Inuit the EU made any future trade 
by Inuit o f Canada virtually impossible.
2.7 Has the EU legislation had a negative impact on trade by Inuit?
As noted in section 2.5, the EU institutions took the view that the financial downturn was 
the main cause for the decreased sales o f seal products in Greenland and Canada. It appears that 
quantifying the impacts of the seal products legislation on Inuit has been difficult in the absence of 
information, which would demonstrate the amount o f trade between Inuit o f Canada and the EU,
*'** Canada’s first submission to the W TO (n 535) paras 689-90 citing Legal Service o f  the Council (n 546) 
16 (emphasis in original).
*^® COWI Report 2010 (n 44) paras 6.1 and 6.1.1.
**0 ibid
*** s 2.6.
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res t o f  the  w orld , o r w ith in  the  dom estic  C anad ian  m arket. F o r in stance, the F u r H arvesters A uction  
sales reports  do n o t con ta in  any  in fo rm ation  as to  w here  th e  p roducts o f  Inu it o rig in  from  N u navu t 
w ere  destined  to , apart from  2004 , w hen  the  m ajo rity  o f  the  sea lsk ins o ffered  at the  auction  by  Inu it 
w ere p u rchased  b y  R ussian  and D an ish  buyers.**’ In add ition , th e  G overnm en t o f  N unavu t figu res 
are  largely  non-ex isten t. In  fact, the  G overnm ent o f  N u n av u t started  keep ing  an inven to ry  o f  tanned  
sea lsk ins fo r th e  first tim e in January  2012.***
2.7.1 G reen land
A lthough , trade in fu r fluctuates annually,**'* trade  sta tistics reveal th a t G reen lan d ’s trade  
in furs and lea thers ou tside the  E U  increased  be tw een  2006  and  2011 , w hereas its exports to  the 
EU  d im in ished  in value afte r 2006 (T able  2 .1). T he figu res deno ting  trade to  th e  EU  show  a sharp  
decrease in 2008 , w h ich  can be argued to  have started  in 2007 . H ow ever, du ring  th is period , trade  
in sealsk ins ou tside the  EU  increased , im ply ing  th a t th e  g lobal m arke t had  no t slow ed  dow n, 
con trary  to  the  a rgum ents o f  the  EU  institutions.***
Table 2.1. Trade o f Greenlandic sealskins in the EU and outside
2004 71% 29% 115,723 45,477
2005 69% 31% 108,372 54,399
2006 66% 34% 91,026 59,681
2007 43% 57% 45,043 20,889
2008 16% 84% 31,307 11,132
2009 22% 78% 19,602 5,201
2010 26% 74% 23,167 5,761
2004 71% 29% 115,723 45,477
Source: Great Greenland
See Fur Harvesters Auction, ‘Sale results’ 17 December 2004 
<www.furharvesters.eom/results/2004/Dec04can.pdf> accessed 6 November 2012.
*** Anita Li, ‘Nunavut government to keep track o f  tanned seal skins to help save money for local groups’ 
Star (25 January 2012) <www.thestar.com/news/canada/article/l 121347—nunavut-government-to-keep- 
track-of-tanned-seal-skins-to-help-save-money-for-local-groups> accessed 3 December 2012.
**"* See eg M alouf (n 315).
*** ch 6 s 6.6.
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These trends evidently coincide with the concurrent development o f national legislation 
in Belgium and the Netherlands; the resolution of the European Parliament; the scientific opinion 
o f the EPS A; the developments at the Council of Europe; and the subsequent development of the 
EU seal products legislation.**®
2.7.2 Nunavut
In 2012, the Government o f Nunavut published a report on the impact o f the EU legislation 
in Nunavut, according to which the decline in ‘market interest in sealskins was immediate and 
apparent well in advance o f the official implementation date for the ban’.**’ The Government 
argued that interest in their products declined sharply in 2008, following the publication o f the 
draft*** seal products legislation.**® This resulted in international buyers and brokers’ reluctance to 
purchase sealskins due to the uncertainty surrounding the future o f the EU market and trans­
shipment o f sealskins through the EU.*®® Therefore, after the entry into force o f the Basic 
Regulation most sealskins originating from Nunavut were sold either to Canadian customers or 
Inuit producers.*®* This is in contrast to previous years when the main buyers were companies 
established in Russia and Denmark.*®’
The sales figures o f the Fur Harvesters Auction reveal that after the discussion o f the EU 
ban had started in 2007, hardly any sealskins were sold through the auction.*®* However, the
**® s 2.3.
**’ Nunavut Report (n 81) 5.
*** COM (2008) 469 final.
**® Nunavut Report (n 81) 5.
*®® Case T-18/10 ITK v Parliament and Council (EGC, 6 September 2011), para 4.
*®* Some sealskins from the O ttawa fur auction are sold back to N unavut Inuit under the ‘Dressed Sealskins 
for Nunavum m iut’ program.
<http://env.gov.nu.ca/sites/default/files/English% 20Dressed% 20Sealskin% 20AdIlJ.pdf> accessed 12 
October 2012.
*®’ See Fur Harvesters Auction, ‘Sale results’ (n 552).
*®* ibid
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worldwide financial downturn did not start until late 2008.*®'* The decrease in prices paid for 
sealskins originating from Nunavut is reflected in the Fur Harvesters Auction’s sales figures, which 
are virtually non-existent in 2007-2009 and 2011 (Table 2.2). The situation has improved slightly 
since Inuit are selling their sealskins through the auction again.*®* However, the number of skins 
offered for sale is larger than actually sold.
Table 2.2. Nunavut ringed sealskins offered and sold through Fur Harvesters Auction
01/2014 1,078 485 45% 37.92 66
2013 1,386 970 70% 33.87 70
2012 1,589 1,200 76% 42.44 82
2010 8,700 1,300 15% 23.41 40
2006 6,224 5,975 96% 69.33 121.29
2005 7,770 6,526 84% 72.65 142.5
2004 7,800 6,630 85% 67.02 92.4
2003 10,461 7,845 75% 44.78 69.85
Source: Fur Harvesters Auction
Figures of the Government of Nunavut show that between 2002 and 2007, the number of 
sealskins sold fluctuated between 5,000 and 9,000 per year, whereas in 2008, this dropped to 1,000 
(Table 2.3).*®® Based on the figures of the Fur Harvesters Auction (Table 2.2), it appears that the 
market for ringed sealskins has not yet recovered. The same year, the Government started selling 
sealskins through private sales and a government subsidised program.*®’
*®^ The financial crisis started with problems in the US throughout 2007. The impacts spread outside the US 
in autumn 2008.
*®* Northern News Services, Report on Northern Industry: Opportunities North Section C June 2012 
<www.nnsl.eom/opps/oppsC.pdf> accessed 6 November 2012. In 2012, the total value of all different animal 
fur sales by the government o f Nunavut was worth 464,702 CAD.
*®® Nunavut Report (n 81) 5.
*®’ The number o f skins sold through these channels was approximately 3,000 to 4,500 in 2008. Northern 
News Services <www.nnsl.com/business/pdfs/fur.pdf> accessed 6 November 2012.
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Table 2.3. Gross sales and the number o f sealskins sold between 2002 and 2009
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In conclusion, sales and prices of sealskins from Greenland and Nunavut decreased 
significantly after 2006. This coincides with the legislative developments at the EU Member State 
and the EU level, the EE SA report and the statements by the European Parliament and the Council 
of Europe.*®* The sales figures of the Governments of Greenland and Nunavut support their 
arguments that the EU legislation impacted negatively the trading of seal products of Inuit origin. 
Therefore, despite the EU institutions’ pledges that they did not want to ‘adversely affect the Inuit’ 
embodied in the Preamble to the Basic Regulation,*®® the EU has not been capable of preventing 
the negative impacts on Inuit.*’®
2.8 Conclusion
The most significant conclusion reached in Chapter 2, for the purposes of this thesis, was 
the prolonged adverse impact of the EU legislation on the image of seal products, and thereby, its 
contribution to the continued decline of the seal products market.*” This is crucial because the
*®* ch 7 s 7.1.1.
*®®ch 1 s 1.1.
*™ These negative impacts are further explored in ch 7 ss 7.2-7.3. 
*’* s 2.6.
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institutions have argued that the worldwide financial downturn was the primary cause o f the 
adverse impact on Inuit.*”  Due to the strict conditions imposed by the Inuit exemption, it has been 
impossible for products o f Inuit origin fi-om Canada to enter the EU market.*”  Since it appears that 
the Commission was aware that Canadian Inuit were unlikely to be able to qualify for the Inuit 
exemption,*”  it can be argued that the EU has failed to address the interests o f these peoples despite 
numerous pledges to respect indigenous peoples’ rights under international law.
Chapter 3 concentrates on the specific rights guaranteed under the UN Declaration that 
can be seen as central in the context o f the EU seal products legislation and the ability o f Inuit to 
sell the products o f their harvesting activities in the EU market. Chapter 3 further investigates 
whether the EU is bound by the Declaration and whether these rights are enforceable before the 
CJEU.
*” s2 .6 . 
*” s 2.3.1. 
*”  ibid
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Chapter 3 - The rights guaranteed to indigenous peoples in international law
3.1 Introduction
In order to evaluate whether the EU achieves fair balance between the protection o f seals 
and the rights o f Inuit, Chapter 3 investigates how the rights o f Inuit are protected at the 
international level and whether the EU complies with international law guaranteeing indigenous 
peoples’ rights.*”  Although Chapter 3 focuses specifically on the UN Declaration since the 
Commission has noted that the EU’s engagement towards indigenous peoples takes place in the 
context of the UNDRIP,*”  reference is made to international law provisions protecting indigenous 
peoples’ rights, namely the ILO Convention 169 and the ICCPR, when appropriate. It appears that 
the EU institutions acknowledge that in order to regulate Arctic issues, which in turn are likely to 
have an impact on Arctic indigenous peoples, they need to take into account the UN Declaration, 
the ILO Convention 169 and other customary international law provisions protecting indigenous 
peoples.*”  In fact, the EU has expressly committed to respect the rights under the Declaration and 
the work o f the ILO.*’*
Additionally, all EU Member States have ratified the ICCPR, which means that all Member 
States must respect the rights under Article 27 ICCPR, which protects the right to enjoy indigenous 
culture and traditional economic activities, such as trapping, fishing, hunting and reindeer 
herding.*’® Since the CJEU has established very clearly through its case law that the EU must 
respect the international law in the exercise of its powers,**® the Court’s statement can be seen to
*’* s 3.2.2.
*’® ch 1 s 1.4. 
*” s 3.2.1. 
*’*s 3.3.1. 
*’®s 3.4.1.1. 
**® s 3.2.
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apply also the international law rights o f indigenous peoples. However, whether the Declaration or 
customary international law is enforceable before the CJEU is unclear.***
The application o f international law in EU law is nevertheless critical, considering that the 
seal products legislation has had an adverse impact on indigenous peoples who live outside the 
EU’s jurisdiction.**’ Although the CJEU referred to the provisions of the UNDRIP in ITK v 
Commission,^^^ it rejected the claim that the Declaration should apply.**'* The application of 
international law is critical also because the institutions claim that the rights o f Inuit are protected 
under the Inuit exemption.*** However, since the practical implementation o f this exemption has 
resulted in the inability o f Inuit of Canada to benefit from it**® the EU’s actions appear to undermine 
specifically Article 20 UNDRIP and other customary international law provisions, which guarantee 
the right of indigenous peoples to ‘freely pursue their economic, social and cultural 
development’.**’
Chapter 3 begins with an analysis of whether the CJEU’s existing case law supports the 
view that the UNDRIP or the provisions of customary international law, which has been argued to 
be codified in the Declaration, is binding on the EU institutions.*** This section is useful in 
understanding the dynamics guiding the process through which the CJEU applies international law 
in disputes before it. Whether the EU has competence to legislate in indigenous issues is considered 
next.**® Lastly, Chapter 3 investigates the scope o f the rights guaranteed under UN Declaration that 
can be seen as central to Inuit in the context of the dispute before the CJEU.*®®
**'8 3.2-3.2.1.
**’ ch 2 ss 2.6.1 and 2.8. Similar conclusion was reached in ch 7 s 7.2.2.3.
*** Case 1-526I\Q ITK V Commission (EGC, 25 April 2013).
**'* s 3.2.1. In this case, the Inuit applicants argued that the EU m ust respect their right to participate and be 
consulted in matters relating to their rights under the UNDRIP as well as to guarantee that they as indigenous 
peoples are not deprived from judicial protection before the CJEU.
***ch 6 s 6.1.2.
**® ch 7 s 1.2.23 
**’ c h l  s l .2 .1 .
***s3.2.
**® s 3.3:
*®®s3.4.
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3.2 Limitations o f EU law: are international law norms binding on the EU?
The thesis argues that in order to successfully protect indigenous peoples’ rights, the EU 
needs to apply the rights under the UNDRIP in practice. Although the CJEU has established that 
the EU must respect international law in the exercise o f its p o w e r s , t h e  enforceability o f the 
UNDRIP before the Court is unclear due to its non-legally binding character. However, it has been 
argued that the provisions o f the Declaration codify several existing rights under customary 
international law,^^  ^ such as the ILO Convention 169 and jurisprudence o f international and 
regional human rights courts and bodies.^^^ It also appears that as a result o f the adoption o f the UN 
Declaration, indigenous peoples virtually all over the world can rely on the Declaration in order to 
increase their political influence over national policies affecting them^ '^  ^because an overwhelming 
majority o f the UN Member States have ratified, or later endorsed, it.^ ^^
However, the way in which the CJEU applies international law in cases before it is not 
straightforward. Since the Treaties offer limited guidance concerning the position o f international 
agreements within the EU legal system, their applicability in EU law is essentially determined by 
the CJEU. The only Treaty provision relating to the application o f international law in EU law is 
Article 216(2) TFEU, which states that agreements concluded by the Council are binding on the
See eg Case C-286/90 Anklagemyndigheden v Poulsen and Diva Navigation Carp [1992] ECR I 6019 
paras 9-10 {Paulsen). See also Case C-366/10 y4/r Transport Association o f America and Others v Secretary 
o f State (ECJ, 21 December 2011), para 123 (ATAA); Case C -466/11 Gennaro Currà and Others v Germany 
(ECJ, 12 July 2012), para 18 {Curra).
See eg Siegfried W iessner and others, ‘Rights o f  Indigenous Peoples Committee o f  the International Law 
Association: Interim Report for the Hague Conference’ (2010) 6; Brenda Gunn, Understanding and 
Implementing the UN Declaration on the Rights o f Indigenous Peoples: An Introductory Handbook 
(Indigenous Bar Association 2011)6 .
ibid. eg that o f  the Inter-American Commission and Human Rights Court, the UN Human Rights Council, 
the Human Rights Commission, the Committee on the Elimination o f  Racial Discrimination, and UN Special 
Rapporteurs on indigenous peoples.
On the UN Declaration see eg Claire Charters, ‘Indigenous peoples and International Law and Policy’ in 
Benjam in J Richardson, Shin Imai and Kent McNeil (eds). Indigenous peoples and the law: comparative and 
critical perspectives (Hart 2009).
Although Canada, Australia, N ew  Zealand and the US initially voted against the declaration they have 
since reversed their stance.
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institutions and Member States and form an integral part o f EU law. This provision codifies the 
ECJ’s 1982 decision in Hauptzollamt Mainz v Kupferberg,^^^ which further established that 
individual litigants may rely on the provisions o f an international agreement concluded by the 
Council before national courts. Additionally, any decisions adopted by international organisations 
and bodies, which are directly connected to agreements concluded by the Council, form an integral 
part o f the EU legal system upon their entry into force in the same way as the agreement itself
However, the CJEU has not applied the approach established in Kupferber^^^ uniformly 
to all international agreements. This is evident fi-om the case law concerning international 
agreements concluded by the Member States, but not by the institutions. According to the Court, 
acts adopted by the institutions cannot be challenged on the basis o f an international law instrument 
which has not been ratified by the EU. In its 2002 decision in Netherlands v Parliament and 
C o u n c i l , the ECJ held that ‘[i]t is common ground that, as a rule, the lawfulness o f a Community 
instrument does not depend on its conformity with an international agreement to which the 
Community is not a party’ Therefore, such agreements are not part of EU law. Because the UN 
Declaration has been ratified by all Member States, but not the EU it would appear that it is not 
part o f EU law as such.
Indeed, the degree o f the explicit EU competence over the subject matter o f the agreement 
is critical. In 2012, in Currà and Others v G e r m a n y , the Court stated that it can only interpret 
and apply international law within the context of the explicit EU competence:
Case 104/81, Hauptzollamt Mainz v CA Kupferberg and Cie KG  [1982] ECR 3641.
Case 30/88 Greece v Commission [1989] ECR 3733, para 13; Case 192/89 SZSevince v Staatssecretaris 
van Justitie [1990] ECR 1-3497, paras 8-9. The Court appears to treat such decisions as autonomous sources 
o f  international law. See also Joana Mendes, ‘EU law and global regulatory regimes: Hollowing out 
procedural standards?’ (2012) 10 (4) Int J Constitutional L 988, s 2.
Kupferberg (n 596).
Case C-377/98 Netherlands v Parliament and Council [2001] ECR 1-7079.
^  ibid para 52.
Currà (n 591). Currà concerned an application for compensation brought by several Italian nationals 
against Germany in respect o f  the harm which they suffered as a result o f  their deportation from Germany 
during the Second W orld War.
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Admittedly, the European Union must respect international law in the exercise of 
its powers (see, by analogy. Case C 286/90 Poulsen and Diva Navigation [1992] 
ECR 16019, paragraph 9, and Case C 366/10^/> Transport Association o f  America 
and Others [2011] ECR I 0000, paragraph 123). Thus, the Court must apply 
international law and may be required to interpret certain rules falling within the 
scope o f that law, but solely within the context of the competence which has been 
conferred on the European Union by the Member States.^°^
The CJEU addressed this issue in more detail in ATAA v Secretary o f  State fo r  Energy and 
Climate Change where it held that the provisions o f an international convention^°^ ratified by all 
the EU Member States, but not the EU itself would have a binding effect on the EU only if  the 
Member States had transferred to it all the powers previously exercised by them in the field.^°^ 
Consequently, the EU must have acquired and assumed exclusive powers in the entire fie ld  to which 
that international agreement applies.^®  ^Because human rights are not exclusive competence of the 
EU, the case law implies that the EU is not bound by international agreements, which all the 
Member States have ratified, even if  they are legally binding on the ratifying States. In the light of 
the above the Court would most probably not investigate the legality of the seal products legislation 
in the light o f the UNDRIP, considering that (i) it is legally non-binding, (ii) it has not been ratified 
by the Council, and (iii) the EU has no exclusive powers in the field o f indigenous peoples’ rights. 
112 The document relied on by the applicants is a declaration and thus does not have the binding 
force o f a treaty. It cannot be considered that that declaration can grant the Inuit autonomous and 
additional rights over and above those provided for by Union law.
Currà (n 591) para 18.
ATAA {n 59V).
^  The Convention on International Civil A viation (signed on 7 D ecember 1944).
^05^LT4(n591)para62.
^  ibid paras 63 and 72. In this case, the convention had been signed before the establishment o f  the EC. The 
CJEU recalled that although Article 351(1) TFEU implied a duty on the part o f  the institutions not to impede 
the performance o f  the obligations o f  M em ber States, which stemmed from any international agreement 
concluded prior to 1 January 1958, that duty did not bind the EU as regards the third States party to that 
agreement, ibid para 61.
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3.2.1 The application o f  customary international law in EU law
The CJEU has expressly acknowledged that customary international law is applicable to 
both EU internal and external action.^°^ In its 1992 decision in Poulsen and Diva Navigation,^^^ the 
Court held that EU legislation must be interpreted in light of the relevant rules o f international law, 
including customary international law. In this case, the Court established that the EU had to take 
into account certain maritime conventions^®^ ‘in so far as they codify general rules recognized by 
international custom’.®^® Additionally, the provisions o f the UN Convention on the Law of the 
Sea®“ were applicable in Poulsen^^^ even if  they had not entered into force at the time of the 
decision.®^  ^Based onPoulsef^^ any indigenous peoples’ rights codified by customary international 
law should, in theory, be applicable before the CJEU.
It has also been suggested that the EU is bound by the principles o f customary international 
law even where such principles are codified in international agreements to which the EU is not a 
signatory.®^® It appears that the EU can be regarded bound by and held liable for breaches o f both 
international Treaty law and customary international law®*® on the grounds o f Article 47 o f the 
Treaty on European Union (TEU),®*’ which stipulates that the EU has ‘international legal 
personality’. Advocate-Generals of the CJEU certainly seem to think that the Court has to interpret 
the provisions o f international agreements where these form expressions o f customary rules and
®®^ See eg Theodore Konstadinides, ‘W hen in Europe: Customary international law  and EU competence in 
the sphere o f  external action’ (2012) 13(11) German Law Journal 1177, 1183 referring to Tawhida Ahmed 
and Israel de Jesus Butler, ‘The European Union and human rights: A n international law  perspective’ (2006) 
1 7 E u rJ In t’11771,778.
®®^ Poulsen (n 591) para 10.
®°^  eg Convention on the High Seas (adopted 29 April 1958 entered into force 30 September 1962) 450 UNTS 
11.
®*° Poulsen (n 591) para 10.
®** adopted 10 December 1982 entered into force 16 N ovem ber 1994 1833 UNTS 3 (UNCLOS).
®*^  Poulsen (n 591) para 10.
®*^  ibid 
®’“ ibid
®*® Konstadinides (n 607) 1183.
®*® ibid
®*7[2010]OJC83/13.
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serve as a criterion for the validity o f the activities of EU institutions.®*® However, the Advocate- 
Generals are not always successful in persuading the Court to agree.®*®
As noted in Chapter 1, the EU has recognised the significance o f the UNDRIP.®^® The 
European Parliament and the High Representative consider that the rights in the UNDRIP and the 
ILO Convention 169 are o f political importance to the EU.®^ * The High Representative, Catherine 
Ashton, delivered a Declaration on International Indigenous Peoples Day in 2011 on behalf o f the 
EU and the Member States ‘reaffirming their commitment to indigenous peoples both in and 
outside the EU’.®^  ^This Declaration further stated that:
The 27 Member States o f the EU all support the 2007 United Nations Declaration 
on the Rights o f Indigenous Peoples, an important milestone for them and for 
everyone working to promote human rights. We work with the UN Office o f the 
High Commissioner for Human Rights to support the participation o f indigenous 
peoples at UN events and meetings; and we support the International Labour 
Organisation in its work for indigenous peoples, including that based on ILO 
Convention 169.
In theory, the Declaration by the High Representative could be interpreted as an explicit 
acceptance of an obligation rising out o f the UNDRIP, if  not also the ILO Convention 169. 
Additionally, the UNDRIP is referred to in the Preamble to the Basic Regulation. Whether the 
explicit acceptance would require the EU to implement the UNDRIP within the EU legal order by 
a separate instrument is unclear. Nevertheless, the point the thesis makes is that there are instances
®*® See Case C-533/08 TNT Express Nederland BV v AXA Versicherung AG  [2010] ECR 1-4104, Opinion o f  
AG  Kokott, para 65.
®*® See eg Case C-50/00 P, Union de Pequehos Agricultores v Council [2002] ECR 1-6677 (UPA), Opinion 
o f  AG Jacobs. The role o f  the Advocates-General is to propose to the ECJ, in complete independence, a legal 
solution to the cases for which they are responsible. However, their Opinions are non-binding on the Court. 
®^° ch 1 s 1.1.
®^* This is despite the fact that the majority o f  the current 28 M em ber States are not parties to the ILO 
Convention 169. In fact, only Denmark, the Netherlands and Spain have ratified the ILO Convention 169. 
See International Labour Organisation <www.ilo.org/ilolex/cgi-lex/ratifce.pl7C169> accessed 13 October 
2011.
®  ^ Declaration by the High Representative, Catherine Ashton, on behalf o f  the European Union on the 
occasion o f the International Day o f  the W orld's Indigenous People on 9 August 2011 
<www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/eritrea/press_comer/all_news/ne w s/2011/20110809_0 l_en.htm > 
accessed 2 April 2012.
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where the EU has accepted obligations rising out o f international conventions, which are non­
binding on it. For instance, the institutions decided to fully implement CITES within the EU legal 
order although it was non-binding on the EU.®^ ® By doing so, they recognised the decision-making 
powers o f the CITES Conference o f Parties and transposing these decisions into EU law.®^ '* This 
approach is supported by the Vienna Convention,®^® which provides, inter alia, that ‘third parties 
are not bound by a treaty unless the parties to the treaty®^ ® intend the provision to be the means of 
establishing the obligation and the third State expressly accepts that obligation in writing’.®^  ^This 
is significant since an explicit acceptance o f the obligations rising from the UNDRIP and thus, a 
decision to adhere to the Declaration, means that the EU should ensure compliance with it 
throughout the territory covered by the Treaties.®^®
However, it is noteworthy that the CJEU has held that the Vienna Convention is non­
binding on either the EU or EU Member States.®^ ® Despite this, the Court has established through 
its case law that several provisions o f the Vienna Convention reflect the rules o f customary 
international law, which themselves are binding upon the EU institutions and thus, form part of the 
EU legal order.®®® This acknowledgement can be seen as instrumental for the Court’s acceptance 
of customary international law in EU law.®®* Indeed, the Court has, inter alia, recognised that many 
customary law principles codified in the provisions o f the Vienna Convention apply in cases before 
it. It has explicitly referred to at least Article 26 according to which the agreements and stipulations
®^® See eg M endes (n 597) s 4.
®24 ibid
®  ^ Vienna Convention on the Law  o f  Treaties (adopted 23 M ay 1969, entered into force 27 January 1980) 
1155 UNTS 331.
®^® In this context, ‘treaty’ means an international agreement, rather than the founding Treaties o f  the EU.
®^’ V ienna Convention, art 35.
®^® On the topic o f  the EU adhering to an international environmental agreement, see Kramer, EU  
Environmental Law (n 186) s 11-18.
®®® See Case C-386/08 Firma Brita GmbHv Hauptzollamt Hamburg-Hafen [2010] ECR 1-01289, para 42.
®®° ibid. See also Case C -162/96 Racke GmbH and Co v Hauptzollamt Mainz [1998] ECR 1-3655, paras 24 
and 45-46; Case C -118/07 Commission v Finland [2009] ECR 1-10889, para 39.
®®* See Konstadinides (n 607).
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o f the parties to a contract must be observed,®®  ^and Article 31(1), which contains a fundamental 
interpretative norm o f international law according to which an international law Treaty must ‘be 
interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the 
treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose.’
In A T A A f^  the Court addressed the issue o f whether certain principles o f customary 
international law could be relied upon by individuals in an action for annulment against an EU Act. 
In previous cases, the CJEU has held that customary international law was less precise than Treaty 
norms and did not therefore create rights for individuals.®®'* For instance, in Racke v Hauptzollamt 
M a i n z the Court noted that customary international law would be applicable to the extent that 
‘the individual concerned was invoking fundamental rules o f customary international law against 
the disputed regulation, which had been taken pursuant to those rules and deprived that individual 
o f the rights to preferential treatment granted to it by the Cooperation Agreement’.®®® Although 
Racke^^^ indicates that the rights guaranteed in customary international law could be relied on 
before the Court in certain circumstances, whether the CJEU considers that the UNDRIP codifies 
customary international law and that the seal products was pursuant to the UNDRIP is unclear.
Thus far, the CJEU has rejected the argument that the fundamental rights in the ECHR on 
which the Inuit applicants relied should be interpreted in the light of ‘provisions relating to the 
protection of indigenous peoples in international law,®®® as enshrined, in particular, in [the 
UNDRIP]’.®®® It nevertheless appears that the appellants’ referral to ‘provisions relating to the
®®^ See eg Racke (n 630) para 49; Case T-338/08, Stichting Natuur en Milieu and Pesticide Action Network 
Europe v Commission (EGG, 14 June 2012), para 72.
ATAA (n 591).
®®4j;acte(n630).
®®® ibid paras 48-49, 52.
®®® ibid. In this case, the contested EU act was Council Regulation (EEC) N o 3300/91 o f  11 N ovem ber 1991 
suspending the trade concessions provided for by the Cooperation Agreement between the European 
Economic Community and the Socialist Federal Republic o f  Yugoslavia [1991] OJ L 3 15/1.
®®^ Racke (n 630).
®®® This could be interpreted to include not only the UNDRIP, but potentially also the ILO Convention and 
other customary international law, such as the ICCPR.
®®® Case T -S ie m iT K v  Commission (EGC, 25 April 2013) para 104.
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protection of indigenous peoples in international law’ in ITK  v Commission^'^ can be interpreted to 
apply to customary international law in addition to the UNDRIP. Therefore, based on Racke^^ Inuit 
need to convince the Court that the seal products legislation deprived them of ‘the rights to 
preferential treatment’ granted to them by the UNDRIP because the contested legislation was 
adopted pursuant to the UNDRIP and other customary international law protecting indigenous 
peoples’ rights. However, this may prove challenging.
The Court has already rejected one argument concerning the UNDRIP in ITK  v 
Commissionf'^ Thus, even if  the UNDRIP could be seen to codify customary international law, in 
this case, the EGC considered the applicants’ argument concerning Article 19 UNDRIP as 
irrelevant in the context o f an alleged infringement o f their rights under the ECHR, and specifically 
the ‘right to be heard’ The applicants argued that if  an individual’s property rights were 
considerably restricted, this person should be given a reasonable opportunity o f putting their case 
to the competent authorities.®'*'* Although the Court noted that the EU seal products legislation 
referred to the UNDRIP, it stated that the claimants’ argument that ‘the right to be heard had to be 
interpreted in the light o f Article 19 UNDRIP could not succeed’.®'*® Although the Court’s decision 
is not very clear, it appears that since the EGC found no restriction of the applicants’ right to 
property, there was no infringement o f the right to be heard either. Although on the one hand the 
EGC’s decision concerning Article 19 UNDRIP could be seen to undermine the importance o f the
®  ^Case T-526/10 ITKv Commission (EGC, 25 April 2013) para 104.
®'** ibid 
®'*2 ibid
®^® The ‘right to be heard’ is one o f  the fundamental rights recognised by the EU legal order. It is codified in 
Article 47 o f  the Charter o f  Fundamental rights. Before the entry into force o f  the Lisbon Treaty, the ‘right 
to be heard’ was imposed as a general rule o f  EU law in cases where there was an adverse impact on the 
applicant’s interests, specifically in cases involving export o f  goods. See eg Case T - 4 10/06 Foshan City 
Nanhai Golden Step Industrial Co, Ltd v Council [2010] ECR 11-00879. This case involved See also ch 6 s
6.2 .2 .
®  ^Case T-526/10 77% V Commission (EGC, 25 April 2013), para 110.
®*® ibid. Article 19 UNDRIP can be interpreted to impose an obligation for States to seek the free, prior and 
informed consent o f  indigenous peoples before implementing any legislative or administrative measures 
which may affect indigenous peoples. See s 3.4.2.
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UNDRIP, the Court’s conclusions on Article 19 are not surprising, considering the CJEU’s 
approach towards different international instruments in EU law.
The Court’s conclusions concerning Article 19 UNDRIP do not necessarily mean that the 
EU fails to respect indigenous peoples’ rights under the UNDRIP. In fact, it appears that the Court 
considered that the Inuit were heard in relation to the seal products legislation since in its opinion 
there was an adequate consultation o f indigenous peoples.®*® Therefore, the Court’s conclusions are 
consistent with existing case law, which has, inter alia, established that if an applicant was ‘in a 
position in which it could effectively make known its views’ there would not be a breach o f the 
applicant’s rights of defence.®^  ^In its 2010 decision in Foshan v Council,^^ the ECJ specifically 
held that ‘the right o f interested parties, in particular exporters, to be heard...includes the right to 
be informed of the main facts and considerations on the basis of which it is intended to recommend 
the imposition o f definitive anti-dumping duties’.®*® Thus, the mere fact that the applicant was 
informed was appropriate in the case concerning anti-dumping duties. However, providing mere 
information and an opportunity to make their views known in relation to the EU seal products 
legislation is unlikely to be sufficient under Articles 18 and 19 UNDRIP, which concern the right 
o f indigenous peoples to be consulted in decision making concerning their rights.®®® Whether 
indigenous peoples were appropriately consulted by the EU is further discussed in section 3.4.3.
On the whole, the CJEU’s case law indicates that the institutions must indeed respect the 
rights under the UNDRIP. Therefore, the EU appears to recognise the need to take into account the 
UNDRIP and the ILO Convention 169 because these instruments constitute current international 
law on indigenous peoples’ rights. The EU’s commitment is evidenced, inter alia, from the seal 
products legislation, the statement by the Council that the EU is working towards the universal
®*® s 3.4.3.
®*^  Foshan (n 643) para 125.
®*® ibid
®*® ibid para 109.
®®®s 3.4.2.
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ratification and implementation o f all major international human rights instruments,®®* including 
those protecting indigenous peoples’ rights,®®^  the Declaration by the High Representative, 
Catherine Ashton,®®® and the Commission documents concerning the EU’s engagement with 
indigenous peoples in the context o f the EU’s future Arctic policy.®®* This is logical considering 
that the EU has considerable power and role at the international fora. However, the CJEU may find 
that the Declaration is not enforceable before it for three reasons. First, the Declaration is non­
binding on the EU. Second, indigenous rights do not fall within the exclusive competence o f the 
EU.®®® Finally, even if  private applicants able to rely on provisions o f customary international law 
codified in the provisions o f the UN Declaration in an action for annulment against an EU act, such 
law does not per se create rights for individuals.
3.3 Does the EU have competence to legislate in indigenous issues?
Although the Commission considers that ‘[ijndigenous issues are an integral part o f the 
EU’s human rights policy’ and that ‘[t]he EU seeks to integrate human rights, including 
indigenous issues, into all aspects o f its external policies’,®®® human rights are not exclusive 
competence o f the EU.®®^  In fact, although the EU may act to protect human rights, provided that 
it acts within scope o f EU law, the Member States are the primary protectors of human rights
®®* See Council, Guidelines Human Rights and international Humanitarian law (European Communities 
2009) <http://eeas.europa.eu/human_rights/docs/guidelines_en.pdf> accessed 13 M arch 2013.
®®^ COM (2008) 763 final, para 2.2. In this context, the EU operates many policies and initiatives, such as the 
regional policy and cross-border programs which may benefit indigenous peoples participating in the 
‘Northern D im ension’, a  jo in t policy between EU, Russia, Norway and Iceland. Additionally, the EU funds 
projects through the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights, established by Regulation (EC) 
N o 1889/2006 o f  the European Parliament and o f  the Council o f  20 Decem ber 2006 on establishing a 
financing instrument for the promotion o f  democracy and human rights worldwide [2006] OJ L386/1.
®®®s 3.2.1.
®®*chi s i . 4.
®®® s 3.3.
®®® SWD (2012) 182 final, para 1.2.
®®^ Opinion 2/94 [1996] ECR 1-1759, para 27: ‘No Treaty provision confers on the Community institutions 
any general pow er to enact rules on human rights or to conclude international conventions in this field.’
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within the EU.®®® It also appears that the institutions have not had much influence in the 
development of law and policy relating to indigenous peoples within the EU, but the EU has let 
the Member States deal with their indigenous populations at the national level. This can be inferred 
from the fact that the EU Treaties®®® do not confer any explicit competence to the institutions to 
legislate in indigenous issues.®®® The only area in which the institutions appear to have 
‘competence to carry out activities and conduct a common policy’®®* as regards indigenous 
peoples is the field o f development aid where these peoples are a ‘thematic priority’.®®^ However, 
since Canada is not a developing country, there is no development co-operation in this sense 
between the EU and Canada. In the light o f this, the EU’s attempt to balance rights o f Arctic 
indigenous peoples with the protection o f seals seems rather problematic.
Since the EU is founded on the principle o f conferred powers, the general rule is that the 
EU institutions have no competence in any areas which are not specifically mentioned in the 
Treaties.®®® In fact, according to Article 2(5) TEU, the institutions may only provide support and 
co-ordination for the European aspects o f areas in which Member States retain exclusive 
competence. However, this support and co-ordination cannot include harmonisation o f Member 
States’ laws.®®* Therefore, the EU may act only where the Treaties provide a legal basis for its 
action. The fact that the institutions have not had any involvement in indigenous issues is logical, 
considering that the EU was developed on the principles o f economic co-operation. Therefore, the
®®® See eg Brid M oriarty and Eva M assa (eds), Law Society o f Ireland: Human Rights Law (4th edn, OUP 
2012) 168.
®®® In this context, the term ‘treaties’ means the founding Treaties o f  the EU.
®®® TEU, arts 2-6.
®®* TFEU, art 4(4).
®®^ See Council Resolution o f  30 N ovem ber 1998 on Indigenous peoples within the framework o f  the 
development cooperation o f  the Community and the M em ber States, 13461/98. The Treaty contains an 
explicit legal basis (art 212 TFEU) for the EU to insert a clause making respect for human rights an essential 
element and basis for co-operation to an agreement between the EU  and a  third country, which falls within 
the scope o f  the E U ’s external development policy.
663 P qj. list o f  competencies see TFEU, arts 2-6. See also TEU, art 2(5).
®®* TEU, art 2(5).
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subsequent emphasis on fundamental human rights®®® and social,®®® political and fiscal cohesion 
has only developed fairly recently.
Even though according to the Commission, Arctic indigenous peoples in the EU ‘are 
protected by special provisions under EU law’,®®^ these provisions have a very limited application. 
In practice, the ‘special provisions’ means Protocol 3 to the Act o f Accession o f Sweden and 
Finland, which concerns exclusively the Sami people inhabiting the Arctic regions of the EU’s 
northernmost Member States.®®® The Protocol guarantees exclusive reindeer herding rights to Sami 
people o f Sweden.®®® It further acknowledges that Finland and Sweden are committed to preserve 
Sami culture in accordance with their international law obligations, specifically Article 27 ICCPR 
and the UN Declaration.®^® It is striking that neither Member State has yet ratified the ILO 
Convention 169 due to its implications on their legal systems, inter alia, due to the right to 
landownership.®^* The issue concerning landownership by the Sami demonstrates that the EU 
cannot intervene and force its Member States to recognise Sami land rights. Therefore, it is up to 
each Member State with an indigenous population to regulate their internal matters relating to 
economic, social, educational, linguistic and cultural rights or indeed landownership. Any 
involvement, which the institutions have in the area of indigenous issues, relate to support, co­
ordination and supplementation o f Member States’ actions in the area o f culture and education of
®®® Opinion 2/94 (n 657) (comment on the E C ’s power to act in the field o f  human rights and on its accession 
to the ECHR).
®®® Although the EU shares competence with the M em ber States in the area o f  social policy, this relates 
primarily to employment, labour law  and working conditions, vocational training, social security, and the 
right o f  association and collective bargaining. TFEU, art 4(1 )(b).
®®7 COM (2008) 763 final, para 2.2.
®®® Act concerning the conditions o f  accession o f  the Kingdom o f  Norway, the Republic o f  Austria, the 
Republic o f  Finland and the Kingdom o f  Sweden and the adjustments to the Treaties on which the European 
Union is founded [1994] OJ C 241/9.
®®® It must be noted that there are no exclusive reindeer herding rights for the Sami o f  Finland under the 
Finnish legal system.
®’o See Darpo (n 197) 2.
®’* Jukka Nyyssonen, ‘Principles and practice in Finnish national policies towards the Sami People’ in Giinter 
M innerup and P ia Solberg (eds). First World, First Nations: Internal Colonialism and Indigenous Self- 
determination in Northern Europe and Australia (Sussex Academic Press 2011) 88-89.
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indigenous peoples in the context o f Article 165 TFEU and public health under Articles 6 and 168
In conclusion, the fact that the EU accepts certain obligations arising from the UNDRIP 
and the ILO Convention 169®^® has no impact on the competencies of the institutions to legislate 
in the field of indigenous peoples’ rights, but the competencies remain -with the EU Member 
States.®^* However, it could be argued that the institutions are politically bound by obligations 
arising from customary international law on indigenous peoples’ rights. Regardless, Inuit should 
not be subject to regulation by the EU because the institutions do not have any competence to 
regulate indigenous issues within the EU. Additionally, the fact that Inuit inhabit self-governing 
regions outside the EU’s jurisdiction makes the EU’s attempt to regulate their rights highly 
inappropriate, considering that the rights o f Inuit are already adequately protected by international 
law as well as national legislation in force in Canada and Greenland. This coupled with the fact 
that the seal populations, which the EU is attempting to protect, are also outside the EU’s 
jurisdiction makes the EU’s legislative action even more problematic.
3.4 Rights central to indigenous seal hunting guaranteed under the UN Declaration
Because the balance between indigenous economic rights and the protection o f seals is the 
subject of the primary research question of this thesis, the most important right in relation to the 
seal products legislation under the UNDRIP is the right o f indigenous peoples ‘to engage freely in 
all their traditional and other economic activities’ (Article 20).®^ ® Therefore, this section assesses 
whether the EU respects this right under Article 20. Additionally, this section investigates whether 
the EU has fulfilled the requirements for indigenous consultation. Indigenous peoples’ right to
®  ^Tim e Koivurova and others, EU competencies affecting the Arctic (European Parliament 2010) para 2.8.1. 
®’® 8 3.2.1
®’* On the E U ’s competencies to legislate in Arctic issues, see K oivurova and others (n 672) para 2.8.3.
®7®s 3.4.1.
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participate in decisions that have potential to affect their rights is guaranteed under Article 18 
UNDRIP. Additionally, Article 19 UNDRIP concerns the right to give their ‘free, prior and 
informed’ consent before States implement legislative or administrative measures which may affect 
these peoples.®’® The implications o f indigenous participatory rights are that if  the seal products 
legislation was drafted without adequate participation o f Inuit, the balance between the economic 
interests o f Inuit and the protection of seals can be argued to be unfair. The reason why this thesis 
investigates the participatory rights is that in ITK  v Commissiorf^^ the Inuit argued that they were 
not consulted in relation to decision making concerning the seal products legislation.®’® The EGC 
addressed this claim in its decision in April 2013. However, according to it, there was sufficient 
consultation o f indigenous peoples. Whether the consultation was conducted in accordance with 
the provisions o f UNDRIP is investigated in section 3.4.3.
Although the UNDRIP guarantees several other rights, which the EU must take into 
account because they are considered an important part o f seal hunting, including the right to 
culture®’® and the right to natural resources, these rights are not discussed in full detail in this thesis 
unless they contain an economic component as in the case o f Article 27 ICCPR. This is because 
the focus o f this thesis is whether the EU legislation balances fairly the protection o f seals and the 
rights o f indigenous peoples to engage in their traditional economic activities. Based on the UN 
Human Rights Committee’s General Comment No 23®®® on Article 27 ICCPR, the right of 
indigenous peoples to preserve their distinct culture and way o f life is closely linked to two other 
rights, namely (i) the right to engage in traditional economic activities and (i) the right to access
®’® s 3.4.2.
®”  Case T-526l\0 ITKv Commission (EGC, 25 April 2013).
®’® s 3.4.3.
®’® In its W hite Paper, ‘M anagement and Utilization o f  Seals in G reenland’, the Government o f  Greenland 
stated that Inuit o f  Greenland have the right to practise cultural traditions and customs (art 11(1) UNDRIP) 
and the right to not be subjected to forced assimilation or destmction o f  their culture (art 8 UNDRIP). Even 
though this sounds drastic, Greenland expressed fears that the EU seal products legislation m ay destroy Inuit 
way o f  life and disturb the diversity o f  their culture. M anagem ent and Utilization o f  Seals (n 11) 3 ,3 8 .
680 ‘ICCPR General Comment N o 23: Article 27 (Rights o f  M inorities)’ CCPR/C/21 /Rev. 1 /Add.5 (8
April 1994).
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living natural resources.®®* This is because indigenous peoples have traditionally used living natural 
resources not only to survive, but to earn livelihood.®®’ Therefore, it can be argued that Article 27 
ICCPR recognises that traditional indigenous harvesting activities may include an economic 
component. This is supported also by State practice in some countries. For instance, in Canada 
some First Nations were encouraged to fish for commercial purposes prior the Confederation Act, 
7^ 67.®®®
It is worth noting that the EU does not contest the importance o f indigenous cultural rights. 
As noted in Chapter 1, the Preamble to the Basic Regulation recognises that seal hunting is an 
integral part o f indigenous culture.®®* Therefore, in theory it could be seen to support the right to 
derive economic benefit fi'om activities which are related to indigenous cultures. However, as noted 
in Chapters 1 and 2, the EU’s understanding of these rights is rather restrictive.®®® It is also 
noteworthy that since the exploitation o f natural resources by indigenous peoples takes place 
outside the EU’s jurisdiction, the EU cannot regulate the use and conservation o f seals in Canada 
or Greenland. For this reason, the EGC noted in its decision in ITK  v Parliament and CounciP^^ 
that the EU legislation does not affect the hunting o f seals outside the EU.®®’
3.4.1 Right to engage in economic activities
The rights o f Inuit to engage in economic activities under Article 20 UNDRIP is critical 
for this thesis because in ITK  v Parliament and C o u n c i l the applicants claimed that the ban on 
seal products seriously impacted ‘the health and well-being o f the Inuit people, and, more
®®*s3.4.1.1.
®®^ See eg Kitok v Sweden (Case No 197/1985) views adopted 27 July 1988, para. 9.2; Ilmari Lansman and 
others v Finland (Case N o 511/1992), adopted 26 October 1994, paragraph 9.1; Jouni Lansman (n 474) para
10.2 .
®®® Confederation Act, 1867 (UK), 30 & 31 Viet, c 3 reprinted in RSC 1985, App II, N o 5. See also eg Jack 
v R [1 9 8 0 ] 1 SCR 294.
®«*chl s l . l .
®®® c h i  s 1.2.2; ch 2 s 2.5.
®®® Case T-18/10 ITK v Parliament and Council (EGC, 6 September 2011).
®®’ ch 6 s 6.4.1.
®®® Case T-18/10 R  ITK v Parliament and Council [2010] ECR 11-75 (Proceedings for interim measures 1).
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particularly,...[their right] to engage in the commercial exploitation o f  seal products, which 
constitute an important source o f their income in the Union’.®®® This provision is relevant for this 
thesis also because the Inuit applicants claimed that their fundamental rights under EU law, 
specifically under the ECHR, should be interpreted in the light o f international law on indigenous 
peoples’ rights, including the UNDRIP.
Article 20(1) UNDRIP recognises the right o f indigenous peoples ‘to engage freely in all 
their traditional and other economic activities.’ As discussed in Chapter 1, indigenous economic 
activities, as they are understood in Canada and Greenland, are not limited to traditional subsistence 
activities whereby indigenous peoples merely barter items, such as fish and wildlife products, for 
other goods, but not money.®®® Indeed, modem indigenous economies necessitate these peoples to 
purchase goods and services, which they cannot produce themselves, such as electricity and internet 
access.®®* Besides, as noted in Chapter 1, both in Greenland and Canada seal hunting serves another 
purpose, namely the sale o f by-products o f seals, such as sealskins both in international and 
domestic markets to generate income.®®’ Therefore, the rights o f Inuit cannot be argued to be limited 
to acquiring money to pay for hunting-related activities only, but contemporary indigenous peoples 
must also be able to connect their houses to the grid in order to keep abreast o f any recent 
government proposals and developments affecting them,®®® pay their bills online and heat their 
houses either by gas or district heating.
Article 20(1) appears to support not only the right to engage freely in economic activities, 
but also the right to ‘maintain and develop’ their economic systems or institutions. This suggest 
that international law supports the right Inuit to develop their traditional seal hunting activities to
®®® Case T-18/10 R  ITK v Parliament and Council [2010] ECR 11-75 (Proceedings for interim measures 1), 
para 59 (emphasis added).
®®® ch 1 s 1.2.2.
®®* ibid 
®®^ ibid
®®® In ITK V Commission, the EGC noted that the text o f  the proposed implementation measures were placed 
online, indicating that the EU expects that Inuit should have access to the internet. Case T-526/10 ITK v 
Commission (EGC, 25 April 2013), para 129.
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include profit-making. The ‘right to develop’ is further supported by Article 3 UNDRIP, which 
stipulates that indigenous peoples have the right to ‘freely pursue their economic, social and cultural 
development’ by virtue o f the right to self-determination. This provision itself is supported by 
several legally binding international human rights instruments discussed in Chapter 1.®®* 
Consequently, indigenous economic rights can be argued to form part o f customary international 
law.
Therefore, it appears that indigenous economic activities are not confined to the ‘cultural 
heritage of bartering’®®® under international law, but as noted in Chapter 1, the commercial aspects 
o f indigenous harvesting activities are related to the need o f these peoples to adjust to modem 
society since without the possibility o f making profits these peoples would find it difficult to 
survive.®®® It was also noted that the EU’s view o f the scope o f indigenous peoples’ rights differs 
from the way the WTO Panel, the Governments o f Canada and Greenland, indigenous peoples 
themselves and intemational law view the issue.®®’
3.4.1.1 Indigenous economic rights under other intemational law instruments
Indigenous economic activities are recognised as important for the continued existence of 
these communities also by the decisions of the UN Human Rights Committee and the ILO 
Convention 169. The Committee has emphasised the connection between the right to enjoy 
particular culture and traditional activities, such as trapping, fishing, hunting and reindeer herding, 
to eam a livelihood under Article 27 ICCPR.®®® In 1994 the Committee noted in its General 
Comment No 23 that States may be required to adopt positive legal measures to guarantee that
®®*chl s 1.2.1.
®®®chi s i .2.2.1.
®®® EC-Seal Products (n 69) para 7.287.
®®Ubid
®®® ICCPR General Comment N o 23 (n 680) para 7.
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indigenous harvesting activities are protected from State infringement.®®® Additionally, States may 
also need to adopt measures ‘to ensure the effective participation...[of indigenous peoples] in 
decisions which affect them’.’®® The Committee has thus clearly articulated the indigenous 
participatory rights and the right to be protected from State infringement when exercising their 
rights to eam a livelihood from their traditional activities. Additionally, in its 1996 decision in 
Lânsmarf^^ the Committee noted that:
[i]t is also undisputed that reindeer husbandry is an essential element of the [Sami] culture; 
that some o f  the authors practice other economic activities in order to gain supplementary 
income does not change this conclusion. The Committee recalls that economic activities 
may come within the ambit o f article 27, if  they are an essential element of the culture of 
an ethnic community.’®’
Since Article 27 ICCPR requires that members o f a minority are not denied their right to enjoy their 
culture, measures which amount to a denial o f this right are incompatible with the obligations under 
this provision.’®® As noted in Chapter 1, the ICCPR is generally considered to form part of 
customary intemational law.’®* Therefore, it can be concluded that customary intemational law as 
codified by the ICCPR supports not only the traditional indigenous economic rights, but other 
activities to supplement their income.
Indigenous economic rights are recognised also by the ILO Convention 169. It stipulates 
that States should adopt measures that promote ‘the full realisation of the social, economic and 
cultural rights of [indigenous] peoples with respect for their social and cultural identity, their 
customs and traditions and their institutions’.’®® The Convention further requires States to
®®® ICCPR General Comment N o 23 (n 680) para 7. The Committee considers these activities as part o f  
indigenous cultural rights. See also Kitok (n 682) (concerning Sami reindeer herding allegedly violated by 
quarrying activities); Bernard Ominayak, Chief o f the Lubicon Lake Band v Canada (Communication N o 
167/1984) views adopted on 26 M arch 1990 (concerning the enjoym ent o f  indigenous lands and resources 
including trapping and hunting due to various development projects involving gas, oil and timber).
ICCPR General Comment N o 23 (n 680) para 7.
’®* Jouni Lansman (n 474).
’®^ ibid para 10.2.
®^® ibid para 10.3.
’®*chl s 1.2.1.
ILO Convention 169, arts 2(l)-2(2)(b) (emphasis added).
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strengthen and promote activities, which enable indigenous peoples to develop their societies and 
support their economic self-reliance and development.’®® Article 23(1) lists the customary ways in 
which indigenous peoples have obtained livelihood, including:
[h]andicrafts, rural and community-based industries, and subsistence economy and 
traditional activities of the peoples concerned, such as hunting, fishing, trapping and 
gathering, shall be recognised as important factors in the maintenance o f their 
cultures and in their economic self-reliance and development.
Additionally, the ILO Convention notes that States should eliminate any possible socio­
economic gaps between indigenous peoples and other members o f the wider society, in a manner 
compatible with indigenous aspirations and ways of life.’®’ This is because many indigenous people 
are still at the margins o f the society in terms of income and employment opportunities.’®® 
Therefore, read together these two provisions can be interpreted as a requirement not to enact 
obstacles on the exercise of indigenous rights, but actively eliminate any existing barriers. Since 
the EU has expressed its support to the ILO ‘in its work for indigenous peoples, including that 
based on ILO Convention 169’,’®® the way in which the EU has interpreted indigenous peoples’ 
economic rights is in disagreement with the ILO Convention 169 since neither this Convention nor 
the UNDRIP specifically limit the scope of the indigenous economic rights to those which should 
not be exercised primarily or exclusively for commercial purposes. In fact. Article 20(1) UNDRIP 
read together with Article 43 UNDRIP implies that the right to engage freely in all economic actives 
is a minimum requirement because Article 43 specifically stipulates that: ‘[t]he rights recognized 
herein constitute the minimum standards for the survival, dignity and well-being o f the indigenous 
peoples o f the world’. This means that the Declaration sets the minimum necessary to meet
’®® ILO Convention 169, art 23(1).
’®’ ibid art 2(2)(c).
’®® See eg Anaya, Indigenous Peoples in International Law (n 16); David W ilson and David MacDonald 
‘Growing gap project: The income gap between aboriginal peoples and the rest o f  Canada’ (Canadian Centre 
for Policy A lternatives 2010)
<www.policyaltematives.ca/sites/default/files/uploads/publications/reports/docs/Aboriginal%20Income%2 
OGap.pdf> accessed 13 April 2010.
’®®ch 3 s 3.2.1.
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intemational human rights standards, not an upper limit.’*® Consequently, States are free to apply 
higher standards than those set out in the UN Declaration, but surely not lower. It is noteworthy 
that, for instance, the EU’s ‘Northern Periphery Programme’ recognises that livelihoods of the Sami 
o f the Nordic countries are varied and include ‘reindeer herding and fishing, agriculture, trade, 
small-scale industry, handicrafts and the service industries’.’** This raises a question o f on what 
basis does the EU assume that the livelihoods o f the Inuit should be limited to subsistence hunting 
and fishing without the possibility to develop their activities into a small-scale industry? This raises 
an important question as to why should the economic activities of indigenous peoples associated 
with the EU be any different than those o f Inuit o f Canada?
In conclusion, the EU’s narrow definition o f indigenous economic rights is no longer 
appropriate or helpful since it is not supported by intemational law instmments on indigenous 
peoples’ rights. Indeed, indigenous peoples have the right to ‘freely pursue their economic, social 
and cultural development’’*’ as well as the right ‘to engage freely in all their traditional and other 
economic activities’ under the UNDRIP.’*® This means that not only do the States recognise 
economic activities as part of indigenous culture, but that these peoples have the right to determine 
how they wish to engage in their economic activities or to pursue their economic development. 
Additionally, the UN Human Rights Committee has recognised because the economic benefit from 
some traditional indigenous activities, such as reindeer herding is low, many reindeer herders have 
been forced to look for additional sources of income in order to survive, even though their preferred 
means o f supporting themselves may be reindeer herding.’** Nevertheless, the important point is 
that the economic activities do not diminish the value o f indigenous cultures. In fact, it could be 
argued that without such activities these cultures could no longer exist.’*® It also appears that the
’*® See eg Gunn (n 592) 6.
'^* See ‘Northern Periphery Programme 2007-2013: Operational Program m e’, para 4.3.3 (emphasis added).
’*2 UNDRIP, art 3. 
’*® ibid art 20(1). 
’** ch 2 s 2.5.2. 
’*®s3.4.1.2
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current understanding o f indigenous economic rights in countries where Inuit and other Arctic 
indigenous peoples live, including the two EU Member States, does not support the EU narrow 
interpretation that indigenous peoples could not engage in economic activities the same way as 
non-indigenous peoples do. Indeed, the Sami reindeer herders in Finland and other Nordic countries 
sell reindeer meat as part o f their traditional activities.’*® Since the income from these activities 
may be low, the Sami can engage in other economic activities the same way as any other Nordic 
citizens.’*’
3.4.2 Right to participate and the right to consent under the UNDRIP
Other important rights in relation to the EU seal products legislation are the participatory 
rights. In order to ensure that the EU has balanced the rights o f Inuit to engage in their economic 
activities with the protection o f seals, Inuit must be able to participate in decision making 
concerning them. Article 18 UNDRIP stipulates that:
Indigenous peoples have the right to participate in decision-making in matters which 
would affect their rights, through representatives chosen by themselves in 
accordance with their own procedures, as well as to maintain and develop their own 
indigenous decision-making institutions.
The right to participate is connected to the responsibility o f the States to seek indigenous 
peoples’ consent before implementing legislative or administrative measures, which may affect 
these peoples. This means that States must not only inform, but consult and possibly accommodate 
indigenous peoples’ interests when they take decisions concerning their rights. The responsibility 
o f the States to consult is stipulated in Article 19 UNDRIP:
’*®ch 2 s 2.5.1.
’*’ ibid
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States shall consult and cooperate in good faith with the indigenous peoples 
concerned through their own representative institutions in order to obtain their free, 
prior and informed consent before adopting and implementing legislative or 
administrative measures that may affect them.
The use o f the term ‘may’ implies that the mere potential impact necessitates indigenous 
peoples to be consulted. This is also the view o f the Supreme Court of Canada.’*® A report by the 
Intemational Law Association Committee on Rights of Indigenous Peoples has further elaborated 
the content o f Article 19.’*® According to it, the term ‘informed consent’ ensures that, before giving 
their consent, the indigenous community is ‘aware o f the possible effects that the measure to be 
taken is suitable o f producing with respect to its interests’.” ® This implies that all the relevant 
information, which is necessary in order for indigenous peoples to arrive at a position on a policy 
proposal, is made available to them in an easily comprehensible form and language.” *
In Canada, the federal government has adopted an approach according to which indigenous 
peoples must be informed in advance, all information has to reach them by various means (fax, 
email and mail) and the recipients must to be given sufficient time to prepare their response.” ’ 
Additionally, the Government guidelines state that during the consultation process government 
officials must be in continuous contact with those indigenous peoples, who are likely to be affected 
by decision making, in order to make the consultation process meaningful and enable indigenous 
peoples to feedback their questions and concerns to the Government.” ®
Further, according to the Intemational Law Association Committee, the giving or 
withholding of consent should be determined by an indigenous people ‘according to the rules and 
procedures determined by the group itself.” * This implies that indigenous peoples should be
’*® See eg Haida Nation v British Columbia (Minister o f Forests) [2004] 3 SCR (Supreme Court o f  Canada).
Steven W heatley, ‘Autonomy or Self-Government’ in W iessner and others (n 592) 14.
’ ®^ ibid 
^^ * ibid
See eg Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development Canada (AANDC), Aboriginal Consultation and 
Accommodation: Updated Guidelines for Federal Officials to Fulfill the Duty to Consult (AANDC 2011). 
ibid
” * W heatley (n 719) 14.
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treated as equal partners whose participation is critical, rather than just the recipients of 
information. Finally, experts disagree whether the requirement to obtain ‘free, prior and informed 
consent’ implies that indigenous peoples have a right o f veto in relation to the adoption of 
legislative measures or whether it simply means that States have a duty to consult in good faith 
with indigenous peoples with the objective o f reaching a consensus.” ® Wheatley argues that ‘while 
the ideas o f democracy and political equality o f citizens...suggest that no individual or group 
within the society should be provided with a veto over legislation with majority support’, such a 
conclusion is inconsistent with the recognition o f collective rights o f indigenous peoples.” ® He 
further argues that ‘the existence o f the right o f veto in favour o f indigenous peoples seems to be 
confirmed by the object and purpose of UNDRIP, as shown by other provisions included in its text, 
as well as by pertinent intemational practice’.” ’
He also refers to the provisions o f the draft Nordic Saami Convention, according to which 
‘states shall not adopt or permit measures that may significantly damage the basic conditions for 
Saami culture, Saami livelihoods or society, unless consented to by the Saami parliament 
concemed’.” ® Although Wheatley’s arguments are controversial, reconciling indigenous peoples’ 
rights with the more customary notion o f ‘basic individual human rights’ is potentially problematic 
because indigenous peoples’ rights arise ‘from and [are] embedded in culture’.” ® Therefore, 
indigenous peoples’ rights and their legal situation can be argued to be ‘unique’ compared to non-
W heatley (n 719) 14. See also UN Human Rights Council, Report o f  the Special Rapporteur on the 
situation o f  human rights and fundamental freedoms o f  indigenous people, James Anaya. UN Doc. 
A /H R C /12/34 ,15 July 2009. According to Anaya, the principles o f  consultation and consent are designed to 
‘build dialogue in which both States and indigenous peoples are to work in good faith tow ards consensus and 
try ...to  arrive at a mutually satisfactory agreem ent’. Thus, they do not mean that indigenous peoples get a 
veto over any legitimate decision-making processes, ibid paras 48-49.
’ ®^ W heatley (n 719) 14.
ibid 14-15 referring to art 10 UNDRIP; Draft Nordic Saami Convention, art 16; African Commission on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights, Communication 276/2003 Ce«/re for Minority Rights Development (Kenya) and 
Minority Rights Group International on behalf ofEndorois Welfare Council v Kenya (4 February 2010) para 
281.
Draft Nordic Saami Convention, art 16 
<www.regjeringen.no/upload/BLD/Nordic% 20Sami% 20Convention.pdf> accessed 21 January 2014.
” ® Ruddle and Davis (n 483) s 6.
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indigenous peoples. Indeed, the intemational protection o f indigenous peoples’ rights is considered 
sui generis law, which means that it was drafted specifically to address the unique situation o f 
indigenous peoples who required specific type of protection vis-à-vis non-indigenous peoples.” ® 
According to other opinions, however, the right to be consulted and give consent does not 
mean that indigenous peoples get a veto over any legitimate decision-making processes. According 
to James Anaya, the Special Rapporteur on the situation o f human rights and fundamental freedoms 
of indigenous people, the principles o f consultation and consent are designed to ‘build dialogue in 
which both States and indigenous peoples are to work in good faith towards consensus and try...to 
arrive at a mutually satisfactory agreement’.” * However, principles o f consultation and consent 
do not give:
indigenous peoples a right to unilaterally impose their will on States when the latter 
act legitimately and faithfully in the public interest. Rather, the principles of 
consultation and consent are aimed at avoiding the imposition o f the will o f one party 
over the other, and at instead striving for mutual understanding and consensual 
decision-making.” ’
It would appear that the way in which Anaya has interpreted rights under Articles 18 and 19 are 
more palatable for most States, whereas Wheatley’s interpretation can be seen as rather 
controversial.
3.4.2.1 Right to participate and the right to consent under other intemational instmments
The same way as the rights discussed in section 3.4.1.1, the right principles to be consulted 
and give consent are guaranteed by several other intemational law instmments. Article 6(1 )(a) of 
the ILO Convention 169 stipulates that governments must consult indigenous representatives
ch 2 s 2.5.2. See eg Aoife Duffy, ‘Indigenous Peoples’ Land Rights: D eveloping a Sui Generis Approach 
to Ownership and Restitution’ (2008) 15(4) Intemational Journal on M inority and Group Rights 505, 538.
’®* UN Human Rights Council, Report o f  the Special Rapporteur on the situation o f  human rights and 
fundamental freedoms o f  indigenous people, James Anaya. UN Doc. A/HRC/12/34, 15 July 2009. 
ibid paras 48-49.
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through appropriate procedures, before adopting any legislative or administrative measures, which 
potentially have a direct impact on these peoples. As such, these rights appear very similar under 
the UNDRIP and the ILO Convention 169. Governments must also establish means by which 
indigenous peoples are able to participate the same way as any other sectors o f population, at all 
levels o f decision making, in both the elective institutions and bodies responsible for policies and 
programmes concerning indigenous peoples.” ® Furthermore, consultations must be undertaken in 
good faith and in a form which is appropriate to the circumstances. The objective o f the 
consultation should be the achievement o f an agreement or consent o f the indigenous peoples to 
the proposed measures.” * In addition to the UN Declaration and the ILO Convention 169, the UN 
Human Rights Committee has suggested in the context o f Article 27 ICCPR that States should 
adopt measures, which guarantee effective participation o f indigenous peoples in decisions 
affecting them.” ®
3.4.3 Was there an adequate consultation o f indigenous peoples by the EU?
This section is relevant for assessing the question whether the EU legislation respects the 
rights under the UN Declaration, which in turn is relevant for the primary research question 
concerning the balance between indigenous peoples’ rights and the protection of seals. In ITK  v 
Commissions^ the EGC addressed the claim that Inuit were not consulted by the Council and 
Parliament before the adoption of the Basic Regulation in September 2009. The Court noted that 
according to the Commission, Inuit communities were broadly and repeatedly consulted in 
preparation for both the Basic Regulation and its implementing measures.” ’ According to the
” ® ILO Convention 169, art 6(1 )(b). 
” * ibid art 6(2).
” ® General Comment No 23 (n  680) para 7. See also Jouni Lansman (n 474). 
” ® Case T-526/10 ITK v Commission (EGC, 25 April 2013).
’®’ ibid para 114.
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Court, the Inuit exemption was introduced after consultation with Inuit communities on 21 January 
2009/^^ which is well before its adoption. Although the Court noted that the applicants disputed 
the relevance and usefulness o f some of their meetings with the Commission representatives, they 
did not dispute the fact that they were presented in the January 2009 meeting/^^ Although the 
applicants’ dissatisfaction with the consultation meetings implies that it is unlikely that they were 
involved in the process o f establishing the rules and procedures according to which these 
consultations took place,^"^° the EGC held that the Commission could not be criticised for consulting 
widely with all interested parties. "^*  ^ Quite the opposite, the fact that the Commission consulted 
different parties indicated that it wished to take account o f all the relevant evidence relating to the 
problem. '^*^
Moreover, the Court noted that without being contradicted by the applicants several of 
them were present at the stakeholder consultation meeting’'*^ o f 18 November 2009 concerning the 
implementation o f the Inuit exemption, at which an ‘information note on the proposed text was 
distributed, discussed, and subsequently placed on the intemet’.’^ '^  In addition, the Court noted that 
the Commission published the draft of the Implementing Regulation on the internet on 2 June 
2010.’'*^ The Court seemed to consider that Inuit had been heard and given the opportunity to make 
their views known according to the established procedures o f the Commission. Therefore, in its 
opinion, the essential procedural requirements were satisfied. According to the Court, Inuit had a 
possibility to participate in decision making concerning both the Basic Regulation and the 
Implementing Regulation since some of the consultation meetings appear to have taken place 
before the adoption o f the Basic Regulation. However, questions arise whether the consultations
Case T -526 /10ITK v Commission (EGC, 25 April 2013), para 114.
™ ibid
which is an important requirement according to the International Law Association Committee. See s 3.4.2. 
eg animal welfare organisations and representatives o f  Inuit communities. ITK v Commission (n 738) para 
129. 
ibid
See Stakeholder Meeting Report (n 383).
Case T-526/10 /TAT v Commission (EGC, 25 April 2013), para 125. 
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were conducted in line with the basic principles o f the UNDRIP or the ILO Convention 169 due to 
the claims o f the Canadian Inuit organisation.
In his Radio Canada interview in November 2013, Terry Audla, president of the Canadian 
Inuit organisation, Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami, maintained that the EU never consulted Canadian Inuit 
before the November 2009 meeting, which concerned exclusively the measures implementing the 
Basic Regulation, but not the Basic Regulation itself. '^*  ^ Although this is very worrying, it is 
impossible to verify whether there was ‘effective participation’ o f the Canadian Inuit in the 
negotiation process due to insufficient evidence establishing whether the Inuit o f Canada were 
indeed present, or presented by anyone, in the January 2009 meeting, considering that no records 
o f this meeting are publicly available.^'*^ If  this is not the case, the negotiation process and 
consultation of the Canadian Inuit were not meaningful or adequate when the EU prepared its plans 
to adopt the Basic Regulation. In line with Articles 18 and 19 UNDRIP it is insufficient that Inuit 
o f Canada were merely informed o f the EU’s plans. Therefore, it is uncertain whether the 
requirement for the States to obtain the ‘free, prior and informed consent’ under Article 19 
UNDRIP '^^* has been fulfilled. It also appears that Inuit may not have had a say in the procedure 
and rules o f consultation which is the condition promoted by the International Law Association 
Committee. Therefore, the EU’s consultation may have fulfilled only partially the UNDRIP’s 
standard o f consultations. The implications o f this are that if  the seal products legislation was 
drafted without participation o f relevant indigenous peoples, the balance between the rights o f Inuit 
and the protection o f seals is unfair.
Eilis Quinn, ‘Eye on the Arctic; Why Inuit are still fighting the EU  seal ban’ Radio Canada International 
(29 N ovem ber 2013) <www.rcinet.ca/en/2G13/l I/29/eye-on-the-arctic-why-inuit-are-still-fighting-the-eu- 
seal-ban/> accessed 14 January 2014.
See Stakeholder Meeting Report (n 383). The COW I Report 2008 notes that: ‘A  public consultation was 
conducted between 20th December 2007 and 13th February 2008 via the Commission's Interactive-Policy 
M aking (IPM) tool. The consultation provided the possibility for EU citizens as well as non-EU citizens to 
express their view on regulation o f  seal hunting - as an input to the policy decision-m aking process.’ COW I 
R eport 2008 (n 81), para 2.5. However, this can hardly be consistent with the provisions o f  the UNDRIP, 
ch 3 s 3.4.2.
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3.5 Conclusion
In order to evaluate whether the EU achieves a fair balance between the protection of seals 
and the rights o f indigenous peoples to engage in their traditional economic activities, Chapter 3 
has investigated how and to what extent international law instruments recognise the rights o f Inuit 
to participate in decision making concerning them and to engage in economic activities, which are 
related to seal hunting. It has also investigated the extent to which these instruments are binding on 
the EU and thus enforceable before the CJEU.
It appears that international law instruments fully support the rights o f Inuit to engage in 
seal hunting and related economic activities.^'*^ Therefore, the EU’s understanding o f the scope of 
this right as limited to ‘subsistence’ differs from that under international law. It can be argued that 
the EU’s view is inconsistent with rights under Article 20 UNDRIP.^^° Such an argument is 
supported by the findings in Chapter 7, which demonstrate that the EU’s practical implementation 
o f the Inuit exemption is inadequate because it fails to guarantee access to the EU market to all 
potential beneficiaries. Therefore, the EU seal products legislation could be seen to trump the 
indigenous peoples’ rights under Article 20 UNDRIP. Since the UN Deelaration has been argued 
to codify customary international law,^^  ^Article 20 can be interpreted to codify particularly Article 
27 ICCPR and Article 2 the ILO Convention 169. Consequently, the EU’s narrow understanding 
o f indigenous economic rights may have resulted in a breach o f these rights not only under the 
UNDRIP, but also customary international law.
It also appears that the EU and the Canadian Inuit organisation disagree whether there was 
adequate consultation o f Canadian Inuit in the context o f the seal products legislation. Whereas 
according to the CJEU, consultations were adequate, even if  Inuit contested the meaningfulness of 
the consultation meetings, the Inuit organisation disagrees because in its opinion Inuit of Canada
s 3.4.1.
ibid 
’5^ 8 3.2.1.
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were not consulted before the adoption o f the Basic Regulation. This is potentially very 
embarrassing for the public image of the EU, considering that the EU has expressed its commitment 
to indigenous peoples both in and outside the EU by supporting the UN Declaration and the ILO 
in its work for indigenous peoples.^^^ Although these instruments are highly relevant in the context 
o f the EU seal products legislation, they are non-binding on the EU as such.’^^  Therefore, there is 
uncertainty whether international law is enforceable before the CJEU on the grounds that the 
Treaties do not confer exclusive competence o f the institutions to legislate in the field o f indigenous 
peoples’ rights. The lack o f explicit competence nevertheless makes it debatable whether the EU 
should have adopted legislation relating to indigenous peoples’ rights in the first place,^ '^* 
considering that that the Inuit exemption fails to protect interest o f Inuit o f Canada. Therefore, it is 
possible to argue that the EU has no similar degree o f familiarity or experience in dealing with 
indigenous peoples’ rights as the Governments o f Canada and Denmark do. Additionally, it appears 
that the EU may have failed to ensure that its consultation with indigenous peoples adheres to the 
relevant provisions under international law, by guaranteeing that all potential beneficiaries o f the 
Inuit exemption were consulted before the adoption of the Basic Regulation.
The following Chapter (Chapter 4) examines the rights and interests o f Inuit under 
Canadian law as regards seal hunting. The corresponding rights under the laws o f Greenland are 
investigated in Chapter 5. These two Chapters are included in this thesis in order to demonstrate 
that indigenous rights are adequately regulated under Canadian and Greenlandic law as these laws 
take animal welfare requirements into account in that extent which is compatible with indigenous 
peoples’ rights.
’52 ch 3 s 3.3.2.
’52 s 3.4.1.
’54 s 3.3; ch 8 s 8.2.
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Chapter 4 - The rights o f Inuit to hunt seals and animal welfare in Canada
4,1 Introduction
As noted in Chapter 1, according to the EU, the seal products legislation ‘balances the 
welfare o f seals with the interests o f I n u i t ’ because it contains a specific exemption for their 
benefit. For this reason Chapter 4 investigates the scope o f the rights o f Inuit under Canadian law 
and whether the way in which the EU limits the exercise o f these rights is appropriate, considering 
that the EU legislation has resulted in the exclusion o f Inuit o f Canada from the EU market.
To assess the restrictive effect o f the EU legislation on Canadian Inuit Chapter 4 
investigates what constitutes a legitimate restriction o f indigenous peoples’ rights under Canadian 
law.’56 Thus, Canadian legislation and jurisprudence on aboriginal and treaty rights are signifieant 
for the purposes o f this thesis because they are informative in evaluating the restrictive impact of 
the EU legislation on Inuit. As is noted in Chapter 6 , the EU institutions deny that the EU legislation 
has had any adverse impact on Inuit on the grounds that the Basic Regulation does not regulate 
either the hunting of seals or the consumption of seal products outside the EU. ’5’ Therefore, the 
CJEU found that products o f Inuit origin can in principle be placed on the EU market under the 
Inuit exemption.’ *^
Canadian precedents are relevant in this regard because they illustrate how the conditions 
to which products o f Inuit origin must adhere to under the EU legislation may in fact impose an 
unreasonable limitation on the rights o f Inuit. For instance, a requirement for any licences, which 
are not freely available, would most probably fail the Sparrow test o f justification under Canadian 
law if  it imposed an unreasonable limitation or ‘undue hardship’ on the exercise of those rights or
’52 E U ’s second submission to the W TO (n 68) para 208. 
’55 s 4.4.
’5’ ch 6 s 6.1.2.
’58 ibid
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if  it denied the rights holders o f their preferred means o f exercising their rig h ts .’^^  Therefore, 
requirement for licences, which are difficult to obtain, would most probably be disproportionate in 
Canadian law.’ °^ These arguments are relevant in relation to the conditions imposed on Inuit by the 
Implementing Regulation.
Additionally, Chapter 4 argues that sinee Canadian law already adequately regulates seal 
hunting by Inuit by prohibiting inhumane harvesting practices, it is not necessary for the EU to 
limit the sale and import o f seal products o f Inuit origin to those ‘contributing to the subsistence of 
indigenous communities’ on the grounds that Inuit would start hunting more seals, which would 
consequently lead to poor animal welfare outcomes for seals in the Canadian Arctic. As noted in 
Chapter 1, in its submission to the WTO, the EU explained that it was necessary to make the 
conditions of entry for products o f Inuit origin strict with the intention o f not to incentivise 
indigenous people to hunt more seals.’®*
The problem with the EU’s narrow understanding o f the scope o f indigenous peoples’ 
rights is that the EU has made the conditions o f the Inuit exemption so restrictive that not only does 
the exemption eliminate any possible abuse of this exemption, but it also prevents the potential 
beneficiaries from benefiting from the exemption altogether. The EU’s arguments also reveal that 
it does not take into account the fact that there are no quotas for any seal species harvested by Inuit 
under Canadian law, but Inuit can harvest an indefinite number of seals for any purposes that are 
consistent with each individual Inuit T reaty .T herefo re , by ‘ c a lib ra tin g ’ the Inuit exemption to 
allow low levels o f trade in seal products means that the EU imposes restrictions on Inuit right to
’5^8 4.4.1.
’5° s 4.4.2.
’5* ch 1 s 1.2.2. 
’« s 4 .3 .
’52 ch 1 s 1.2.2.
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engage in economic activities, which are not supported either by international law or Canadian law. 
Therefore, the EU’s views appear very patronising.’®"*
Although the rights o f Inuit o f Canada and Kalaallit to hunt seals appear very similar 
because they both can be restricted on the grounds of animal welfare, there are several other factors, 
which make these rights very different from one another.’®® The differences between the way in 
which seal hunting is regulated in Greenland and Canada,’®® together with the EU’s association 
with Greenland’®’ and the seal products legislation itself, are the main reasons why no products 
from Inuit regions o f Canada have been able to enter the EU market after the entry into force o f the 
EU legislation. This is in contrast with Greenland since virtually all products from Greenland seem 
to qualify under the Inuit exemption.’®*
Chapter 4 begins with a brief overview o f the rights o f ‘aboriginal peoples of Canada’.’®^ 
The rights o f Inuit are investigated in the context o f the right to hunt seals and sell by-products o f 
harvesting activities.” ® Since this right is slightly different under each Treaty coneluded between 
the Government and Inuit region in question, the four Inuit Treaties are explored individually. What 
constitutes a legitimate restriction o f indigenous peoples’ rights under Canadian law is explored in 
the context o f the case law of the Supreme Court o f Canada.” *
’54 Terry Audla, president o f  Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami, considered the E U ’s approach as ‘O rwellian’ since the 
Inuit exemption ‘for his people is a meaningless "empty box" under a ban that essentially wipes out European 
m arkets’. See Sue Bailey, ‘Advocates on both sides o f  Canada's seal hunt await W TO decision on EU  ban’ 
CTV News (St John’s, NL, 24 November 2013) <www.ctvnews.ca/canada/advocates-on-both-sides-of- 
canada-s-seal-hunt-await-wto-decision-on-eu-ban-1.1557923#ixzz2sdTW S5PV> accessed 7 February 2014. 
’55 ch 5 s 5.6.
’55 eg the requirements relating to hunting licences, reporting. See s 4.3 and ch 5 s 5.3.
’5’ ch 5 s 5.2.1.
’58 E C S ea l Products (n 69) para 7.317.
’52" s 4.2.1. Constitution Act, 1982, s 35(2), being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982 c 11: ‘[i]n 
this Act, “aboriginal peoples o f  Canada” includes the Indian, Inuit, and M etis peoples o f  Canada.’ The rights 
o f  M étis peoples differ from those o f  Inuit. For reasons explained in section 1.2.1.1 their rights are not 
discussed in this thesis.
” ®s4.3.
” 's 4 .4 .
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4.2. Why the rights o f  Inuit o f  Canada are relevant for this thesis?
The way in which Inuit Treaty rights can be exercised under Canadian law is relevant to 
this thesis because unlike the assumption by the EU, Inuit rights are not mere subsistence rights, 
but involve ‘commercial exploitation o f seal products’.’”  Despite the attempts o f the Government 
o f Canada to clarify the legal framework according to which indigenous peoples’ rights in Canada 
are protected, the most important point in relation to this is that rights o f Inuit fall outside the scope 
o f EU competence and jurisdiction. Therefore, the EU should not interfere with the protection of 
indigenous rights in Canada” ® and should avoid adopting any legislation that has an impact on 
these rights. The EU’s unfamiliarity with indigenous rights is evidenced, inter alia, from its 
arguments that the Inuit are exempt from the animal welfare requirements provided under Canadian 
law because:
neither the welfare requirements included in...[the Nunavut Land Claims Agreement]” "* 
nor in the "guiding principles" [which are reflected in the Wildlife Act o f the territory of 
Nunavut] prevent the Inuit in Canada from resorting to methods which are very problematic 
from an animal welfare perspective, such as the use o f nets or shooting seals in open 
water.” ®
Further, the EU criticised Canada for its inability to propose concrete solutions to ensure 
adequate enforcement o f sealing regulations in Inuit regions o f Canada as well as to improve the 
humanity o f seal hunting conducted by Inuit on the grounds that they use certain traditional hunting 
methods,” ® such as netting and shooting seals in open water, which the EU considers cruel.’”
’”  ch 1 s 1.2.2.
” ® Indeed, although the EU may have involvement in prom oting human rights in the context o f  its 
development policies, Canada is not a developing country.
” 4 s 4.5.3.
” 5 European U nion’s comments on Canada’s and N orw ay’s responses to the questions from the Panel 
following Second M eeting (5 June 2013) para 32.
” ® The main methods to hunt seals used by Canadian Inuit are firearms, netting and harpoons. See Algers 
and others (n 391) table 2.
’”  EU ’s comm ents on Canada’s and N orw ay’s responses (n 775) para 33. These are based on the EFSA 
Report 2007, which noted that ‘[a]ttempts should not be made to kill seals that cannot be adequately 
visualised (e.g. harpooning through the snow )...as it can cause avoidable pain, distress, fear and other forms 
o f  suffering’ and ‘[s]ome methods should not be used to kill seals as they are inherently inhumane e.g.
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However, the EU’s criticism towards the rights o f Inuit o f Canada is incomprehensible for several 
reasons. First, the EU’s understanding of the matter is inaccurate because even if  Inuit can use their 
traditional hunting methods, this does not mean that the welfare requirements are inapplicable to 
indigenous peoples.” * This is because the exercise of Inuit Treaty rights depends not only on the 
federal legislation governing seal hunts, but also on case law of the Supreme Court of Canada and 
the individual Treaties (also known as Land Claim Agreements) concluded between the 
Government o f Canada, provincial governments and four different Inuit regions. Therefore, a 
thorough understanding o f the scope of indigenous peoples’ rights in Canada requires familiarity 
with the Canadian legal system and the complex dynamics between the different layers o f this 
system.
Although the long-standing jurisprudence of the Supreme Court o f Canada has established 
that indigenous peoples may be exempted from provincial wildlife laws,” ® they are not exempted 
from the prohibition against causing ‘unnecessaiy pain or suffering on any animal’,’*® including 
seals, under the federal Criminal Code, 7P55.’** Additionally, each province has a separate animal 
cruelty statute, which stipulates what actions constitute as cruelty and the level o f punishment.’*’ 
Therefore, even if  as a result o f Canadian jurisprudence provincial wildlife laws may contain 
provisions’*® stipulating that Treaties concluded with indigenous peoples prevail provincial wildlife 
laws. Treaties do not prevail over anti-cruelty statutes.
trapping seals underwater that causes death by suffocation.’ Algers and others (n 391) General 
Recommendations, 8-9.
” * EC-Seal Products (n 69) para 7.294 referring C anada’s response to Panel question N o 114.
” ® See eg i? V Sutherland and Others [1980] 2 SCR 451; Moosehunter v R [1981] 1 SCR 282, 293 Dickson 
J; Simon v R [1985] 2 SCR 3 8 7 1 6 0  Dickson CJ; R v Horseman [1990] 1 SCR 901 ; R v Morris [2006] 2 SCR 
915 1154 , 57, 60, Deschamps and A bella JJ.
’*® ibid s 445.1.
’** Criminal Code, RSC 1985, c C-46.
’*® ch 2 s 2.5.2.
” ® See eg An Act Respecting the Conservation and Development o f Wildlife, RSQ c C-61.1 2002 (Quebec), 
s 24.1, which stipulates that any agreements concluded between the governm ent and the Inuit o f  Nunavik 
prevail over the provisions o f  the provincial wildlife legislation should these two be in conflict.
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In fact, section 4.5 demonstrates the federal government can restrict the use o f any hunting 
methods employed by Inuit, if  necessary. However, the government needs to justify the limitations 
according to certain criteria established by the Sparrow test,’*"* which is a specific test of 
justification developed by the Supreme Court o f Canada to protect indigenous peoples from 
arbitrary and unjustified infnngement by the federal and provincial governments.’*® The assessment 
under this test involves, inter alia, whether the limitation on the treaty right is ‘unreasonable’, 
whether the regulation imposes ‘undue hardship’ on the right holders and whether it denies to the 
right holders their ‘preferred means o f exercising that right’.’*®
The EU’s attack on Canadian Inuit is further unjustified considering that the EU clearly 
lacks both competence and jurisdiction in this regard.’*’ This is explicitly acknowledged by the 
CJEU, which highlighted the fact that the EU seal products legislation was not aimed at regulating 
seal hunting, nor the use or consumption o f seal products outside the EU in the second proceedings 
for interim measures.’** Therefore, the EU should not attempt to impose its standards on Inuit 
through its legislation. This is even more compelling because the EU does not have competence to 
stipulate that non-indigenous seal hunters in Finland and Sweden cannot shoot seals in open 
water,’*® EU law cannot prevent these hunters from using at least some of the very methods which 
the institutions consider inhumane. Additionally, there is no independent monitoring ensuring the 
humanity o f seal hunting within the EU Member States, but hunters in Finland and Sweden are 
generally expected to police themselves.’®® This is simply because there are no resources for 
monitoring the compliance with animal welfare requirements across difficult accessible hunting
’*"*8 4.4.1.
’*® ibid 
’*5 ibid 
’*’ ch 3 s 3.3.
’** ch 6 s 6.3.1.
’*® The EU has no direct competence to regulate hunting within its M em ber States, apart from some D irectives 
and Regulations concerning the environment, public and animal health, internal market, common commercial 
policy, agriculture, freedom, security and justice, which either directly or indirectly impact on hunting.
’®® E C S ea l Products (n 69) Addendum, para 24: ‘H unters in Finland are largely self-regulated and it is 
unclear i f  there is any independent monitoring o f  that hunt. It is also unclear how  well monitored the Swedish 
hunt is due to the relative scarcity o f  inspectors.’
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areas. Therefore, the EU’s arguments that Canada must ensure adequate monitoring o f seal hunts 
conducted by Inuit and enact measures, which would improve animal welfare outcomes in 
Canadian Inuit regions, are unrealistic.
Additionally, based on Canadian case law, all limitations on Inuit treaty rights, which are 
not specifically mentioned in the Treaty, must be justified.’®* This implies that the federal and the 
provincial governments must bear the burden of demonstrating that the infringement in indigenous 
peoples’ rights is justified.’®’ Therefore, it could be argued that the EU institutions, specifically the 
Commission and ultimately the CJEU, should have assessed more carefully whether an alternative, 
less restrictive measure existed to harmonise the EU’s internal market relating to the exempted 
products, considering that the COWI report acknowledged that it would be impossible for Canadian 
Inuit to fulfil the conditions imposed by the Implementing Regulation.’®®
4.2.1 The rights o f indigenous peoples o f Canada: treaty rights and aboriginal rights
In general, indigenous peoples o f Canada hold either (i) treaty rights or (ii) aboriginal 
rights.’®"* According to the Supreme Court of Canada, ‘Aboriginal rights flow from the [specific] 
customs and traditions of the native peoples’,’®® whereas treaty rights are contained in the individual 
Treaties concluded between the federal government and the individual indigenous peoples. Because 
Canadian Inuit have concluded modern-day treaties with the Government o f Canada, their rights 
are treaty rights, rather than aboriginal rights, and the scope o f their rights are found in each 
individual Treaty. The adoption o f section 35(1) o f the Constitution Act, 1982’®® gave constitutional 
protection for both types o f rights, by stipulating that ‘[t]he existing aboriginal and treaty rights of
s 4.4.1.
’” ibid 
’®® ch 2 s 2.6.
’®4 In order to distinguish between the tw o right holders, those indigenous groups, which have concluded an 
agreement with Canada are sometimes called ‘treaty peoples’.
’®® R V Badger [1996] I SCR 7 7 1 1 7 6  [Badger].
’®® Constitution Act, 1982, s 35(1), being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982 o i l .
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the aboriginal peoples o f Canada are hereby recognized and affirmed.’ Section 35(3) stipulates 
specifically that any rights acquired as part of Treaties conducted after 1982 are also protected since 
the term ‘treaty rights’ includes ‘rights that now exist by way o f land claims agreements or may be 
so acquired’. Treaties are negotiated between indigenous peoples, the Government o f Canada and 
the province or territory in which the group in question resides or over which it has claimed 
rights.’®’ They usually cover matters such as land ownership, the protection o f indigenous culture, 
wildlife harvesting rights and the right to manage or co-manage wildlife, resource development and 
the environment.
In essence, in the absence o f a Treaty, the rights o f indigenous peoples are guaranteed by 
the common law doctrine o f aboriginal rights.’®* This doctrine means that provided that an 
indigenous group is able to demonstrate that they have traditionally sustained themselves from a 
land, river or sea, they have a prima facie right to continue to do so.’®® In jR v Van der fggt,*®® 
Lamer CJ held that only practices, customs and traditions, which were integral to a distinctive 
aboriginal society before contact with Europeans in a manner that this practice ‘truly made the 
culture what it was’ were protected by the Canadian constitution.*®*
4.2.2 Inuit Treaties
Inuit Treaties outline relations between the Federal Government and the Inuit. The specific 
Treaties discussed in this thesis are: the Quebec Treaty (1977), the Inuvialuit Treaty (1984), the
Canada’s first submission to the W TO (n 535) para 88 and accom panying footnote.
’®* According to M cLachlin J, the Crown’s dealings with indigenous peoples were founded on two 
fundamental principles in the common law: firstly, ‘the Crown asserted title subject to existing aboriginal 
interests in their traditional lands and adjacent w aters’ and secondly, ‘those interests were to be removed only 
by solemn treaty with due compensation to the people and its descendants’. See R v Van der Feet [1996] 2 
SCR 5 0 7 1 1 6 , McLachlin J.
’®® ibid 
*®o ibid
*®* ibid 1 6 3 , Lamer CJ.
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N u n av u t T reaty  (1993) and  the  L ab rado r T reaty  (2005).*°’ T hese  trea ties each ind iv idually  vest fee 
sim ple ow nership*”® in the  ind igenous signato ries inhab iting  th e  fou r Inu it reg ions: (i) the 
Inuv ia lu it; (ii) th e  N unavu t; (iii) the  N u n av ik  (N orthern  Q uebec); and the  N u n atsiav u t (N orthern  
L abrador) (See F igure  4 .1 ). T he v ast majority*°4 o f  C anad ian  Inu it lives in  these  fou r Inu it reg ions 
and  form s th e  m ajo rity  o f  the  popu la tion  w ith in  these  regions.*°®
MATERIAL REDACTED AT REQUEST OF UNIVERSITY
T here is an im portan t in terp lay  betw een  com m on law  and  Inu it T reaties. O n th e  one hand  
Inu it T reaties can be argued  to  cod ify  the  ex is ting  decis ions o f  the  S uprem e C ourt o f  C anada  
concern ing  aborig inal and trea ty  righ ts. O n the  o ther hand , Inu it T rea ties  w ere  d rafted  in b road  
te rm s and lack  consistency  betw een  them . B ecause very little  case law  concern ing  Inu it trea ty  righ ts
The Inuit Treaty o f 1765, concluded between the British governor o f Newfoundland, Sir Hugh Palliser, 
and Inuit o f south and central Labrador is excluded from the discussion because the claimants are the 
Labrador Métis, rather than the Labrador Inuit.
*°® 1984 Inuvialuit Treaty, s 7(1); 1993 Nunavut Treaty, s 19.2.1; 2008 Nunavik Treaty, s 8.3.3; 2005 
Labrador Treaty, s 4.4.1.
*®4 In 2011, 26.9% of Inuit live outside Inuit homeland in urban centres in southern Canada. Small numbers 
also lived in rural areas outside the settlement regions. See Statistics Canada, National Household Siawey 
2011 (n34 ) 14.
*°5 In 2011, Inuit living in Nunavut accounted for nearly half (45.5%) o f the total Inuit population in Canada. 
Inuit form the majority o f population in all Inuit regions (57.6% in the Inuvialuit region and over 80% in 
Nunavut, northern Labrador and Nunavik). National Household Survey 2011 (n 34) 14.
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exists, it is challenging to gain a complete understanding o f how these rights may be exercised in 
practice, or what are the limitations that may be imposed on the exercise of Inuit treaty rights by 
the federal or provincial government unless they are investigated in the context o f wider Canadian 
jurisprudence concerning aboriginal and treaty rights.
4.3 Right to hunt seals and sell products acquired as a result o f harvesting activities
The Inuit right to hunt seals is subject to both the federal Marine Mammal Regulations 
I 9 9 3 8 O6  and each individual Inuit Treaty. According to the federal government, in some
cases Inuit Treaties complement the provisions o f the MMRs, and in cases where there is a conflict. 
Treaties may also supersede the MMRs}^^ Since the MMRs do not include a specific derogation for 
indigenous seal hunters, its provisions concerning humane killing o f marine mammals apply 
equally to all indigenous hunters.*®* Section 8  o f the MMRs prohibits the killing, or attempted 
killing, of any marine mammal, apart from in a manner that is designed to kill it quickly. According 
to the federal government, hunting methods for seals prescribed in section 28 o f the MRRs require 
hunters to kill seals in a manner that avoids all unnecessary pain and suffering.*®® This is consistent 
with the prohibition to inflict unnecessary pain or suffering on any animal under section 445.1 of 
the federal Criminal Code, 1985,**® which applies to all wildlife, including seals.
Although according to the federal government, the coverage o f the MMRs is determined 
by a complex set o f constitutionally determined parameters, with some indigenous hunters subject 
to them while others are not,*** the general provisions applying to Inuit is section 6(1) of the MMRs,
*°5 SOR/93-56.
*”’ Canada’s first submission to the W TO (n 535) para 88. For instance, under the 1993 Nunavut Treaty, 
hunting methods, which are deemed traditional, are exempted from the requirements o f  the Marine Mammal 
Regulations 1993 SOR/93-56. See also s 4.5.3.
*°* Canada’s first submission to the W TO (n 535) para 88.
*®® ibid para 92.
**®RSC 1985, c C-46.
*** EC-Seal Products (n 69) para 7.294 referring Canada's response to Panel question N o 114.
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which stipulates that ‘[a]n Indian or Inuk**’ ...may, without a licence, fish for food, social or 
ceremonial purposes for seals’. Because the provisions o f each individual Treaty is different, Inuit 
are also subject to their own regulatory regime established by the Treaty.**® An examination o f Inuit 
Treaties reveals in addition to having a right to hunt seals, Inuit may also sell non-edible by­
products derived from seals, such as sealskins and blubber, which have been acquired as a result of 
their harvesting activities.**"*
Significantly for the purposes of this thesis, the exercise o f the right to harvest fish and 
wildlife under the Inuit Treaties or under section 6(1) o f the MMRs is not conditional on obtaining 
any permits, licenses or other authorisation.**® This is in contrast with Kalaallit**® as well as 
Canada’s non-indigenous hunters. Although Inuit inhabiting some Inuit regions o f Canada, such as 
the Labrador Inuit, may be required to obtain a licence for transporting sealskins outside this 
region,**’ it is uncertain whether this requirement applies to all Inuit regions under Canadian law. 
If  it did, it could be argued to function as a proof o f origin.*** Nevertheless, the differences between 
Inuit regions of Canada and Greenland, for instance, in the requirements for licences as well as to 
report catches for statistical purposes**® can be argued to have implications on the differing ability 
o f these Inuit populations to fulfil the conditions under the Implementing Regulation.
**’ For clarity, the term ‘In u if is a  plural form, whereas an individual m em ber o f  Inuit peoples is an ‘Inuk’. 
**® ibid
**"* It appears that under the Nunavut Treaty (1993), Inuit can also sell edible parts derived from seals, s 4.3.3. 
*‘® There are exceptional situations in which Inuit are required to obtain licences for any purpose under the 
provisions o f  Inuit Treaties, however, these relate to commercial harvesting o f  cetaceans, marine fish and 
shellfish, but not seals.
**®ch 5 s 5.3.1.
**’ s 4.3.4.
*** ibid 
**® ch 5 s 5.3.
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4.3.1. The Quebec Treaty (1977)
Under the Quebec Treaty, Inuit enjoy an exclusive right to harvest any species of 
‘mammals, fish and birds’,*’® except for those requiring specific conservation measures.*’* The 
‘right to harvest’ is defined as ‘harvesting activity pursued within the [Inuit] Territory, for personal 
and community use, commercial trapping and commercial fishing’.*”  Additionally, Inuit of 
Nunavik ‘have the right to trade and conduct commerce in all the by-products of the exercise of 
their right to harvest’.*’® According to the Oxford English Dictionary, the term to conduct 
commerce means the activity of buying and selling, ‘especially on a large scale’,*’"* which indicates 
that the Inuit right to hunt seals and ‘the right to trade and conduct commerce in all the by-products’ 
under the Quebec Treaty (1977) can be exercised for commercial, rather than for subsistence 
purposes. Therefore, the right held by Nunavik Inuit extends beyond the concept o f ‘subsistence’ 
because there is an explicit the right to ‘conduct commerce in all the by-products’, which can be 
understood to include sealskins and blubber.
The economic nature o f indigenous harvesting activities is supported by provincial 
legislation*’® concerning Inuit harvesting activities, which stipulates that the amounts paid to Inuit 
hunters under the provincial government’s support program can be used to increase ''the 
profitability o f  their fu r  frWe’.*’® In conclusion, the rights enjoyed by Nunavik Inuit are not limited 
by the concept of ‘subsistence’. This is in contrast with many Canadian First Nations because 
according to the decisions o f the Supreme Court of Canada, only a handful of First Nations enjoy
*’® Quebec Treaty (1977), s 24.1.12.
*’* ibid ss 24 .1 .12,24.3 .1 ,24.3 .3  and 24.3.10.
*”  ibid s 24.3.11(a) (emphasis added).
*’® ibid s 24.3.16 (emphasis added). See also An Act respecting hunting and fishing rights in the James Bay 
and New Québec territories, 2002 RSQ, c D-13.1 (Quebec), s 28.
*’"* Oxford English Dictionaries online <https://oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/commerce> 
accessed 23 M arch 2013.
*’®yf» Act respecting the support program for Inuit beneficiaries o f  the James Bay and Northern Québec 
agreement for their hunting, fishing and trapping activities, RSQ, c P -3 0 .2 ,2004.
*’5 ibid s 4 (emphasis added).
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‘a right to exchange fish on a genuinely commercial basis’.*”  R  v Gladstone^^^ is one o f the few
cases where the Supreme Court o f  Canada found that:
the extent and scope of the trading activities o f the Heiltsuk [Nation] support the 
claim that, for the purposes o f s. 35(1) analysis, the Heiltsuk have demonstrated an 
aboriginal right to sell herring spawn on kelp to an extent best described as 
commercial.*’®
Gladstone^^^ is nevertheless useful for the purposes of this thesis because it demonstrates that there 
are indeed some indigenous peoples who have rights, which can be argued to be ‘primarily or 
exclusively’ commercial, unlike what is the EU’s view,
4.3.2 The Inuvialuit Treaty (1984)
Under the Inuvialuit Treaty, seal hunting is governed by specific provisions relating to 
marine mammals.*®* Under section 14(27), the beneficiaries o f this Treaty have the right to sell all 
non-edible parts of seals: ‘the right to harvest fish and marine mammals includes the right to sell 
the non-edible products of legally harvested fish and marine mammals’.*®’ In conclusion, the same 
way as under the Quebec Treaty (1977), the Inuvialuit enjoy the right to sell all non-edible parts o f 
legally harvested seals under the Inuvialuit Treaty (1984). Under the Inuvialuit Treaty the right can 
be interpreted to be exercised for commercial purposes, rather than for the purposes o f subsistence.
*”  R V Gladstone [1996] 2 SCR 723 1 5 7 , Lamer CJ.
*’* ibid
*’® ibid 1 2 8 , Lamer CJ.
*®° ibid
*®* Under this Treaty, marine mammals are regarded as a fish resource. This is in line with Marine Mammal 
Regulations 1993 SOR/93-56, s2 8 .
*®’ Inuvialuit Treaty (1984), s 14(27).
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4,3.3 The Nunavut Treaty (1993)
The right to sell seal products under the Nunavut Treaty is the most comprehensive 
compared to the corresponding rights in the other three Inuit Treaties. This is because whereas 
under the other Inuit Treaties, Inuit can only sell the non-edible parts o f the harvested seals outside 
the Inuit regions, the Nunavut Treaty does not contain any restrictions as regards to whether the 
right concerns the sale of edible or non-edible products. Although the Treaty does not contain any 
specific provisions on seals, according to the federal government, Nunavut is ‘the only Inuit region 
with a significant seal harvest’.*®® Consequently, the provisions o f the Nunavut Treaty (1993) can 
be interpreted to apply to seals. Section 5.7.30 of the Treaty stipulates that ‘an Inuk shall have the 
right to dispose freely to any person any wildlife lawfully harvested. The right to dispose shall 
include the right to sell, barter, exchange and give, either inside or outside the Nunavut Settlement 
Area’.*®"*
Significantly the Treaty indicates that products, such as sealskins, do not need to be ‘partly 
processed, consumed or used within Inuit communities’,*®® but they can be sold to anyone for 
processing outside the settlement area. This is important because the Inuit exemption under EU 
seal products legislation applies exclusively to seal products, which are ‘partly processed, 
consumed or used within Inuit communities’.*®® Therefore, the EU’s understanding o f the scope of 
Inuit economic rights differs considerably from those under the Nunavut Treaty.
*®2 Canada’s first submission to the W TO (n 535) 24. 
*®4 Nunavut Treaty (1993), s 5.7.30 (emphasis added). 
*®5 Regulation 737/2010, art 3.
*25 ibid
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4.3.4 The Labrador Treaty (2005)
Under section 13.4.1 o f the Labrador Treaty Inuit have the right to harvest at all times of 
the year any species seals ‘up to the quantity needed for their food, social and ceremonial 
purposes’.*®’ Because conservation statuses of all seal species hunted by Labrador Inuit are 
favourable, the federal government has not established any quotas for any seal species harvested 
for food, social and ceremonial (FSC) purposes. The Labrador Treaty demonstrates that the way in 
which indigenous rights have been interpreted by the EU differs from as they are regulated under 
Canadian law. According to the EU, the requirement that seal hunting contributes to the 
‘subsistence of indigenous communities’ was included in the EU legislation in order not to 
incentivise indigenous peoples to hunt more seals.*®* However, its interpretation is not supported 
by Canadian law under which Inuit can hunt potentially an indefinite number o f seals, provided 
that this is consistent with each individual Treaty.
The Labrador Treaty (2005) prohibits the sale o f seals harvested for FSC purposes with the 
exception o f the non-edible seal products ie sealskins.*®® Further, the Treaty stipulates that sealskins 
can be sold and transported outside the Labrador settlement area, if  they can be identified as having 
been harvested by Inuit exercising their treaty rights.*"*® It appears that identification is possible 
based on specific permits, which ‘may be required by the Minister or the Nunatsiavut Government’ 
in order to transport any.. .[harvested products] outside the Labrador Inuit Settlement Area’.*"** The 
requirement to obtain transport permits could be argued to have been sufficient in satisfying the 
EU’s traceability requirements*"*’ since the products could be traced back to Labrador Inuit
*®’ The Labrador Treaty (2005) differs somewhat from other Inuit Treaties in that it explicitly states that seals 
and walrus are ‘species or stocks o f  Fish in the Labrador Inuit Settlement A rea’. See Labrador Treaty (2005), 
sch 13-C and s 13.12.5.
*®*ch 1 s 1.2.2.
*®® Labrador Treaty (2005), s 13.4.7 ‘No Person may sell Fish or A quatic Plants H arvested under section
13.4.1,13.4.2 or 13.4.11 except the non-edible products from F ish’.
*"*” ibid ss 13.4.9 and 13.4.10(a),(c).
*"** ibid s 13.4.10.
*42 ch 2 s 2.3.1.
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settlement area without separate attesting documents imposed by the EU legislation. A transport 
permit would not only prove the origin of these products, but also differentiate them from the 
products o f commercial hunts conducted in the province o f Newfoundland and Labrador.*"*®
In conclusion, the right to sell sealskins under the four Inuit Treaties discussed in this 
section entail the possibility to sell non-edible by-products o f the hunt. In contrast to the EU 
legislation, these Treaties do not stipulate that the right is limited in any other way. Thus, the Inuit 
Treaties can be argued to support the right o f Inuit to make profit from their economic activities. 
As such, the rights corresponds to the UNDRIP right to engage in economic activities.*"*"* This 
means that the right o f Inuit to sell seal products is significantly different from that understood by 
the EU seal products legislation under which only products from hunts conducted genuinely for 
subsistence purposes qualify for placing on the market.*"*® Therefore, it appears that the EU 
legislation limits the exercise o f Inuit right to sell by-products unnecessarily.
4.4 What constitutes a legitimate restriction of treaty rights?
The importance of this section for this thesis is that it provides a valuable point o f reference 
when assessing the restrictive effect o f the EU legislation on the rights o f Inuit.*"*® The decisions of 
the Supreme Court o f Canada demonstrate how the conditions imposed by the EU through the 
Implementing Regulation may restrict the exercise o f indigenous rights to engage in their traditional 
economic activities. The existing case law demonstrates that the federal and provincial 
governments must have good reasons for restricting treaty rights, for instance, on the grounds of 
public safety. Thus, if  indigenous peoples engage in certain hunting activities several kilometres 
away from the nearest buildings, public safety concerns are not sufficient to impose a restriction of
*42 The coastal areas o f  the province o f  Newfoundland and Labrador are one o f  the main areas where the 
controversial commercial seal hunt takes place. This hunt is conducted primarily by non-indigenous 
fishermen who earn their living from commercial fishing.
*44 ch 3 s 3.4.1.
*45 ch 1 s 1.2.2.
*45 See eg ch 7 s 1 .2 2 3  for the impact o f  the implementation o f  the Inuit exemption o f  Inuit o f  Canada.
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the exercise o f the right to hunt unless there is threat to others.*"*’ Thus, certain hunting activities 
cannot be restricted on the grounds o f public safety unless they take place in the vicinity o f 
buildings and thus pose a threat to others.*"** Therefore, treaty rights cannot be limited 
unnecessarily, but the limitation on the grounds o f public safety must be genuinely aimed at the 
protection o f the public.
This is particularly significant because the CJEU is unconvinced that the EU legislation 
has an adverse impact on Inuit.*"*® As is noted in Chapter 6 , the EGC found the evidence provided 
by Inuit as ‘very general in nature’ and incapable o f substantiating their claims that the legislation 
violated their fundamental rights under the ECHR.*®® Additionally, the Court found that there was 
no adverse impact on Inuit because their interests were accommodated by the Inuit exemption, 
considering that their products could be placed on the market under Article 3(1) of the Basic 
Regulation.*®* Furthermore, the legislation did not impact rules concerning the hunting o f seals or 
consuming seal products outside the EU because it only affected those products that were placed 
on the market within the EU.*®’
4.4.1 The Sparrow test of justification
The Sparrow test was laid down in the Supreme Court of Canada’s 1990 landmark decision 
R V S p a r r o w which established certain criteria according to which aboriginal and treaty rights 
can be curtailed by federal legislation. The test is still authoritative although the list o f valid
*"*’ Morris (n 779) 1 57, 60, Deschamps and Abella JJ. Morris concerned prosecution o f  two indigenous 
appellants who were arrested for hunting deer on land where there were no private properties, camping sites, 
or other dwellings within the range o f  at least two kilometres. Therefore, the particular hunting site was 
deemed very safe, ibid % 10.
*"** The Supreme Court o f  Canada’s 2010 decision in Beckman v Little Salmon/Carmacks First Nation [2010] 
3 SCR 103 confirms that treaty right to hunt near buildings may be limited due to public safety as it would 
pose a threat to others.
*45 ch 6 s 6.3.1.
*5° ibid
*51 ibid 
*®2 ibid
*5® [1990] 1 SCR 1075 [Sparrow]
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legislative objectives has been widened by later case law, specifically R  v G l a d s t o n e It can be 
argued that the Sparrow test was designed to ensure that the federal and provincial governments 
evaluate the impact of their policies on indigenous peoples and eliminate all unnecessaiy and arbitrary 
decisions by providing very specific reasons for limiting the exercise o f treaty and aboriginal rights, 
which are essential for these peoples. It can also be argued that the Sparrow test was designed to be 
sympathetic towards the rights of indigenous peoples due to uncertainty concerning the exercise of 
historical treaty rights and the common law aboriginal rights. As a consequence of this uncertainty, 
many right holders have frequently been prosecuted by federal and provincial governments for fishing 
and hunting without licences even though they have been entitled to do so under common law or the 
historic Treaties.*®®
This interpretation is supported by the arguments of Dickson CJ and La Forest J, who held 
that the federal government’s earlier approach according to which ‘the treaty rights can be limited 
by such regulations as are [considered] reasonable’,*®® was inconsistent with section 35(1) o f the 
Constitution Act, JP&2*®’ because the term ‘reasonable’ was insufficient to fulfil the meaning of 
‘recognition and affirmation o f aboriginal rights’ after 1982.*®* The constitutional protection of 
indigenous peoples’ rights meant that the Court had to develop a more comprehensive legal 
standard, which would determine whether government decisions, which have a restrictive impact 
on the exercise of aboriginal and treaty rights, were justified.*®®
Although the Sparrow test concerned aboriginal rights, it has been ruled to apply equally 
to treaty rights.*®® In the 1996 Supreme Court o f Canada decision in R v B a d g e r Cory J held that
*54 Gladstone (n 827).
*55 s 4.2.1.The vast num ber o f  number o f  appeal cases involving First Nations peoples before the Supreme 
Court o f  Canada demonstrates this.
*55 ibid 1118 referring to A v Eninew (1984), 12 CCC (3d) 365 at 368, Hall JA.
*5’ Constitution Act, 1982, s 35(1), being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982 c 11: ‘The existing 
aboriginal and treaty rights o f  the aboriginal peoples o f  Canada are hereby recognized and affirm ed’.
*5* Sparrow (n 853) 1118.
*55 ibid
*55 See eg Badger (n 795); R v Côté [1996] 3 SCR 139.
*5* Badger (n 795).
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the express wording o f section 35(1) ‘supports a common approach to infringements o f aboriginal 
and treaty rights’ as it recognises and affirms both of these rights.*®’ This is because although the 
sources o f these rights differ, noteworthy similarities exist between them. Cory J concluded that 
because neither o f these rights was absolute, both could be curtailed by legislation, provided that 
the federal government was able to justify the infringement.*®® Accordingly, ‘any limitations on 
treaty rights, like breaches of aboriginal rights, should be justified’ in accordance with the criteria 
established in Sparrow.
In S p a r r o w Dickson CJ and La Forest J held that the federal government was required to 
bear the burden o f justifying any legislation that had a negative impact on aboriginal rights.*®® Given 
the generality of section 35(1),*®’ the justificatory standard had to be defined on a case-by-case basis.*®* 
According to them, the first enquiry concerned whether the federal legislation had violated an existing 
aboriginal right, resulting in a prima facie infringement of the Canadian constitution.*®® In order to 
determine whether there was a violation, the Court would determine the following: ‘First, is the 
limitation unreasonable? Second, does the regulation impose undue hardship? Third, does the 
regulation deny to the holders of the right their preferred means o f exercising that right?’*’® Dickson 
CJ and La Forest J held that the indigenous appellant challenging the legislation would bear the 
burden of showing that it constituted a prima facie infringement o f the claimed right.*’* The 
regulation would be a prima facie interference if it had an adverse restriction on the exercise of their
*®’ Badger (n 795) 1 7 9 , Cory J. 
*5® ibid 1 7 4 , 77.
864 ibid 1 7 5 , Cory J. To date, the Court has approved only one limitation on treaty rights, namely the use o f  
catch limits, which does not need to be justified. See Marshall (n 97) 1 6 1 . According to the court, the historic 
Treaty right to fish for the purposes o f  trade under the M i’kmaq Treaties o f  1760-01 was intended to enable 
First Nations appellants to satisfy their everyday needs. Therefore, the appellants’ modern-day treaty right 
would not be violated, if  it could be reasonably expected that quotas established by the government regulation 
enabled individual indigenous families to gain a moderate livelihood from their traditional activities.
*®5 Sparrow (n 853).
*5® ibid 1110.
*®’ the constitutional provision protecting these rights.
*®* Sparrow (n 853) 1110.
*55 ibid 
*’® ibid 1112.
*’* ibid
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rights. The test was intended to investigate ‘whether either the purpose or the effect o f  the legislation 
unnecessarily infringe the interests protected by the.. .righf The concept of prima facie 
infringement has been explored in later case law. In their 2006 decision in JR v M o r r i s the majority 
of the Supreme Court of Canada held that such an infringement required a ‘meaningful diminution’ of 
a treaty right, which included anything but an insignificant interference.*”  In conclusion, under the 
first part o f the Sparrow test, apart from an insignificant interference, the limitation o f an interest 
protected by the aboriginal or treaty right constitutes a prima facie infringement of the right.
It can be argued that under this test, the denial of market access (eg through the imposition of 
some form of licence) in a case where an indigenous individual has a right to engage in economic 
activities constitutes a prima facie infringement of Inuit treaty rights. Therefore, in theory, the EU’s 
attesting documents could be seen as a prima facie infringement of indigenous peoples’ economic 
rights under international law, especially since it is impossible for Inuit of Canada to obtain these 
documents in practice. In Marshall,^^^ Binnie J o f the Supreme Court o f Canada indicated that a 
requirement to obtain a licence under provincial law*’® in order to sell fish was inconsistent with 
the First Nation appellant’s right to fish for trading purposes.*”  Similarly, a ban on sales would 
infringe the appellant’s right to trade.*’* This was because the requirements for licences would have 
rendered the exercise o f the treaty right virtually impossible. Binnie J held that because the historic 
Treaty in question contained no restrictions in the form of licensing systems, any limitations, which 
would have been expressly mentioned in the Treaty, therefore any restrictions constituted a prima
*”  Sparrow (n 853) 1112 (emphasis added). Thus, i f  the appellant had to ‘spend undue tim e and money per 
fish caught or i f  the net length reduction [stipulated by the legislation] resulted in a hardship to the M usqueam 
in catching fish’, there was a prima facie infringement.
*”  Morris (n 779).
*’4 ibid 15 3  
*’5 Marshall (n 97).
*’® Maritime Provinces Fishery Regulations SOR/93-55, ss 4(1 )(a) and 20; Fishery (General) Regulations, 
SOR/93-53, s 35(2).
*” M z r fW /(n  97) 166-67.
*’* ibid
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facie  infringement o f Mr Marshall’s treaty right.*’® This case confirms that no limitations, which 
are not explicitly mentioned in the Treaty, are acceptable since the interference is significant.
Another decision by the Supreme Court o f Canada from the mid-1990s, R  v MW,**® 
demonstrates how the conditions imposed by the Implementing Regulation may restrict the exercise 
o f Inuit right to engage in economic activities in practice. As was noted in Chapter 2, the EU 
institutions have denied that the seal products legislation is the cause o f the inability o f the Canadian 
Inuit to access the EU market.*** However, in EC-Seal Products, t h e  Panel found that the 
restriction was caused by the practical implementation o f the EU legislation, not Canada’s inability 
to adapt to the EU’s legislative requirements.**® MAra/**"* demonstrates that the provincial 
governments cannot impose arbitrary restrictions on the exercise o f the aboriginal rights because 
these conditions conflicted with the appellant’s right to fish and thus restricted the exercise o f this 
right unnecessarily. This case is highly relevant for the purposes o f this thesis because it 
demonstrated that although it may be possible for the federal or provincial government to require 
indigenous peoples to obtain hunting and fishing licences in some cases, the actual use o f licences 
cannot have the purpose o f rendering the exercise o f these rights virtually impossible.
Indeed, in this case Cory J held that ‘the simple requirement of a [fishing] license is not in 
itself unreasonable’ nor can it be considered an undue hardship in cases where ‘a license.. .is freely 
and readily available’.**® However, ‘[t]he situation might be different if, for example, the license 
could only be obtained at locations many kilometres away from the reserves and accessible only at 
great inconvenience or expense’.**® According to Cory J, the provincial fishing regulations**’
*’® Marshall (n 97) 1 6 5 . The Treaty in question was the 1760-61 M i’kmaq Treaty.
**® [1996] 1 SCR 1013 [Nikal].
*** ch 2 s 2.6.
**2 EC-Seal Products (n 69).
**® s 7.2.2.S 
**4 M W  (n 880).
**® ibid 1 9 9 . See also R v Sampson (1995) 16 BCLR (3d) 226 (British Colum bia Court o f  Appeals) 1 5 4 .
**5 M W  (n 880) 1100 .
^^^British Columbia Fishery (General) Regulations SO R/84-248, s 4(1) (repealed by Pacific Fishery 
Regulations, 1993 SOR/93-54).
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conflicted with the First Nation’s aboriginal right to fish due to several arbitrary conditions affixed 
to the fishing licence. Therefore, the conditions constituted a violation o f this right because they 
impinged upon the First Nation’s right to determine the occurrence, method and manner of 
fishing.**^
The infringing conditions were, inter alia, those that the right to fish was restricted to (i)
food fishing only; (ii) Mr Nikal and his family only; (iii) salmon only, and (iv) fishing times were
subject to change.^*^ According to Cory J, the First Nation had:
the right to determine who within the band will be the recipients o f the fish for 
ultimate consumption; the right to select the purpose for which the fish will be used, 
i.e. food, ceremonial, or religious purposes; the right to fish for steelhead trout; and 
the right to choose the period o f time to fish in the river.^^°
In addition, other terms of the licence could be seen as infringements to the extent they contradicted 
the appellant’s aboriginal rights. According to Cory J, rules, which prescribed the following, could 
be seen as a violation: waters in which fishing could take place; the type o f gear which could be 
used; and the fishing times and days.*^* The implication o f this case is that if  the exercise of 
aboriginal or treaty rights is unnecessarily restricted by the government legislation (eg the 
requirement for licences which are not jfreely available), the government is unlikely to be able to 
justify the requirement for such licences. Additionally, MarshaW^^ demonstrates that the violation 
on the interests of protected by the treaty right constitutes a prima facie infringement of that right. 
Therefore, if  an infringement is found, according to the second part of the Sparrow test, the 
government must demonstrate that the restriction is justifiable.*^^ What constitutes ‘a valid legislative 
objective’ under this test is considered next.
*** Nikal (n 880) % 100,105-106, Cory J, Consequently, the Court declared the fishing licence invalid, ibid ^ 
118.
ibid 1103 . 
ibid 1104 . 
ibid 1105 .
Marshall (n 97).
Sparrow (n 853) 1113.
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4.4.1.1 Valid legislative objectives under the Sparrow test
A valid legislative objective means that the Court will scrutinise the objective of Parliament 
in authorising the government department to enact the contested regulations and the objective of 
the government department in question. According to Dickson CJ and La Forest J:
An objective aimed at preserving s. 35(1) rights by conserving and managing a 
natural resource, for example, would be valid. Also valid would be objectives 
purporting to prevent the exercise of s. 35(1) rights that would cause harm to the 
general populace or to aboriginal peoples themselves, or other objectives found to 
be compelling and substantial.*^"^
They nevertheless rejected ‘public interest’ as a valid objective because it was not sufficiently 
precise for the purposes o f justifying a limitation on aboriginal rights:
The Court of Appeal below held, at p. 331, that regulations could be valid if 
reasonably justified as "necessary for the proper management and conservation o f 
the resource or in the public interest". (Emphasis added.) We find the "public 
interest" justification to be so vague as to provide no meaningful guidance and so 
broad as to be unworkable as a test for the justification o f a limitation on 
constitutional rights.*^^
This is critical for the purposes of this thesis because the CJEU frequently uses the terms 
‘public interest’*^  ^and ‘objectives of general interest recognised by the EU’ to justify limitation on 
fundamental rights.*^’ Because in Canada, the term ‘public interest’ is considered unsuitable in the 
context of a limitation on aboriginal and treaty rights, the Sparrow test and the CJEU’s proportionality 
differ considerably. Since the Sparrow test was adopted specifically to address aboriginal and treaty
Sparrow {n^52>)\\\3. 
*^  ^ibid
896 See eg Case C-112/00 Eugen Schmidberger, Internationale Transporte und Planzilge v Republik 
Osterreich [2003] ECR 1-5659; Case C-544/10 Deutsches Weintor eG v Land Rheinland-Pfalz (ECJ, 6 
September 2012); Case C -12/11 Denise McDonaghv Ryanair Ltd (ECJ, 3 \ January 2013).
*^ See eg C-283/11 Sky Osterreich v Osterreichischer Rundfunk (ECJ, 22 January 2013) {Sky Osterreich), 
para 48. See also oh 6 s 6.4.1.
148
rights following their constitutional recognition in 1982,*^* the main difference between the Sparrow 
test and the CJEU’s proportionality test is the fact that the Sparrow test is applied exclusively in 
jurisprudence concerning aboriginal and treaty rights, whereas the proportionality test is deemed 
appropriate for assessing a restriction of fundamental right and freedoms within the EU.*^^
4.4.1.2 If  a valid objective is found, is the legislation justifiable?
If a Canadian court finds a valid legislative objective, it proceeds to determine whether the 
government’s legislation or action is justifiable. In this context, the Court has to consider the special 
trust relationship and the responsibility of the government vis-à-vis indigenous peoples (ie the honour 
of the Crown).^°° The Sparrow test necessitates that the Court may need to scrutinise the government’s 
regulations according to a justificatory standard which may place a heavy burden on the Crown.^°* 
According to Dickson CJ and La Forest J, section 35(1) oftheCo«5 ftYwrio«^c/, iP52 was not intended 
to undermine Parliament’s ability and responsibility to create and administer overall conservation and 
management policies, but to guarantee that these policies ensure that indigenous peoples’ rights are 
taken ser ious lyDepending on the circumstances of the case, the justification test would require 
the Court to address further questions, such as:
whether there has been as little infringement as possible in order to effect the desired 
result; whether, in a situation of expropriation, fair compensation is available; and, 
whether the aboriginal group in question has been consulted.^®*
Because the list is not exhaustive, the Court can examine other relevant factors. Ultimately, however, 
if  an aboriginal or treaty right is infringed, the federal government cannot proceed without consulting 
with the indigenous peoples in question. Additionally, the government would also have to
s 4.4.
6 s 6.4.1.
^  Sparrow (n 853) 1114.
ibid 1118-1119.
0^2 ibid 1119.
902 ibid
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demonstrate that the regulation was not motivated by any other objectives, such as reallocating the 
resource to non-indigenous users whilst excluding indigenous users 2°“^ Further, the government 
would have to show that the regulation is necessary in order to achieve a legitimate aim. Therefore, 
the Sparrow test involves balancing and weighing o f the objectives of the government legislation 
as well as the proportionality o f the infringement on indigenous peoples’ rights in a similar way as 
the CJEU’s proportionality test.
In conclusion, the Sparrow test establishes that the Court should examine the purpose or the 
effect of the government legislation and identify whether it unnecessarily causes adverse effects on the 
aboriginal or treaty right in question. The Court has to determine, inter alia, whether the legislation 
imposes an unreasonable limitation or undue hardship on the exercise of the right, and whether the 
right holders are denied their preferred means of exercising that right. As seen in Marshall,^^^ the 
inability to exercise a treaty right was found to amount to an unreasonable limitation of the exercise of 
that right.^°^ The Court further held that the government bore the burden of showing that the legislation 
was n e c e s s a r y I t  rejected ‘public interest’ as a valid legislative objective, and required the 
government legislation to pursue specific, identifiable objectives, such as conserving and managing a 
natural resource, public safety or other ‘compelling and substantial’ objectives.^®* According to the 
Court, the infringement on aboriginal rights had to be minimal, and depending on the case, 
compensation may have to be available and the indigenous peoples in question may have to be 
consulted.
9°^  According to D ickson CJ and La Forest J, the needs o f  non-indigenous users o f  a fishery were o f  lower 
priority than those o f  the indigenous people.
902 Marshall (n 97).
902 s 4.4.1.
907 ibid
908 ibid
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4.4.2 Decisions after Sparrow
The Supreme Court o f Canada has since Sparrow^^^ widened the scope o f the valid 
objectives to include a whole range o f other legislative objectives. Although the Canadian courts 
seemingly avoid the express usage o f the term ‘public interest’, in Gladstone,^^^ Lamer CJ stated 
that in theory, ‘a compelling and substantial purpose’, could extend to any goal, which can be 
justified for the good o f the community as a whole, indigenous and non-indigenous.®^^ According 
to him:
Although by no means making a definitive statement on this issue, I would suggest 
that with regards to the distribution o f the fisheries resource after conservation goals 
have been met, objectives such as the pursuit o f economic and regional fairness, and 
the recognition o f the historical reliance upon, and participation in, the fishery by 
non-aboriginal groups, are the type o f objectives which can (at least in the right 
circumstances) satisfy this standard.®*^
The findings by Lamer CJ have been confirmed in more recent decisions by the provincial 
courts, such as the Supreme Court o f British Columbia’s 2009 decision in Ahousaht Indian Band 
and Nation v Canada^^^ According to Carson J, in addition to objectives, which concern 
specifically the use o f natural resources, Canadian courts recognise that societal interests arising 
from the need to balance the interests o f a given indigenous society with the broader social, political 
and economic interests o f non-indigenous people and other indigenous peoples fall within the 
‘compelling and substantial’ objectives.®*"* According to her, in the context o f the fisheries regime, 
such objectives included, inter alia, conservation and sustainability o f fisheries resources; 
protection o f endangered species; priority o f aboriginal right to fish for food; health and safety of
®°® Sparrow (n 853).
®*° Gladstone (n 827).
9" ibid 1 7 5 .
912 ibid
912 Ahousaht Indian Band and Nation v Canada (AG) 2009 BCSC 1494 [Ahousaht).
914 ibid 1881 .
151
the fishermen and consumers; adherence to international Treaties; facilitation o f indigenous 
participation in the fisheries; and pursuit o f economic and regional fairness.®*^
Noticeably, animal welfare is not mentioned in the list o f valid and substantial objectives 
nor is there any existing case law concerning restrictions of treaty or aboriginal rights on the 
grounds o f humane treatment o f animals. However, as noted in section 4.2, the anti-cruelty 
provisions, which are found in the Criminal Code, 1985®*® and the Marine Mammal Regulations 
1993®*7 apply equally to all Canadians. Consequently, Inuit treaty rights can be limited due to the 
need to take into account the humane treatment o f animals.®**
In conclusion, treaty rights can be limited for several reasons. However, treaty rights cannot 
be curtailed by federal or provincial legislation unless the Treaties themselves limit the exercise of 
the rights.®*® As decided in S p a r r o w , the restriction on aboriginal and treaty rights must be based 
on a valid objective, which may justify the limitation.®^* NikaP^^ and MarshalP^^ imply that licences 
governing the exercise o f the right to hunt, fish or to sell fish and other by-products must be easily 
obtainable and must not subject the exercise o f these rights to conditions, which conflict with the 
right or limit its exercise unnecessarily.®^"* Although the scope o f ‘compelling and substantial 
objectives’ was widened by G la d s to n e the requirement to justify all infringements on aboriginal 
and treaty rights using the criteria outlined in Sparrow^^^ remains valid. Therefore, Canadian treaty 
jurisprudence indicates that these rights should not be limited by federal or provincial legislation 
unless there is a genuine reason to do so.
Ahousaht (n 913)^ SSI.
®*2 RSC, 1985, c C-46, s 445.1(1). Under the Code, it is an offence to deliberately cause or perm it 
‘unnecessary pain, suffering or injury to an animal or a bird’.
®*7 SOR/93-56.
®**s4.5.
®*®s4.2.
®2® Sparrow (n 853).
921 s 4.4.1-4.4.2.
®22MW(n880).
®22 Marshall (n 97).
®24s4.4.1.3.
®22 Gladstone (n 827).
®22 Sparrow (n 853).
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4.5 What are valid objectives to limit the exercise o f Inuit treaty rights?
Each Inuit Treaty includes a set o f conditions under which the exercise of indigenous 
harvesting rights may be limited. This section discusses specifically restrictions on the grounds of 
(i) humane killing o f wildlife®^  ^ and (ii) the hunting methods and equipment. Inuit Treaties 
stipulate that regional wildlife boards are capable o f setting restrictions on hunting methods and 
equipment used.®^ * Therefore, any method, which does not guarantee humane killing o f seals, can 
justify the restriction on that method of harvest. As noted in section 4.3, the provisions regulating 
humane harvesting are contained in the federal Criminal Code 1985,®^ ® which prohibits animal 
cruelty. The same way as most EU legislation on animal welfare, the 1985 Code deals primarily 
with domestic animals and wild animals kept in captivity. The provision applying to seals is 
section 445.1(1), which provides that ‘[ejvery one commits an offence who wilfully causes or, 
being the owner, wilfully permits to be caused unnecessary pain, suffering or injury to an animal 
or a bird’.®*® Sections 445.1(2)-(3) further stipulate that:
[ejvery one who commits an offence under subsection (1) is guilty o f (a) an 
indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term of not more than five 
years.®**
For the purposes o f proceedings under paragraph (I)(a), evidence that a person 
failed to exercise reasonable care or supervision o f an animal or a bird thereby 
causing it pain, suffering or injury is, in the absence o f any evidence to the contrary, 
proof that the pain, suffering or injury was caused or was permitted to be caused 
wilfully, as the case may be.®*^
927 Other valid objectives include public safety and firearms control. The latter means that Inuit must have 
any licence required for the use and possession o f  firearms under federal law, which applies to all indigenous 
people o f  Canada. The general law restrictions on the use o f  firearms are contained in the Firearms Act, SC 
1995, c 39.
928 eg s 4.5.1.
929 RSC 1985, c C-46.
920 ibid s 445.1(1).
921 ibid s 445.1(2).
922 ibid s  445.1(3).
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The prohibition to cause ‘unnecessary pain, suffering or injury’ implies that the Code adopts a 
utilitarian approach,®** which permits activities that are sufficiently beneficial to humans and thus, 
outweigh some harm (ie pain and injury) to the animals involved.
4.5.1 Restrictions under the Quebec Treaty (1977)
The provincial Hunting and Fishing Act, 2002®*"* reaffirms the hunting and fishing rights 
o f the Nunavik Inuit under the Quebec Treaty (1977). Since the rights under the 2002 Act are not 
substantially different from those under the 1977 Treaty, this thesis refers to the provisions o f this 
Treaty unless they have been modified by the 2002 Act. Under the current legislation, Nunavik 
Inuit have the right to use all ‘traditional hunting, fishing and trapping methods and methods in use 
as o f 11 November 1975, except where such methods affect public safety’.®** Equipment, which is 
prohibited by legislation on the grounds weapon control, includes ‘any explosives, poisons, 
firearms connected to traps and remote controls, automatic weapons, tracer bullets, non-expanding 
ball ammunition, air-guns, and other similar equipment’.®*® Strikingly, the prohibited hunting 
methods and equipment under the Quebec Treaty (1977) are similar to those in the Habitats 
Directive, discussed briefly in Chapter 2.®*’
The EFSA noted in its 2007 report that some of the methods prohibited under the Quebec 
Treaty 1997 as well as the Habitats Directive have been tested in the past as an alternative for rifles, 
netting and hakapiks. The report nevertheless concluded that ‘[njone of the alternative tested 
methods (e.g. pistol, captive bold, poisoning) has been considered to be practical or provide a
®** oh 2 s 2.5.1.
®*4 An Act respecting hunting andfishing rights in the James Bay and New Québec territories, 2002 RSQ, c 
D-13.1.
®*2 ibid s 18(c).
®*® ibid s 18(a).
927 oh 2 s 2.2.1.
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humane killing’.®** Therefore, the level o f protection offered to seals in terms o f suitable hunting 
equipment under Canadian law is not that different from the Habitats Directive or the 
recommendations of the EFSA, apart from netting.
The Quebec Treaty (1977) was amended by the Nunavik Treaty (2008),®*® which covers 
the Nunavik Marine Region.®"*® According to the provisions o f the 2008 Treaty, Nunavik Inuit may 
employ any type, method or technology to harvest seals, provided that this does not (i) result in 
harmful alteration to the environment; or (ii) conflict with laws o f  general application regarding 
humane killing o f wildlife, public safety and firearms control. Additionally, harvesting activities 
cannot conflict with limitations either on a season o f harvest; or sex, size and age o f wildlife®"** set 
by the Nunavik Marine Region Wildlife Board.®"** It can be assumed that the provisions o f the 2008 
Treaty apply to seals despite the lack of explicit acknowledgement in that regard.
4.5.2 Restrictions under the Inuvialuit Treaty (1984)
Section 12(24) of the Inuvialuit Treaty (1984) stipulates that the right to harvest is subject 
to the laws o f general application respecting public safety and conservation. Although animal 
welfare is not explicitly mentioned, as noted in section 4.5, Inuit rights are subject to the federal 
laws on firearms control and animal cruelty since these laws apply to all Canadians, regardless 
whether they are indigenous or not.
®** Algers and others (n 391) para 3.5.1.
®*® The Nunavik Treaty (2008) amended the Quebec Treaty (1977) by incorporating the Nunavik M arine 
Region in the Nunavik Settlement Region. A  separate Treaty exists because it was impossible to include 
marine regions in the Treaties in 1977.
94° Nunavik consists o f  the Nunavik M arine Region and the ‘R egion’ as defined in the Quebec Treaty (1977), 
s 23.1.8.
94' Nunavik Treaty (2008), s 5.1.1.
942 ibid s 5.3.23(a)-(c).
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4.5.3 Restrictions under the Nunavut Treaty (1993)
Under the Nunavut Treaty, Nunavut Inuit may employ any type, method or technology to 
harvest species of wildlife, provided that this does not result in a harmful alteration to the 
environment or conflict with the laws o f general application regarding humane killing o f wildlife, 
public safety or firearms control. Additionally, the Treaty provides for limitations adopted pursuant 
to a valid conservation purpose (eg on method or season o f harvest; or sex, size, or age of 
wildlife).®"** It can be inferred from this that any harvesting method specifically mentioned in the 
Treaty can be limited if  it does not guarantee humane killing o f seals. Remarkably, the Nunavut 
Treaty (1993) is the only Treaty which specifically mentions netting and harpooning. According to 
section 1.1.1, the term ‘harvesting’ includes ‘hunting, trapping, fishing, as defined in the Fisheries 
Act, netting, egging, picking, collecting, gathering, spearing, killing, capturing or taking by any 
means’. Since ‘the right to harvest wildlife’ is broad enough to include netting and harpooning o f 
seals, which are traditional hunting methods used by Inuit, these methods can be constrained, if  the 
federal government considers that Inuit use these methods to cause ‘wilfully...unnecessary pain, 
suffering or injury’ to seals.®"*"*
4.5.4 Restrictions under the Labrador Treaty (2005)
According to the provisions o f the Labrador Treaty (2005), the exercise o f the right to hunt 
seals®"** is subject to Inuit laws and federal laws®"*® on conservation, public health, and public safety, 
including legislation on firearms control.®"** The Treaty stipulates that any person harvesting seals
®"** Nunavut Treaty (1993), s 5.7.42(a)-(c).
944 s 4.5.
942 Labrador Treaty (2005), part 13.5.
942 Laws o f  general application and legislation established by the M inister o f  Fisheries and Oceans. 
947 Labrador Treaty (2005), s 13.5.1(b).
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for FSC purposes may use any ‘humane’ harvesting method or technology.®"** According to the 
Labrador Treaty, a hunting method or technology is humane if  ‘it was permissible under laws of 
general application that were in operation on 1 August 1999, except as otherwise provided in 
legislation implementing an international agreement.®"*® Because no agreements are specifically 
mentioned in this context, this provision was probably included in the Treaty in case any harvesting 
methods became unacceptable due to evolving scientific evidence.
4.6 Conclusion
Chapter 4 has investigated the rights that the Inuit o f Canada enjoy in relation to seal 
hunting under the four Inuit Treaties.®*® Under these Treaties, Inuit have the right to hunt seals and 
sell all the by-products (eg sealskins and blubber) resulting from their harvesting activities.®** 
Significantly, the right appears to be similar with the right codified in Article 20 UNDRJP (right to 
engage freely in all economic activities)®** and therefore, it extends beyond the narrow dictionary 
definition of the term ‘subsistence’.®** Whilst it could be argued that the EU took its international 
law obligations into account by referring to the UNDRIP in the Preamble to the Basic Regulation,®*"* 
it violated the rights o f Canadian Inuit under Article 20 UNDRIP because it did not accommodate 
the fact that Inuit of Canada would not be able to adjust to the EU’s traceability requirements under 
the Implementing Regulation.
®"** Labrador Treaty (2005), s 13.4.3. 
®49 ibid s 13.4.4.
®*®s4.1.
®** ss 4.3.1.1-4.
922 ch 3 s 3.4.1.
922 S4 .3 .1 .1; oh 1 s 1.2.3.
924 c h 6 s 6 .3 .1 .
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In fact. Chapter 2 reveals that the COWI estimated that hardly any products o f Inuit origin 
from Canada were present on the EU market during the drafting o f the Implementing Regulation.®** 
Although this is hardly surprising due to the uncertainties created by the seal products legislation, 
it does not justify the EU’s approach towards Arctic indigenous peoples, if  the exercise o f their 
rights under the UNDRIP becomes virtually impossible as a result o f the Inuit exemption. Even if 
the Canadian Inuit were anticipated to sell very small numbers o f their products in Europe,®*® the 
conditions to which Inuit products are subject to under the EU legislation can be argued to limit the 
exercise o f Inuit economic rights unnecessarily. For instance, the requirement that seals must be 
partly consumed, used or processed in Inuit communities can be seen inconsistent with the Nunavut 
Treaty (1993) since this Treaty does not itself contain such requirement, but Inuit are free to sell 
their products to anyone outside the Inuit settlement region.
Additionally, Canadian case law demonstrates that imposition of limiting conditions on the 
exercise of aboriginal and treaty rights may be inconsistent with these rights. For instance, MAra/®** 
and MarshaW^^ demonstrate that when the governments impose certain limiting conditions, such 
as a sale ban or a requirement for a fishing licence, on the exercise o f an indigenous peoples’ right, 
the limitation may render these rights virtually useless.®*® Similarly, the government’s attempt to 
determine how indigenous peoples’ rights should be exercised removes the decision-making away 
from the rights holders, which essentially constitutes an infringement o f these rights under 
Canadian law.®®® This is an important point in the context of the EU legislation because it can be 
argued that it is inappropriate for the EU to impose a requirement on indigenous peoples to obtain 
attesting documents, which are not fi’eely available, as a condition to the entry to the EU market. 
As noted in Chapter 2, the EU did not expect Canadian Inuit to be able to invest into the EU’s
9** oh 2 s 2.6.1.
922 ch 2 s 2.6.
92* M W  (n 880).
928 Marshall (n 97).
929 S 4.4.1.
92° ibid
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traceability system due to the burden it would impose on them. Therefore, it appears that the EU 
legislation renders the exercise o f the indigenous economic rights under international law virtually 
impossible.
Chapter 4 has also demonstrated that under the Inuit Treaties, Canadian Inuit can use any 
such methods to hunt seals, which do not violate laws on firearms control, conservation, public 
safety and humane hunting of wildlife.®®* This suggests that the federal government can restrict 
methods, which are incompatible with humane harvesting practices. In addition, the use o f certain 
inhumane equipment, such as explosives and poisoning, is prohibited under the weapons control. 
This can be argued to make Canadian law consistent with the Habitats Directive and the 
recommendations o f the EFSA, with the exception o f certain traditional hunting methods, such as 
netting.®®* However, since also within the EU, Member States may derogate from animal welfare 
requirements under the Treaty on the grounds o f ‘religious rites, cultural traditions and regional 
heritage’,®®* the possibility o f the Inuit to use their traditional seal hunting methods is not that 
different from EU law. The same way the EU Member States laws governing seal hunting,®®"* 
Canadian legislation requires seals to be spared from unnecessary pain and suffering.®®* Therefore, 
it can be concluded that Canadian law adequately restricts the use o f cruel hunting methods to the 
extent this is consistent with indigenous way of life and the realities o f the Arctic environment in 
which Inuit live.®®® In conclusion, it is not necessary for the EU to restrict the entry o f seal products 
o f Inuit origin from Canada on animal welfare grounds because seals are adequately protected 
under Canadian laws applying to Inuit.®®*
®®* ss 4.5.1-4.5.4.
®®*s 4.5.1.
®®*s4.2.
®®4 See eg M etsastyslaki 615/1993 (Hunting Act 1993) (Finland) (unofficial translation), s 32(1). 
®®*s4.5.
®®®s 4.5.1-4.5.4.
®®* ibid
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Chapter 5 investigates Greenland’s position as an autonomous part o f Denmark and as an 
overseas territory o f an EU Member State. The EU’s relationship with Greenland is significant for 
the purposes o f this thesis since it explains why that the EU legislation seemingly favours seal 
products originating from Greenland over those fi’om the Canadian Inuit regions. In accordance 
with the comparative method, Chapter 5 analyses the rights o f Kalaallit to hunt seals in relation to 
those o f Inuit o f Canada in order to see what the main similarities and differences are.
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Chapter 5 - The rights relating to seal hunting in Greenlandic law
5.1 Introduction
In order to answer the main research question o f this thesis, namely whether the EU 
balances fairly the competing interests o f protection o f seals and the rights o f indigenous peoples 
to engage in their traditional economic activities. Chapter 5 focuses on rights o f Kalaallit to hunt 
seals. The primary reason for investigating these rights is the association between Greenland and 
the EU and the consequent obligations the EU has for Greenland. As is seen in section 5.2.1, the 
provisions o f the TFEU impose, inter alia, a clear and precise obligation for the EU to promote the 
interests and prosperity o f Kalaallit in order to further their economic, social and cultural 
development. Additionally, the same treatment must be applied to trade between Denmark and 
Greenland as to the trade between all EU Member States. The association between Greenland and 
the EU is instrumental for this thesis because it can be argued to have resulted in discrimination 
between Kalaallit and Inuit o f Canada under the Inuit exemption.®®*
Chapter 5 investigates to what extent the rights o f Kalaallit to hunt seals can be restricted 
on the grounds o f animal welfare under Greenlandic legislation. It can be argued that since 
Greenland adequately regulates Inuit seal hunting by prohibiting cruelty, it is unnecessary for the 
EU to limit the sale o f seal products o f Inuit origin to those products, which contribute to the 
subsistence o f indigenous communities, in order to discourage commercial exploitation o f seals by 
them. Additionally, Chapter 5 investigates how the rights o f Kalaallit to hunt seals correspond to 
the treaty rights o f Inuit o f Canada. In order to do this Chapter 5 employs a comparative analysis, 
which is useful in identifying the main similarities and differences between the rights o f these two 
peoples. It appears that the rights o f Kalaallit are most similar with the rights o f Nunavut Inuit who
®®* As is noted in ch 7, the WTO Panel concluded the EU  discriminated against products from Inuit regions 
o f  Canada. Because the EU could not justify this discrimination under the W TO Agreements, the EU 
legislation violated the rules o f  international trade law. ch 7 ss 1.223  and 7.4.S.2.
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can sell all products derived from seals,®®® including meat, blubber and sealskins under the 1993 
Nunavut Treaty. However, there are also many dissimilarities in terms of, inter alia, the 
requirement for licences and the requirement to report catches.®*®
Chapter 5 begins with a brief investigation into Greenland’s position as an autonomous 
part o f Denmark and its relationship with the latter. Greenland’s association with the EU is 
subsequently explored in section 5.2.1. The right o f Kalaallit to hunt seals is explored in sections 
5.3-5.4. In this context, the following factors are relevant: (i) what are the specific rights relating 
to seal hunting that the Kalaallit enjoy under the laws o f their self-governing territory; (ii) how 
these rights are regulated in Greenland®** and (iii) to what extent is the right o f Kalaallit to hunt 
seals constrained on the grounds o f animal welfare.®** Most o f the material on which Chapter 5 
relies is in Danish. Therefore, all legislation used for this Chapter consists of unofficial translated 
versions. Whereas the unofficial translations of the Greenland Home Rule Act 1978®** and the 
Greenland Self-Government Act 2009®*"* were found online, all the other legislation has been 
translated by the author.
5.1.1 How do the rights of Canadian Inuit and Kalaallit differ?
One o f the most obvious differences between the rights o f Kalaallit and those o f the Inuit 
o f Canada is that these groups’ modern-day rights originate in different legal systems. Whereas 
Canada’s criminal and civil law has its basis in English common and statutory law,®** the dominant 
tradition in Greenland is the Danish civil law approach. Another distinctive feature between these
®®®ch 4 s 4.3.3.
®*® s 5.3.
97' ibid 
®**s5.4.
972 L ev nr 577 a f  29 november 1978 cm  Gronlands Hjemm estyre (Greenland Home R ule Act 1978) 
(Denmark) (translation), s 1.
974 Lov om  Gronlands Selvstyre N r 473 a f  12 juni 2009 (Greenland Self-Government A ct 2009) (Denmark) 
(translation).
972 with the exception o f  Quebec.
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legal systems is the references to the term ‘indigenous people’ or the lack o f it. As noted in Chapter 
1, Kalaallit are not explicitly referred to as ‘indigenous’ in Greenlandic laws.®*® They are 
nevertheless recognised as indigenous by Denmark and the international community.
In general, the Danish civil law tradition is characterised by statutory law whereas 
precedent plays a less important role.®** In fact, very little relevant case law outlining the rights of 
Kalaallit exist. However, several pieces o f legislation adopted by the Government o f Greenland 
play an important part in outlining these rights even though their codification in legislation appears 
to be relatively recent since hardly any legislation concerning hunting rights exists before 1999. As 
was noted in Chapter 2, there are some significant differences in administrative procedures relating 
to seal hunting between Inuit o f Canada and Kalaallit, which may have contributed to the differing 
abilities o f these peoples to meet the EU’s conditions for the sale and import o f seal products under 
the Inuit exemption.®** For instance, the degree o f established procedures for documenting and 
collating statistics relating to hunting activities differ. Whereas Kalaallit are, inter alia, required to 
acquire a license to hunt seals and report their annual catches to the government,®*® no comparable 
system exists in Canada.
For this reason, it can be argued that Greenland was in a better position to adopt the EU’s 
traceability regime. Additionally, the proceedings before the WTO reveal that due to the EU’s 
obligations towards Greenland, the Danish authorities had no other option, but to ensure that seal 
products from Greenland would have access to the EU market as o f 20 August 2010.®*® This 
nevertheless sets Greenland and Inuit regions of Canada apart since no similar arrangement existed
976chl s 1.2.1.
®** Anker, Ronne and Olsen (n 222) 296. Although case law can be argued to play an im portant role as a 
source o f  Danish law, it is not given the same importance as in comm on law. In fact, even if  precedents they 
are non-binding, they are normally taken into consideration. See eg D itlev Tamm, ‘The Danes and their Legal 
H eritage’ in Borge Dahl, Torben M elchior and Ditlev Tamm (eds) Danish Law in a European Perspective 
(2nd edn, Thomson 2002) 57.
®7» ch 2 s 2.6.
®*®s 5.3.1.
®*® ch 7 s 7.2.2.3
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for products of Inuit origin from Canada. Consequently, the impact on Inuit of Canada has been 
negative.®**
Indeed, as was noted in Chapter 2, the findings o f the Commission’s impact assessment 
indicated that all other measures, apart from a flexible traceability regime, would place a burden 
on Inuit.®** Additionally, although the Commission was aware o f the differing abilities between 
Greenland and the Inuit regions o f Canada to meet the EU’s traceability conditions, the 
implementation of the EU legislation does not reflect this. In fact, it appears that the Commission 
decided not to adopt the flexible measures in order to satisfy the arguments o f the animal welfare 
organisations that the EU public must be confident that no products o f commercial hunts will enter 
the market under the exemptions.®** However, since several EU Member States continue trading 
in seal products originating hunts were allegedly cruel hunting practices are in use,®*"* therefore, it 
is questionable whether the EU legislation results in better animal welfare outcomes in seal hunts 
conducted in jurisdictions outside the EU.®**
5.2 Greenland’s relationship with Denmark
Since Greenland is not a sovereign country, but an autonomous part o f the Kingdom of 
Denmark, it may be useful to explain their relationship because it reveals why the EU must take 
into account the interests of Kalaallit and balance them with the protection o f seals. In fact, as noted 
in section 5.1, the Danish authorities had an influential role in enabling products from Greenland 
to access the EU market, whilst there was no similar advantage granted to products o f Inuit origin
®*' ch 7 s 7.2.2.3.
®»2 ch 2 s 2 .6 .
982 ch 2 s 2.6.1.
984 See EC-Seal Products (DS400, DS401) European U nion’s responses to first set o f  questions from the 
Panel (13 October 2012) 279 (EU ’s responses to the first set o f  questions from the Panel) referring to Eurostat, 
‘Exports o f  seal products from the European Union (2001-2011)’.
985 ch 2 s 2.3; ch 7 s 7.2.1.2.
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from Canada.®*® Even though the conduct of the national authorities seems to have been consistent 
with EU law,®** it was not consistent with the WTO Agreements.®**
Greenland’s special legal status within the Kingdom o f Demark was initially recognised 
under the Home Rule Act 1978,®*® which was the main legal instrument between Denmark and 
Greenland between 1979 and 2009. Although the 1978 Act is no longer in force,®®® it is relevant for 
this thesis for two reasons. First, it was the instrument on which the rights o f Kalaallit to hunt, fish 
and gather natural resources were initially based. Second, the 2009 Act does not create any new 
rights to Kalaallit, with the exception o f the right to independence fi'om Denmark at an 
undetermined point in the future. Although the 2009 Act also transferred further fields of 
responsibility to the Government o f Greenland, these cannot be described as indigenous rights.
Although the 1978 Act concerned almost exclusively the powers and relations of the home 
rule authorities with the Danish authorities,®®* it contained one reference to rights that are somewhat 
similar either to the Inuit treaty rights or common law aboriginal rights discussed in Chapter 4.®®* 
Section 8(1) of the 1978 Act stated that: ‘the resident population o f Greenland has fundamental 
rights in respect of Greenland’s natural resources’. Although the 1978 Act did not specify what the 
terms ‘fundamental rights’ or ‘natural resources’ meant, the term ‘natural resources’- can be 
understood to have encompassed all living resources as opposed to non-living resources (eg oil, gas 
and minerals). This is because section 8(2) referred to ‘non-living resources’ by stipulating that
®*® ch 7 s 7.2.2.S 
®**s 5.2.1.
®** ch 7 s 7.2.2.3
®*® Under current Danish law Greenland is no longer ju s t a community. C f Greenland Home Rule A ct 1978, 
s 1(1): ‘Greenland is a distinct community within the Kingdom o f  D enm ark’.
®9® The Home Rule A ct 1978 was repealed by s 23(1) the Greenland Self-Government A ct 2009 under which 
Greenland assumed inereased autonomy.
®9' The transfer o f  several administrative and legislative powers to Greenland in 1987 was significant because 
it moved deeision making closer to the inhabitants o f  Greenland. Thus, it can be argued that the Home Rule 
system enhanced local decision making in the sense o f  the E U ’s concept o f  subsidiarity whereby decisions 
should be made as close to the citizens as possible. A t the same time, Denmark has retained considerable 
influence over Greenland through annual economic transfers, which constitute 40%  o f  G reenland’s GDP 
(approximately 450 million euros).
®®2 ch 4 s 4.3.
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‘preliminary study, prospecting and the exploitation of [mineral] resources [were] to be regulated 
by [a separate] agreement’ between Denmark and Greenland. Although the ‘separate agreement’ 
was required in order ‘[t]o safeguard the rights o f the resident population in respect of non-living 
resources and to protect the interests o f the unity o f the [Danish] Realm’, in reality, all the revenues 
from mining and mineral resources accumulated exclusively to Denmark.®®* Consequently, the 
reference to ‘fundamental rights in respect o f Greenland’s natural resources’ can be interpreted to 
have included the right to fish and hunt wildlife, including marine mammals.
Because the Home Rule Act 1978 contained very little information as to the rights of 
Kalaallit to hunt seals, these are found in separate instruments promulgated by the Government o f 
Greenland. Because of the regional self-governance, the Government o f Greenland is responsible 
for enacting its own legislation in areas, which have been transferred to it under the Home Rule 
Act 1978 and the Self-Government Act 2009.®®"* Hence, the Government o f Greenland has the 
ability to legislate in areas relating to animal welfare and hunting o f seals.®®*
5.2.1 Relationship between Greenland and the EU
Since Greenland has constitutional ties with Denmark, which is an EU Member State, 
Greenland’s inhabitants are EU citizens. However, as an overseas country (OCT) outside mainland 
Europe, the European acquis does not apply to Greenland.®®® Instead, the association between
®®* Lov nr 166 a f  12 maj 1965 om mineralske râstoffer i Gronland (Greenland M ining A ct 1965) stated that 
the mineral resources in Greenland belong to Denmark. Under the Greenland Self-Government A ct 2009, all 
revenues ‘from mineral resource activities in Greenland shall accrue to the Greenland Self-Government 
authorities.’
®®4 Self-Government Act 2009, s 2(1): ‘The Greenland Self-Government authorities may determine that the 
fields o f  responsibility that appear from the Schedule to this A ct shall be transferred to the Self-Government 
authorities.’
995 ss 5.5-5.Ô.
992 Treaty on Greenland [1984] OJ L29 m eant that the EC Treaty would no longer apply to Greenland and 
established special relations between the EC and Greenland modelled on the rules which applied to overseas 
territories.
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Greenland and the EU is governed by the Overseas Association Decision.®®* As noted in Chapter 
3, although the EU seeks to integrate indigenous issues into all aspects o f its external policies, 
indigenous issues are not a matter of EU law because the Treaties confer no competences on the 
EU to legislate in this area.®®* However, since Denmark agrees ‘to associate with the Union the 
non-European countries and territories which have special relations with’ it,®®® Articles 198-203 
TFEU apply to Greenland, subject to the specific provisions outlined in the Protocol (No 34) on 
special arrangements for Greenland annexed to the TFEU,*®®® which grants Greenland quota-free 
and duty-free access to EU markets in fishery products.*®®*
Articles 198-203 TFEU lay down the nature o f the association between the EU and 
Greenland.*®®* Article 198(2) specifically stipulates that the purpose o f the association is ‘to 
promote the economic and social development of...[Greenland] and to establish close economic 
relations between...[it] and the Union’. Furthermore, the association serves ‘primarily to further 
the interests and prosperity o f the inhabitants o f [Greenland] in order to lead them to the economic, 
social and cultural development to which they aspire’.*®®* This indicates that the link between the 
EU and Greenland is close. In contrast, no comparable association exists between the EU and the 
Inuit regions o f Canada. Although the association in itself may not be enough to demonstrate that 
the EU discriminates between Kalaallit and Inuit o f Canada, other Treaty provisions provide more 
evidence o f ways in which the Treaty obliges the EU to promote economic prosperity o f Greenland.
®®* Council Decision 2013/755/EU.
998 ch 3 s 3.3.
999 Under art 198 TFEU, ‘the M em ber States agree to associate with the Union the non-European countries 
and territories which have special relations with Denmark, France, the Netherlands and the United K ingdom ’.
1000 TFEU, art 204.
'°®' The access is nevertheless conditional on the Fisheries Partnership Agreement between the EU, Denmark 
and Greenland by which the EU gains access to Greenland fishing zones. See Council Regulation (EC) No 
753/2007 o f  28 June 2007 on the conclusion o f  the Fisheries Partnership A greem ent between the European 
Community on the one hand, and the Government o f  Denmark and the Home Rule Government o f  Greenland, 
on the other hand [2007] OJ L I72/1.
1002 Yhere is for instance a constant dialogue between the Commission, Greenland and Denmark to through 
the annual OCT-EU forum, regular trilateral meetings as well as partnership meetings with the Commission 
and Denmark.
1003 TpEU, art 198(3).
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Therefore, it is the execution o f the Treaty provisions in practice can be argued to have resulted in 
discrimination against all other indigenous peoples apart from Kalaallit under the EU’s policy on 
seal products.
Article 198(3) TFEU specifies that Greenland’s economic and social development must be 
realised in line with the principles in the Preamble to this Treaty. The principles, which are relevant 
in this context, stipulate, inter alia, that the Europe as a whole intends to ensure the development 
o f prosperity o f OCTs to which it is bound by solidarity, in accordance with the principles o f the 
Charter of the United Nations.*®®"* Additionally, the Member States aspire to strengthen the unity 
and harmonious development o f their economies ‘by reducing the differences existing between the 
various regions and the backwardness o f the less favoured regions’;*®®* and to promote international 
trade by removing existing obstacles*®®® which in turn ‘calls for concerted action in order to 
guarantee steady expansion, balanced trade and fair competition’.*®®* Consequently, the Treaty 
imposes a clear and precise requirement for the EU to promote the interests and prosperity o f 
Greenland in order to further its economic, social and cultural development, inter alia, by 
promoting balanced trade, guaranteeing fair competition and reducing differences between o f the 
metropolitan areas of Western Europe and the remote Arctic regions.
According to Articles 199(1) and 200 TFEU, the same treatment must be applied to trade 
between Denmark and Greenland as to the trade between all EU Member States. Additionally, these 
provisions prohibit the imposition of customs duties on imports into the EU of goods originating 
from Greenland. Although the Treaty extends some of the EU’s internal market principles to 
Greenland, OCTs are not part of the EU customs territory, and therefore, products from Greenland 
are considered ‘non-Community goods’ under EU law.*®®* The requirement to ensure that imports
1004 jF E U , preamble, recital 8.
*°®* ibid recital 6.
'°°2 ibid recital 7.
'®°7 ibid recital 5.
1008 Regulation 2913/92, art 3(1): ‘The customs territory o f  the Community shall com prise... the territory o f  
the Kingdom o f  Denmark, except the Faroe Islands and G reenland’.
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from Greenland are treated the same way in the internal market as goods from any EU Member 
State nevertheless explains why the exemptions*®®® found in the EU seal products legislation 
seemingly favour goods from Greenland and the EU Member States.*®*® In fact, the different 
treatment between products from Greenland and those from Inuit regions o f Canada was of 
particular relevance in EC-Seal P r o d u c t s where the Panel found that the EU violated its 
obligations under the WTO agreements because the EU legislation discriminated against imported 
products originating in non-EU countries, including the Canadian Inuit regions.
Due to the special relationship between the EU and Greenland, the EU also provides regular 
funding to Greenland. Although according to the Commission, this money is being used to support 
not only fisheries, but other programmes, such as education,*®** it is possible to argue that the EU 
rules do not prevent this money being used for other purposes, such as to implement the EU’s 
traceability regime in Greenland. This can be inferred from the fact that during the November 2009 
consultation meeting, the Commission indicated that the money paid to Greenland under the 
Fisheries Partnership Agreement*®** was a sufficient compensation for Inuit seal hunters for the 
adverse effects of the EU legislation.*®** Currently, Greenland receives 17,8 million EUR annually 
from the general EU budget on the basis o f this Agreement.*®** Funding is also available through 
various initiatives, such as the ‘Northern Periphery Programme’, which aims to ‘help peripheral 
and remote communities on the northern margins o f Europe to develop their economic, social and
*°®® Specifically, the Inuit and marine resources exemptions.
*®*® The Panel explicitly stated that ‘the legislative history o f  the EU Seal Regime, which suggests that the 
[marine resources exemption in Article 3(2) o f  Regulation 1007/2009] M RM  exception was designed with 
the situation o f  EU member States in m ind’. EC-Seal Products (n 69) para 7.351.
10" ibid
'°'* See Commission ‘Programming Document for the Sustainable Development o f  G reenland’ C (2007) 
3068
*®** Council Decision 20I2/653/EU  o f  16 July 2012 on the signing, on behalf o f  the European Union, and the 
provisional application o f  the Protocol setting out the fishing opportunities and financial contribution 
provided for in the Fisheries Partnership Agreement between the European Community on the one hand and 
the Government o f  Denmark and the Home Rule Government o f  Greenland, on the other hand [2012] OJ L 
293/4.
*®** See Stakeholder M eeting Report (n 383).
*®** C (2007) 3068; Council Decision 20I2/653/EU.
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environmental potential’.*®*® Although none o f these programmes cover Inuit regions o f Canada, 
the Commission has stated that the Northern Periphery Programme could possibly be extended to 
Canada.*®**
In conclusion, the preferential treatment in the field o f trade and the financial compensation 
scheme sets Greenland apart from Inuit regions o f Canada since no comparable association exists 
between the latter and the EU, which would enable Canadian Inuit to benefit from any financial 
compensation due to the seal products ban.*®**
5.3 Hunting o f seals under Greenlandic laws
Seal hunting in Greenland is governed by the Order on the protection and hunting o f seals 
2010,*®*® which was drafted after the Basic Regulation entered into force in September 2009.*®*® 
Initially, it appeared that the 2010 Order was adopted as a response to international laws concerning 
conservation of marine resources and biodiversity due to the provisions prohibiting the taking of 
grey and harbour seals, lactating females and new-born seal pups with a distinctive pup hair, lanugo 
coat.*®** However, it may be inferred from the Explanatory Notes*®** to the 2010 Order that, in fact, 
the Government amended its laws in order to comply with the prevailing attitudes within the EU. 
This is because many of the requirements under the 2010 Order were designed to reduce 
unnecessary suffering and wastefulness associated with commercial seal hunts. For instance, the
See Northern Periphery Programme, ‘Programme Info’ 
<w ww.northem periphery.eu/en/content/show/& tid=I77> accessed 15 M ay 2013.
*®** SWD (2012) 182 final, para 1.2.
*®** Stakeholder M eeting Report (n 383).
*®'9 Selvstyrets bekendtgorelse nr 16 a f  12 november 2010 om beskyttelse og fangst a f  sæler (Order on the 
protection and hunting o f  seals 2010) (Greenland) (unofficial translation).
*®*® The Inuit exemption itself entered into force in August 2010.
*®** In most seal species pups are bom  in a lanugo coat, which differs from juvenile or adult pelage in colour 
and length. See eg Jefferson, Leatherwood and W ebber (n I) para 4.1. eg the harp seals shed their white pup 
hair at approximately three weeks.
1022 Vejledning til Selvstyrets bekendtgorelse nr 16 a f  12 november 2010 om beskyttelse og fangst a f  sæ ler 
(Explanatory Notes to Order on the protection and hunting o f  seals 2010).
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2010 Order contains specific rules on discarding the unwanted parts, according to which hunters 
must ensure that as much o f the seal as possible is used,*®** The Notes also state that it is illegal to 
leave seal carcasses on the ice.*®** This could be seen as an attempt to avoid criticism raised by 
animal welfare NGOs in the context o f commercial seal hunts in Canada.*®**
Section 1 o f the 2010 Order stipulates that it applies to all seal populations found in the 
Greenlandic fishing territory.*®*® The same way as in Canada, in Greenland the right to hunt seals 
is subject to several limitations, including those relating to catch limits, closed seasons and methods 
of hunting. However, several aspects o f Greenlandic law differ from that of Canada, specifically 
since there are no requirements to attend training, to obtain hunting licences or to report catches to 
the government under Canadian law.*®** In addition to the rules applying for the whole of 
Greenland, the municipal governments may set more rigorous rules concerning hunting o f seals.*®** 
For instance, local councils can issue municipal statutes with detailed guidelines concerning 
netting.*®*® A municipal board may also adopt more stringent statutes concerning the protection of 
seals;*®*® rifles and ammunition used;*®** the taking o f residues fi*om the hunting site; reporting the 
amount of meat acquired as well as issue guidelines for the exercise o f hunting in certain areas 
within the municipality.*®** In addition, under the Hunting and Fishing Act 1 9 9 9 *®^  ^ the 
Government can adopt further rules concerning several areas, ranging from conservation and the 
conduct o f hunting activities to the processing, utilisation and marketing o f wildlife, including
*®** 2010 Order, s 7. See also Explanatory N otes to Order on the protection and hunting o f  seals 2010.
*®** Explanatory N otes to Order on the protection and hunting o f  seals 2010.
*°** Animal interest groups have criticised the Canadian commercial seal hunters for leaving the carcasses on 
the ice and taking only the sealskins.
*®*® ie harp seal {Pagophilus groenlandicus), hooded seal {Cystophora cristatd), bearded seal (Erignathus 
barbatus), ringed seal {Phoca hispida), harbour seal {Phoca vitulind) and grey seal {Halichoerus grypus).
*027 Yhe government can lay down procedures for the reporting the catches, including requirem ent to provide 
information on the hunting method and equipment used. See 2010 Order, s 8(2).
*®** ibid s 12.
*®*9 ibid s 6(5). There are 18 municipalities. See Nanoq, ‘Political L ife’ 
<http://uk.nanoq.gl/Emner/About/Political.aspx> accessed 25 June 2012.
*®*® 2010 Order, s 3.
*®** ibid s 6.
*®** ibid s 12.
*®** Landstingslov nr 12 a f  29 oktober 1999 om fangst o g jag t (Fishing and Hunting A ct 1999) (Greenland).
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s e a l s . I t  is unclear, however, whether any local rules exist in Canada, which are not specified by 
the Treaties.
In conclusion, the right to fish and hunt wildlife in Greenland is extensively regulated since 
the government, and to some extent municipalities, can adopt further rules concerning, inter alia, 
conservation, annual shooting tests, the conduct o f hunting activities,*®^  ^ and the processing, 
utilisation and marketing o f seals.*®^ ^
5.3.1 Requirement to obtain licences
Since there is no private ownership of land, sea or living natural resources in Greenland all 
its residents may hunt seals, subject to the issuance o f hunting licenses.*®^’ Hunters may also be 
required to pass an annual hunting test as a condition for obtaining l i c e n s e s . T h i s  implies that 
hunters must be competent users o f firearms. Therefore, the annual hunting test requirement can be 
argued to spare seals fi-om unnecessary suffering. These requirements differ fi*om the right to hunt 
seals under the Canadian law since Canadian Inuit do not need licences to hunt seals, nor are they 
required to pass an annual hunting test or to report their catches to the federal or regional 
government.
The requirement for hunting licences in Greenland may also have had implications for the 
fulfilment of the EU traceability requirements under the Implementing Regulation. It can be argued 
that since Greenland already had a licensing system and a separate system for reporting catches as 
well as a labelling system with specific barcodes, it was less challenging for Kalaallit to fulfil the
Fishing and Hunting Act 1999, s 8(8). 
ibid
ibid s 8(9).
2010 Order, s 1(2). Section 4 o f  the Fishing and Hunting A ct 1999 specifies the conditions for bunting 
and fishing and s 6 provides that the government may impose a fee for issuing bunting licences.
Fishing and H unting Act 1999, s 10.
1039 c h 4 s  4 .3 .
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EU’s traceability requirements. In contrast, Canadian Inuit clearly struggle with this requirement 
because there are no existing traceability systems in relation to seal products in Canada. As 
noted by the COWI Report 2010:
in Greenland each skin is registered when purchased so it is possible to trace back 
the number o f skins sold by each hunter, per species. Moreover, all Great 
Greenland skins are automatically measured, stamped for size, quality, production 
code and the Great Greenland logo. Products from Great Greenland are also affixed 
a label containing a bar code, containing the above-mentioned information and the 
text: traditional hunt conducted by INUIT communities for subsistence 
purposes.*®^*
However, it appears that the COWI report identified the existing traceability system in 
Greenland as ineffective in satisfying European public on the grounds that it was ‘voluntary, not 
externally enforced and lacking a legal basis since [essentially] it was a marketing measure from 
the producer’.^ ®"*^ The COWI report further noted that the existing system was perceived to be 
‘open for fraud if  products are imported from non-eligible hunts to the company and labelled’. 
This is a heavy accusation, suggesting that commercial seal products from Canada and Norway 
would be able to access the EU market via Greenland where these products would be labelled by 
the government-owned fur processing company. Great Greenland, as originating from 
Greenland.
However, i f  it, indeed, is ‘possible to trace back the number o f skins sold by each hunter, 
per species’ why would the Government of Greenland risk labelling products originating from 
commercial hunts in Canada as originating from Greenland? In 2012, the Government of 
Greenland expressed its dissatisfaction with the EU’s traceability requirements by arguing that it
1040 COWI Report 2010 (n 44) para 5.3: ‘Only in Greenland some form o f  traceability system was found in 
relation to seal products and Inuit hunters, which has been developed in anticipation o f  the EU Regulation.’ 
ibid; Case T-18/I0  R  II ITK v Parliament and Council [2010] ECR 11-235 (Proceedings for interim 
measures 2), para 87.
1042 COWI Report 2010 (n 44) annex 5, table 2-1. 
ibid 
ibid
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was inappropriate for the EU to require indigenous products to be accompanied with attesting 
documents since sealskins processed by Great Greenland bore a logo and a bar code signifying 
their origin.
In conclusion, since Greenland already had a sophisticated systems for tracing seal 
products, it may have been somewhat easier for Greenland to fulfil the EU’s traceability 
requirements. Therefore, the government did not probably have to amend its existing system 
substantially in order to comply with the requirements o f the EU legislation, whereas this would 
have posed a far greater burden on Inuit o f Canada, considering that no comparable systems existed 
in Canada. However, the fact that the EU made Greenland adopt its traceability system 
demonstrates that the EU undermined the ability o f the Government o f Greenland to ensure that 
the Inuit exemption would not be abused by commercial hunters.
5.4 How far does Greenlandic law regulate Inuit seal hunting on animal welfare grounds?
This section investigates to what extent animal welfare considerations restrict the exercise 
of the right to hunt seals in Greenland. It can be argued that the Government o f Greenland already 
adequately regulates seal hunting in the interests of animal welfare to the extent that this is 
consistent with the preservation o f indigenous culture. Indeed, section 1 of the Animal Welfare Act 
2003 reveals that it was designed to ensure proper animal care and best possible protection of 
animals from pain, suffering, anxiety, permanent injury or substantial disadvantage. This Act 
applies to all animals, including wildlife, although the majority of its provisions relate to livestock 
animals.^ ®"*^  The only other provision that is directly relevant to seals is section 13, which provides 
that animals must be killed as quickly and painlessly as possible. Although the Animal Welfare Act 
2003 prohibits culling by suffocation, drowning and hanging, it specifically states that killing of
Management and Utilization o f  Seals in Greenland (n 11) 23.
Landstingslov nr 25 a f  18 december 2003 om dyrevæm  (Animal W elfare A ct 2003) (Greenland) 
(unofficial translation), s 2.
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marine mammals by drowning is acceptable. This can be understood to include the use o f sealing
nets, which is explored in section 5.4.1. It is worth mentioning that the use of firearms is getting 
more prevalent in Greenland. Therefore, netting may not be used as widely as previously 
thought.
Under the 2010 Order the allowable hunting methods include the use of firearms and 
‘trapping’,^ ®'*^  which can be understood to mean the use of specific sealing nets. The Government’s 
White Paper ‘Management and utilization o f seals in Greenland’ explains that the current seal 
hunting practices include shooting seals at their breathing holes, on the ice or in open-water.^°^° 
However, the exact hunting method used depends on number o f factors, including the season, 
location, ice conditions and the seal species hunted. For instance, in those parts o f Greenland, where 
there is enough daylight in winter, it is possible for Kalaallit to shoot some ringed seals at their 
breathing holes.^ ®^ ^
The 2010 Order further specifies that hunters must use specified rifles and ammunition, 
and that only specific types o f sealing nets can be used.*®^  ^According to the Explanatory Notes to 
the 2010 Order, the requirement to use a specific type o f ammunition and firearms is to reduce 
unnecessary suffering o f seals.*°^  ^The Notes refer specifically to section 1 o f the Animal Welfare 
Act 2003, which requires hunters to use specific rifles with specific ammunition which cause the 
least possible suffering. Therefore, Greenland’s laws recognise the need to take into account 
scientific knowledge according to which seals are sentient beings and to cause the least suffering 
possible to them.
Animal W elfare A ct 2003, s 13.
See Hovelsrud, M ckenna and Huntington (n 42) S I38. 
ibid s 1(1).
’050 See M anagement and Utilization o f  Seals in Greenland (n 11). However, hunting seals in open water is 
challenging since seals can hardly be seen from a boat because they are mostly submerged.
ibid. W hilst hunting at the breathing hole, hunters must ensure that they use a lance, which will ensure a 
swift kill.
2010 Order, ss 6(4) and 6(6).
Explanatory N otes to Order on the protection and hunting o f  seals 2010.
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5,4.1 Netting
Although the use o f nets is permitted under the 2010 Order, netting is used only seasonally. 
Therefore it can be seen as a highly exceptional, but essential method of hunting seals in Greenland. 
According to the Explanatory Notes to the 2010 Order, the use o f nets protects the livelihood of the 
Inuit population in the northern and eastern districts o f Greenland*® '^  ^ where netting is the only 
possible method o f catching sufficient numbers o f seals during the Arctic winter, which is defined 
as ‘the seasonal period when the Sun is more than 12° below the horizon, which humans perceive 
as being continuously dark’.^ °^  ^ According to the Government o f Greenland, netting is used 
exclusively in open water in autumn, particularly when the sea-ice has not yet formed, and under 
the ice in winter.*°^^ Another reason why netting is used seasonally is that nets are less effective in 
spring and summer because seals are able to see them.^°^^
Using nets to hunt seals is controversial. For instance, the EFSA concluded in its 2007 
report that nets were an inhumane method to kill marine mammals. '^^^^ In its assessment of the 
likelihood o f suffering, the EFSA noted that it was ‘very likely that a seal trapped in a net... will 
experience moderate to major adverse welfare effects’. D u e  to cruelty associated with netting, 
the Bern Convention prohibits the use of nets and traps to hunt mammals in cases where they are 
‘applied for large scale or non-selective capture or killing’. T h e  requirements under this 
Convention are identical to those listed in the Habitats D irec tiv e .C o n seq u en tly , netting is 
prohibited in countries, which are parties to the Bern Convention, including Finland, Sweden,
Explanatory N otes to Order on the protection and hunting o f  seals 2010.
See Jorgen Berge and others, ‘Diel vertical migration o f  Arctic zooplankton during the polar night’ (2008) 
Biology Letters <www.st-andrews.ac.uk/~perg/Berge_et_al_Biol_Lett_2008.pdf> accessed 23 June 2012. 
The duration o f  the polar night varies, but in north Greenland it may last from October to the end o f  March. 
Management and Utilization o f  Seals (n 11) 14.
Algers and others (n 391) para 1.3.3.1.
1058 ibid 95.
’0^ 0 ibid para 7.4.3.
’050 Bern Convention, appendix IV.
100’ ch 2 s 2.2.1.
1062 Although so called trap-nets are being used for capturing seals in Finland under M etsastyslaki 615/1993 
(Hunting A ct 1993), the trap-nets differ from sealing nets because they have been found to be a humane
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and Norway. However, according to the EFSA, netting is in use in Greenland, Alaska, Iceland and 
parts of Canada and Russia.*°^^
In conclusion, Greenland’s animal welfare law demonstrates that when faced with a 
conflict between the right o f Kalaallit to hunt seals and a desire not to cause unnecessary pain and 
suffering to seals, the right o f Kalaallit to acquire sustenance from their environment takes 
precedence over animal suffering. This is so even though netting is considered cruel. However, 
since the 2003 Animal Welfare Act provides that animals should be killed as quickly and painlessly 
as possible, it can be argued that deliberate infliction o f cruelty is not acceptable under the 2003 
Act. This is supported by the fact that netting is used only seasonally in certain geographic location. 
Therefore, the situation in Greenland is similar to Canada because Inuit Treaties stipulate that 
animal welfare considerations can justify restriction o f indigenous rights in Canada. 
Consequently, it can be concluded that both Canadian and Greenlandic law contain provisions 
which prohibit deliberate infliction of cruelty on seals by limiting the use o f such methods which 
are considered inhumane.
5.5 Is seal hunting exercised for subsistence purposes in Greenland?
As noted in Chapter 1, one o f the arguments by the Inuit applicants in ITK  v Parliament 
and Council^^^^ was that the EU legislation demoted their economic activities to ‘traditional hunting 
methods’ and ‘subsistence’,*®^  ^ which in turn, unduly limited their possibilities to survive. 
According to the Government o f Greenland, seal hunting, as it is conducted by Kalaallit, is neither
method o f  catching seals. For more information about trap-nets see Finnish Game and Fisheries Research 
Institute, ‘Capturing grey seals alive with trapnets’
<www.rktl.fi/english/fish/exploitation_of_fish/capturing_grey_seals.html> accessed 23 April 2010.
See Algers and others (n 391) table 2.
*0^ “ ch 4 s 4.7.
Case T-18/10 ITK v Parliament and Council (EGC, 6 September 20 1 1).
*°®^chl ssI.2.2-1.2.2.1
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exclusively subsistence hunting in a traditional sense, which does not involve any profit-making 
nor is it exclusively a commercially motivated hunt.*°®  ^ Therefore, the right appears somewhat 
similar to that o f the Inuit o f Canada.*®®* Although Greenlandic law does not stipulate for what 
purposes Inuit can hunt seals, the Government’s White Paper explains that on the one hand, seals 
are hunted primarily for their meat, which provides the basic food supply for most Greenlandic 
communities.*®®®
On the other hand, the right to hunt seals includes a commercial dimension in the sense 
that hunters are able to sell sealskins which have been acquired as by-products to the government- 
owned tannery.*®^® Usually, seal meat is distributed among the inhabitants o f Inuit communities 
through direct sharing, bartering or sales at local markets, implying that Kalaallit have a right to 
sell both the edible and non-edible products derived fi*om seals. Therefore, the rights o f Kalaallit 
can be argued to be similar as those o f Nunavut Inuit who can sell all products derived from seals, 
including meat, blubber and sealskins under the Nunavut Treaty.*®^* In some cases, wildlife 
products are transported and sold to towns and settlements, which do not have direct access to these 
products themselves.*®^^ The sale to the final consumer takes place through a co-operative 
supermarket chain or partly government-owned distribution companies.*®^* Therefore, the sale of 
seal meat could be argued to be organised around commercial enterprises, rather than be part o f 
traditional subsistence activity.
Approximately half of the sealskins acquired by hunters are further processed for sale and 
the other half is used for other, non-specified purposes.*® '^* The Government acknowledges that 
these figures may be somewhat imprecise because hunters frequently report ‘struck and lost’ as
*067 Management and Utilization o f  Seals ( n i l ) .
1068 cb 4 s 4.3.
*®®® Management and Utilization o f  Seals ( n i l ) .
*®^® ibid. The tannery subsequently produces furs and leather from these skins. Some sealskins are further 
used to produce handicrafts, clothes and traditional artefacts.
*0’* ch 4 s 4 .3 .13 .
*®^  ^Management and Utilization o f  Seals ( n i l ) .
ibid 
*°’U bid  13.
178
ordinary catch when reporting their annual harvest.*®^ ® According to the definition by the EFSA, 
the term ‘struck and lost’ means that: ‘seals that are hit or shot by sealers but are not 
retrieved...[This] include[s] animals that are dead, or animals that may eventually die from fatal 
injuries. Animals may [also] subsequently recover from minor injuries’.*®^®
In conclusion, it appears that neither in Greenland nor Canada is the right to hunt seal 
exercised for mere subsistence purposes because both the Inuit o f Canada and Kalaallit of 
Greenland have a right to sell non-edible products, such as sealskins and blubber, originating from 
their harvesting activities. Additionally, Kalaallit and Inuit o f Nunavut have the right to sell seal 
meat.
5.6 Comparison in the right of Kalaallit and the right of Inuit o f Canada to hunt seals
As noted in section 5.1.1, the main differences between the rights o f these two peoples 
relate to the administrative requirements imposed on the exercise of the right to hunt seals. Whereas 
Canadian Inuit are not required to obtain licences for exercising their rights, Kalaallit are. Kalaallit 
also have a duty to report the catches to the government and they may also be required to pass an 
annual shooting test as a condition for obtaining hunting licences.*®^  ^Although both Canadian and 
Greenlandic law permits the use o f traditional hunting methods, which can be considered cruel, 
such as netting, legislation also prohibits causing unnecessary pain and suffering to seals. As 
discussed in Chapter 4, the Government of Canada is able to restrict the use of cruel hunting 
methods under the provisions o f the Canadian Criminal Code, 1985,*®^ * which prohibit the wilful 
infliction of unnecessary pain or suffering on all animals.*®^® Since the Code does not exempt 
indigenous peoples from its scope, it applies equally to all seal hunters, indigenous or non-
1075 M anagement and Utilization o f  Seals (n 11) 14.
1076 Algers and others (n 391) Glossary.
*®^s 5.3.1.
*®7* RSC 1985, c C-46. 
*®7^  ibid s 445.1.
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indigenous.*®*® Additionally, under the Marine Mammal Regulations 1993*®** Inuit hunters are 
required to use only those hunting methods, which enable them to kill hunts without unnecessary 
pain and suffering.*®*  ^Therefore, federal legislation prohibits the use o f all hunting methods, which 
are considered inhumane.*®**
In Greenland, the requirement to avoid unnecessary suffering under the Animal Welfare 
Act 2003 is complemented by the requirement to use appropriate ammunition and firearms.*®*'* The 
Government of Greenland specifically acknowledges that although the use of some hunting 
methods, which are considered cruel, is allowed, their use is limited to exceptional circumstances, 
and the local municipalities may adopt more rigorous rules concerning, inter alia, netting.*®*® The 
relevance o f this is that both Canadian and Greenlandic law contain an explicit requirement to avoid 
unnecessary suffering. Therefore, the EU should not interfere with the protection o f indigenous 
rights since the exercise of these rights is sufficiently regulated by national and regional authorities.
5.7 Conclusion
In order to answer the primary research question. Chapter 5 has demonstrated that both 
Greenland and Canada regulate animal welfare to the extent which is compatible with indigenous 
culture. It nevertheless appears that both Canadian and Greenlandic legislation has followed broad 
developments in international law relating to conservation and protection o f seals.*®*® Indeed, 
animal welfare laws applying both in Greenland and the Canadian Arctic stipulate that unnecessary
1080 cb 4 s 4.5.
*®** SOR/93-56, s 28.
*082 cb 4 s 4.3.
1083 cb 4 s 4.5. In any case, the infringement on Inuit treaty rights would have to be minimal and Inuit have 
to be consulted in the matter. Eg Labrador Treaty specifically stipulates that the federal government must 
consult the regional Inuit government before the adoption o f  any measures that have a direct impact on the 
right to hunt seals for FSC purposes. Labrador Treaty (2005), s 13.5.2.
*®*^ s 5.3.3.
*®*® s 5.3.
1086 Jbid
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infliction o f pain and suffering must be avoided.*®*  ^Therefore, there is no requirement for the EU 
to protect seals outside its jurisdiction by enacting legislation, which impinges on the rights of 
indigenous peoples.
Chapter 5 has revealed that the provisions o f the TFEU reveal that due to the association 
between Greenland and the EU the Treaty imposes an obligation on the EU to promote Greenland’s 
interests. Greenland enjoys, inter alia, preferential treatment in the field o f trade, which necessitates 
the EU Member States to treat goods originating in Greenland the same way as trade between any 
EU Member States. Significantly, the association and the subsequent obligations o f the EU sets 
Greenland apart from Inuit regions o f Canada since the latter does not enjoy similar preferential 
treatment under EU law.*®** These obligations explain also why the Inuit exemptions seem to favour 
products from Greenland over those from the Inuit regions o f Canada.*®*® In fact, it appears that the 
exemptions were designed and implemented with the situation o f Greenland and the EU Member 
States in mind.*®®®
It can also be argued that due to its existing traceability systems, the Government of 
Greenland was better prepared to respond to the EU’s traceability requirements*®®* than the regional 
Inuit governments o f Canada because there were no existing traceability systems in place in Canada 
in relation to seal products. Despite the close relationship between the EU and Greenland, the EU 
has taken a rather patronising attitude towards the interests and arguments o f the Government of 
Greenland. Indeed, the decision to adopt the current traceability requirements demonstrates a large 
degree o f distrust towards Greenland’s ability to ensure that the Inuit exemption would not be 
abused by commercial seal hunters. As noted in Chapter 2, the COWI report considered 
Greenland’s existing labelling system to be open for fraud.*®®^  Therefore, the Inuit exemption was
*®^’ ss 5.3-S.4; ch 4 ss 4.5.-4.5.4. 
*®»**s 5.2.1.
*®*^  s 5.3; ch 4 ss 4.5.1-4.5.4.
*®®® s 5.2; ch 7 ss 1 2 2 2 - 1 2 2 3 .  
*09* s 5.3.1.
*092 ch 2 s 2.6.1.
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not a ‘free pass’ for Greenland to access the EU market, but in order to gain access to the EU 
market, it had to change its laws concerning seal hunting as well as to apply for the Commission’s 
approval for a recognised body. Additionally, it can be argued that although the EU institutions 
took into account the individual characteristics o f Greenland in the implementation o f the Inuit 
exemption, the Danish authorities’ interpretation o f EU law played a significant role in enabling 
Kalaallit to access the market in the first place.*®®*
In order to address the main research question concerning the fair balance between the 
protection o f seals and the rights o f Inuit, Chapter 6  discusses the litigation between the Inuit and 
the EU institutions. Because litigation is still on-going. Chapter 6  discusses the findings o f the 
CJEU to date.
s 5.1; ch 7 s 1 2 .2 3 .
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Chapter 6  - How is the conflict between the protection o f seals and indigenous rights solved by 
the CJEU?
6.1 Introduction
In order to answer the primary research question o f this thesis. Chapter 6  investigates how 
the CJEU solves the conflict between the rights of indigenous peoples and protection of seals in the 
context o f the litigation between the EU institutions and Inuit. This litigation is central for this 
thesis because it can be argued to be indicative o f how EU’s commitments under the UNDRIP are 
realised in practice. Although the institutions have pledged to respect the rights under the 
UNDRIP,*®®'* the EU’s approach towards Arctic indigenous peoples is not entirely satisfactory due 
to the adverse impact on Inuit o f Canada. As noted in Chapter I, at the political level, the EU is 
committed to engage in regular dialogue with indigenous communities.*®®® Indeed, the three main 
institutions of the EU, the Commission, the Council and the Parliament, have acknowledged that 
the involvement o f Arctic indigenous peoples in policy making, particularly in issues which affect 
these peoples, must be promoted.*®®® Although this indicates strong support for indigenous peoples’ 
rights, the practical implementation o f the EU’s commitments may fall somewhat short o f its 
aspirations.*®®^
Since one of the appeal cases*®®* brought by Inuit is currently pending before the Court, 
Chapter 6  investigates the decisions issued thus far. The same applicants initiated two separate 
actions for annulment before the ECG: one against the Basic Regulation {ITK v Parliament and
*®94 ch 1 s 1.4.
*°95 ibid. Consequently, the E U ’s engagement with indigenous peoples takes place in accordance w ith the 
UNDRIP, ch 3 s 3.4.3.
*°95 ch 1 s 1.4.
*°97 It may well be that the EU has failed to identify the exact scope o f  the indigenous participatory rights in 
practice, considering that Inuit claim that they were not consulted in relation to the Basic Regulation, ch 3 s
3.4.3
*098 Case C-398/I3 P ITK and Others v Commission [2013] OJ C 274/11.
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Counciiy^^ and the other against the Implementing Regulation (ITK v Commission)P^ However, 
both actions before the EGC were unsuccessful. Additionally, when the decision in ITK v 
Parliament and CounciT^'^^ was pending the applicants filed two separate proceedings for interim 
measures,**®  ^which sought temporary suspension o f the operation o f the Basic Regulation on the 
grounds that it caused them ‘serious and irreparable harm’.**®* On both occasions, the EGC found 
that the applicants were unable to demonstrate that interim measures were necessary in order to 
avoid such harm being caused to them and their communities.
Thus, despite having initiated several separate proceedings against the EU seal products 
legislation, all of these have been declared inadmissible. Indeed, both the EGC and the ECJ decided 
that the applicants lacked standing under Article 263(4) TFEU to challenge the Basic 
Regulation.**®'* The Court delivered its decision in an appeal case in ITK  v Parliament and 
CowMcf/**®® on 3 October 2013, confirming the findings o f the EGC that the Basic Regulation was 
subject to the stringent admissibility rules under Article 263(4) TFEU. It is noteworthy that 
Advocate General Kokott advised the CJEU to dismiss the Inuit appeal in ITK  v Parliament and 
CowMcz/**®® on 17 January 2013.**®^  The Opinion stated that there was no gap in legal protection of 
the applicants even if  the Court dismissed their appeal because they could challenge the 
Implementing Regulation. However, in April 2013, the EGC dismissed their challenge against the 
Implementing Regulation in ITK  v CommissionP^^
*®99 Case T-18/10 ITK v Parliament and Council (EGC, 6 September 2011).
**0® Case T-526/10 ITK v Commission (EGC, 25 April 2013).
*101 y Parliament and Council (n 1099).
**®^ U nder art 109 o f  the Rules o f  Procedure o f  the General Court, the party who made an initial application 
for interim measures can still make a further application on the basis o f  new facts even though the initial 
application had been dismissed.
**®* Case T-18/10 R  ITK v Parliament and Council [2010] ECR 11-75 (Proceedings for interim measures 1); 
Case T-18/10 R I I  ITK v Parliament and Council [2010] ECR 11-235 (Proceedings for interim measures 2). 
**®‘* Case T-18/10 ITK v Parliament and Council (EGC, 6 September 2011).
**®* Case C-583/11 P ITK v Parliament and Council (ECJ, 3 October 2013).
**®® ibid
**®^ Case C -583 /11 P ITK v Parliament and Council (17 January 2013), Opinion o f  AG Kokott.
**®* ITK V Commission (EGC, 25 April 2013) (n 1100).
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Chapter 6  begins with a deliberation why the litigation involving Inuit before the CJEU is 
important for the purposes o f this thesis and whether the rights of Inuit were sufficiently protected 
by the EU legislation.**®® It subsequently investigates whether the decisions o f the CJEU mean that 
the Inuit applicants are being deprived of judicial protection in the EU.***® The key question for this 
thesis, namely whether the institutions struck a fair balance between indigenous peoples’ rights and 
the objectives o f the seal products legislation, is discussed in the context o f ITK  v CommissionP^^ 
Lastly, Chapter 6  investigates the application o f the proportionality test in post-Lisbon case law in 
order to determine whether the restriction on the rights o f Inuit is fair.***^
6.1.1 Why is the litigation involving Inuit significant for this thesis?
The cases initiated by Inuit are significant for the purposes o f this thesis because this is 
the first time the CJEU has adjudicated a case concerning indigenous peoples’ rights. Additionally, 
ITK  V Parliament and CowMcz/**** was one o f the first cases where the EGC had an opportunity to 
interpret and apply for the first time the provisions o f the Treaty in context o f an action for 
annulment by private parties after the entry into force of the Treaty o f Lisbon in 2009. The Courts’ 
decision to dismiss both cases involving Inuit applicants on the grounds that Inuit were already 
covered with the Inuit exemption is disappointing since the Courts fail to acknowledge that the 
applicants are unable to adhere to the strict conditions imposed by the EU legislation, and thus 
access the EU market. Because the Inuit exemption is indeed ‘impracticable’***'* in practice, the
**09 ss 6.1.1-6.1.2.
***®s6 .2 .
**** ITKv Commission (EGC, 25 April 2013) (n 1100). See s 6.3.
***^  s 6.4.
**** Case T-18/10 77% v Parliament and Council (EGC, 6 September 2011).
***'* Inuit argued that they could not comply with the E U ’s traceability regime in the context o f  the second 
proceedings for interim measures. The EGC merely noted that they did not provide any reasons why it was 
impossible to adapt the existing traceability systems to the E U ’s requirements. Case T-18/10 R  II ITK v 
Parliament and Council [2010] ECR 11-235 (Proceedings for interim measures 2), para 88. See also ch 2 s 
2.6; COWI Report 2010 (n 44) annex 5.
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CJEU’s conclusion that the EU legislation contains an exemption for Inuit***® by which they are 
covered, does not address the concerns o f Inuit in a meaningful way.
The EGC’s decision in ITK  v CommissioiP^^^ merits further investigation for the purposes 
o f this thesis at least from three points o f view. First, it discussed some of the fundamental issues 
raised by the applicants in this decision. Second, because the applicants have appealed the EGC’s 
decision it is still possible that the CJEU will reverse some of the EGC’s findings. Finally, the way 
in which the EGC analysed the arguments raised by Inuit is o f interest for this thesis because the 
EU legislation is also subject to scrutiny before the WTO in EC-Seal Products, w h i c h  focuses 
specifically on the issue whether it is acceptable for the EU to restrict trade in seal products in order 
to protect public morals o f its citizens.**** As noted in Chapter 1, the dispute settlement Panel 
accepted the EU’s public morals defence even though it also found that some other aspects o f the 
EU legislation were incompatible with international trade rules.***® This indicates that the Panel 
disagreed with the CJEU on many issues although there were also some similarities in their 
decisions because the CJEU considered the legislation as consistent with the Treaty and the Panel 
considered the legislation as ‘necessary’ to protect public morals.***® The fact that this legislation 
is subject to two separate disputes in international and transnational fora meant that the decisions 
o f the CJEU and WTO were likely to address some overlapping issues and facts. However, each 
court clearly has its own specific jurisprudence. Additionally, since the arguments raised in the two 
disputes were very different, they could not be applied interchangeably. * ** *
***®s 6.3.1.
***® ITKv Commission (EGC, 25 April 2013) (n 1100).
**** EC-Seal Products (n 69).
**** ch 7 ss 7.3; 7.3.1.2; 7.4.3.2 and 7.8.
***9 ch 7 s 7.4.
***9 ibid
**** See also Tamara Perisin, ‘Is the EU Seal Products Regulation a sealed deal? EU and WTO challenges’ 
(2013) 62(2) Inti and Comparative L Q 373.
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6.1.2 Were the rights o f Inuit sufficiently protected by the EU legislation?
The CJEU’s decision to dismiss both the initial challenge and the subsequent appeal 
against the Basic Regulation**** is disappointing, considering that this regulation specifically 
mentions Tnuit and other indigenous peoples hunting seals’ as it exempts them from the general 
sale and import ban.**** Despite this, Inuit had no standing and thus, no access to the CJEU. This 
was because according to the EGC the reference to Tnuit and other indigenous peoples’ in Article 
3(1) o f the Basic Regulation was insufficient to make the Inuit applicants either directly or 
individually concerned because the regulation did not affect their legal situation.***'* Additionally, 
the Court noted that Article 3(1) did not constitute ‘a complete set o f rules which [we]re sufficient 
in themselves’, but required implementing provisions and were thus not of direct concern to 
persons.***® Consequently, the situation of the Inuit applicants could be assessed only on the basis 
o f the Implementing Regulation.***®
The EGC further held that Inuit were not affected by the general prohibition to place seal 
products in the market because they did not place the products on the market themselves, but this 
was done by the companies which also placed the products o f commercial seal hunts on the 
market.**** It concluded that ‘in principle, the placing on the market o f the European Union o f seal 
products which result fi*om hunts traditionally conducted by Inuit and other indigenous
**** Case T-18/10 ITK v Parliament and Council (EGC, 6 Septem ber 2011); Case C-583/11 P ITK v 
Parliament and Council (ECJ, 3 O ctober 2013), para 105.
**** Regulation 1007/2009, art 3(1).
***'* Case T-18/10 ITK v Parliament and Council (EGC, 6 September 2011), paras 75-79; ITK v Parliament 
and Council, Opinion o f  AG K okott (n 1107) para 74.
***® Case T-18/10 ITK v Parliament and Council (EGC, 6 September 2011), para 78.
***® ibid
**** ibid paras 79-80. AG Kokott acknowledged in her Opinion that the EGC had failed to acknowledge that 
there was one applicant amongst the Inuit applicants who herself both processed and placed seal products on 
the EU market. She would have thus fulfilled the requirements o f  less stringent standing rules under Article 
263(4) TFEU (see s 6.2.1 for the less stringent standing requirements). However, AG Kokott did not consider 
that the errors made by the EGC were significant enough to set aside the judgm ent by the EGC. ITK v 
Parliament and Council, Opinion o f  AG Kokott (n 1107) paras 76-84.
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communities and contribute to their subsistence continues to be permitted’.**** Thus, according to 
the Court’s interpretation, indigenous peoples’ rights were sufficiently protected by the EU since 
the Basic Regulation contained an exemption for the benefit o f Inuit, which ‘in principle’ enabled 
Inuit to continue trading their products in the EU.
However, as noted throughout this thesis, EC-Seal Products^^^^ demonstrates that Canadian 
Inuit were unable to benefit from the Inuit exemption.***® Therefore, a merely theoretical market 
access is highly unsatisfactory since in practice the market access depends on the fulfilment of 
numerous conditions under the Implementing Regulation. In practice, these conditions have 
prevented Inuit o f Canada from accessing the market altogether.**** Furthermore, the Commission 
was aware that this would be result o f the EU’s traceability regime even before it adopted the 
Implementing Regulation.**** Therefore, the traceability regime could be argued to have been 
designed in a discriminatory manner.
6.2 Are Inuit being deprived from judicial protection before the CJEU?
The lack of adequate access to justice for private applicants**** directly before the CJEU 
has been an issue surrounding the EU Courts for some decades. Commentators have criticised the 
CJEU for denying private applicants legal protection due to the strict application o f the legal 
test***'* governing legal challenges against the acts of institutions.***® Despite criticism, the CJEU
**** Case T-18/10 ITK v Parliament and Council (EGC, 6 September 2011), para 79.
***9 EC-Seal Products (n 69).
***® See eg ch 7 s 7.2.2.S
**** This difference in treatm ent between Kalaallit and Inuit o f  Canada was considered to violate the 
provisions o f  the W TO Agreements, ch 7 ss 7.3.1.2 and 7.4.3.2.
**** ch 2 s 2.6.
**** ie companies, N GO s and individuals.
***'* The test was initially established in the ECJ’s 1963 decision in Case 25/62 Plaumann and Co v 
Commission [1963] ECR 95.
***® See eg UPA, Opinion o f  AG Jacobs (n 619); M ariolina Eliantonio and N elly Stratieva, ‘From Plaumann, 
through UPA and Jégo-Quéré, to the Lisbon Treaty: The locus standi o f  private applicants under Article 
230(4) EC through a political lens’ M aastricht W orking Papers Faculty o f  Law 2009T 3 (December 2009); 
M ariolina Eliantonio and Betül Kas, ‘Private parties and the annulment procedure: Can the gap in the 
European system o f  judicial protection be closed?’(2010) 3(2) Journal o f  Politics and Law 121; Steve Peers 
and M ario Costa, ‘Judicial review o f  EU acts after the Treaty o f  Lisbon’ (2012) 8(1) EuConst 82.
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has maintained the same approach for over five decades. It was anticipated that the standing rules 
would be relaxed by the Treaty o f Lisbon. However, although the Treaty revision changed the 
rules slightly, this has not benefited the Inuit applicants.
The issue concerning access to justice first arose in the context o f Inuit applicants when 
Advocate General Kokott issued her opinion in ITK  v Parliament and C o u n c i l Although the 
opinions o f Advocate-Generals are only persuasive on the ECJ, the Court decided to follow this 
Opinion. Advocate General Kokott stated, inter alia, that there was no gap in the applicants’ legal 
protection even if  the Court dismissed their appeal because they could challenge the Implementing 
Regulation:
I would point out in passing that also in the present case Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami 
and its co-appellants are not deprived o f legal protection by the General Court’s 
interpretation of the expression ‘regulatory act’ in...Article 263 TFEU. Rather, 
they have the possibility o f making an indirect challenge to contest the alleged 
unlawfulness of Regulation No 1007/2009 in any legal actions brought against 
implementing measures for that regulation. Most o f them have done precisely 
that.****
However, as noted in Chapter 1, the EGC found the action against the implementing 
measures in TTK v Cowmm/on**** as inadmissible because the applicants failed to establish that 
their rights had been infi-inged by the Commission. The applicants appealed this decision on 7 July 
2013 and this case is currently pending before the courts.***® At the earliest the decision in this 
case can be anticipated in late 2014 or early 2015.
*136 jYjr y Parliament and Council, Opinion o f  AG Kokott (n 1124). 
**** ibid para 61.
**** ITKv Commission (EGC, 25 April 2013) (n 1100).
**39 ibid
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6,2.1 What is required from applicants to establish ‘direct concern’?
There are some cases in which action by private applicants has been successful, including 
the EGC’s 2011 decision in M icroban v  CommissionP'^^ The findings in this case are significant 
because they confirm that private applicants are capable o f gaining an improved access to justice 
directly before the CJEU under Article 263(4) TFEU. In practice this means that the applicants 
must fulfil only one o f the conditions under Article 263(4), namely to be ‘directly concerned’ by 
the EU act, which they seek to challenge. However, the act in question must be a ‘regulatory act’ 
and not entail any implementing measures. Thus, it can be argued that the Basic Regulation would 
have failed this test merely because it contains implementing measures, even if  it had been 
considered to be a regulatory act. Article 263(4) stipulates that:
Any natural or legal person may, under the conditions laid down in the first and 
second paragraphs, institute proceedings against an act addressed to that person or 
which is o f direct and individual concern  to them, and against a regulatory act 
which is o f direct concern  to them and does not entail implementing measures.**'**
The distinction between a ‘regulatory act’ and a ‘legislative act’ is critical here. The 
difference is that where the contested legislation is a regulatory act, applicants need to demonstrate 
that the act in question is o f ‘direct concern’ to them. In contrast, in all other situations, the Court’s 
customary standing rules continue to apply, ie, the applicants must demonstrate both ‘direct’ and 
‘individual’ concern. The significance o f this is explored by investigating the EGC’s decisions in 
MicrobaP^^^ and IT K  v Parliam ent and C o u n c i l Although these cases were decided around the 
same time, their outcomes are very different.
1140 x _262/10 Microban International V Commission (EGC, 25 October 2011) {Microban).
1141 TFEU, art 263(4) (emphasis added).
**'** Microban (n 1140).
**‘*3 Case T-18/10 ITK v Parliament and Council (EGC, 6 September 2011).
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In MicrobanP^^ the Commission did not have the power to adopt Decision 2010/169,**'*® 
which prohibited marketing o f an additive known as triclosan.**'*® According to the Court, the 
contested Decision was a ‘non-legislative act o f general application’ because it applied to all natural 
and legal persons who were engaged in the production and marketing o f triclosan and products 
containing it.**'** This made the Decision a regulatory act, rather than a legislative act.**'** 
Consequently, in order to challenge the Commission Decision Microban needed to show only 
‘direct concern’. The test of direct concern was fulfilled for two reasons. First, the Decision directly 
affected Microban’s legal position because they used triclosan to manufacture a product which was 
subsequently sold on for use in the making o f products which were intended to come into contact 
with foodstuffs.**'*® Second, the Commission Decision left no option to Member States, but to ban 
the marketing of triclosan.**®®
Although the Court found similarly in ITK  v Parliament and Cownc//**®* that the applicant 
companies, which were active in the processing and marketing o f seal products from Inuit and non- 
Inuit hunters and trappers, were directly concerned by the EU legislation,**®* the Basic Regulation 
was not a regulatoiy act.**®* Since this Regulation contained implementing measures, it was a 
legislative act, and consequently, the Court had to examine whether the companies were also 
‘individually concerned’ in addition to being ‘directly concerned’. According to the Court, the trade
**'*'* Microban (n 1140).
**'*® Commission Decision 2010/169/EU o f  19 M arch 2010 concerning the non-inclusion o f2 ,4 ,4 ’-trichloro- 
2 ’-hydroxydiphenyl ether in the Union list o f  additives which may be used in the manufacture o f  plastic 
materials and articles intended to come into contact with foodstuffs under Directive 2002/72/EC [2010] OJ 
L75/25.
**'*® Microban (n 1140) paras 40-69.
**'** ibid para 24.
**'** ibid paras 20-25. This was because the decision was ‘o f  general application in that it applies to objectively 
determined situations and it produces legal effects w ith respect to categories o f  persons envisaged in general 
and in the abstract.’ ibid para 23.
**'*9 Microban (n 1140) para 28.
**®° ibid para 29.
**®* Case T-18/10 ITK v Parliament and Council (EGC, 6 September 2011).
1152 y Commission (EGC, 25 April 2013) (n 1100) para 87.
**®* Had this been the case, it would have been sufficient in giving the applicant companies standing under 
Article 263(4) TFEU.
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and import ban in Article 3(1) of the Basic Regulation was expressed in a general manner and thus, 
capable o f applying equally to any trader who was covered by the regulation, apart from products 
falling within the scope o f Inuit exemption.**®'* Although the applicant companies placing seal 
products in the market were covered by both the general prohibition and the Inuit exemption, this 
was not sufficient to distinguish them from all other traders because they did not explain what 
peculiar attributes they had or why their factual situation was different from all the others.**®® 
Strikingly, in his 2002 Opinion in UPA v CounciiP^^ Advocate General Jacobs stated that there 
was no compelling reason to require private applicants to be differentiated fi-om all others in the 
same way as an addressee o f that decision.**®* This Opinion was nevertheless rejected by the Court.
6.2.2. What does the lack of access to justice in ITK v Parliament and Council mean?
The appeal in ITK  v Parliament and Cow«c/7**®* raised concerns o f access to justice under 
Article 263(4). Since the arguments put forward by Inuit concerning the lack o f access to justice 
are an important part o f the assessment whether the rights o f Inuit are balanced fairly with the 
protection of seals, these arguments are investigated in detail in this thesis. Although overall, the 
Court’s conclusions in this case did not raise anything new compared to the EGC’s earlier decision 
in the same case,**®® the implications o f the appeal case are potentially enormous. This is because 
if  their appeal case in ITK  v CommissioP^^^ is dismissed by the Court, this means that the Inuit 
have no way o f ensuring that the EU legislation affecting their rights does not infiinge these rights 
in practice. Therefore, it can be argued that the EU should have taken adequate measures for the
**®'* ITKv Commission (EGC, 25 April 2013) (n 1100) para 89.
**®® ibid paras 90 and 93.
1156 Opinion o f  AG Jacobs (n 619).
**®* ibid para 59.
**®^ Case C-583/11 P ITK v Parliament and Council (ECJ, 3 October 2013), para 105.
**®9 In short, the ECJ upheld the EG C ’s findings concerning the ‘regulatory act’ and the legislative act. 
According to it, a  contrary interpretation would have amounted to nullifying the distinction made between 
the term ‘acts’ and ‘regulatory acts’ in Article 263(4) TFEU. See Case C -583/11 P ITK v Parliament and 
Council (ECJ, 3 October 2013), para 58.
**60 Case C-398/13 P ITKv Commission [2013] OJ C 274/11.
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protection of Inuit in accordance with the provisions o f the UNDRIP before the adoption of the 
Basic Regulation or not adopt any legislation concerning them. The implication o f ITK  v 
Parliament and CounciP^^ is that how the adequate protection is implemented depends on the 
Member States since the Court does not have the jurisdiction to amend the standing rules under 
Article 263(4).
In their first ground of appeal in ITK  v Parliament and C o u n c i l the appellants argued 
that the EGC erred in law by interpreting the term ‘regulatory act’ in Article 263(4) TFEU by not 
encompassing the term ‘legislative act’ within the meaning o f Article 289(3) TFEU, which defined 
legislative acts as those ‘adopted by legislative procedure’.**®* According to the appellants, the 
EGC’s interpretation nevertheless negated any raison d'être o f the possibility to challenge the EU 
legislation based on Article 263(4) because its interpretation of the terms ‘direct concern’ and 
‘individual concern’ was too restrictive. Secondly, according to the applicants, the EGC was under 
a legal duty to explain why it rejected a broad interpretation o f Article 263(4) in conformity with 
Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights**®'* and Articles 6  and 13 ECHR**®® (the right to a 
fair trial and the right to an effective remedy). Thirdly, the applicants claimed that the EGC wrongly 
presented and distorted the evidence provided by them.**®®
In its analysis the CJEU addressed the difference between legislative acts and regulatory 
acts in detail. This discussion is not significant to the research question, apart from the fact that the 
Court rejected the applicants’ arguments by stating that the Basic Regulation could not be
**6* Case C-583/11 P ITK v Parliament and Council (ECJ, 3 October 2013), para 105.
**62 ibid
**63 ibid para 45.
**6^* Charter o f  Fundamental Rights, art 47:
Everyone whose rights and freedoms guaranteed by the law o f  the Union are violated has 
the right to an effective remedy before a tribunal in compliance with the conditions laid 
down in this Article. Everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable 
time by an independent and impartial tribunal previously established by law.
**65ETS5;213UN TS 221.
**66 Since the verbatim arguments o f  the applicants are not available for public, it is not possible to verify the 
exact content o f the applicants’ claim.
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considered a ‘regulatory act’ since this would have made the distinction between the terms
‘legislative act’**®* and ‘regulatory act’ redundant in the context o f an action for annulment under
Article 263(3) TFEU.**®* However, as noted by Advocate General Kokott, this interpretation is
opposed by many commentators.**®® The Court also considered unfounded the appellants’ argument
that the EGC breached the obligation to state reasons concerning its interpretation of Article 263(4)
in the light o f the Charter and the ECHR.***° According to the CJEU, the EGC ‘was not required to
provide an account which follows exhaustively all the arguments’ raised, but that the reasoning
could be implicit, provided that it ‘enables the parties to know why the measures in question were
taken and provides the competent court with sufficient material for it to exercise its power o f
review’.**** Therefore, it was sufficient for the EGC to state that it would exceed its jurisdiction if
it interpreted Article 263(4) ‘in a way which has the effect o f setting aside the
conditions...expressly laid down by the Treaty’, even in the light o f the principle o f effective
judicial protection.**** This interpretation is, indeed, supported by existing case law. In Grant v
South-West Trains the CJEU held that the EU’s power to act in the field o f human rights could
not result in the extension o f the competence of the EU:
Although respect for fundamental rights which form an integral part o f those general 
principles o f law is a condition of the legality o f Community acts, those rights cannot in 
themselves have the effect o f extending the scope o f the Treaty provisions beyond the 
competences o f the Community.***'*
**62 Case C-583/11 P ITK v Parliament and Council (ECJ, 3 October 2013), para 45. According to the Court, 
this regulation was adopted following the ordinary or special legislative procedure in art 289(3) TFEU. Thus 
it was a legislative act.
**68 ibid paras 51-59. According to the Court, the Treaty o f  Lisbon used the term ‘regulatory act’ w ith the 
intention o f  excluding legislative acts to identify the category o f  acts which may be the subject o f  an action 
for annulment under less stringent conditions than previously, while maintaining ‘a restrictive approach in 
relation to actions by individuals against legislative acts.
*169 y Parliament and Council, Opinion o f  AG Kokott (n 1124) 28: ‘The interpretation o f  the new  third 
variant o f  the fourth paragraph o f  Article 263 TFEU is also a very controversial subject in legal literature. It 
seems that the numbers o f  supporters and opponents o f  categorising legislative acts as regulatory acts are 
broadly equal.’
***° Case C -583/11 P ITK v Parliament and Council (ECJ, 3 O ctober 2013), para 85.
**** ibid para 82.
**** ibid
***3 Case C-249/96 Grant v South-West Trains Ltd [1998] ECR 1-621.
***'* ibid para 5.
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The CJEU also rejected the appellants’ argument that the EGC’s interpretation o f the term 
o f ‘regulatory act’ created a gap injudicial protection, and was in itself incompatible with Article 
47 of the Charter because this rendered any legislative act ‘virtually immune to judicial review’. 
According to the Court, the protection conferred by Article 47 did ‘not require that an individual 
should have an unconditional entitlement to bring an action for annulment’ directly before the 
CJEU.***® Referring to the highly criticised decisions in UPA v CowMcz/***® and Commission v Jégo- 
Quéré the CJEU noted that although the conditions o f admissibility under Article 263(4) TFEU
had to be interpreted in the light o f the fundamental right to effective judicial protection, such an 
interpretation could not have the effect o f setting aside the conditions expressly laid down in the 
Treaty.**** Further, the protection conferred by Article 47 of the Charter was not intended to change 
the system o f judicial review established by the Treaties, specifically under Article 263(4) 
TFEU.***®
Significantly, the CJEU further noted that as established in case law, and reaffirmed Article 
19(f)(2) TEU, it was the Member States’ responsibility ‘to establish a system of legal remedies and 
procedures which ensure respect for the fundamental right to effective judicial protection’***® 
because ‘the national courts and tribunals, in collaboration with the Court of Justice, fulfil a duty 
entrusted to them both o f ensuring that in the interpretation and application o f the Treaties the law 
is observed’.**** However, neither Article 47 o f the Charter nor Article 19(1)(2) TEU required that 
an individual should be entitled to bring actions against EU acts, as their primary subject matter.
***® Case C-583/11 P ITK v Parliament and Council (ECJ, 3 October 2013), para 105.
1*76 jjpj  ^y Council (n 619) para 44.
**** C-263/02 P Commission V Jégo-Quéré [2004] ECR 1-3425, para 36.
*178 jpj^ y Parliament and Council (ECJ, 3 October 2013) (n 1174) para 98.
1179 This was apparent from the Explanation on Charter Article 47, which must, in accordance with A rticles 
6(1)(3) TEU and Charter Article 52(7), be taken into consideration for the interpretation o f  the Charter. ITK 
V Parliament and Council (ECJ, 3 October 2013) (n 1174) para 97 referring to Sky Osterreich (n 897), para 
42.
*180 jpf^ y Parliament and Council (ECJ, 3 October 2013) (n 1174) paras 99-101 referring to UPA (n 619) 
para 41 ; Commission v Jégo-Quéré (n 1069) para 31.
1181 y Parliament and Council (ECJ, 3 October 2013) (n 1174) paras 99-101 referring to Opinion 1/09, 
para 69.
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before the national courts or tribunals.**** Therefore, in essence, the Court concluded that it was 
practically impossible for Inuit to contest the Basic Regulation under Article 263(4) TFEU. 
However, this did not result in a gap in judicial protection for the applicants simply because the 
Treaty did not enable them to challenge a legislative act. Thus, the outcome was fully compatible 
with the Treaty.
The Court’s arguments can be seen as an allocation o f the responsibility over indigenous 
peoples’ market access on the Member States. The Court indicated that since it could only carry 
out its functions within the limits o f the Treaty, it was the Member States who bore the ultimate 
responsibility over the legal remedies and procedures which ensure that the EU as a whole respects 
for the right to effective judicial protection. Therefore, the CJEU’s decision can be argued to 
demonstrate that despite the pledges o f the institutions to respect indigenous peoples’ rights, EU 
law lacks an effective mechanism for ensuring that the EU’s decision making does not violate their 
rights in practice.**** It could be argued that the EU needs to put adequate measures in place for the 
efficient protection o f Inuit and other indigenous peoples. However, in practice, this is ultimately 
the responsibility o f the Member States, not the Court.
It can be argued that the existence of adequate measures to protect all indigenous peoples’ 
rights, not just those the EU sees fit to protect, is particularly relevant since the Inuit applicants 
have no right to appeal their case to the ECtHR despite the fact that the EU is in the process of 
acceding to the ECHR.***'* Because of the EU’s on-going accession process to the ECHR, it 
appeared that Inuit applicants may be aiming to take their case to the ECtHR after having exhausted 
the necessary judicial avenues. Although under the current legal arrangements, the EU cannot be 
challenged before the ECtHR, in theory, after its accession, individuals are able to appeal to the
1182 jYjr y Parliament and Council (ECJ, 3 October 2013) (n 1174) para 106.
**»ch 3 s 3.4.2.
***'* The EU is obliged to accede to the ECHR under art 6(2) TFEU. Under ECHR, the legal basis for the 
E U ’s accession is provided for by art 59(2) ECHR, as amended by Protocol N o 14 to the ECHR, which 
stipulates that: ‘[t]he European Union may accede to this Convention’.
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ECtHR in cases where their action against the EU institutions has been found inadmissible before 
the CJEU.*^^  ^Therefore, provided that the individuals have exhausted all the remedies before the 
CJEU, they can appeal to the ECtHR.” ^^  However, the accession process is likely to take several 
years since the CJEU will be asked to deliver its opinion on the draft accession agreement” *’ after 
which the agreement must be ratified by the 28 EU Member States and the 47 member states o f the 
Council o f Europe.” ** Therefore, the ECtHR is unlikely to be a feasible option for the Inuit. 
According to Article 35(1) ECHR, the ECtHR will only deal with the matter within a period o f six 
months from the date on which the final decision was taken ie six months after the decision is 
delivered by the CJEU.
Thus, the EU Courts’ decisions mean that there is a danger that Inuit are prevented from 
access to justice even though the protection under international law necessitates States to provide 
adequate measures to ensure that decision-making concerning indigenous peoples rights is fair and 
not arbitrary.” *^  Therefore, the EU as a whole needs to put adequate measures in place for the 
efficient protection of Inuit and other indigenous peoples in line with the international law 
principles governing their rights.
This does not apply to the decisions o f  the EGG because o f  the possibility to appeal to the ECJ. Generally 
on the topic o f  the E U ’s accession to ECHR see eg Tobias Lock, ‘EU accession to the ECHR: implications 
for the judicial review in Strasbourg’ (2010) EL Rev 777; N oreen O ’Meara, “ ‘A more secure Europe o f  
R ights?” The European Court o f  Human Rights, the Court o f  Justice o f  the European Union and EU accession 
to the ECH R ’ (2011) 12(10) German L J 813; Paul Craig, ‘EU accession to the ECHR: Competence, 
procedure and substance’ (2013) 36 Fordham Inti L J 1114; Kanstantsin Dzehtsiarou and others (eds). Human 
Rights Law in Europe: The Influence, Overlaps and Contradictions o f the EU and the ECHR (Routledge 
2014).
The decisions o f  the ECtHR in cases to which the EU is party will be binding on the E U ’s institutions, 
including the ECJ. In this respect, see Opinion 1/91 [1991] ECR 1-6079 and Opinion 1/92 [1992] ECR I- 
2821.
Draft Explanatory report to the Agreement on the Accession o f  the European Union to the Convention 
for the Protection o f  Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, para 5 
<www.coe.int/t/dghl/standardsetting/hrpolicy/CDDH-UE/CDDH-UE_documents/CDDH- 
U E 2 0 1  l_16_final_en.pdf> accessed 24 January 2012.
1188 Government o f  Netherlands, ‘Draft agreement on EU accession to ECHR important step’ (8 April 2013) 
<www.govemment.nl/news/2013/04/06/draft-agreement-on-eu-accession-to-echr-important-step.html> 
accessed 15 M ay 2013.
ch 3 s 3.4.2.
” 50 See eg ch 3 s 3.4.3.
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6.3 The arguments raised in ITK v Commission
This section is relevant to the main research question o f this thesis because the EGC’s 
decision in ITK  v Commission^^^^ is the only decision by the CJEU, which explicitly discusses the 
issue whether the interests o f Inuit are fairly balanced with the protection o f s e a l s . I n  order to 
allege breach of their rights, Inuit claimed that the institutions infringed several fundamental rights 
under the ECHR.” *^ Specifically, the applicants claimed a violation o f their right ‘to engage in the 
commercial exploitation o f seal products’ under Article 1 o f Protocol No 1 to the ECHR (right to 
property).” '^^  It can be argued that they relied on this provision since the ECHR contains no explicit 
provision for ‘freedom to pursue a trade or business’. Therefore, violations concerning their 
economic activities could be seen to fall within the scope o f the right to property in the ECHR.
The applicants further claimed a violation of their living conditions (the right to respect for 
private life under Article 8  ECHR) read in light o f Inuit ‘moral convictions and beliefs about the 
relationship between mankind and the natural world, more particularly wild animals’ under the 
protection o f the freedom of thought, conscience, and religion (Article 9 ECHR), the freedom of 
expression (Article 10 ECHR), and their fundamental right to be heard. Additionally, they 
claimed that these rights should be interpreted in the light o f international law instruments on 
indigenous rights, particularly the U N D R I P . A c c o r d i n g  to them, the institutions ‘did not strike 
a fair balance between the interests of the Inuit and those pursued by the regulation, which seriously
ITK V Commission (EGG, 25 April 2013) (n 1100).
"92 In contrast, ITK v Parliament and Council concentrated exclusively on the admissibility o f  their action 
under Article 263(4) TFEU. See Gase G-583/11 P ITK v Parliament and Council (EGJ, 3 October 2013).
"9^ In their initial application, the applicants raised several issues relating, inter alia, to fundamental human 
rights, the status o f  indigenous peoples in EU law and the legislative competence o f  the EU institutions.
"9^ 1 For the arguments, see eg Gase T-18/10 R  ITK v Parliament and Council [2010] E G R 11-75 (Proceedings 
for interim measures 1), paras 57-59.
"9^ The right to be heard has been imposed as a general rule o f  EU law in cases where there is an adverse 
impact on the applicant’s interests. See eg Foshan (n 643) para 109: ‘the right o f  interested parties, in 
particular exporters, to be heard ... constitutes one o f  the fundamental rights recognised by the Gommunity 
legal order’. The right is also codified in Article 19 UNDRIP. See ch 3 s 3.4.2.
"9^ch3 S3.2.3
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impacts the living conditions o f the applicants and, more broadly, the living conditions o f the Inuit
people’.” 97
They also contested the legal basis o f the Basic Regulation. The Court rejected this claim, 
stating that the institutions could not be prevented from using the internal market provision (Article 
114 TFEU) even if  the legislation was ultimately motivated by other aims, such as animal 
welfare.” *^ In fact, existing case law demonstrates that the Court has applied similar approach in 
cases where an EU act was based on Article 114 TFEU, even though the institutions essentially 
pursued aims, such as the protection o f public health” ^^  and c o n s u m e r s . T h e  applicants also 
argued that the legislation exceeded what was necessary to achieve its objectives and that product 
labelling would have been a less restrictive and more effective alternative for achieving these 
objectives. The Court rejected all these arguments. It held that the ‘proportionate nature o f that 
regulation cannot be examined in relation to objectives other than those pursued by that 
regulation’ without elaborating the issue any further.
It is noteworthy that the initial arguments raised in this case” ®* were very similar, if  not 
identical, to those raised in ITK  v Parliament and Council, t h e  difference being that the former 
contested the Implementing Regulation, whereas the latter contested the Basic Regulation. 
However, it appears that in ITK  v Commission,^^^^ the EGC analysed the arguments primarily in 
relation to the Basic Regulation, even though the applicants sought the annulment o f the 
Implementing Regulation pursuant to Article 263(1) TFEU.” ®® Why the EGC’s judgment
1197 y Commission (EGC, 25 April 2013) (n 1100) para 116.
"98 ibid para 41.
"99 Case C-376/98 Germany v Parliament and Council [2000] ECR 1-8419, para 88; Case C-491/01 British 
American Tobacco (Investments) and Imperial Tobacco [2002] ECR 1-11453, para 62; and Joined Cases 
C - 154/04; C-155/04 Alliance for Natural Health and Others [2005] ECR 1-6451, para 30.
Case C-58/08 Vodafone and Others [2010] ECR 1-4999, para 36.
” 91 ITK V Commission (EGC, 25 April 2013) (n 1100) paras 93-94.
1202 ibid
1203 ibid
120"* Case T-18/10 ITK v Parliament and Council (EGC, 6 September 2011).
1205 ibid
1200 ibid para 116.
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concentrates on the Basic Regulation is unclear. On the one hand, it could be argued that this reveals 
a problem with the judgments of the CJEU because according to the ECJ, the EGC was ‘not 
required to provide an account which follows exhaustively all the arguments’ raised, but that the 
Court’s reasoning can be implicit.” ®’
On the other hand, this could be because the applicants nevertheless claimed that the impact 
o f these two regulations was a ban on the marketing of seal products in the EU.” ®* Accordingly, as 
a result o f these two regulations, the majority o f exports in seal products to the EU were destined 
to disappear, and consequently, the export o f their products to the EU was likely to be severely 
affected.” ®® However, not all their arguments concern the combined effect of these two regulations, 
but they also made separate claims concerning the Implementing Regulation. For instance, that it 
was ‘likely to result in the loss o f a substantial market and of related infrastructure’.” ®^
6.3.1 Was there a breach of the applicants’ fundamental rights?
Rather than investigating the alleged breach under the ECHR, the EGC noted that the 
protection conferred by the ECHR was implemented in EU law by the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights.” ”  This is consistent with the majority o f post-Lisbon case law, which refers exclusively to 
the Charter.” ”  It appears that is not necessary for private applicants to rely on the rights provided 
by the ECHR before the CJEU since the ECtHR’s 2006 decision in Bosphorusv Irelancf^^^ indicated 
that the EU’s legal system protected fundamental rights in a manner, which was equivalent to the 
ECHR.” ”  Although the Charter was non-binding at the time o f the decision in Bosphorus, i t
”®’ s6.2.
1208 Commission (EGC, 25 April 2013) (n 1100) para 98.
” 99 ibid 
ibid
ibid para 105.
” ” s6 .3 .
” ”  Bosphorus Hava Yollari Turizm ve Ticaret Anonim Sirketi v Ireland (45036/98) (2006) 42 EHHR 1.
” ”  ibid para 165.
Bosphorus (n 1213).
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became legally binding primary EU law after the entry into force o f the Lisbon Treaty in 2009 and 
it subsequently stands on an equal footing with the Treaties.” ”  Indeed, the provisions o f the Charter 
have frequently been relied upon by individuals as providing grounds for judicial review. 
Consequently, any EU legislation found to be in breach o f the Charter must be held void.” ”  
Strikingly, it was initially though that the Charter would not be relevant in disputes between 
individuals.” ”  Possibly for this reason the Inuit did not allege violation o f their rights under the 
Charter. However, the post-Lisbon case law proves that the provisions o f the Charter are indeed 
applied in disputes between private parties.” ”
It nevertheless appears that other more compelling reasons exist as to why the Inuit 
applicants chose to refer to rights under the ECHR. Based on the decisions o f the ECtHR, Article 
8  ECHR (right to private life) entails strong protection o f indigenous cultures.” ’® In this regard the 
interpretation that Article 8  ECHR protects indigenous culture reflects the protection afforded to 
indigenous peoples under Article 2 7 ICCPR as articulated by the UN Human Rights Committee.” ’  ^
This is evidenced, for instance, by G and E  v Norway, which indicated that the consequences of 
building a hydroelectric plant could constitute interference with Article 8  rights for the Sami 
reindeer herders ‘who move their herds and deer around a considerable distance’.” ’* Therefore, the 
Sami was, in principle, entitled to claim the right to respect for the indigenous life style as being 
‘private life’, ‘family life’ or ‘home’ under Article 8 .” ’"^ Additionally, in its 2006 decision in
1216 j £ u ,  art 6(1) states that the EU recognises the rights, freedoms and principles set out in the Charter. It 
also states that the Charter and the Treaties have the same legal value.
See eg Koen Lenaerts, ‘Exploring the Limits o f  the EU Charter o f  Fundamental R ights’ (2012) 8(2)
European Constitutional Law Review  375 d o i:l0.1017/S 1574019612000260.
See eg ibid 337; Juliane Kokott and Christoph Sobotta, ‘The Charter o f  Fundamental Rights o f  the 
European Union after L isbon’, EUl W orking Papers, A cademy o f  European Law (2010) No 2010/06, 
Distinguished Lectures o f  the Academy, 14 <http://cadmus.eui.eu/handle/1814/15208> accessed 10 February 
2013.
” ”  See eg Case C-386/10 P Chalkor v Commission (ECJ, 8 Decem ber 2011), para 51; Case C 71/11 and C
99/11 Germany v Y and Z  (ECJ, 5 September 2012). See also discussion in s 6.5.1.
” ’9 See eg Koivurova (n 100).
” 2* ibid. See also ch 3 s 3.4.1.1.
” 22 App nos 9278/81 and 9415/81 (3 October 1983).
'223 ibid 2.
” 2"* G and E v Norway (n 1222) 2.
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Hingitaq 53 and Others v Denmark,^^^^ the ECtHR addressed the issue relating to the protection of 
natural heritage and resources as a right asserted by Inuit o f Greenland as part o f their right to 
peaceful enjoyment o f their possessions under Article 1 of the Optional Protocol No 1.” ’® Thus, 
whilst it can be argued that the ECtHR has become more sensitive to indigenous peoples’ rights 
and their concerns,” ”  the same cannot be said for the CJEU.
Indeed, despite the recognition o f indigenous peoples’ rights under the ECHR, the EGC 
rejected all the arguments concerning the alleged breach o f fundamental rights in ITK v 
C o m m is s io n According to it, the applicants failed to provide any evidence to support the alleged 
infringement o f private life (Article 8  ECHR; Charter Article 7).” ’® It stated that describing ‘the 
way of life o f Inuit communities, the seal hunting they practise and the difficulties o f the life and 
survival of the people’ and the claims that Inuit had no other option than to rely on commercial 
undertakings and infrastructure as well as the difficulties connected with the traceability system 
were unsubstantiated and ‘very general in nature’.” *® Therefore, according to the EGC, the 
evidence failed to demonstrate that the Inuit communities had suffered any harm, which was 
disproportionate compared with the objective pursued by the EU legislation.” *' The way in which 
the Court reached this conclusion nevertheless implies that it conducted some form proportionality 
analysis o f the EU legislation, even if  it did not explicitly refer to the proportionality test.
The EGC further held that nor were the applicants’ arguments concerning the right to 
property (Charter Article 17) substantiated because they should have demonstrated that there was 
an impairment of this right in relation to the different categories into which they fell (ie private
'225 Hingitaq 53 and Others v Denmark App no 18584/04 ECHR 2006-1.
'225 Council o f  Europe and European Court o f  Human Rights, ‘Cultural rights in the case-law o f  the European 
Court o f  Human R ights’ (Januaiy 2011) 40
<www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Research_report_cultural_rights_ENG.pdf> accessed 13 January 2014. See 
also Koivurova (n 100).
'227 ibid
1228 y Commission (EGC, 25 April 2013) (n 1100) para 119.
'229 ibid para 117.
*230 ibid para 98.
'231 ibid
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individuals, non-profit organisations and companies).” *’ In that regard, it also noted that the 
guarantees accorded by this provision could not be extended to ‘protect mere commercial interests 
or opportunities, the uncertainties o f which are part o f the very essence of economic activity’.” ** It 
is also worth noting that according to the established case-law, the right to property is not an 
absolute right, but must be considered in relation to its social function.” *'' Consequently, 
restrictions may be imposed on the exercise o f this right, provided that they correspond to 
objectives o f general interest pursued by the EU and ‘do not constitute, with regard to the aim 
pursued, a disproportionate and intolerable interference, impairing the very substance o f those 
rights’.” ** In relation to the claims relating to the freedom of expression” *® and the freedom of 
thought, conscience and religion,” *’ the Court merely stated that the applicants recognised 
themselves that they were not directly infringed by the Basic Regulation.” **
It can be argued that the EGC’s approach to indigenous property rights under the Charter 
is problematic since the property rights are manifestly different for indigenous peoples than for the 
mainstream population due to the collective nature o f indigenous rights.” *® It is generally 
recognised that indigenous peoples’ rights are ‘inalienable’ in that they cannot be bought or sold 
by individuals engaging with and benefiting from such rights.” '*® Therefore, they have entirely 
different value compared to, for instance, non-aboriginal fishing licence. This means that the CJEU 
may have to develop an autonomous interpretation of what property rights mean for indigenous 
peoples, rather than rely on existing case law.” '" The task is not an impossible one since, for
1232 Commission (EGC, 25 April 2013) (n 1100) para 109.
” 33 Joined Cases C -120/06 P and C-121/06 P FIAMMand Others v Council and Commission [2008] ECR  I- 
6513, para 185.
See eg Case C -210/03 Swedish Match [2004] ECR I-l 1893, para 72; Deutsches Weintor (n 896) para 54. 
1235 See eg Deutsches Weintor (n 896) para 54.
” 9^ ibid art 11. This right includes ‘freedom to hold opinions...w ithout interference by public authority and 
regardless o f  frontiers’.
” 2^ Charter o f  Fundamental Rights, art 10(1).
1238 Commission (EGC, 25 April 2013) (n 1100) para 117.
Koivurova (n 100).
” '*9 Ruddle and Davis (n 483) s 6.
For similar arguments in the context o f  the ECtHR, see Koivurova (n 100).
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instance, the Inter-American Court o f Human Rights is well-known for its decision to develop 
strong protection for indigenous collective rights through its case law.” ”  Therefore, it can be 
argued that the CJEU should have assessed how different States’ domestic legal systems function 
in respect o f their indigenous peoples’ rights in cases where indigenous peoples initiate proceedings 
before courts as natural persons.” ”  In this context, it is worth noting that Advocate General Kokott 
indicated that the absence o f easier direct legal remedies available to individuals against EU acts 
could be explained principally by the ‘particularly high democratic legitimation o f parliamentary 
legislation’ since in many national legal systems individuals have either limited direct legal 
remedies, or no remedies at all, against parliamentary laws.” ”
The fact that the EGC concluded that there was no sufficient evidence to substantiate the 
claims of the applicants is frustrating, considering that the COWI Report 2010 acknowledged that 
unless a flexible traceability regime was adopted to implement the Inuit exemption, this would 
place a burden on Inuit.” ”  Additionally, as noted throughout this thesis, the Commission was 
aware that Canadian Inuit were unlikely to be able to benefit from the Inuit exemption.'” ® It could 
be argued that the fact the conditions for access under the Inuit exemption are not flexible enough 
is in conflict with recital 14 o f the Preamble to the Basic Regulation, which states the institutions 
did not want to adversely impact the ‘fundamental economic and social interests o f Inuit’. '” ’ 
Therefore, the implementation o f the Inuit exemption should reflect an intention to promote 
indigenous interests, rather to restrict them. Additionally, since the WTO Panel concluded that the 
Inuit exemption discriminated against the Inuit o f Canada, the CJEU’s conclusion that the EU 
legislation respected the rights of Inuit appears inappropriate.
'2''2 See eg Inter-American Court o f  Human Rights, The Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni v Nicaragua (2001) 
Series C No 79.
'243 P qj. similar arguments in the context o f  the ECtHR, see Koivurova (n 100).
'244 y Parliament and Council, Opinion o f  AG K okott (n 1124) 38.
'243 ch 2 s 2.6.1.
'245 ibid 
'247 c h  1 S 1.1.
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Although the judgment does not contain any explicit reference to the principle of 
proportionality, the Court employs some o f the terminology used in this test. In fact, the EGC 
rejected the applicants’ claim that the institutions did not strike a fair balance between their interests 
and those pursued by the EU legislation, indicating that the balance was fair. In this context, the 
Court noted that it was obvious from Recital 14 in the Preamble to the Basic Regulation that the 
institutions took ‘account of the particular situation o f Inuit communities’ as referred to in the 
UNDRIP. Because o f this, the legislature ‘took the view that an exemption for products which 
result from hunts traditionally conducted by them for the purposes o f subsistence should be 
authorised’.” ”  Furthermore, according to the Court, Recital 15 demonstrated that the Basic 
Regulation did not impact rules concerning the hunting of seals, and that the placing on the market 
o f seal products o f Inuit origin was authorised by Article 3(1) o f this Regulation.'” ®
In conclusion, the EGC did not find any infringement o f fundamental rights in ITK  v 
Commission}^^^ Had it considered that there was a prima facie  breach o f fundamental rights, it 
would have used the ‘proportionality tests’ to assess whether the harm suffered by Inuit was 
disproportionate and whether a fair balance was struck between the aims o f the legislation and the 
rights o f indigenous peoples. Since it appears that the EGC may have used the proportionality 
test'” ' to assess whether fair balance existed between the protection o f seals and the rights o f 
indigenous peoples, ITK  v CommissioiT^^^ suggest that this balance was indeed fair and the Inuit 
should start taking steps towards the adoption o f the EU’s traceability regime, should they wish to 
sell their products in the EU. The next section investigates what would the ECJ take into account
'248 y Commission (EGC, 25 April 2013) (n 1100) para 115 referring to Regulation 1007/2009, preamble, 
recital 14.
'245 ibid para 118. Similarly, the EGC held in its decision in Case T-18/10 ITK v Parliament and Council 
(EGC, 6 September 2011), para 75 that the Basic Regulation ‘does not in any way prohibit seal hunting, 
which indeed takes place outside the European Union market, or the use or consumption o f  seal products 
which are not m arketed’ w ithin the EU.
'250 ITK V Commission (EGC, 25 April 2013) (n 1100).
' 23 '  s 6.4.
'232 ITK V Commission (n 1250).
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in order to strike a fair balance between the rights o f Inuit and the objectives o f the legislation, 
should the appeal in ITK  v Commissioifl^^^ be well-founded.
6.4 How does the CJEU balance various interests at stake in a case claiming an infringement of 
fundamental rights?
This section is fundamental for the purposes o f this thesis since it addresses the key 
question for this thesis. The EU Courts conduct a proportionality review in cases where they find 
a prima facie  infringement o f any o f the applicants’ fundamental rights under the Charter. Although 
it would appear that the Court would use the same test to assess an infringement o f any other Charter 
right, the case law demonstrates that the Court may apply this test slightly differently depending 
on the policy area.” *'* Since this thesis investigates the balance between indigenous economic rights 
and the protection of seals, this section analyses specifically Article 16 o f the Charter (‘freedom to 
conduct a business’) in the absence o f extensive post-Lisbon case law concerning Article 17 (‘right 
to property’). In contrast, the ‘freedom to conduct a business’ under Article 16 has been invoked in 
several post-Lisbon decisions. Therefore, it is possible to describe the way in which the ECJ has 
used the proportionality test in the context of this provision. It can also be argued that contrary to 
what was concluded by the EGC in ITK v Commission,^^^^ Article 16 may be more compatible with 
the ‘right to engage in commercial exploitation o f seal products’, than Article 17.
It has been argued that essentially the CJEU’s proportionality review utilises three steps, 
namely the tests o f ‘suitability’, ‘necessity’ and ‘proportionality stricto sensu ' The last step o f 
the analysis assesses specifically whether the balance struck between the various interests
1253 y Commission (n 1250) para 118.
” 34 eg public health, public security, consum er protection, common agricultural policy. See also Tor-Inge 
Harbo, ‘The function o f  the proportionality principle in EU law ’ (2010) 16(2) E LI 158 DOl: 10.1111/j.1468- 
OS 86.2009.00502.x.
1253 y Commission (n 1250). See s 6.4.1.
” 35 See eg Harbo (n 1254).
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concerned is fair.” *’ Therefore, it is the most important part o f the proportionality test for the
purposes o f this thesis. Although it has been argued that the CJEU only apply the last step of the
proportionality test (also known as an intensified review), if  the contested measure seriously
impacts an important fundamental right, not merely because an applicant claims a violation o f a
fundamental right,” ** it appears that this may not be the case anymore. The way in which the
principle o f proportionality is implemented in the post-Lisbon case law is determined by the
Charter, namely Article 52(1).” *® In its 2013 decision in Sky Osterreich v Osterreichischer
Rundfunk,^^^^ the CJEU held that:
In accordance with Article 52(1) o f the Charter, any limitation on the exercise of 
the rights and fi-eedoms recognised by the Charter must be provided for by law and 
respect the essence o f those rights and freedoms and, in compliance with the 
principle o f proportionality, must be necessary and actually meet objectives of 
general interest recognised by the European Union or the need to protect the rights 
and freedoms o f others.” ®'
This implies that consistent with Article 52(1) o f the Charter, the Court may automatically
investigate whether the exercise o f the rights and freedoms provided by the Charter was seriously
impacted by an EU act because the institutions must respect the ‘essence’ o f the claimed rights.
The Court further held that the proportionality test in the context of Article 16 o f the Charter
investigated the following factors:
the principle o f proportionality requires that measures adopted by European Union 
institutions do not exceed the limits o f what is appropriate and necessary in order 
to attain the objectives legitimately pursued by the legislation in question; when 
there is a choice between several appropriate measures recourse must be had to 
the least onerous, and the disadvantages caused must not be disproportionate to 
the aims pursuedP-^^
'237 See eg Janneke Gerards, ‘Pluralism, deference and the margin o f  appreciation doctrine’ (2011) 17(1) ELJ 
80 DOI: 10.1111/). 1468-03 86.2010.00540.x.
'238 ibid
'235 Sky Osterreich (n 897) para 47.
'250 ibid
'25' ibid para 48 (emphasis added).
'252 ibid para 50.
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Thus, the test laid out in Sky Osterreich^^^^ stipulates that the investigation begins with the 
assessment whether the measure chosen by the institutions is ‘appropriate’ to achieve the objective 
pursued by the legislation.” ”  The purpose o f the first part o f the test is to avoid imposition of 
measures, which are unsuitable for pursuing the legislative objective.” ®* The next step, also known 
as ‘the necessity test’, assesses whether the measures are ‘necessary’ in order to attain the aims o f 
the legislation. In essence, this means that the measure chosen by the institutions should be ‘least 
restrictive’ or ‘least onerous’ with regard to the fundamental right in question.” ®®
Two questions should be asked in this context: (i) whether there are less restrictive, 
measures and (ii) whether the alternative measures are equally effective in achieving the pursued 
objective.” ®’ Hence, when there is a choice between various suitable measures the institutions must 
use the least restrictive measures.” ®* In human rights context, the necessity test means that the 
legislation should cause minimal harm to citizens, whereas in the trade context, the ‘necessity’ 
element means that when pursuing non-trade-related domestic policy objectives the institutions 
should impose the least trade-restrictive measure.” ®® In the latter case, this would probably mean 
that an import ban was inappropriate. The final step, the process o f ‘weighing and balancing’ o f 
competing interests, comes to play only in cases that have passed the necessity test.” ’® The purpose 
o f the last part o f the test is to ensure that ‘the disadvantages caused’ are not ‘disproportionate to 
the aims pursued’ by the legislation. It means that even if  the EU legislation was found to be
” ®2 Sky Osterreich (n 897) para 50.
1264 P qj. further discussion on proportionality test in the CJEU see eg Harbo (n 1254).
” 55 Alternatively, this stage o f  assessment may be used to single out measures which claim to protect the 
general interest while, in reality, they have a protectionist purpose. See eg Andenas and ZIeptnig (n 116) 378, 
387.
” ®5 Similar formulation is found in eg GATT, art XX. See ch 7 s 7.4.
” ®’ See eg Andenas and ZIeptnig (n 116) 388.
” ®* ibid 378.
” ®® ibid 388. In a case where both o f  these elements exist, as in the seal products legislation, it could be 
argued that the EU legislation should cause minimal harm to fundamental rights as well as to impose the least 
restrictive measure on trade.
” ’9 See eg Andenas and ZIeptnig (n 116) 378.
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‘suitable’ and ‘necessary’ under the first two steps, it may still impose an excessive burden on the 
applicant, and therefore, fail the proportionality test.'” '
6.4.1 How would the ECJ use the proportionality test in ITK v Commission!
The proportionality test as set out in Sky Osterreichl^'^^ implies that the CJEU should 
scrutinise the objectives o f the EU seal products legislation and determine whether it was 
appropriate to achieve a legitimately pursued objective. What is considered a legitimate objective 
by the CJEU varies on case-by-case basis. In the context o f fundamental freedom to conduct a 
business under Article 16 o f the Charter, the Court has ruled that, inter alia, the protection o f human 
health,'” * consumer protection'’”  and the freedom of information'” * constitute as a legitimate aim 
or ‘general interest recognised by the EU’, capable o f restricting Article 16 rights. In ITK v 
Commission)'^'^^ the EGC confirmed that the protection o f animal welfare was a legitimate objective 
in the public interest.'” ’ In this context, the Court noted that similar interests, namely the health 
and protection of animals, were the interests o f the EU.'” *
However, in ITK  v Commission,^'^^^ the EGC rejected the argument that the objective of the 
Basic Regulation was the protection o f animal welfare.'’*® Since according to the Court, the sole 
objective o f this Regulation was the harmonisation of the market,'’*' it held that the ‘principal 
objective o f the Basic Regulation is not to safeguard the welfare o f animals but to improve the
See eg Harbo (n 1254). 
'272 Sky Osterreich (n 897).
'273 See eg Deutsches Weintor (n 896).
'274 See McDonagh (n 896).
'275 Sky Osterreich (n 897).
'276 ITK V Commission (EGC, 25 April 2013) (n 1100).
'277 ibid para 42.
'278 ibid. See also Joined Cases C -37/06 and C -58/06 Viamex Agrar Handels GmbH and Zuchtvieh-Kontor 
GmbH V Hauptzollamt Hamburg-Jonas [2008] ECR 1-69, paras 22-23; Case C - 100/08 Commission v 
Belgium (ECJ, 10 September 2009), para 91.
'279 y Commission (EGC, 25 April 2013) (n 1100).
'28° ibid paras 35, 92.
'2*' ibid para 71.
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functioning o f the internal market’.” *’ It further held that if  the conditions for recourse to the 
internal market provision (Article 114 TFEU) as a legal basis were fulfilled, the institutions could 
not be prevented from relying on this provision, even if  in actual fact the institutions had pursued 
the protection of animal welfare.” ** Based on this, unless the CJEU decides that the seal products 
legislation is indeed aimed at harmonising the market, it is likely to find that the protection o f seals 
from cruelty is a legitimate aim in this context.” *'* In the former case, the EGC’s conclusions 
concerning Article 114 TFEU would be applicable.
Thus, having found a legitimate objective, the Court would move on to investigating 
whether the measures chosen were not more restrictive than what is necessary to achieve the 
legislative objective o f the institutions. In Sky Osterreich,^^^^ the Court held that when there are 
several options for regulation o f business activities, the preference is a least restrictive measure.” *® 
In the context of trade restrictions on seal products, this could be argued to be voluntary or 
compulsory labelling, rather than a sale and import ban. Remarkably, the institutions had several 
options to adopt a measure aiming at the harmonisation o f the internal market before the adoption 
o f both the Basic Regulation and the Implementing Regulation.” *’ However, instead of product 
labelling, they chose more restrictive measures, namely a sale and import ban in the context o f the 
Basic Regulation” ** and attesting documents in the context o f the Implementing Regulation. 
Indeed, as noted in Chapter 2, the institutions rejected voluntary product labelling in the context of
1282 y Commission (EGC, 25 April 2013) (n 1100) paras 35 ,92 .
” 83 ibid para 41.
” *4 It is worth noting that the ECtHR has ruled on one case claiming an infringem ent o f  human rights on the 
grounds o f  the protection o f  public m orals due to animal cruelty, which could be argued to support the 
protection o f  seals on grounds o f  public morals, even i f  the allegedly cruel hunting took place outside the 
EU. The case endorsed the view  o f  the U K  courts that no breach o f  human rights resulted from the ban on 
hunting w ith dogs imposed by the Hunting A ct 2004, which was ‘designed to eliminate the hunting and 
killing o f  anim als for sport in a manner which the legislature judged to cause suffering and to be morally and 
ethically objectionable’. Friend, and Countryside Alliance and Others v UK App N os 16072/06, 27809/08 
(24 November 2009).
” ®3 Sky Osterreich (n 897).
'285 ibid para 50.
'287 ch 2 s 2.6.1; ch 7 s 7.4.
'288 The institutions rejected the labelling and certification regime initially proposed by the Commission and 
adopted a sale and import ban instead, ch 7 s 7.4.
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the Inuit exemption due to concerns that commercial products may be imported into the market 
under this exemption.” *®
Lastly, the Court would investigate whether the EU legislation was disproportionate. It can 
be argued that it would be disproportionate, if  it imposed an excessive burden on the Inuit, even if  
it was found to be ‘appropriate’ and ‘necessary’. The cases” ®® investigated for the purposes of this 
thesis demonstrate that since the limitation imposed by the contested act of the institutions did not 
affect the core of the business activity o f the applicants, there was no breach o f Article 16. However, 
since Canadian Inuit are unable to access the EU market altogether, despite the Inuit exemption, 
their situation is different because the EU legislation affects the core o f their economic activities. 
Even though the institutions deny that the EU legislation restricts the right o f  indigenous peoples 
to sell seal products in the EU, it can be argued that the conditions under the Implementing 
Regulation, including the requirement to obtain attesting documents from a certified body, amount 
to a de facto  restriction on the freedom of Inuit o f Canada to engage in their economic activities in 
the EU. This is because the exempted products cannot be placed on the market without attesting 
documents, which in turn cannot be obtained by Inuit before the Commission has approved 
Canadian entities as ‘recognised’ bodies under the Implementing Regulation.” ®'
6.4.2 Criticism concerning the proportionality test and its elements
The critics argue that because the second step in the CJEU’s analysis (the ‘necessity test’) 
does not question whether the EU institutions could have refrained from adopting any measure, it
'285 ch 2 s 2.6.1; ch 5 s 5.3.1. The COW I identified the existing labelling system in Greenland as ineffective 
in satisfying consumers on the grounds that it was ‘open for fraud’, suggesting that commercial seal hunters 
o f  Canada would be able to access the EU market by redirecting their products through Greenland. COW I 
Report 2010 (n 44) annex 5, table 2-1.
'250 See eg Sky Osterreich (n 897); McDonagh (n 896); Deutches Weintor (n 896).
'251 ch 2 s 2.3.1.
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does not involve ‘a true balancing o f the competing interests’.” ®’ Therefore, the CJEU will not 
investigate this as part o f their proportionality analysis. It has also been argued that the 
proportionality principle is ill-suited for judicial review since the three smaller elements necessitate 
an assessment o f policy considerations and political choices.” ®* Critics further argue that it is 
challenging for the judiciary to assess whether ‘fair balance’ was struck by the institutions.” ®'* In 
the context of the EU seal products legislation, this could be seen as an indication that the CJEU 
may not be able to establish with certainty whether the institutions indeed struck fair balance 
between the protection o f seals and the rights o f the Inuit.
Additionally, critics have argued that it may be challenging for the CJEU to gather 
sufficient factual information to conclude that the objectives o f the contested measure could have 
been achieved equally well by less restrictive means.*’®* Thus, in the context o f the EU seal products 
legislation, this may mean that the CJEU may not be able to assess whether a less restrictive 
measure (than the ban or the attesting documents) was indeed available for the EU to ensure that 
seal products entering its markets from Canada originated genuinely from the Inuit regions. As 
noted in Chapter 2, the Council’s legal service considered labelling as similarly effective as a trade 
ban.*’®® Therefore, a finding by the CJEU that a less restrictive was not as effective would appear 
weak. It has been suggested that due to the political choices involved, the CJEU often considers it 
appropriate to leave the discretion to the institutions in cases involving the principle o f 
proportionality.*’®’ However, this is problematic in the context o f indigenous peoples’ rights. It can 
argued that due to the sui generis nature o f indigenous peoples’ rights, the CJEU may be required 
to diminish the discretion afforded to the EU institutions to interfere with the traditional way o f life
*’®’ See eg Andenas and ZIeptnig (n 116) 378.
*253 ibid 389.
*254 ibid referring to eg Grainne de Bùrca, ‘The Principle o f  proportionality and its application in EC L aw ’ 
(1993) YEL 105, 108-109.
*255 ibid
*255 ch 2 s 2.6.1.
1257 Tbis is o f  particular importance in areas o f  possible conflict with national constitutional law. ibid.
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and livelihoods o f Inuit,*’®* especially since they can be argued to lack familiarity with indigenous
issues 1299
Indeed, it has been argued that the institutions generally have wide**®® discretionary powers 
as regards EU legislation in matters relating to, for instance, the common agricultural policy**®* 
because they are generally considered to be better equipped than the courts to take difficult political 
decisions, to assess complex sets o f conflicting interests and to investigate various possible 
solutions and measures.**®’ This also appears to be the case in jurisprudence concerning the internal 
market article as a legal basis.**®* Despite taking the view in ITK  v Commission that the protection 
o f indigenous peoples was ultimately the jurisdiction o f the Member States, the CJEU has often 
been described as rather political on the grounds that their judgments favour the interests o f the 
institutions, rather than those o f the Member States.**®'* Because the Court has had a rather 
prominent role in the development o f EU law, the case law forms a very important element o f EU 
law.**®* In the light o f this the Court’s suggestion that it could not do anything to protect the interests 
o f Inuit seems rather weak.
There is scope for the CJEU to be more inventive along the lines o f the Inter-American 
Court of Human Rights, which is well-known for its decision to develop strong protection for 
indigenous rights through its case law.**®® This could equally apply to the CJEU because although
1298 pqj. similar comments in the context o f  the ECtHR, see Koivurova (n 100).
*’®9 ch 3 s 3.5; ch 4 s 4.2.
*3°° It has been argued that the degree and nature o f  discretion is variable. See Paul Craig, EU Administrative 
Law (OOP 2006) 433-34.
*301 See eg Case C -5 9 /1 1 Association Kokopelli v Graines Baumata SAS (ECJ, 12 July 2012).
*302 eg Case C-326/05 P, Industrias Quimicas del Vallès v Commission [2007] ECR 1-6557, para 75: ‘i f  the 
Commission is to be able to pursue effectively the objective assigned to it, account being taken o f  the complex 
technical assessments which it must undertake, it must be recognised as enjoying a broad discretion' 
(emphasis added); Case C-448/06, cp-PharmaHandels GmbH v Bundesrepublik Deutschland [2008] ECR I- 
05685, para 27: ‘the Commission must be given a discretion which is sufficient to allow  it to determine, on 
a fully informed basis, the measures that are necessary and appropriate for the protection o f  public health .’ 
(emphasis added). See also Andenas and ZIeptnig (n 116) 389.
*303 See eg Swedish Match (n 1234).
*304 Anker, Ronne and Olsen (n 222) 48.
*305 ibid. The C JEU ’s influence is not limited to deciding disputes, but in some instances, its judgem ents have 
become a m ajor source o f  EU law.
*306 s 6.3.1.
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the Court attempts to follow its own precedents, it is not bound by its previous decisions.**®’ Rather 
the Court treats existing case law persuasive.**®* The dynamic approach is reflected also in the 
Court’s main methods o f interpretation, specifically, the teleological approach, which tries to give 
the interpretation that best fulfils the purpose o f the law in a particular context.**®®
6.5 Conclusion
In order to answer the primary research question of this thesis. Chapter 6 has conducted an 
analysis into how the Court would balance the rights o f Inuit and the protection o f animal welfare 
if  it found a prima facie violation o f their rights under the Charter in the appeal case in ITK v 
Commission,^^^^ which is currently pending before the CJEU. As it was noted in sections 6.1-6.3, 
thus far, Inuit have been unsuccessful in bringing a challenge against the seal products legislation. 
The implications o f their unsuccessful appeal in ITK  v Parliament and CounciP^^ are potentially 
enormous because if their appeal in ITK  v Commission^^^^ is dismissed by the Court, Inuit have no 
means o f ensuring that EU legislation affecting their rights does not infringe their rights in practice. 
Therefore, it can be argued that the EU should take adequate measures for the protection o f Inuit 
and other indigenous peoples in line with the provisions o f the UNDRIP. This is particularly 
important due to the institutions’ pledges to respect indigenous peoples’ rights in the context o f the 
EU’s forthcoming Arctic policy.**** The existence o f adequate measures is also relevant since the
*397 Anker, Rnnne and Olsen (n 222) 48.
*398 ibid 
*395 ibid
*3*9 Case C-398/13 P ITKv Commission [2013] OJ C 274/11.
*3** Case C-583/11 P  ITK v Parliament and Council (ECJ, 3 October 2013), para 106. 
*3*2 y  Commission (n 1310).
*3*3 ch 1 s 1.4.
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Inuit applicants have no right to appeal their case to the ECtHR despite the fact that the EU is in 
the process o f acceding to the ECHR.***'*
Additionally, despite their failure to be heard by the CJEU, it can be inferred from the 
EGC’s decision in ITK  v CommissioiT^^^ that the Court considered that the rights o f Inuit were 
sufficiently protected by the EU seal products legislation because it refers to the UNDRIP and 
contains a specific exemption for the benefit o f Inuit.***® However, in practice, this protection is 
highly unsatisfactory since only one indigenous people, namely Kalaallit, has been able to access 
the market under the Inuit exemption. Therefore, the EU legislation can be argued to discriminate 
against all other indigenous peoples since no other peoples are expected to be able to access the 
market under this exemption even if  they were initially identified to fall within its scope.
Chapter 7 investigates the trade dispute between Canada and the EU. It explores the trade 
rules governing the operation o f a sale and import ban before the WTO. In addition. Chapter 7 
analyses the Panel’s decision in EC-Seal Products,^^^^ which found that the EU legislation was 
‘necessary’ for the protection of public morals within the EU. Central to this dispute for the purpose 
o f this thesis was the discrimination against Canadian Inuit which arose fi-om the practical 
implementation of the Inuit exemption. Because this thesis focuses on the rights o f Inuit, Chapter 
7 discusses principally those aspects o f the Panel’s analysis, which are critical for the research 
question.
*3*4 The EU is obliged to accede to  the ECHR under art 6(2) TFEU. Under ECHR, the legal basis for the 
E U ’s accession is provided for by art 59(2) ECHR, as amended by Protocol No 14 to the ECHR, which 
stipulates that: ‘[t]he European Union may accede to this Convention’.
*3*3 ITKv Commission (EGC, 25 April 2013) (n 1100).
*3*6 s 6.3.1.
*3*7 EC-Seal Products (n 69).
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Chapter 7 - EC-Seal Products: trade dispute before the WTO
7.1 Introduction
In order to investigate how the EU balances the competing interests o f the protection of 
seals and the rights o f Inuit, Chapter 7 explores the question of how this conflict was solved in the 
context of EC-Seal ProductsP^^ Although neither the Inuit o f Canada nor the Government o f 
Greenland***® were parties to the proceedings due to the inability of non-State actors to become 
full Members o f the WTO,**’® the Panel discussed the Inuit exemption extensively as part o f its 
analysis. The Panel decision is immensely important for this thesis because it demonstrates that 
the EU legislation resulted in a different treatment between products o f Inuit origin from Canada 
than those from Greenland. Therefore, the decision differs significantly from the judgments o f the 
CJEU, which thus far have found no evidence to substantiate the claims o f Inuit concerning the 
ineffectiveness o f the Inuit exemption.**’*
EC-Seal Products^^^^ could be seen to cast some doubt on the claims that the EU 
legislation balances the protection of seals with the interests o f Inuit. In fact, the Panel’s findings 
could damage the EU’s reputation, considering that the institutions have repeatedly claimed that
*3*8 EC-Seal Products (n 69). The Panel issued its decision in the matter in N ovem ber 2013. All parties to 
the dispute have appealed the decision. Therefore, some o f  the Panel’s findings m ay be reversed by the 
Appellate Body. This decision is expected to be published later in 2014 or early 2015. See W TO: EC- 
Notification o f an appeal by Canada under measures prohibiting the importation and marketing o f seal 
products notification ofan appeal by Canada under article 16.4 and article 17 o f  the understanding on rules 
and procedures governing the settlement o f  disputes (DSU), and under rule 20(1) o f  the working procedures 
for appellate review (29 January 2014) W T/DS400/8; E C -Seal Products Other Appellant Submission by the 
European Union (29 January 2014) W T/DS400, DS401.
*3*5 Greenland could not jo in  Canada in the dispute since it is represented in the W TO by the EU. See N ordic 
Council o f  Ministers, Seals and Society (Nordic Council o f  M inisters 2008) 44.
*320 general, indigenous peoples can participate in international policy-m aking only as observers. See eg 
Carola Betzold and Anaïd Flesken, ‘Indigenous peoples in international environmental negotiations: 
evidence from biodiversity and climate change’ in Thoko Kaime (ed). International Climate Change Law 
and Policy: Cultural Legitimacy in Adaptation and Mitigation (Routledge 2014).
*323 See specifically Case T-18/10 R  II ITK v Parliament and Council [2010] ECR 11-235 (Proceedings for 
interim measures 2), para 86ff; Case T-526/10 ITK v Commission (EGC, 25 April 2013).
*322 EC-Seal Products (n 69).
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the EU as a whole is committed to indigenous peoples both in and outside the EU.**”  The Panel’s 
analysis indicated that although the EU could, in theory, adopt its legislation on seal products in 
order to protect public moral concerns of its citizens,**”  on the whole this legislation was 
inconsistent with the EU’s obligations under the WTO Agreements due to the discriminatory 
impact against imported products.**’* Therefore, the Panel did not accept the EU’s arguments that 
the seal products legislation was consistent with international trade rules and ‘recommended that 
the Dispute Settlement Body request the European Union to bring the inconsistent measures into 
conformity with its obligations’ under the WTO Agreements.**’®
Consequently, if  the EU amends its legislation by removing the conditions, which violate 
the non-discrimination principles, it will be WTO compliant. This means that the ban could remain 
in place provided that the EU does not discriminate against Canadian products. Therefore, the 
Canadian concerns that the Panel decision legitimises any future bans on products originating 
from several other lawful industries, which the public and animal welfare organisations consider 
cruel,**”  may well be justifiable, considering that the dispute settlement process has not managed 
to ensure that the US has fully complied with its WTO obligations under the Agreement on 
Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT)**’* in US-Tuna 7/,**’® US-COOLP^^ and US-Clove
”23 ch 3 s 3.2.1.
*324 In fact, the Panel found the seal products legislation as ‘necessary’ within the meaning o f  provisions o f  
the TBT Agreement and ‘provisionally necessary’ within the meaning o f  provisions o f  the GATT to protect 
public morals o f  the EU  citizens.
*323 The Panel not only found discrimination between products originating from Inuit regions o f  Canada and 
Greenland, but also between all imported seal products from outside the EU and those originating from the 
EU M em ber States under the marine resources exemption, discussed in ch 2 s 2.3. However, due to the focus 
o f  this thesis on Inuit o f  Canada and Greenland, this chapter examines the Inuit exemption.
*326 EC-Seal Products (n 69) paras S.6-8.7.
*327 See eg Quinn E, ‘Eye on the Arctic: W hy Inuit are still fighting the EU seal ban’ Radio Canada 
International (29 November 2013) <w w w .rcinet.ca/en/2013/ll/29/eye-on-the-arctic-w hy-inuit-are-still- 
fighting-the-eu-seal-ban/> accessed 14 January 2014.
*328 (15 April 1994) LT/U R /A -lA /10 <http://docsonline.wto.org>
*325 W TO: US: Measures Concerning the Importation, Marketing and Sale o f Tuna and Tuna Products (13 
June 2012) W T/DS381/AB/R (JJS-Tuna IIAB).
*330 W TO United States-Certain country o f origin labelling (COOL) requirements—Report o f  the Appellate 
Body (29 June 2012) W T/DS384/AB/R and W T/DS386/AB/R {US-COOL AB).
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C i g a r e t t e s Two years after the Appellate Body decision in US-Tuna //***’ and US-COOU^^^ 
the complainants have requested the establishment of a compliance panel under Article 21.5 
DSU**”  because the parties disagree on whether the US has implemented the recommendations 
and rulings. Similarly, the US measures at issue in US-Clove Cigarettes^^^^ are subject to 
arbitration proceedings under Article 22.6 DSU because Indonesia and the US have not been able 
to agree on the level o f suspension o f concessions or other obligations pursuant to Article 22.2 
DSU.***® Remarkably, US-Tuna //***’ indicated that in theory, the US could protect dolphins 
outside its jurisdiction. However, the discriminatory impact on imports made the US legislation 
inconsistent with the TBT Agreement. Therefore, this decision can be seen as very similar to EC- 
Seal ProductsP^^ However, the on-going disagreement between the US and the complainants in 
these three cases against the US highlights that one o f the problems with the dispute settlement 
process before the WTO is the apparent lack o f effective mechanisms, which ensure that the 
regulating Member amends its laws to comply with the adverse ruling against them as a matter of 
WTO law.
The decision in EC-Seal Products^^^^ can be argued to be significant in the history o f the 
WTO. Despite the fact that customarily the decisions by the dispute settlement bodies**'*® have 
been regarded as lacking force as precedents,**'** the Panel’s decision was generally assumed to
1331 -\^T0: United States: Measures affecting the production and sale o f  clove cigarettes—Report o f  the 
Appellate Body (4 April 2012) W T/DS406/AB/R {US-Clove Cigarettes AB).
*332 US-Tuna II AB (n 1329) <www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds381_e.htm> accessed 23 
January 2014.
*333 US-COOL AB (n 1330) <www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds384_e.htm> accessed 23 
January 2014.
*334 Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement o f  Disputes (DSU) (15 April 1994) 
LT/UR/A-2/DS/U/1 <http://docsonline.wto.org>.
*333 US-Clove Cigarettes (n 1331) <www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds406_e.htm> accessed 
23 January 2014.
*336 ibid
*337 US-Tuna II m  (n 1329).
*338 EC-Seal Products (n 69).
*335 ibid
*340 These bodies consist o f  ad hoc Panels and the perm anent Appellate Body.
*341 Clearly, they are binding on the parties to the dispute. See eg Laura Nielsen, The WTO, Animals and 
PPMs (M artinus N ijh o ff2007).
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have potentially far-reaching impacts not only on any future measures concerning animal welfare, 
but also on other non-trade measures adopted in the context o f the WTO.*” ’ One rather surprising 
outcome of the Panel’s analysis was that the EU’s public morals defence fell within the scope of 
legitimate objectives under Article 2.2 TBT,**'** even though the TBT Agreement does not 
explicitly contain the term ‘public morals’. By deciding so, the Panel departed significantly from 
the two existing decisions, concerning a public morals defence under Article XIV GATS**'*'* and 
Article XX(a) GATT, namely US-Gambling^^^^ and China-Audiovisual Products
Therefore, EC-Seal Pro<7wcA**'*’ is the first decision to rule that such a defence was 
‘necessary’ in the context o f the TBT Agreement. Even more remarkably, the Panel decided to 
address the EU’s public moral defence under Article XX(a) GATT only after having found that it 
was consistent with Article 2.2 TBT. Because the TBT and the GATT Agreements constitute 
separate legal regimes. Members often invoke both agreements in disputes before the WTO. In its 
analysis, the Panel found that the EU legislation fell within the scope of both agreements, but 
decided to begin its analysis from the more specific agreement, namely the TBT. Since the WTO
*342 See eg Kate Cook and David Bowles, ‘Growing pains: the developing relationship o f  animal welfare 
standards and the world trade rules’ (2010) 19(2) RECIEL 227 DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9388.2010.00679.x; 
Terence P Stewart, Elizabeth J Drake and Stephanie M anaker, ‘Is a balance between trade liberalization and 
animal welfare achievable: the role o f  the WTO EC-Seal Products case in the debate’ Steward and Steward 
(13 M arch 2013) <www.stewartlaw.com/Article/ViewArticle/848> accessed 12 June 2013.
*343 ibid paras 7.418-7.419.
*344 General Agreement on Trade in Services (15 April 1994) LT/U R /A -lA /10 <http://docsonline.wto.org> 
(GATS), art XIV:
Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a manner which would constitute a 
means o f  arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where like conditions prevail, 
or a  disguised restriction on trade in services, nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to prevent 
the adoption or enforcement by any M em ber o f  measures: (a) necessary to protect public morals or 
to maintain public order (emphasis added)
*345 W TO: United States: Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply o f  Gambling and Betting Services— 
Report o f the Appellate Body (7 April 2005) W T/DS285/AB/R (US-Gambling AB).
*346 W TO: China: Measures Affecting Trading Rights and Distribution Services for certain Publications and 
Audiovisual Entertainment Products—Report o f  the Appellate Body (21 D ecember 2009) W T/DS363/11 
{China-Audiovisual Products AB).
*347 EC-Seal Products (n 69).
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Agreements do not specifically mention animal welfare, the issues raised by the EU legislation 
were analysed under the provisions, which were applicable to trade in general.
Chapter 7 begins with the background surrounding the Panel’s decision, namely the issue 
whether the EU can legitimately impose its non-trade values on other Members by enacting 
regulation, which attempts to influence behaviour outside the EU’s jurisdiction.**'** This discussion 
demonstrates that although the WTO acknowledges that its Members may wish to adopt measures 
protecting non-trade interests,**'*® these measures are often found to violate the non-discrimination 
principles found in the WTO Agreements. Therefore, the dispute settlement bodies have very rarely 
upheld Members’ non-trade measures, particularly those relating to Article XX GATT.***® 
However, based on recent decisions against the US,**** Members may find it easier to justify non­
trade interests under Article 2.2 TBT than Article XX GATT. Subsequently, Chapter 7 investigates 
in more detail the reasons why the Panel found a violation o f the non-discrimination principles in 
both the TBT Agreement***’ and the GATT Agreement.**** Lastly, Chapter 7 discusses the 
implications o f the Panel’s decision on Inuit.***'*
7.1.1 Background surrounding EC-Seal Products: interaction between trade and non-trade values
It can be argued that the issue of whether the EU could adopt measures addressing animal 
cruelty outside its jurisdiction forms part of the wider debate over whether the WTO Agreements 
require amending in order to accommodate a wide range o f societal and environmental 
concerns.**** Therefore, EC-Seal Products^^^^ could be seen instrumental for the legitimacy o f the
” 48 ch 1 s 1.4.1.
” 45 s 7.1.1.
*” ® s 7.3.
” 51 US-Tuna II AB  (n 1329); US-COOL AB (n 1330); US-Clove Cigarettes AB (n 1331).
*” 2s7.Z
*353 s 7.3.
” 54 ss 7.4-7.S.
” 55 See eg Fitzgerald (n 332); Stewart, Drake and M anaker (n 1342).
*355 EC-Seal Products (n 69).
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WTO***’ because a large number of its decisions have been seen to undermine the Members’ 
ability to legislate issues, which cause them concern. Consequently, striking the right balance 
between trade and non-trade values within the WTO system could be seen critical. It appears that 
the WTO is fully aware o f the concerns o f its Members that they may be prevented from adopting 
policies protecting the environment and wildlife. In Shrimp-TurtleP^^ the Appellate Body stated 
that its decision did not mean that:
the protection and preservation o f the environment is o f no significance to the 
Members o f the WTO. Clearly, it is. We have not decided that the sovereign 
nations that are Members o f the WTO cannot adopt effective measures to protect 
endangered species, such as sea turtles. Clearly, they can and should. And we have 
not decided that sovereign states should not act together bilaterally, plurilaterally 
or multilaterally, either within the WTO or in other international fora, to protect 
endangered species or to otherwise protect the environment. Clearly, they should 
and do.***®
The statement nevertheless implies that the WTO discourages unilateral action by its 
Members. Therefore, the more recent case law under the TBT Agreement seems to depart from the 
dispute settlement bodies’ earlier approach in Shrimp-TurtleP^^ It can be argued that the decision 
facing Panel in EC-Seal Products^^^^ was very complex for several reasons. On the one hand, had 
the Panel decided that the protection o f public moral concerns o f the EU citizens was inconsistent 
with the WTO agreements, this would have confirmed the WTO’s longstanding approach that trade 
interests have the ability to override non-trade interests.**®’ It could be argued that an adverse 
decision against the EU would violate the right o f WTO Members, as sovereign nations, to enact 
legislation reflecting their moral concerns.**®*
” 57 See eg Stewart, Drake and M anaker (n 1342).
1358 United States: Import Prohibition o f  Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products—Report o f  the
Appellate Body (12 October 1998) W T/DS58/AB/R {Shrimp-Turtle AB).
**59 ibid para 185.
” 59 ibid
” 51 EC-Seal Products (n 69).
**®2 See eg Stewart, Drake and M anaker (n 1342).
**®* Howse, Langille and Sykes (n 169).
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On the other hand, questions arise as to whether the Panel truly balanced the competing 
interests of the protection of seals and the rights of Canadian Inuit, considering that Canada and the 
EU have different moral beliefs. Even though it is not argued in this thesis that animal welfare 
concerns are inconsistent with international trade rules, the decision to uphold the EU’s public 
morals defence could be seen as a nullification or impairment o f Canada’s benefits under the WTO 
agreements. This is specifically so because the EU did not allow Canada to prove that its seal 
products are derived from humane h u n ts .A lth o u g h  Canada amended its legislation governing 
seal hunts^^^  ^in 2009 to make it more compatible with the various reports assessing the humaneness 
o f seal hunts,^^^  ^the EU did not consider Canada’s efforts as sufficient as it banned all seal products, 
which do not fall within the three explicit exemptions of the legislation.
The complexity of the issues facing the Panel is further demonstrated in the arguments that 
EC-Seal Products^^^^ is likely to open the floodgates for measures, which are essentially 
discriminatory, but are now afforded protection by the public morals defence. Indeed, 
commentators have expressed their fears that the public morals defence will be used by other WTO 
Members to attack other legitimate industries, such as fur and factory farming, which can 
equally be described as ‘morally abhorrent’ to some citizens. The Panel decision could be argued 
to raise concerns about how its findings will be applied in future cases concerning public morals. 
Therefore, the main problem with EC-Seal Products^^^^ is that as a consequence almost any current
S eeegP eriS in fn  1121)398.
Marine Mammal Regulations 1993 SOR/93-56.
ch 2 s 2.5. See also Fisheries and Oceans Canada, ‘Amendments to the M arine Mammal Regulations: 
Seal H arvest’ < www.dfb-mpo.gc.ca/media/back-fiche/2009/seal_hunt-chasse_au_phoque-eng.htm> 
accessed 19 N ovem ber 2009.
A s noted in ch 2, arts 3 (l)-(2 ) o f  the Basic Regulation (1007/2009) exempt seal products from the general 
sale and import ban in three situations, namely (i) products imported for personal use, and product resulting 
from (ii) hunts conducted by indigenous peoples (the Inuit exemption) or (iii) hunts conducted for non-profit 
purposes (the marine resources exemption). Further, arts 3 and 5 o f  the Implementing Regulation (737/2010) 
set out the specific requirements, which seal products must fulfil in each o f  these three situations, ch 2 s 2.3. 
1368 EC-Seal Products (n 69).
See eg Stewart, Drake and M anaker (n 1342).
1370 Howse, Langille and Sykes (n 169).
EC-Seal Products (n 69).
222
animal uses may be considered as harmful in one way or another, regardless whether they legal or 
illegal.^^^  ^Therefore, the Panel decision can be argued to support the views o f green criminologists 
and animal welfare NGOs, discussed in Chapter 2, which depart from most existing animal welfare 
legislation.
Therefore, it is rather striking that the Panel readily accepted the EU’s arguments that 
commercial seal hunting was inherently cruel. In fact, the Panel decision implies that since nothing 
could be done to improve animal welfare outcomes in seal hunts, the EU was justified to ban the 
sale and import of seal products within its territory beeause there was a risk that potentially a large 
number o f seals would be subject to poor animal welfare outcomes. The EU’s arguments are 
problematic, considering that some degree o f pain and suffering is likely to occur, regardless o f 
whether animals are killed in abattoirs or in the wild. Therefore, killing animals for the purposes of 
feeding millions of Europeans could be argued to be equally morally abhorrent because it is 
impossible guarantee with 100% certainty that no animal will experience any pain or suffering.*^^"^
Some commentators have argued that the fears that the public morals defence may be 
abused by other WTO Members ignores the fact that the Panel excluded the abuse o f this defence 
because it ensure that the EU legislation was consistent with the ‘necessity test’.^ ^^  ^Although this 
implies that the EU public morals defence was compatible with the EU’s obligations because it 
survived the necessity analysis, the EU failed the last aspect o f the necessity analysis under 
Article XX GATT, which prohibits arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between different 
trading p a r tn e rs .T h e re fo re , had the Panel not found discrimination against Canada, this would 
have eroded the very purpose of the non-discrimination principles, which were designed to prevent
ElfVing (n 438). 
ch 2 s 2.5.2. 
ch 2 s 2.5.
Howse, Langille and Sykes (n 169). 
s 7.2.1.3.
Therefore, the public morals defence was ‘provisionally necessary’ under the GATT, s 7.3.2.
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the abuse of the general exceptions in GATT and other agreements. Additionally, doubts exist 
whether the EU seal products legislation results in an improvement o f animal welfare outside the 
EU due to the transit trade through EU Member States.
Therefore, the arguments that the Inuit exemption reflects a perfect compromise between 
various interests pursued by the EU, namely the protection o f public morals and the protection of 
‘indigenous culture and traditions’ can be questioned on the grounds that the contribution made 
to animal welfare is rather weak. Therefore, even if  the Panel indicated that balancing animal 
welfare and the rights o f Inuit through the Inuit exemption was legitimate,^^*^ it is possible to 
disagree with the view that the Inuit exemption was capable o f balancing these interests fairly. This 
is because an exemption for the benefit o f indigenous peoples, which essentially excludes all 
indigenous peoples, apart from one, from the EU’s market^^^^ can hardly be argued to be fair since 
the interests o f all other indigenous peoples, apart from one, are not being accommodated by the 
EU. In fact, the Inuit exemption was proven to have been designed and implemented in such a way 
that no other beneficiary would benefit from it.*^ ^^  Indeed, as is seen in section 1 2 2 2 ,  the Panel’s 
analysis exposed an ‘inherent fault’ in the design and application of the EU legislation, which 
implies that the discrimination against Canadian Inuit was intentional.
It is also possible to disagree with commentators that the Panel’s finding that the EU 
discriminated between imported products and products o f Inuit from Greenland and the EU 
Member States ‘puts into question the extent o f deference afforded to sovereign states to strike 
delicate compromises in real world c i r c u m s t a n c e s T h i s  is because the Panel accepted, in 
principle, that the EU could design its legislation to balance various legislative objectives. Thus,
s 7.4.3.
" 7 ^ s 7 .2 .1 .2 ;c h 2 s 2 .3 .
1380 Howse, Langille and Sykes (n 169).
ibid citing EC-Seal Products (n 69) para 7.296.
s 7.2.2.3.
ibid
Howse, Langille and Sykes (n 169).
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in theory, the EU can maintain its chosen level o f protection, provided that it extends the scope of 
both the Inuit exemption and the marine resources exemption to allow products from outside the 
EU to benefit from these exemptions. Considering that the EU legislation has extraterritorial 
effects in that it attempts to balance the welfare o f wild animal populations with the rights o f 
indigenous peoples, both o f which fall outside its jurisdiction, the Panel decision cannot 
realistically be argued to limit the EU’s sovereign right to strike a delicate balance between these 
two issues. In fact, from an Arctic inhabitant’s view the EU legislation can be seen an intervention 
of the rights of other sovereign States and indigenous self-government regions not to be subject to 
the EU’s regulatory imperialism. Therefore, the Panel has given the EU plenty o f freedom to 
amend its legislation in a way that still allows the EU to achieve the protection o f public morals, 
but does not nullify or impair Canada’s benefits under the WTO agreements, or indeed the rights 
of indigenous peoples’ under international law. The next sections investigate the Panel’s findings 
concerning the Inuit exemption under the TBT Agreement. Its findings concerning the Inuit 
exemption under the GATT Agreement are discussed in section 7.3.
7.2 Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade
In its analysis the Panel concluded that the EU legislation was a technical regulation within 
the meaning o f Aimex 1(1) to the TBT Agreement^^^^ because as a whole it laid down specific 
product characteristics for ‘all products that might contain seal’.*^ ^^  For the purposes of this thesis 
the most relevant provisions are Articles 2.1, 2.2 and 5 TBT. Although the EU legislation was 
consistent with the objective o f addressing public moral concerns under Article 2.2 TBT, the
In order to meet the criterion o f  the definition o f  ‘technical regulation’ under Annex 1.1 o f  the TBT 
Agreement, the contested legislation must be proven to lay down either ‘product characteristics’ or ‘their 
related process and production m ethods’. EC-Seal Products (n 69) paras 7.111-7.112 referring to E C -  
Asbestos AB (n 189) paras 66-70. The same test was applied in US-Clove Cigarettes AB (n 1331); US-COOL 
AB (n 1330) and US-Tuna II {n 1329).
EC-Seal Products (n 69) para 7.112.
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exemptions to the legislation were inconsistent with Article 2.1 Consequently, the EU
legislation as a whole violated the TBT Agreement. The Panel also found that the EU had acted 
inconsistently with its obligations under Article 5.1.2 TBT because it had not ensured that the 
exempted products could be placed on the market as from the date o f entry into force o f the EU 
legislation. These findings are critical because they confirm the arguments o f Inuit applicants 
before the CJEU that they were unable to benefit from the exemption.*^^^
7.2.1 Article 2.2 TBT
This section contributes to the primary research question by determining whether the EU 
legislation balances the protection o f seals fairly with the rights o f Inuit. Article 2.2 TBT stipulates 
that technical regulations cannot be ‘prepared, adopted or applied with a view to or with the effect 
o f creating unnecessary obstacles to international trade’. Therefore, such regulations cannot ‘be 
more trade-restrictive than necessary to fulfil a legitimate objective, taking account o f the risks 
non-fulfilment would create’. A r t i c l e  2.2 further stipulates that in assessing risks, inter alia, 
available scientific and technical information, related processing technology or intended end-uses 
o f products are relevant.
In order to assess the EU’s claims under Article 2.2 the Panel had to identify the objective 
pursued by the EU and establish the legitimacy o f this objective.^^^^ Based on the legislative 
history*^^^ and the Preamble to the Basic Regulation, the Panel held that this regulation addressed
EC-Seal Products (n 69) para 8.2.
Case T-18/10 R I I ITK v Parliament and Council [2010j E C R 11-235 (Proceedings for interim measures
2).
The basic principles under the TBT are very similar to those under GATT in that the measures m ust be 
‘necessary’.
1390 TBY, art 2.2.
1391 uS-Tuna / / AB (n 1329) paras 314-322. See also US-COOL AB (n 1330) para 374.
EC-Seal Products (n 69) para 7.378 referring to US-Tuna 7 /AB (n 1329) paras 304 ,314; US-COOL AB 
(n 1330) para 371. The Panel nevertheless also noted that that it was not bound by the alleged moral objective 
asserted by the EU, but it ‘may also find guidance’ in evidence submitted by Canada.
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three main considerations: (i) ‘the need to harmonise the rules relating to sale o f seal products 
within the EU’s internal market’ (ii) ‘concerns about seal welfare issues’ and (iii) ‘the need 
to preserve the economic and social interests o f Inuit and to define the conditions for exemptions 
to the ban’ It noted that since it was common for technical regulations to have more than one 
objective,*^^® there was no reason, in principle, why the seal products legislation could not have 
several objectives. However, critically for the purposes o f this thesis, the Panel was ‘not convinced 
that the "aim", "target", or "goal" o f the EU Seal Regime was to protect the interests 
o f... [indigenous peoples] ’.
This is an important finding in respect o f Article 2.2 TBT. Thus, unlike as claimed by the 
EU, the seal products legislation was not enacted to protect the interests o f the indigenous peoples 
per se. The Panel’s interpretation was further supported by the finding that while other indigenous 
communities, apart fi*om Kalaallit, could potentially qualify under the Inuit exemption, they have 
been unable to benefit from it.’^ *^ This is significant because it confirms that the interests o f Inuit 
were not the primary concern o f the EU, but animal welfare concerns o f the European public were. 
Indeed, according to the Panel, the principal objective o f the EU institutions was to address the 
‘moral concerns of the EU public with regard to the welfare o f seals’. I t  further divided the 
objective o f ‘addressing the public moral concerns on seal welfare’ into two aspects: (i) preventing 
consumers from purchasing or being exposed to products derived fi-om inhumanely killed seals and 
(ii) aiming at a reduction in the overall number o f seals killed.
This implies that despite arguing that the interests o f Inuit were equally balanced with 
animal welfare, the EU legislation was not aimed at the protection of indigenous peoples’ rights as
EC-Seal Products (n 69) para 7.387 referring to Regulation 1007/2009, recitals 5-8, 10, 15,21. 
ibid referring to Regulation 1007/2009, recitals 1 ,4 -5 ,10-11 . 
ibid referring to Regulation 1007/2009 recitals 16-17.
ibid para 7.400 referring to US-Clove Cigarettes AB (n 1331) paras 113 and 115.
ibid para 7.401.
ibid para 7.453.
ibid para 7.387.
ibid para 7.443.
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such, but the EU put more emphasis on assuaging its citizens’ concerns over suffering of seals 
outside its jurisdiction.
7.2.1.1 Why was the public moral defence accepted under the TBT Agreement?
What made EC-Seal Products^^^^ remarkable is the fact that after having ruled out the
harmonisation of the EU’s internal market and the protection o f ‘the economic and social interests
of Inuit’ as the objectives o f EU seal products legislation, the Panel found the ‘concerns about seal
welfare’ as consistent with Article 2.2 TBT. This is in contrast with the findings o f the CJEU
which held that the harmonisation o f the EU’s internal market was the sole objective o f the Basic
Regulation. The CJEU’s conclusion is further supported by Recital 21 o f the Preamble to this
Regulation, which states that its objective is indeed the harmonisation o f the internal market:
Since the objective o f this Regulation, namely the elimination o f obstacles to the 
functioning o f the internal market by harmonising national bans concerning the trade in 
seal products at Community level, cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States 
and can therefore be better achieved at Community level...
It could be argued that the Panel concluded that the EU’s objectives were the ‘concerns 
about seal welfare issues’ because the ‘harmonisation o f the EU’s internal market’ does not 
fall within the scope of any o f the legitimate aims within Article 2.2 TBT or Article XX GATT.'"* '^* 
Although it is logical that the ‘concerns about seal welfare’ were consistent with the ‘protection 
o f public morals’ under Article XX(a) GATT, the Panel’s conclusions concerning Article 2.2 TBT 
raise questions as to the merits of its interpretation of the issue for two reasons. First, Article 2.2 
TBT does not include the notion o f ‘public morals’. Second, this is the first time when the dispute 
settlement bodies has indicated that the public morals defence is available under any other 
agreement apart from the GATT and the GATS, although it has been suggested that public morals
1401 EC-Seal Products (n 69) para 7.443.
' ‘‘02 ch 6 s 6.4.1.
Regulation 1007/2009, recitals 1, 4-5, 10-11.
s 7.4.2.
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defence in the context o f Article XX GATT and Article XIV of the GATS Agreement could be 
used to justify trade-restrictive measures concerning a particular product or service in cases where 
such measures are origin-neutral or when a good is produced in a way that allegedly offends, inter 
alia, human rights standards. However, this argument is yet to be tested since very little case 
law concerning ‘public morals’ exists before the WTO. Therefore, this is an emerging area of 
WTO jurisprudence.
It can be argued that the interpretation that the public morals defence was available under 
Article 2.2 TBT due to the similarities between the GATT and the TBT Agreement may be little 
oversimplified because essentially Article 2.2 TBT recognises the right of WTO Members to adopt 
technical regulations, which aim at protecting, '‘inter alia: national security requirements; the 
prevention o f deceptive practices; protection o f human health or safety, animal or plant life or 
health, or the environment’, but clearly no ‘public morals’. Although the use of the words 'inter 
alia" in this provision signifies that the list o f legitimate objectives is not a closed one, this cannot 
be interpreted as an authorisation for Members to use potentially all general exceptions under 
other WTO Agreements, specifically Article XX GATT, in the context o f Article 2.2 TBT. Indeed, 
although the Panel was right to investigate whether the EU’s objective was reflected in ‘other 
provisions o f the covered agreements’,*'^ ®^ the Appellate Body has limited the applicability o f the 
‘covered agreements’ to those which bear some resemblance to the objectives listed in Article 2.2 
TBT.
Therefore, the fact that the Panel concluded that ‘public morals’ fell within the scope of 
legitimate objectives under Article 2.2 TBT based on US-Clove Cigarettes, m a y  be an
Raj Bhala, ‘Four points about trade and human rights’ in Indira Carr, Shawkat Alam and M d Jahid 
Hossain Bhuiyan (eds), International Trade Law and the WTO (Federation Press 2013) 355. 
s 7.4.2.
1407 US-COOL AB (n 1330) para 269. The term ‘covered agreem ents’ can be understood to mean other W TO 
agreements. The Appellate Body has specifically identified at least the GATT agreement as one o f  such 
agreements, ibid para 444.
US-Clove Cigarettes AB (n 1331).
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oversimplification o f the issue. It appears that in US-Clove Cigarettes^'^^^ the Appellate Body, 
indeed, noted that Recital 2 in the Preamble o f the TBT Agreement indicated that ‘the TBT 
Agreement expands on pre-existing GATT disciplines and emphasizes that the two Agreements 
should be interpreted in a coherent and consistent manner’.*'**® However, the recital in question 
merely notes that: ‘Members, Having regard to the Uruguay Round o f Multilateral Trade 
Negotiations; Desiring to further the objectives of GATT 1994’. Therefore, it can be argued that 
the Preamble only establishes a very general link between these two agreements, and mentions 
nothing about the obligation to interpret the TBT Agreement in the light o f the GATT 
Agreement.*'***
It appears that the Appellate Body’s decision in US'-COOZ*'**  ^ is more helpful in this 
regard. In this case the Appellate Body stated that whether an objective, which was not listed in 
Article 2.2 TBT, could be considered legitimate, ‘a panel may have regard to those objectives that 
are expressly listed in Article 2.2, because these may provide an illustration and reference point 
for other legitimate objectives’.*'**^  Significantly for the purposes o f this thesis, the Appellate Body 
concluded that ‘an objective that is linked or related to a specific listed objective [in Article 2.2 
TBT] may be more likely to be found to be legitimate’.*'**'* It found that the US’s objective o f ‘the 
provision of information to consumers on origin’ bore some relation to the objective o f ‘prevention 
o f deceptive practices’ reflected in both Article 2.2 TBT itself and Article XX(d) GATT, ‘insofar 
as consumers could be deceived as to the origin o f products if  labelling is inaccurate or 
misleading’.*'**^  Furthermore, support for the legitimate nature o f ‘the objective o f providing
1409 US-Clove Cigarettes AB (n 1331).
1410 EC-Seal Products (n 69) para 7.382.
*'*** In contrast, the Preamble to the Agreement on the Application o f  Sanitary and Phytosanitary M easures 
(15 April 1994, LTA JR/A-lA/12) specifically states that it was designed ‘to elaborate rules for the application 
o f  the provisions o f  GATT 1994 which relate to the use o f  sanitary or phytosanitary measures, in particular 
the provisions o f  Article X X (b );(l)’.
*'**2 ibid
*'**2 US-COOL AB (n 1330) para 444 (emphasis added).
*'**'* ibid
*'**^  bid para 444.
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information to consumers on origin’ was also found elsewhere in the covered agreements, 
particularly in Article IX GATT.*'**® This implies that a panel can only accept unlisted objectives 
which bear some relation to either ‘the prevention o f deceptive practices; protection o f human 
health or safety, animal or plant life or health, or the environment’. Since animal welfare is related 
to animal health, in theory, the ‘concerns about animal welfare’ could be linked to the protection 
o f animal life or health under Article 2.2 TBT.
In this regard it is striking, however, that the Panel explicitly noted that the EU itself 
claimed that the seal products legislation was not aimed at addressing ‘the protection o f seals as 
such’.*'**^  In fact, the EU failed to establish a prima facie  case for its claim under Article XX(b) 
GATT because it ‘never submitted in this dispute that the protection o f seal welfare as such was 
the objective o f the EU Seal Regime’.*'*** Thus, if interpreted strictly, the ‘protection o f public 
morals on seal welfare’ is not linked to the protection of life or health of animals under Article 2.2 
TBT, considering that the Panel explicitly stated that the EU failed to submit evidence that the 
seal products legislation was aimed at protecting seals as such.
7.2.1.2 Did the EU legislation contribute to the protection o f public morals on animal welfare?
This section is important for the purposes o f this thesis because the Panel upheld the EU’s 
public moral concerns and thus found the EU legislation as ‘necessary’ within the meaning of 
Article 2.2 TBT in the absence o f reasonably available alternative measures. Whilst the alternative 
measures and the necessity analysis under Article 2.2 TBT are discussed in section 7.2.1.3, this 
section assesses whether the EU legislation was capable o f achieving its objective. The Panel 
concluded that the EU’s objective o f the ‘protection o f public morals on seal welfare’ contained 
two aspects, namely (i) preventing consumers from being exposed to or participating in commercial
*'**® US-COOL AB (n 1330) para 444. 
*'**2 EC-Seal Products (n 69) para 7.640.
*"*» ibid
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activities involving seal products and (ii) reducing overall demand in seal products. Crucially for 
the purposes o f this thesis, the Panel found that several factors diminished the attainment o f the 
EU’s objective.
As regards the first aspect o f the EU’s objective, the Panel found that the legislation was 
‘capable o f making some contribution’ to its objective because it prevented to ‘some extent’ EU 
citizens from being exposed to and participating in commercial activities involving seal 
products.*'**® This was because virtually all seal products from Canada were excluded from the EU 
market. Therefore, in the Panel’s words the ban was ‘partly capable’ of making a contribution to 
preventing the public from being exposed to such products.*'*^® However, given that the exempted 
products from Greenland and EU Member States were allowed on the market, regardless of whether 
they originated from humane hunting, the exemptions within the EU legislation diminished the 
degree o f the actual contribution made by the ban to its objective.*'*^* This is significant for the 
research question since it could be argued that the objective to protect seal welfare was only 
partially successful.
Further, the Panel found that the evidence failed to establish that the EU public found poor 
animal welfare outcomes in non-commercial hunts*'*^  ^morally justifiable.*'*^* Therefore, the design 
and expected operation o f the Inuit and marine resources exemptions were incapable o f preventing 
consumers from being exposed to produets, which could have been obtained using inhumane 
methods.*'* '^* Moreover, the exempted products were not subject to any mechanism*'*^* through 
which consumers would be informed o f the presence o f these products on the market in general 
and whether a specific product contained seal.*'*^ ® Therefore, consumers could purchase products
1419 EC-Seal Products (n 69) para 7.460.
*'*2° ibid paras 7.446 and 7.448.
*'*2^  ibid para 7.448.
*'*22 ie hunts conducted by both Inuit and non-indigenous hunters in the EU M em ber State 
*'*23 EC-Seal Products (n 69) para 7.445.
*'*2'* ibid para 7.447.
*'*2^  eg labelling scheme.
1426 EC-Seal Products (n 69) para 7.447.
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without knowing whether they originated from cruel hunting practices.*'*^  ^This demonstrates that 
protecting public moral concerns through the seal products legislation is rather idealistic because 
the exemptions are, in fact, incapable o f ensuring that no offending products are marketed within 
the EU. Indeed, although the EU itself has noted that hunting o f seals in open water is cruel,*'*^* this 
method is not prohibited in law either in Finland or Sweden,*'*^® and thus seal products from open 
water hunting within the EU Member States could, in theory, be placed on the EU market.
As regards the second aspect of the EU’s objective, the Panel observed that the ban made 
a contribution to reducing the demand for seal products within the EU and ‘to a certain extent’ 
globally.*'**® However, the EU’s ability to achieve this objective was negatively affected by the 
products imported under the Inuit and the marine resources exemptions as well as the transit trade 
through the EU Member States.*'*** As noted in Chapter 2, EU legislation does not prohibit the 
transhipment, resale, and processing activities,*'**  ^ and representing goods at auction by EU 
Member States, regardless o f whether these products originate from humanely conducted hunts or 
not.*'*** However, since the transit trade enables activities, which would otherwise have been 
prohibited under the ban, it further undermined the EU’s objective.*'**'* Consequently, the transit
*'*22 EC-Seal Products (n 69) para 7.447.
*‘*28 ch 4 s 4.2. See also A lgers and others (n 391) 60: ‘Burdon et al. (2001) concluded that shooting seals in 
open water can never be humane (also see: Smith et al., 2005)’.
*‘*2^  See eg Algers and others (n 391) para 1.3.6.
*430 EC-Seal Products (n 69) paras 7.449-7.450, 7.459. The Panel recalled the impact assessm ent by COW l, 
which stated that ‘the current legislation has been in the pipeline and has created uncertainty about the EU 
m arket’. COW l Report 2010 (n 44) annex 5, 16 and 19. Additionally, the COW l Report 2008 states that 
‘[s]ince seal hunting mostly takes place outside the Community territory, any restrictions to market access in 
the Community will have trade im pacts’. COW l Report 2008 (n 81) 102.
*'*** EC-Seal Products (n 69) para 7.459.
*'**2 ie the processing o f  seals obtained in commercial hunts into final seal products, which in turn may be 
sold to other countries, ibid para 7.454.
*'*** ibid para 7.453. Indeed, although this is not explicitly stated in the EU legislation, all commercial seal 
products are exempt from the import ban, provided that they are not be placed on the m arket within the EU, 
but are exported to other markets, for instance, after being displayed at an auction or having been processed 
within the EU M em ber States, ch 2 s 2.3.
*'**'* According to the EU, the value o f  seal products entering the EU under the transit regim e amounted to 
€812,000 in 2011 (o f  this €713,000 originated in Canada and €99,000 in Norway). See E U ’s responses to the 
first set o f  questions from the Panel (n 984) 279 referring to Eurostat, ‘Exports o f  seal products from the 
European Union (2001-2011)’.
trade and the explicit exemptions*'*** to the ban failed to contribute to achieving the EU’s 
objective.*'**® This is significant because it adds to the argument that the balance between the 
protection of seals and the rights o f Inuit was not fair because the EU Member States undermine 
the public morals objective by facilitating trade in commercial seal products.
In conclusion, the Panel’s analysis on whether the EU legislation achieved its objective by 
preventing the EU public fi*om being exposed to commercial seal products and by reducing the 
overall number o f seals killed demonstrates that the EU achieved this objective only partly. In fact, 
specifically the transit trade undermines the achievement of the EU’s objective, even if  the products 
from commercial hunts were not available to the public. Despite this partial success, the Panel 
continued its analysis into whether the alternative measures proposed by Canada were reasonably 
available to the EU in line with the necessity analysis under Article 2.2 TBT.*'**^
7.2.1.3 The necessity analysis and the availability o f alternative measures
The findings o f this section are important for the research question since the necessity test 
can be argued to balance the ‘right’ o f the EU adopt its seal products legislation on the grounds of 
public morals with its duty to respect the ‘rights’ of Canada under the WTO agreements.*'*** The 
way in which the Panel reached its conclusion was guided by the necessity test,*'**® which required 
that the Panel consider not only the restrictive effect, but also the nature o f risks arising fi-om the 
non-fulfilment o f the EU’s objective.*'*'*® Two recent cases concerning the TBT Agreement have
*'*** including the exemption for travellers, albeit limited in its scope.
1436 EC-Seal Products (n 69) para 7.460.
*'**2 ibid para 7.472.
*'*** See s 7.3.3.
1439 Various versions o f  the ‘necessity test’ have been applied in the context o f  several W TO Agreements, 
including Articles XX and XI GATT; and A rticles 2.2 and 2.5 TBT. See W orld Trade Organisation, 
‘Necessity tests in the W TO ’ SAVPDR/W/27 (2 December 2003).
1440 Evidence in this context includes the texts o f  statutes, legislative history, and other evidence regarding 
the design, structure, and operation o f  the measure at issue. EC-Seal Products (n 69) para 7.372.
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applied the necessity test in the context o f Article 2.2 TBT. Accordingly, the Panel had to consider, 
inter alia:
(i) the degree o f contribution made by the measure to the legitimate objective at issue; (ii) 
the trade-restrictiveness o f the measure; and (iii) the nature o f the risks at issue and the 
gravity o f consequences that would arise from non-fulfilment o f the objective(s) pursued 
by the Member through the measure. In most cases, a comparison o f the challenged 
measure and possible alternative measures should be undertaken*'*^*
Although the EU seal products legislation had a restrictive impact on international trade, 
rather strikingly, the Panel concluded that the EU legislation was ‘not more trade restrictive than 
necessary’ within the meaning o f Article 2.2 TBT.*'*'** This was because the alternative labelling 
and certification system proposed by Canada was not reasonably available to the EU, taking 
account of the risks non-fulfilment o f the EU’s objective would create.*'*'** The Panel’s conclusion 
as regards the alternative measures is likely to be subject to criticism, considering that the dispute 
settlement bodies have put a lot of emphasis on alternative measures in existing case law.*'*'*'*
Additionally, rather strikingly, the exempted products are subject to certification 
requirements under the Implementing Regulation. However, according to the Panel, the measures 
proposed by Canada were incapable o f assuring animal welfare concerns o f the EU citizens.*'*'** 
Although the alternative measures were considered ‘less trade-restrictive’ than a sale and import 
ban, according to the Panel, they were not reasonably available to the EU because the conditions 
and challenges o f seal hunting posed a risk that ‘some portion’ o f seals would experience poor
1441 US-Tuna II AB (n 1329) paras 314-322; US-COOL AB (n 1330) para 374.
1442 EC-Seal Products (n 69) para 7.505.
*^* ibid para 7.504.
1444 Tbus, this part o f  the Panel’s analysis is likely to be contested by Canada. See eg W TO: Korea: Measures 
Affecting Imports o f Fresh, Chilled and Frozen Beef—Report o f  the Appellate Body (11 December 2000) 
W T/DS161/AB/R and W T/DS169/AB/R (Korea-BeefAB); W TO: Brazil: Measures Affecting Imports o f  Re- 
treaded Tyres—Report o f  the Appellate Body (17 Decem ber 2007) W T/DS332/AB/R {Brazil-Tyres AB); 
China-Audiovisual Products P\B (n 1346).
1445 EC-Seal Products (n 69) para 7.497. The alternative m easure involved a system o f  certification and 
labelling o f  products according to a set animal welfare criteria, which would ensure the m inim isation o f  
suffering as it could be effectively monitored and enforced, ibid para 7.486.
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animal welfare outcomes.*'*'*® According to the Panel, depending on the scale of the hunt, potentially 
‘a large number o f seals’ could be subject to inhumane hunting methods.*'*^* It further identified 
several factors as ‘risks and challenges’ relating to the hunt, namely the physical environment in 
which hunting occurred as well as the difficulties o f assessing the consciousness o f seals, 
monitoring and enforcing o f the hunt due to potentially large hunting territories.*'*'** Clearly, these 
are issues, which have been mentioned in most reports assessing the humanness o f seal hunts.*'*'*® 
However, since some of these reports were considered to contain ‘potentially unproven serious 
biases’,*'**® their reliability as evidence is seriously undermined.
Additionally, various experts have not reached a consensus on this issue even though 
numerous studies have been published on animal welfare aspects o f Canadian seal hunts in recent 
years.*'*** Moreover, EU law does not prevent seal hunters within the EU Member States from using 
at least some of the hunting methods, which the EU essentially considers inhumane.*'*** Lastly, no 
independent monitoring o f the compliance with animal welfare requirements exists within the EU 
Member States, but seal hunters in Finland and Sweden are largely self-regulated.*'*** This is simply 
due to lack of resources to monitor hunting in potentially vast hunting areas. Therefore, the EU’s 
arguments that Canada does not have sufficient measures, which would improve animal welfare 
outcomes, or does not ensure adequate monitoring and enforcement o f its sealing regulations, seem 
rather hypocritical.
According to the Panel, an alternative scheme was not reasonably available also because it 
could potentially impose large costs or logistical demands on those participating in the hunt and
1446 E C S ea l Products (n 69) para 7.504. Although the Panel acknowledged that estim ating a poor welfare 
rate for the entire commercial seal hunt was difficult, it noted that in one o f  the m ost robust data sam ples 
concerning Canadian commercial hunts this rate was approximately 5%. ibid para 7.207 referring to Daoust 
and Caraguel (n 421).
1447 E C S ea l Products (n 69) para 7.207.
*'*^ * ibid paras 7.223-7.224.
*'*^® ch 2 s 2.5.
*'**® ibid 
*'*** ibid 
*4** ch 4 s 4.2.
*^ ** ibid
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subsequent marketing o f products.*'**'* However, the Panel failed to notice that the attesting 
documents could similarly be argued to impose large costs or logistical demands on economic 
operators. Furthermore, it could be argued that unless the costs were prohibitively excessive, 
economic operators would have most probably opted for the higher costs, rather than no possibility 
to trade at all. In conclusion, the Panel decision appears to support the EU’s view that achieving 
humane outcomes in seal hunting is challenging, despite the findings o f the EFSA that none of the 
existing killing methods was able to eliminate all suffering with 100% certainty, regardless whether 
this method was used in an abattoir or in the wild since all animals were different.*'***
7.2.2 Article 2.1 TBT
This section is relevant for the purposes o f this thesis because the Panel found a violation 
o f the non-discrimination obligations*'**® under Article 2.1 TBT,*'*** which stipulate that the EU had 
to ensure that ‘products imported from the territory o f any Member shall be accorded treatment no 
less favourable than that accorded to like products of national origin and to like products originating 
in any other country’.*'*** In the context o f WTO, the term ‘treatment no less favourable’ prohibits 
de jure  and de facto  discrimination o f imported products.*'**® Therefore, the EU legislation could 
not discriminate between (i) imported products and (ii) the exempted products originating in the 
EU Member States and Greenland. Overall, the Panel’s findings concerning Article 2.1 TBT are 
significant since they confirm the arguments that the Inuit exemption is in fact ‘impracticable’.*'*®®
1454 EC—Seal Products (n 69) para 7.497.
*'*** ch 2 s 2.5.
1456 jg ^ ‘most-favoured-nation obligation’ and a ‘national treatment obligation’.
*'**2 EC-Seal Products (n 69) para 7.128.
*'*** In this context, the EU claim ed that the commercial seal products and the exempted products were not 
‘like’ because commercial hunting o f  seals is inhumane.
*'**® US-Clove Cigarettes AB (n 1331) para 180.
1460 Yhe applicants in the litigation before the CJEU argued that the requirem ents o f  the Implementing 
Regulation were ‘im practicable’. See Case T-18/10 R I I  ITK v Parliament and Council [2010] ECR 11-235 
(Proceedings for interim measures 2).
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Thus, EC-Seal Products^^^^ confirms that the actual implementation o f the Inuit exemption resulted 
in the exclusion of Canadian Inuit from the EU market because it was designed solely with the 
situation o f Greenland in mind.*'*®* Additionally, the discrimination against Canadian Inuit arose 
from an ‘inherent flaw’ in the EU legislation, rather than any other factor claimed by the EU.*'*®*
In order to determine whether the EU legislation violated Article 2.1 TBT, the Panel 
examined the following questions: (i) whether imported products and other seal products were 
‘like’ products; (ii) whether the EU legislation caused a detrimental impact on competitive 
opportunities for the group o f imported products from Canada vis-à-vis the group o f exempted 
products fi-om the EU Member States and Greenland; and (iii) whether the detrimental impact 
stemmed exclusively fi-om a legitimate ‘regulatory distinction’.*'*®'*
7.2.2.1 Discrimination between imported products and ‘like’ domestic products
The finding that all seal products were ‘like products’ had profound implications on the 
outcome o f EC-Seal Products^^^^ since the non-discrimination principles applied.*'*®® The Panel 
based its decision on US-Clove Cigarettes where the US was found to discriminate against a 
group of imported products (flavoured cigarettes from Indonesia) because these products were 
essentially ‘like’ the group o f domestic products allowed on the market (menthol cigarettes and 
regular cigarettes). The fact that a small group of imported products (regular cigarettes) were 
exempted from the ban was irrelevant due to the ban’s overall negative impact on the vast majority
1461 EC-Seal Products (n 69) para 7.128.
*'*®2 s 7.2.2.S 
*'*®* s 1 2 2 2 .
1464 EC-Seal Products (n 69) para 7.132.
*'*®* ibid
1466 ‘national treatm ent obligation’ is also found in A rticle III GATT and ‘most-favoured-nation’ principle is 
found in Article I GATT.
1467 US-Clove Cigarettes AB (n 1331). In US-Clove Cigarettes the US prohibited the manufacture and sale 
o f  flavoured cigarettes (other than tobacco or menthol) because they appeal to youth, ibid para 78.
*‘*®2 ibid para 79.
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of imported products vis-à-vis the majority o f Tike’ domestic products.*'*®* This analysis was 
directly applicable to EC-Seal Products^'^^^ because imports and seal products from the EU 
Member States were not only were physically indistinguishable, but also had the same end-uses, 
were equivalent from the perspective o f relevant consumers, and had the same international tariff 
classification.*'**®
The actual operation o f the Inuit exemption is highly relevant for this thesis because it 
supports the argument that the EU legislation does not balance fairly the protection o f seals and 
the rights o f Inuit. The Panel found that the EU legislation had a detrimental impact on the 
competitive opportunities o f imported products vis-à-vis products from Greenland and the EU 
Member States.*'*** In order to determine whether this resulted in less favourable treatment to the 
imported products, the Panel examined whether there were any legitimate causes for 
discrimination (also known as ‘regulatory distinctions’)*'*** between commercial seal products and 
products of Inuit origin under Article 2.1 TBT.*'*** Three issues were relevant in this context: (i) 
was the distinction between the commercial hunts and hunts conducted by Inuit rationally 
connected to the protection o f public morals due to animal welfare concerns; (ii) if  not, was there 
any cause or rationale that could justify the distinction in the particular circumstances o f the 
dispute and (iii) was the distinction ‘designed or applied in a manner that constitutes arbitrary or 
unjustifiable discrimination’ such that it lacked ‘even-handedness’.*'**'*
1468 US-Clove Cigarettes AB (n 1331) paras 197-200. 
*'*®® EC-Seal Products (n 69).
*'*2° Canada’s first submission to the WTO (n 535) paras 311 and 321. EC-Seal Products (n 69) para 7.136 
referring to EC-Asbestos AB (n 189) para 102. As established in EC~Asbestos the assessm ent o f  likeness is 
based on, inter alia, the following criteria: (i) the properties, nature, and quality o f  the products; (ii) the end- 
uses o f  the products; (iii) consumers' tastes and habits; and (iv) the tariff classification o f  the product.
*'*2' EC-Seal Products (n 69) para 7.170.
*'*22 ibid para 7.258 referring to Brazil-Tyres AB (n 1444) paras 225-226; W TO: United States: Standards for  
Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline-Report o f  the Appellate Body (29 April 1996) W T/DS2IAB/R 
{US-Gasoline AB) 25-26 and 28-29; Shrimp-Turtle AB (n 1358) paras 166 and 172; W TO: United States: 
Import Prohibition o f Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products—Recourse to Article 21.5 o f  the DSU by 
Malaysia (22 October 2001) W T/DS58/AB/RW , paras 144 and 147.
*'*22 EC-Seal Products (n 69) para 7.174 referring to US-COOL AB (n 1330) para 341.
1424 EC-Seal Products (n 69) para 7.259 referring to US-COOL AB (n 1330) para 340.
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The Panel concluded that given that the same risks to animal welfare were posed by 
indigenous community hunts as seal hunting in general,*'*** the Inuit exemption did not bear a 
rational relationship to the EU’s objective o f addressing the public moral concerns.*'**® Despite this, 
it concluded that the protection o f Inuit interests was capable o f justifying the distinction between 
the indigenous community hunts and commercial hunts because the Inuit exemption was founded 
on the unique interests o f indigenous communities, which were recognised broadly in international 
law and under Canadian law.*'*** Due to the restrictive impact on imports, the Panel continued its 
investigation in to whether the Inuit exemption was designed or applied in such a way that only 
Greenland could de facto  benefit from the exemption.*'***
1.1.22  Design and application o f Inuit exemption
The design and application o f Inuit exemption are highly relevant for the purposes o f this 
thesis because they confirm the arguments o f the Inuit o f Canada that they were unable to access 
the EU market due to the impracticability o f the Inuit exemption.*'**® The Panel scrutinised the Inuit 
exemption very carefully, noting that although Kalaallit were the only indigenous people to benefit 
from the Inuit exemption, this on its own was insufficient to establish arbitrariness in the design or 
application o f this exemption.*'**® Therefore, the Panel considered this as an indication that ‘a 
certain inherent flaw in the design and structure’ o f the Inuit exemption prevented other potentially 
qualifying indigenous communities from benefiting from it.*'*** This is significant because unlike.
*^*22 EC-Seal Products (n 69) para 7.275.
*'*2® ibid paras 7.275 and 7.290. Critically, for the purposes o f  this thesis, in this context the Panel noted that 
the aim o f  the EU legislation could not be considered the protection o f  the economic and cultural interests o f  
Inuit.
*'*22 ibid para 7.298. By doing so the Panel contrasted EC-Seal Products with the Appellate B ody’s previous 
decisions in US-Clove Cigarettes (n 1331) and Brazil-Tyres AB (n 1444).
*'*2^  EC-Seal Products (n 69) para 7.306.
*'*29 s 1.2.2.3.
1480 EC-Seal Products (n 69) para 7.306.
*'*** ibid
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as argued by the EU, the fault was within the EU legislation, not the world-wide economic 
downturn or the inability o f the Government of Canada to adopt the EU’s traceability regime.*'***
Although the Panel recognised that seal hunting formed an important part o f culture and 
tradition o f Kalaallit, when compared with other indigenous communities, hunts conducted in 
Greenland were most similar to the commercial seal hunts.*'*** Furthermore, the legislative history 
o f the EU legislation suggested that the fact that Greenland was the only beneficiary o f the Inuit 
exemption was not purely incidental.*'**'* This was because prior to the adoption o f the 
Implementing Regulation only Kalaallit were thought to be capable o f benefitting from the Inuit 
exemption.*'*** Accordingly, the Panel’s findings confirm that the Commission was fully aware of 
the discriminatory impact arising from the implementation of the Inuit exemption, but it considered 
the adverse impact on Canadian Inuit as inconsequential.*'**®
1 2 .2 3  Actual operation o f the Inuit exemption
Moreover, the Panel decision demonstrates that the Danish authorities had an instrumental 
role in ensuring that Kalaallit could benefit fi-om the Inuit exemption. It appears that the Danish 
customs authorities were processing imports fi-om Greenland based on certificates issued by 
Greenlandic authorities in accordance with the EU legislation.*'*** Critically, this happened before 
the Greenland’s application process for a ‘recognised body’ had officially been completed.*'*** 
According to the EU, Danish customs authorities proceeded in that manner:
*'**2 See ch 2 s 2.6. See also s 1.2.2.3.
*'**2 The level o f  development in the commercial aspect o f  Greenlandic seal hunts; the volum e o f  sealskins 
traded in Greenland; and the integrated nature o f  the seal product industries in Greenland, Canada and 
Norway, indicate that the purpose o f  seal hunts in Greenland has characteristics that are closely related to 
that o f  commercial hunts. EC-Seal Products (n 69) paras 7.313 and 7.317.
*'**'* ibid para 7.315.
*'**2 ibid. See also ch 2 s 2.6.1.
*'**®ch 2 s 2.6.1.
*'*** EC-Seal Products (n 69) para 7.316.
*'*»» ibid
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based on [their] interpretation o f the Implementing Regulation whereby the issuance of 
attesting documents complying with the Implementing Regulation would also be allowed 
during the application process for recognized body status and not only once the process has 
been completed.*'**®
The EU also submitted the following evidence to Panel:
The Danish authorities have informed the EU Commission that, following the date of 
application o f the Basic Regulation (20 August 2010), the Danish customs authorities have 
allowed the importation of seal products under the IC exception on the basis of certificates 
issued by the Groenlandic authorities in accordance with the criteria laid down in the EU 
Seal Regime, despite the fact that the EU Commission has not taken yet a decision on the 
application filed by the Groenlandic authorities to be approved as a “recognized body”.*'*®®
Therefore, it can be argued that it was due to the Danish authorities that seal products from 
Greenland could enter the EU market in the first place. However, since Inuit o f Canada could not 
benefit from similar treatment, this makes the application o f the EU legislation discriminatory.
Significantly, a number o f factors*'*®* casted serious doubts on the ‘even-handedness’ o f the 
design and application o f the Inuit exemption.*'*®* The most important finding in this regard was the 
fact that the Inuit exemption was available de facto  exclusively to Greenland. According to the 
Panel, this suggested that the Inuit exemption was neither designed nor applied with the intention 
o f making it available for all potential beneficiaries.*'*®* Thus, the fact that Kalaallit were the only 
beneficiary was ‘directly attributable to the regime itself and not to the actions o f the operators in 
countries like Canada’.*'*®'* This contradicts the arguments o f the EU institutions that the inability 
o f the Canadian Inuit to access the EU market under the Inuit exemption was due to the Government 
o f Canada.*'*®* This can be argued to cast serious doubts on the genuineness o f the EU institutions 
claims that the EU as a whole respects indigenous peoples’ rights under international law.
1489 EC-Seal Products (n 69) para 7.316.
1490 E U ’s responses to the first set o f  questions from the Panel (n 984) 114.
*‘*9* ie the text, legislative history and the actual application o f  the Inuit exemption.
1492 EC-Seal Products (n 69) para 7.317.
*"92 ibid
*"9"  ibid para 7.318.
*"92 ch 2 s 2.6.1.
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In conclusion, the regulatory distinction between commercial seal hunts and hunts 
conducted by Inuit was not designed and applied in an even-handed manner, even if  it was 
justifiable having regard to international law, Canadian law and the explanations given by the EU 
concerning the benefits to indigenous communities.*'*®® Consequently, the Inuit exemption violated 
Article 2.1 TBT. Overall, the findings o f the Panel concerning Article 2.1 TBT are significant since 
the Panel’s analysis confirmed the arguments o f Inuit that the Inuit exemption was 
‘impracticable’*'*®* and resulted in the exclusion o f Canadian Inuit from the EU market because it 
was designed solely with the situation o f Greenland in mind.*'*®* Additionally, the Panel confirmed 
that the discrimination against products originating in the Canadian Inuit regions arose from an 
‘inherent flaw’ in the EU legislation, not due to the failure o f Canada to implement it.*'*®®
7.2.3 Article 5 TBT
This section is relevant in demonstrating that unlike what was concluded in ITK  v 
Parliament and CoMMoZ**®® where the CJEU found that the Inuit exemption enabled Inuit to sell 
their products in the EU market ‘in principle’,**®* in reality the EU legislation has prevented the 
Canadian Inuit from accessing the EU market altogether. Additionally, the Panel’s conclusions 
concerning Article 5 TBT support the points made in Chapter 4 that the requirement for attesting 
documents, which are not freely available, infringe the rights o f Inuit under international law.**®* 
The Panel found a violation o f Article 5.1.2 TBT, which further demonstrates that the EU’s
1496 EC-Seal Products (n 69) para 7.319.
*'*92 Inuit applicants argued that the requirements o f  the Implementing Regulation were ‘im practicable’. See 
Case T-18/10 R I I  ITK v Parliament and Council [2010] ECR 11-235 (Proceedings for interim measures 2). 
*'*9* The Panel explicitly stated that ‘the legislative history o f  the EU Seal Regime, which suggests that the 
[marine resources exemption in Article 3(2) o f  Regulation 1007/2009] M RM  exception was designed with 
the situation o f  EU member States in mind’. EC-Seal Products (n 69) para 7.351. See also ch 5 s 5.2.1 and 
5.7.
*'*99 s 1.2.22.
**9® Case T-18/10 ITK v Parliament and Council (EGC, 6 September 2011), para 79.
*2®* ch 6 s 6.1.2.
*2®2 ch 4 s 4.4.1.
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traceability requirements **°* resulted in an inability o f Canadian Inuit to place their products on the 
EU market once the ban entered into the force on 20 August 2010, As noted in Chapter 2, the EU’s 
traceability requirements determine whether the Inuit products fulfil the conditions o f Article 3(1) 
o f both the Basic Regulation and the Implementing Regulation.**®"
Additionally, Article 6  o f the Implementing Regulation requires third-party entities to issue 
the attesting documents for qualifying products o f Inuit origin.**®* However, since the EU 
legislation contains no mechanism, which would have enabled trade under the Inuit exemption 
when this exemption entered into force, Canada argued that the EU was obliged to create or 
designate a default body pending accreditation or recognition o f the third-party entities.**®® 
Although the Panel rejected this claim,**®* it noted that since trade under the Inuit exemption was 
practically impossible for some period of time,**®* the obligation to obtain attesting documentation 
from a ‘recognised body’ comprised an obstacle for those wishing to place seal products on the EU 
market pursuant to the Inuit exemption.**®®
The Panel further noted that although Canada could apply to become a ‘recognised body’, 
the traceability requirements imposed an additional time necessary to examine and approve such a 
body according to specific criteria.***® Consequently, the EU’s traceability requirements had the 
effect of creating unnecessary obstacles to international trade inconsistently with Article 5.1.2,**** 
resulting in a violation o f the EU’s obligations under Article 5 TBT. The Panel nevertheless rejected 
Canada’s claim that the EU legislation was applied more strictly than was ‘necessary’ within the
*2°2 The procedures established by the Implementing Regulation are referred to as the ‘traceability 
requirem ents’ in this thesis. U nder art 5 TBT, the procedure is known as the ‘conformity assessm ent 
procedure’.
*20" ch 2 s 2.3.1.
*202 ibid
*206 EC-Seal Products (n 69) para 7.524.
*207 ibid
*208 ibid para 7.527.
*200 ibid para 7.540.
***0 ibid para 7.527.
**** ibid para 7.528.
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meaning o f Article 5.1.2**** because it failed to propose alternative measures, which would have 
made an equivalent contribution to ensuring that the exempted products adhered to the conditions 
laid out by the Implementing Regulation.**** It could be argued that a labelling and certification 
scheme proposed by Canada would have been relevant here.
The Panel’s conclusion that the traceability regime was incapable o f enabling trade in 
products o f Inuit origin from Canada to take place ‘as from the date o f entry into force’ o f the EU 
legislation***" is critical for the purposes o f this thesis because to date the CJEU has not found any 
evidence o f the impracticability o f the Inuit exemption. Similarly, the finding that the EU failed to 
enable trade in qualifying products demonstrates that although the CJEU concluded that the Inuit 
exemption enabled the sale o f products o f Inuit origin in the EU market ‘in principle’,**** its 
conclusions were incorrect.***®
In conclusion, even though the EU legislation was consistent with Article 2.2 TBT because 
it was ‘necessary’ for the protection o f public morals in the absence of reasonably available 
alternative measures, the Panel found a violation o f the EU’s obligations under Articles 2.1 and 
5.1.2 TBT because the EU legislation was incapable o f guaranteeing access for any other 
indigenous people on the EU market under the Inuit exemption, apart from Kalaallit. Thus, the EU 
violated its obligations under the TBT Agreement was recommended to bring the seal products 
legislation in conformity with the TBT Agreement.
**** EC-Seal Products (n 69) para 7.547.
**** ibid. See also s 7.2.1.3.
***" EC-Seal Products (n 69) para 7.547.
*2*2 ch 6 s 6.1.1. 
***® s 1 2 .2 3 .
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7.3 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 (GATT)
For the purposes o f this thesis, the analysis under the GATT concentrates on the Inuit 
exemption.**** The provisions o f the GATT, specifically Articles 1(1) and XX, are relevant to the 
primary research question because they demonstrate that the Inuit exemption accorded less 
favourable treatment to seal products firom Inuit regions of Canada as opposed to those from 
Greenland.**** The Panel concluded that the Inuit exemption was inconsistent with Article 1(1) 
because an advantage granted to seal products fi-om Greenland was not accorded immediately and 
unconditionally to the Tike’ products from Canada.***® Therefore, the Panel decision supports the 
arguments raised in Chapter 5 that the exemptions in the EU legislation were designed to facilitate 
trade in products originating firom EU Member States and Greenland.***®
Additionally, the Panel found that the Inuit exemption was not justified under the public 
morals exemption o f Article XX(a) because it failed to meet the requirements under the Chapeau 
o f the Article XX.**** Although, in theory. Article XX(a) could be used to justify the discriminatory 
impact arising the Inuit exemption, the EU failed the Chapeau analysis. Consequently the EU seal 
products legislation as a whole was inconsistent with Article XX(a).**** This is not surprising, 
considering that the dispute settlement bodies have often interpreted Article XX exceptions very 
restrictively. This has resulted in Members being able to rely on the exceptions only rarely in the
*2** Although the Panel considered that the Inuit exemption (and the marine exemption) had to be justified 
under Article XX, its analysis focused on the EU legislation as a whole. EC-Seal Products (n 69) 7.624.
**** Although Article 111(4) is not relevant for the research question it demonstrated that the EU legislation 
accorded less favourable treatment to seal products from Canada vis-à-vis the EU M em ber States. EC-Seal 
Products (n 69) paras 7.587.
*2*9 ibid para 8.3. The same finding applied to the ‘marine resources exem ption’ found in Article 3(2) o f  
Regulation 1007/2009, which was inconsistent w ith the E U ’s obligations under A rticle 111(4) GATT, ibid 
para 7.612.
*220 ch 5 s 5.2.1.
**21 s 7.3.3. The same findings applied to the tw o other exemptions in Regulation 1007/2009, art 3(2).
*222 EC-Seal Products (n 69).
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history o f  the In fact, prior to the decision in EC-Seal Products, o n e  successful
defence o f an import ban under Article XX GATT has been accepted by the WTO. In EC- 
Asbestos,^^'^^ French law prohibiting ‘the manufacture, import, domestic marketing, exportation, 
possession for sale, offer, sale and transfer...of all varieties o f asbestos’ was found ‘necessary 
to protect human life or health’ within the meaning o f Article XX(b).^^^^ This was because the 
scientific evidence concerning the fatal nature o f chrysotile asbestos was ‘so clear, voluminous, 
and is confirmed, a number o f times, by a variety o f international organizations’. T h i s  is 
significant because it demonstrates that the EU faced almost an impossible task o f defending its 
legislation under Article XX GATT.
The next sections investigate the Panel’s findings in EC-Seal Products^^^^ under Article 
1(1) and Article XX(a) GATT.
7.3.1 Article I GATT: non-discrimination
Since Article I contains a ‘Most-Favoured-Nation’ treatment clause, its primary objective 
is to ensure that all ‘like’ products are treated equally regardless of their origin. Effectively, each
WTO Member must automatically treat imports o f a given product fi'om any other Member the 
same way as they treat the imports o f the same product from their ‘most favoured trading 
partner’. A r t i c l e  1(1) stipulates, inter alia, that:
1523 See eg Paul Stevenson, ‘The W orld Trade Organisation rules: a legal analysis o f  their adverse impact 
on animal w elfare’ (2001) 8 Animal L 107.
1524 EC-Seal Products (n 69) para 7.651.
1525 EC-Asbestos AB (n 189).
1526 Décret no 96-1133 relatif à  l’interdiction de l ’amiante, pris en application du code de travail et du code 
de la consummation (France) (Decree concerning asbestos and products containing asbestos), art 1.
1527 EC-Asbestos AB (n 189) para 192.
1528 i y i j
1529 EC-Seal Products (n 69).
1530 \^ X 0 : European Communities: Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution o f  Bananas—Report 
o f the Appellate Body (25 September 1997) W T/DS27/AB/R, para 190.
1551 See also EC-Asbestos AB (n 189) para 80.
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...with respect to all rules and formalities in connection with importation and 
exportation, and with respect to [rules relating to the sale, offering for sale, 
purchase, transportation, distribution or use o f p r o d u c t s ] , a n y  advantage, favour, 
privilege or immunity granted by any contracting party to any product originating 
in or destined for any other country shall be accorded immediately and 
unconditionally to the like product originating in or destined for the territories o f all 
other contracting parties.
Consequently, the EU could not discriminate between seal products originating from Canada and 
those originating from Greenland even if  the EU Treaties necessitated trade between Denmark 
and Greenland to be treated the same way as trade between any EU Member States.^^^  ^Therefore, 
the ‘Most-Favoured-Nation’ obligation required that once seal products from Greenland were 
granted the advantage o f access to the EU market, such advantage had to be extended ‘immediately 
and unconditionally’ to ‘like’ Canadian seal p r o d u c t s .  1^ 34
Since the vast majority o f seal products from Canada failed to meet the requirements 
under either the Inuit exemption or the marine resources exemption, the EU legislation 
detrimentally affected the conditions o f competition on the market o f Canadian products, in terms 
o f its design, structure, and expected operation of these exemptions.^^^^ The EU argued that no 
discrimination arose from the ban or the exemptions because they were origin-neutraF^^^ since the 
same conditions applied to the prohibited products from all WTO Members, regardless o f their 
origin. Similarly, all exempted products could be placed on the market, regardless of their origin. 
However, in reality hardly any products would enter the market under the marine resources 
exemption, considering that in 2012 Finnish fishermen hunted 47 grey seals.*^^  ^ Strikingly, the
1532 GATT, art 111(4).
1555 ch 5 s 5.2.1.
1554 EC-Seal Products (n 69) para 7.597. The Panel further noted that since Canadian seal products and seal 
products o f  other origin were ‘like’, irrespective o f  w hether they conformed to the requirements under the 
EU legislation in the context o f  A rticle 2.1 TBT, there was no need to conduct separate analysis w hether 
these products were ‘like’ for the purposes o f  GATT. See ibid para 7.594.
1555 ibid para 7.597.
1555 EU ’s second submission to the W TO (n 68) para 207.
1557 See 460/2012 M aa-ja  metsatalousministerion asetus pyyntiluvalla ja  poikkeusluvalla sallittavasta hallin 
metsastyksesta metsastysvuonna 2012-2013 (30 heinakuuta 2012) (Finland) (Degree on the hunting o f  grey 
seals)
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quota for this hunt was 1050 seals. In Sweden, the quota for grey seals was 230 in 2013.*^^* The 
Panel agreed that because Inuit and other indigenous communities live in the territories o f several 
countries, the EU legislation did not give rise to discrimination based on origin per seP'^^ 
However, since Article 1(1) covered both prima facie  and de facto  discrimination, the legislation 
violated this provision because it was discriminatory in practice, even if  it was origin-neutral.
Even though the EU legislation was inconsistent with the EU’s obligations under Article 
1(1), the WTO recognises that, in theory. Members are able to pursue and implement a wide range 
o f legitimate public policy considerations, which may have an impact on trade, provided that they 
respect their commitments under the GATT Agreement.^ '^^* Thus, the EU could seek to justify its 
policy on seal products under the general exceptions to the GATT under Article XX. Whilst Article 
XX does not specifically address animal welfare, the EU argued that the exception relating to the 
protection o f public morals under Article XX(a) was relevant in EC-Seal P r o d u c t s The Panel 
agreed that the EU’s policy objective fell within the scope o f Article XX(a) based on its conclusion 
concerning the TBT Agreement that the EU legislation sought to address the ‘public moral concerns 
on seal welfare’.
<www.mmm.fl/attachments/riistatalous/69aR8QXig/MMMa_460-2012__pyynti-
Ja__poikkeusluvalla_sallittavasta_hallin_metsastyksesta_metsastysvuorma_2012-2013.pdf> accessed 12 
June 2013.
’558 Beslut cm  skyddsjakt efter grâsal 2013 (Decision on protective hunting for grey seals) 3 
<www.naturvardsverket.se/upload/stod-i-miljoarbetet/rattsinformation/beslut/sal/Beslut—skyddsjakt-grasal- 
130418.pdf> accessed 12 June 2013.
’559 EC-Seal Products (n 69) para 7.599.
1540 'w xO : Canada: Certain Measures Affecting the Automotive Industry—Report o f  the Appellate Body (19 
June 2000) W T/DS139/AB/R and W T/DS142/AB/R, para 78.
’54’ s 7.1.1.
’542 Alternatively, the EU argued that the protection o f  ‘human, animal or plant life or health’ under A rticle 
XX(b) was relevant. Furthermore, under Article XX Members can justify  measures, which relate to (c) im port 
and export o f  gold or silver; (d) customs enforcement, monopolies, the protection o f  intellectual property, 
and the prevention o f  deceptive practices; (e) protection o f  products o f  prison labour; (f) protection o f  artistic, 
historic or archaeological assets; (g) conservation o f  exhaustible natural resources; (h) obligations under an 
intergovernmental commodity agreement; (i) restriction on export o f  domestic m aterials as part o f  a 
governmental stabilisation plan; and (j) acquisition or distribution o f  products in short supply.
’545 EC-Seal Products (n 69) paras 7.3.3.1 and 7.631.
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The next section explains why the conditions o f competition for products o f Inuit origin 
from Canada vis-à-vis Tike products’ originating from Greenland on the EU market could not be 
justified under Article X X F ^
7.3.2 The necessity test under Article XX GATT
The ‘necessity test’ in the context o f Article XX GATT involves ‘a process o f weighing 
and balancing’ o f ‘all the relevant factors, particularly the extent of the contribution to the 
achievement o f a measure’s objective and its trade restrictiveness, in the light o f the importance of 
the interests or values at stake’. I t  can be argued that based on previous d e c i s i o n s , t h e  more 
vital or important the values or interests furthered by a measure were, the easier it would be to 
accept that measure as ‘necessary’. In this context, an integral part o f the necessity test was the 
comparison o f the EU legislation with less restrictive alternatives. In this regard, the findings of 
Brazil-Tyres^^^'^ are informative. The Appellate Body has stated that:
[even if the initial] analysis yields a preliminary conclusion that the measure is necessary, 
this result must be confirmed by comparing the measure with its possible alternatives, 
which may be less trade restrictive while providing an equivalent contribution to the 
achievement o f the objective pursued.
Based on its findings under Article 2.2 TBT, the Panel concluded that the EU legislation 
made a material contribution to its objective* '^*  ^ to the extent that products originating from 
‘inhumane hunting’ were prohibited from the EU m a r k e t . D e s p i t e  having identified several
’544 EC-Biotech Panel (n 191) para 7.587.
’545 Brazil-Tyres AB (n 1444) para 156; Korea-Beef AB (n 1444), para 164; EC-Asbestos AB (n 189) para 
172; US-Gambling AB (n 1345) para 306; WTO: Dominican Republic: Measures Affecting the Importation 
and Internal Sale o f  Cigarettes—Report o f the Appellate Body (25 April 2005) W T/DS302/AB/R, para 70. 
1546 Korea-Beef AB  (n 1444) para 162.
Brazil—Tyres AB  (n 1444).
’54^  ibid para 156.
’549 ie (1) by reducing, to a  certain extent, the global demand for seal products and (ii) by helping the EU 
public avoid being exposed to products originating from ‘inhumane hunts’.
’559 EC-Seal Products (n 69) paras 7.3.3.3.2 and 7.637.
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factors/^^^ which undermined the fulfilment of the EU’s objective with the consequence of 
reducing the effectiveness o f the general sale and import ban, the Panel concluded that overall the 
EU legislation contributed ‘to a certain extent’ to its objective o f addressing the EU public moral 
concerns on animal welfareF^^^ The finding that the EU legislation contributed to ‘a certain extent’ 
to its objective is rather weak, considering its restrictive impact on international trade, and 
particularly on Canadian Inuit.
However, based on its findings under Article 2.1 TBT, the Panel concluded that a less 
trade-restrictive alternative measure proposed by Canada was not reasonably available to the EU, 
given, inter alia, the animal welfare risks and challenges o f seal hunting in general. 
Consequently, the EU legislation was ‘provisionally necessary’ within the meaning o f Article 
XX(a).*^ '^* The term ‘provisionally necessary’ is significant because it means that the EU had to 
show that the legislation was not only ‘necessary’, but also consistent with the Chapeau o f Article 
XX. The reason why the EU legislation failed to satisfy the requirements under the Chapeau are 
investigated next.
7.3.3 Chapeau of Article XX
This section is critical for the purposes o f this thesis because it essentially means that the 
discriminatory impacts on products o f Canadian origin arising from the Inuit exemption and the 
EU legislation as a whole violated Article XX(a) GATT. It can be argued that the Chapeau is aimed 
at preventing abuse or misuse of Article XX exceptions,*^^^ because it is considered to strike 
balance ‘between the right o f a Member to invoke an exception under Article XX and the duty of
’55’ EC-Seal Products (n 69) para 7.638. eg the Inuit and marine resource exemptions; the absence o f  any 
mechanism to inform consumers o f  the presence o f  seal products on the EU market and the possibility o f  EU 
M em ber States continue trading in prohibited products under the implicit exemption.
’552 ibid paras 7.3.3.3.4 and 7.638.
’553 ibid para 7.639.
’554 ibid para 7.638.
’555 Shrimp-Turtle AB (n 1358) para 156.
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that same Member to respect the treaty rights o f the other Members’, inter alia, in Article XI(1).’^ ®^ 
Therefore, if  the contested legislation fails to fulfil all the conditions o f Article XX, it violates this 
provision. The Chapeau requires that the general exceptions in Article XX: ‘are not applied in a 
manner which would constitute a means o f arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between 
countries where the same conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on international trade’.
The Chapeau analysis in this thesis focuses on assessing whether the Inuit exemption was 
applied in a manner which constituted a ‘means o f arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination’ within 
the meaning o f Article XX.’^^ * The Panel recalled its analysis under Article 2.1 TBT where it 
concluded that the regulatory distinction drawn between commercial seal hunts and indigenous 
community hunts were justified despite its apparent lack o f a rational connection to the EU’s 
ob ject ive .H ow ever ,  it also noted that because the Inuit exemption was not designed or applied 
in an even-handed manner among the potential beneficiaries,’^^® it did not meet the requirements 
under the Chapeau.’^ ®’ Therefore, the EU failed to establish that the discriminatory impact found 
in the Inuit exemption under the EU legislation was justified under Article XX(a).’ ®^^
Significantly for the purposes of this thesis the Panel found discrimination against Inuit of 
Canada under both the TBT and the GATT Agreements, despite finding that the legislation made 
a contribution to the protection of public moral concerns on welfare o f seals. Thus, although EC- 
Seal Products^^^^ upheld the EU’s public moral defence, it is nevertheless safe to conclude that the 
EU legislation did not strike fair balance between the protection of seals and the rights o f Inuit. 
This is because according to the Panel, neither o f these aims was the EU’s objective under the seal
’555 Shrimp-Turtle AB (n 1358) para 156.
’557 GATT, art XX.
’55* EC-Seal Products (n 69) para 7.646 referring to US-Gasoline AB (n 1472) 25 (emphasis added). 
A lthough the Panel investigated both the Inuit exemption and the marine resources exemption and concluded 
that they both failed the Chapeau analysis, for the purposes o f  this thesis the former is discussed in this 
section.
’559 EC-^eal Products (n 69) para 7.650.
’550 ibid paras 7.3.2.3.3-7.3.2.3.4 and 7.650.
’551 The Panel’s conclusions were identical as regards the marine resource exemption, ibid para 7.650.
’552 ibid para 7.651.
’553 ibid para 7.650.
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products legislation, but the protection o f public moral concerns on seal welfare outside the EU’s 
jurisdiction was. Therefore, the EU’s argument that the Inuit exemption balances the protection of 
seals with the interests of Inuit is not entirely accurate, considering that the legislation does not 
enable Canadian Inuit to benefit from the Inuit exemption. The next section considers in more detail 
what are the main problems with the Inuit exemption.
7.4 Did the Inuit exemption take into account interests o f Inuit?
EC-SealProducts^^^ demonstrates that there are several problems with the EU’s approach 
towards the rights o f Arctic indigenous peoples, and specifically those of Inuit o f Canada. First, 
the Inuit exemption is not aimed at protecting the interests o f Inuit’^ ®^ because it does not enable 
all potential beneficiaries to benefit from it.’^ ®® Second, no appropriate procedures enabling Inuit 
market access were in place at the time when the Basic Regulation entered into f o r c e . ’^57 Third, 
the EU legislation only partly achieved its objective o f reducing demand for seal products 
originating from allegedly cruel hunting p r a c t i c e s . I t  nevertheless becomes clear from the EU’s 
second submission to the Panel that the Commission was convinced that the Inuit exemption was 
capable of ‘balanc[ing] the welfare o f seals with the interests o f I n u i t ’ . ’^59 According to the 
Commission, the Inuit exemption existed because the exempted products did not raise moral 
concerns the same way the commercial products did, and consequently it was unnecessary to 
prohibit the sale o f products falling within the Inuit exemption.’^^® It is noteworthy that although 
‘accommodating international legal obligations towards indigenous communities’ was consistent
1564 EC-Seal Products (n 69) para 7.650.
’555 s 7.2.1.
’555 s 1.2.23 
’557 s 7.3.3.
’55* s 7.2.1.2.
1559 EU ’s second submission to the W TO (n 68) para 208. 
’5^ 5 ibid para 276.
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with WTO law,’^^ ’ the Inuit exemption was discriminatory under both Article 2.1 TBT or the 
Chapeau o f Article XX GATT on the grounds that it accorded less favourable treatment to 
products of Inuit origin from Canada than to Tike products’ originating in Greenland. 
Consequently, this constituted ‘a means o f arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination’ within 
meaning both Article 2.1 TBT and Article XX GATT.’^ ^^
Although according to the supporters o f the EU ban, the EU institutions were genuinely 
concerned about adversely impacting the traditional Inuit way o f life,’^^  ^ Chapters 2 and 7 
demonstrate that the EU institutions were not concerned about the anticipated inability o f the 
Canadian Inuit to access the m a r k e t . H e n c e ,  the Commission’s decision to adopt such 
implementing measures, which were likely to impede the market access o f Canadian Inuit, was not 
entirely unintentional, considering that the COWI Report highlighted that Canadian Inuit would 
face serious problems in accessing the EU market under the Inuit e x e m p t i o n . I n  fact, to date, 
the EU has done little to alleviate these problems. Whether the EU’s approach will change as a 
result o f the Panel’s decision is yet to be seen.
The EU’s second submission to the Panel demonstrates lack o f good faith in this regard. 
Although the inability of Canadian Inuit to access the EU market was proven to arise exclusively 
from the EU legislation,’^ ’® the EU took the view that if  Canadian Inuit were unable to benefit from 
the Inuit exemption this was not due to the EU legislation.’®”  According to the EU, the Greenlandic 
authorities were in the same position as the Canadian Inuit because they did not regard the Inuit
’57’ Canada’s first submission to the W TO (n 535) para 462-463. However, in Canada’s view  an exemption 
based on ‘cultural heritage’ was not a legitimate regulatory objective under the W TO regime since it was 
unrelated to the protection o f  animal welfare, ibid para 406.
’522 ss 1 2 1 .1  and 7.3.3.
’573 See eg Robert Howse and Joanna Langille, ‘Perm itting pluralism: the seal products dispute and why the 
W TO should permit trade restrictions justified by non-instrumental moral values’ N ew  York University 
Public Law and Legal Theory W orking Papers 316 <http://lsr.nellco.org/nyu_plltwp/316> accessed 20 
February 2012.
’524 s7 .2 .2 .2 ;ch  2 s 2.6.1.
’525 ibid 
’525 s 7.2.2.3.
’527 E U ’s second submission to the W TO (n 6 8 ) paras 211 and 215.
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exemption as beneficial for Greenland.’®”  The EU further noted that the Greenlandic authorities 
had ‘strongly and consistently complained about the legislation and made it abundantly clear that 
they would like it to be repealed’.’®”  Surely, this means that the Kalaallit very reluctantly gave 
their ‘free, prior and informed consent’ to the EU legislations within the meaning o f Article 19 
UNDRIP.’®^®
In relation to the Canadian Inuit, the EU claimed that their inability to benefit from the 
Inuit exemption was solely due to Canada’s failure to invest in ‘the necessary infrastructure and 
distribution channels to facilitate the marketability o f seal products’ o f Inuit origin and by failing 
to take the necessary steps, which would allow Canada to certify its seal products in accordance 
with the Implementing Regulation.’®*’ The EU further argued that Canada’s failure ‘cannot be 
found to constitute sufficient evidence o f detrimental impact vis-à-vis [Canada]’.’®*^ In its opinion, 
a finding that the Inuit exemption favoured Greenlandic products would penalise Greenland, 
considering that Canada had consciously chosen not to develop its indigenous industry.’®*® 
According to the EU, products o f Inuit origin from Canada did not find their way into the 
distribution channels because Canada’s seal industry was heavily dependent on commercial 
hunts.’®*^’ Consequently, the EU argued that Canadian Inuit had decided to sell their products 
locally, whereas Kalaallit were capable o f distributing seal products both locally and 
internationally.’®*® However, as is obvious from section 7.2.2.S, the Panel did not agree with the 
EU’s arguments.
’®’* E U ’s second submission to the WTO (n 68) para 291. 
’®”  ibid
’®*®ch 3 s 3.4.2.
1581 Eu^g second submission to the WTO (n 68) para 215.
’5*2 ibid
’5*3 ibid
’5*4 ibid
’5*5 ibid
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7.5 Conclusion
Overall, the findings in EC-Seal Products^^^^ are significant for this thesis because they 
confirm that the EU failed to find a fair balance between the protection o f seals and the rights of 
Inuit. However, since the Panel found the EU’s public morals defence as ‘necessary’ within the 
meaning o f both the TBT and the GATT Agreements, it may be that the EU will not substantially 
amend its legislation, even though it was asked to bring the legislation in conformity with its 
obligations under the WTO Agreements. The fact that the Panel upheld the EU’s public morals 
defence under both agreements is surprising, considering that no case before EC-Seal Products^^^'^ 
has accepted a public morals defence. It is even more surprising particularly since hardly any case 
law exists, which has upheld an import ban under Article XX. Therefore, it is remarkable that the 
EU ban was consistent with the protection o f public morals under both the TBT and the GATT 
agreements.
The Panel’s findings under Article 2.2 TBT raise questions as to the merits of the EU’s 
public morals defence under this provision because it was the first time when the dispute 
settlement bodies upheld such a defence under any WTO Agreement. Because the EU’s objective 
was undermined by the several exemptions to the general sale and import ban, particularly the 
transit trade through the EU Member States, this casts some doubts over the Panel’s finding 
whether the sale and import ban was indeed ‘necessary’.’®** Additionally, due to its restrictive 
effect on Canadian Inuit, the legislation cannot be seen either as capable of balancing the welfare 
o f seals with the interests o f Inuit or suitable for protecting the ‘unique interests o f indigenous 
communities’ under international law.’®*®
’5*5 EC-Seal Products (n 69). 
’5*7 ibid 
’5** S 7.4.
’5*9 ibid
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Indeed, despite the implications o f EC-Seal Products^^^^ concerning the EU’s public moral 
defence, its findings appear to support the claims that the Inuit exemption was ‘impracticable’,’®®’ 
Similarly, the Panel decision confirms the concerns that the Inuit exemption resulted in the 
exclusion o f Canadian Inuit fi'om the EU market because it was designed solely Greenland in 
mind.’®®’ Indeed, in this regard the Panel confirmed that the inability o f Canadian Inuit to benefit 
from the Inuit exemption arose exclusively from ‘an inherent flaw’ in the EU legislation,’®®® not 
from the failure o f Canada to invest in the necessary infi-astructure and distribution channels or the 
failure to take the necessary steps, which would have allowed certification o f seal products in 
accordance with the EU legislation.’®®"’ Consequently, these findings contradict the arguments of 
the EU institutions that the EU legislation did not cause the inability o f the Canadian Inuit to access 
the market under the Inuit exemption.’®®®
Ultimately, the findings in EC-Seal Products^^^^ demonstrate that the exemptions in the 
EU seal products legislation are impracticable, particularly the Inuit exemption. This raises 
questions o f the suitability o f virtue ethics approach to the law-making context because as noted 
in Chapter 2, the ethical approach underlying the EU legislation concentrates on human attitudes 
and motivations for acting, rather than the impact o f those actions.’®®’ Thus, essentially, the EU 
has not fully thought through the impact o f its legislation on Inuit. Because the Inuit exemption 
resulted in less favourable treatment o f Canadian Inuit, it cannot be seen to genuinely protect the 
interests o f Inuit. This becomes obvious from the fact that the EU appeared to have no intention 
to allow all potential beneficiaries to benefit from the Inuit exemption.’®®* In the light o f this, the
’®®° s 7.4.
’5®’ oh 6 s 6.1.1. Case T -18/10 R I I ITK v Parliament and Council [2010] E C R 11-235 (Proceedings for interim 
measures 2.
’5®’ s 7.2.2.3 
’5®3 ibid 
’®®4 s 7.4.
’®®5 s 1 2 2 3
1595 EC-Seal Products (n 69).
’5®’ eh 2 s 2.5.1.
’®®* s 1 2 2 3 .
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EU’s arguments concerning the need to ‘calibrate’ the Inuit exemption in order not to incentivise 
indigenous communities to hunt more seals’®®® can be viewed very patronising and its approach 
towards Arctic indigenous peoples rather problematic.
Although on the one hand EC-Seal Products^^^^ could be seen to strike a ‘fair balance’ 
between the protection of seals and the rights o f Inuit because the Panel held that the EU cannot 
discriminate between the products o f Inuit origin from Canada and those originating from 
Greenland. Therefore, the Panel decision could be argued to send a powerful message to the EU 
that the negative impact o f the seal products legislation on Canadian Inuit was disproportionate. 
On the other hand, since the Panel upheld the EU’s public morals defence, the Panel decision can 
be seen trumping the right o f Canada and the indigenous self-governing regions o f Arctic Canada 
not to conform to regulatory measures imposed unilaterally on them by their trading partners. Thus, 
the WTO seemingly approves the ‘regulatory imperialism’ ’®®’ practiced by the EU whereby it aims 
to change behaviour o f its trading partners by the imposing sustainability criteria or certification 
requirements on various products imported into the EU,’®®® despite taking an opposite view in its 
existing case law, such as Shrimp-Turtle
’5®®c h i  s i . 2.2.
’600 g 7 4
1601 EC-Seal Products (n 69).
’602 ch 1 s 1.4.1.
’®®® As noted in Chapter 1, the EU can be seen to influence the behaviour in its trading partners by adopting 
measures, which may affect various types o f  ‘harm ’ which is confined to certain area outside the E U ’s 
jurisdictions.
1604 Shrimp-Turtle (n 1358). See also s 7.1.1.
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Chapter 8 — Conclusion
8.1. Introduction
The primary research question o f this thesis has investigated whether the EU balanced 
fairly the protection o f seals between the right o f indigenous peoples to engage in economic 
activities related to seal hunting. In Chapter 1, this thesis argued that the balance was fair, if  the EU 
legislation and the Inuit exemption resulted in the following:
• the EU recognised and respected the rights under the UN Declaration (section 8.2)’®®®
• the restriction on the right o f Inuit to engage in the commercial exploitation o f seal products 
was not disproportionate (section 8.3)’®®®
• the legislation resulted in improved animal welfare outside the EU (section 8.4)’®®’
• the Inuit exemption was consistent with the EU’s obligations under the WTO Agreements 
in that it did not discriminate against products o f Inuit origin from Canada as opposed to 
those from Greenland (section 8.5).’®®*
8.2. Did the EU respect the rights under the UN Declaration?
As noted throughout this thesis, the EU has expressed its commitment to respect indigenous 
peoples’ rights by referring to the UN Declaration, inter alia, in several Commission 
communications and in the seal products legislation itself.’®®® The most relevant rights under the 
Declaration in relation to the EU legislation were identified to be: the right to engage in economic
’®°5 oh 3 ss 3.4.1-3.4.3.
’®o® ch6s6.2.-6.4.1.
’®°’ eh 7 s 7.2.1.2.
’®®* ch 7 s 1.223.
’®°® ch 1 s 1.4.
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activities (Article 20); the right to participate in decision making (Article 18); and the right to give 
‘free, prior and informed consent’ before the adoption and implementation o f legislative or 
administrative measures, which potentially affect indigenous peoples in question (Article 19).’®’® 
According to the EU, the Inuit exemption existed because that the UN Declaration recognised that 
seal hunting formed an ‘integral part o f indigenous culture and identity’.’®” Additionally, the 
institutions recognised that the EU legislation should not adversely affect the fundamental 
economic and social interests o f Inuit.’®”  Prima facie  this suggested that the EU respected the right 
o f indigenous peoples to engage in economic activities under the UNDRIP.’®’® However, as was 
noted in Chapter 7, the EU legislation has resulted in a de facto  discrimination against products o f 
Inuit origin from the Canadian Arctic under the WTO law.’®’"’
The findings o f Chapter 7 were critical for this thesis because thus far, it has proven 
difficult for Inuit to demonstrate before the CJEU that the EU legislation has had an adverse impact 
on them.’®’® Considering that the Inuit exemption has enabled only one indigenous people to trade 
their products in the EU, the narrow way in which the EU viewed indigenous economic rights could 
be argued to have resulted in a breach o f their economic rights under Article 20 UNDRIP.’®’® Since 
Article 20 could be argued to codify customary international law, particularly Article 27 ICCPR 
and Article 2 o f the ILO Convention 169, the EU may have violated not only the rights under the 
UNDRIP, but also under customary international law.’®”  Additionally, Chapters 2 and 7 
demonstrated the Commission’s decision to exclude all other potential beneficiaries o f the Inuit 
exemption, apart fi'om the Kalaallit, fi'om the EU market was fully intentional.’®’* For this reason, 
it could be argued that the EU institutions lack familiarity with indigenous peoples’ rights. This
’®’®ch 3 s 3.4.1-3.42.
’®” ch 1 s 1.1.
’®”  ibid 
’®’® ch 3 s 3.3.
'®’4 ch 7 s 72.2.3.
’®’® ch 6 s 6.3.1.
’®’®chl s 1.2.2; ch 3 s 3.5.
’®”  ch 3 s 3.5 
’®’* ch 7 s 7.4.
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argument was supported by the fact that indigenous issues were not a matter o f EU law because the 
EU lacked competence to legislate in this area under the Treaties.’®”  Therefore, it was debatable 
whether the EU should have adopted legislation concerning the rights o f indigenous peoples who 
reside outside its jurisdiction in the first place.’®’®
Although the institutions appeared to respect the rights to be consulted and give consent 
under Articles 18 and 19 UNDRIP,’®”  serious doubts were casted on the accuracy o f this perception 
due to the claims o f Canadian Inuit that they were not consulted before the adoption o f the Basic 
Regulation. Therefore, the actual application of the UNDRIP in EU law was seriously hampered 
by the unfamiliarly o f the EU institutions with indigenous peoples issues as well as the lack o f 
explicit EU competence in this field on the grounds that the institutions did not have competence 
to adopt any legislation relating to the rights o f the indigenous population residing within the EU 
Member States, namely the Sami o f Nordic countries.’®”  Nor did they have any established 
dialogue with the Sami Parliaments, which represent the Sami o f Nordic countries.’®’®
Consequently, it could be argued that although the EU recognised several rights under the 
Declaration, its practical implementation o f these rights, specifically. Article 20 and possibly 
Articles 18 and 19 was inadequate. Therefore, the balance between the protection of seals and the 
rights o f Inuit under the EU seal products legislation could not be argued to be fair because the EU 
legislation did not enable Inuit o f Canada to access the EU market under the Inuit exemption, 
despite indigenous economic rights were recognised under the UNDRIP and other relevant 
provisions o f customary international law.
’®”  ch 3 ss3.3 and 3.5. 
’®’® ch 3 s 3.3.
’®”  ch 3 s 3.4.2.
’®” ch 3 s 3.2.1.
’®’® ch 1 s 1.4.
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8.3. Did the CJEU ensure that the right o f Inuit were not subject to a disproportionate breach?
As noted throughout this thesis, the institutions did not consider that the EU seal products 
legislation was responsible for the alleged negative impact on Inuit since it included a specific 
exemption for their benefit.’®”  Similarly, the litigation between Inuit and the EU institutions before 
the CJEU has failed to bring about any change in the institutions approach, since the Court found 
no infringement o f the indigenous applicants rights under EU law. Thus, EU law has been incapable 
of remedying the infringement of indigenous peoples’ rights. As noted in Chapter 6 , the arguments 
raised in the litigation before the CJEU centred on a claim that the institutions failed to strike fair 
balance between the interests o f the Inuit and those pursued by the EU legislation.’®’® However, 
thus far, all cases initiated by the Inuit against the EU legislation have been unsuccessful.’®’® Rather 
strikingly, even though the Inuit applicants failed to secure access to the EU Courts, the ECJ 
concluded that there was no gap in their judicial protection.’®”  The implications o f this decision on 
Inuit could nevertheless be potentially enormous.’®’* This was because if their final appeal against 
the Implementing Regulation’®’® was dismissed, Inuit would have no way o f ensuring that EU 
measures affecting their rights did not infringe these rights in practice.’®*®
The problem before the CJEU has been the applicants’ inability to provide sufficient 
evidence. The Court has rejected the arguments o f the Inuit applicants as ‘very general’ and as 
incapable o f substantiating any of their claims.’®”  Despite this, the Court appeared to have 
addressed the key question o f this thesis: did the EU achieve fair balance between the rights o f Inuit 
and the protection of seals? Some of the Court’s findings could be interpreted to mean that it
’®’4 ch 2 s 2.6.1; ch 6 s 6.3.1.
’®25 ch 6 s 6.4.
’®’® ch 6 s 6.2.
’®”  ch 6 s 6.2.2.
’®’* ibid
’®’® Case C-398/13 P ITKv Commission [2013] OJ C 274/11. 
’®3® ibid
’®3’ ch 6 s 6.4.1.
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considered this balance to be ‘fair’. Accordingly, the Court indicated that the rights o f Inuit were 
sufficiently protected under EU law since the Basic Regulation referred to the UNDRIP and the 
placing on the market o f products o f Inuit origin was authorised under the Inuit exemption.’®*’ 
These findings were nevertheless problematic because they seemingly ignored the fundamental 
reasons as to why products o f Inuit origin from Canada could not be placed on the market. The 
Court saw no fault in the design o f the EU legislation, nor was it convinced that the conditions for 
market access as laid out in the Implementing Regulation were such as to prevent the entry of 
products under the Inuit exemption. Therefore, the proceedings before the CJEU were not very 
helpful. The only conclusions to be drawn from the decisions thus far were that the EU institutions 
considered themselves as justified in adopting the seal products legislation, despite the obvious 
inability o f Canadian Inuit to access the market.
In conclusion, since it could be argued that the CJEU considered that the Inuit were unable 
to demonstrate that the institutions had violated their rights under EU law, its decision implied that 
the balance between the rights o f Inuit and the protection o f seals was fair, especially since the 
legislation contained an exemption for the benefit o f Inuit and other indigenous peoples. However, 
since this exemption has, in fact, resulted in the ability o f Canadian Inuit to access the market, the 
balance cannot be argued to be fair and thus the EU may have well breached indigenous peoples’ 
rights disproportionally.’®**
8.4. Did the EU legislation result in improved animal welfare outside the EU?
As was noted in Chapter 2, the anticipated impacts o f the EU seal products legislation’s 
contribution to animal welfare outside the EU’s jurisdiction were conflicting. The EU institutions 
argued before the CJEU that since the EU legislation did not contain any provisions on seal
’®*’ ch 6 ss 6.1.2 and 6.3.1.
’®** Since the applicants have appealed the EG C’s decision in ITK v Commission, which has not yet been 
decided, it is impossible to draw definitive conclusions on this.
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hunting, it did not affect the hunting o f seals or the use or consumption o f seal products outside 
the EU.’®”
In contrast, in its submission to the WTO, the EU argued that the legislation had a positive 
impact on animal welfare because Canada’s exports had declined considerably after the 
introduction o f the EU ban. According to the EU, this was due to the reduction in hunting, which 
in turn was due to the reduction in demand both from the EU and other countries.’®*® However, it 
also appeared that there was evidence, which refuted the EU’s conclusion that a causal link existed 
between the lack o f demand firom the EU and improvement o f animal welfare in Canada. This 
included the finding by the COWI that the EU legislation was unlikely to have a positive impact 
on animal welfare outside the EU, if  seal products were diverted to other markets.’®*® Indeed, 
despite the general sale and import ban, EU Member States have been able to continue commercial 
exploitation o f sealskins, provided that products were not available for the general public.’®*’
Since the EU Member States have continued facilitating the transit trade in seal products 
after the adoption o f the EU legislation, it is questionable whether the sale and import ban has, in 
fact, contributed to the improvement of animal welfare outside the EU. It could be argued that the 
transit trade has meant that the EU as a whole has continued to contribute to the alleged suffering 
of seals. Therefore, the legislation may have not resulted in any significant improvement on animal 
welfare because at least some portion of the global trade in commercial seal products, albeit being 
destined for markets outside the EU, has been facilitated by the EU.’®** Thus, the improvement on 
animal welfare could be argued to be cosmetic. This argument was supported by the WTO dispute 
settlement Panel’s conclusion in EC-Seal Products^^^^ where it established that the implicit and
’®*4ch 6 8 6.3.1.
’®*® ch 7 s 7.2.1.1. According to the EU, the ban reduces the demand for seal products, which in turn decreases 
the attractiveness o f  commercial seal hunting outside its jurisdiction and hence results in im proved animal 
welfare.
’®*® ch 2 s 2.3.
’®*’ ibid; ch 7 s 7.2.1.2.
’®*«ch 7 s 7.1.1.
1639 EC-Seal Products (n 69).
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explicit exemptions to the general sale and import ban hampered the achievement o f EU’s 
objective o f protecting public morals on welfare of seals.’®’®
In conclusion, even if  the EU argued that its legislation contributed to welfare o f seals in 
Canada because Canada’s exports have diminished in size and value, the legislation has not 
resulted in improved welfare for seals hunted outside the EU because several EU Member States 
have continued to trade in seal products. Therefore, the balance between the protection o f seals 
and the rights of Inuit could not be argued to be fair in this regard because although the EU 
legislation may have been able to reduce to ‘some extent’ the number o f seals hunted in Canada, 
it has not resulted in any significant improvement in the welfare o f seals hunted outside the EU’s 
jurisdiction.
8.5. Was the Inuit exemption consistent with the EU’s obligations under the WTO Agreements?
Although EC-Seal Products^^^ did not concentrate exclusively on the impact of the EU 
legislation on Inuit, it addressed the Inuit exemption extensively as part of its analysis. Therefore, 
the decision was seen to strike an important balance between the protection o f seals and the rights 
o f Inuit because the Panel found violation o f the EU’s obligations under the WTO Agreements. 
This is despite the fact that the Panel upheld the EU’s public morals defence under Article 2.2 TBT 
and Article XX(a) GATT.’®”  Therefore, the non-discrimination principles under Article 2.1 TBT 
and Article 1(1) GATT could be seen to evaluate whether the EU had struck a ‘fair balance’ 
between the protection of seals and indigenous peoples’ rights because the Panel found a violation 
o f these principles under both the TBT and the GATT Agreements. Consequently, the EU could 
not justify the different treatment between the seal products originating from Inuit regions of 
Canada and those from Greenland under the Inuit exemption. However, since the decision indicated
’®’®ch7s7.2.1.2.
1641 EC-Seal Products (n 69).
’®”  c h 7 s 7 .1 .
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that, in theory, the EU could retain its legislation, if  it was amended to accommodate the entry of 
imports from outside the EU, it could be argued that rather surprisingly, the Panel endorsed the 
general sale and import ban on seal products because the protection o f public moral concerns o f 
EU citizens could not be achieved in any other way. This on the whole could be seen to trump the 
‘rights’ of Canada under the WTO Agreements. Since the Panel’s decision is subject to appeal, it 
will be seen whether the EU modifies its offending legislation to accommodate indigenous peoples’ 
economic rights under international law.
Despite this uncertainty, the Panel’s conclusions concerning the restrictive impact o f the 
EU legislation on Inuit of Canada were critical for the purposes o f this thesis because the EU could 
be argued to have failed to balance the rights o f Inuit with the protection o f seals despite its 
arguments to contrary.’®’* Since the Panel indicated that there was an ‘inherent flaw’ in the EU 
legislation, which has resulted in a discriminatory impact against Canadian Inuit,’®”  the findings 
made throughout the thesis have demonstrated that the balance between the rights o f Inuit and the 
protection of seals was not be argued to be fair due to the de facto  discrimination against Canadian 
Inuit raising the EU legislation, which has effectively prevented the entry o f their products on the 
EU market.
Beyond the end of this thesis, activities are continuing. As noted in Chapter 2, the EU was 
negotiating with the Governments o f Canada and Nunavut in order for the latter to be approved as 
a recognised body.’®’® However, as noted in Chapter 7, all parties have appealed the Panel’s 
decision in EC-Seal Products}^^ Therefore, some of the Panel’s findings may be reversed by the 
Appellate Body. The acceptance o f the EU’s ethical approach underlying the EU legislation is an 
issue which may need further research since most existing animal welfare legislation is designed
’” * ch 7 s 7.5.
’®”  ch 7 s 1.22.2.
’545 ch 2 s 2.3.1.
1546 EC-Notification o f an appeal by Canada (n 1318).
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to allow the continued use o f animals, rather than to prohibit various legitimate activities.’®”  
Similarly, most anti-cruelty statutes, such as those governing the Canadian seal hunt, prohibit 
certain deliberate actions which are likely to cause harm to animals. Therefore, the Panel’s 
acceptance of the EU’s arguments that nothing could be done to improve the humanity o f  seal hunts 
is problematic, considering that some degree o f pain and suffering is likely to occur, regardless of 
whether animals are killed in abattoirs or in the wild. Therefore, killing animals for the purposes of 
feeding millions of Europeans is equally morally abhorrent because it is impossible guarantee with 
100% certainty that no animal will experience any pain or suffering.’®’* Considering that one o f the 
problems with the dispute settlement process before the WTO is the apparent lack o f effective 
mechanisms, which ensure that the regulating Member amends its laws to comply with the adverse 
ruling against them as a matter of WTO law, the EU may decide to maintain its legislation in place. 
However, this means that the adverse impacts on Inuit will continue.
’®” ch 2 s 2.5.1. 
’®’* ch 2 s 2.5.
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